Securing the Internet Backbone: Current activities in the IETF's Secure InterDomain Routing Working Group

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On the Internet...

there are many ways to be bad!



there are many ways to be bad!

Enlist a bot army and mount multi-gigabit DOS attacks

Extortion leverage and general mayhem

Port Scan for known exploits

General annoyance

Spew spam

Yes, there are still gullible folk out there!

Mount a fake web site attack

And lure victims

Mount a routing attack

And bring down an entire region / country / global network!




If I were really bad (and evil)...

I'd attack routing.

- Through routing I'd attack:
 - the route registry server system
 - the DNS root system
 - trust anchors for TLS and browser certificates
 - isolate critical public servers and resources
 - overwhelm the routing system with spurious information

And bring selected parts of the network to a complete chaotic halt!



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engineers.

routers around the globe. That's because Hong Kong-based PCCW, which provides the Internet link to

This is not a new problem. A network provider in Turkey once pretended to be the entire Internet, snarl

Web sites unreachable. Con Edison accidentally hijacked the Internet addresses for Panix customers

It's also not an infrequent problem. An automatically-updated list of suspicious broadcasts created by

Omnimedia and the New York Daily News, Problems with errant broadcasts go back as far as 1997.

the misleading broadcast-which is what most large providers in the United States and Europe do.

A statement from Google said that the problems lasted for "about two hours".

nothing to suggest this was malicious."

site." it said

66 The fact YouTube is back in action makes me revise my thoughts on the clash between governments and freedom of speech

Rory Cellan-Jones

Read Rory's blog

"Traffic to YouTube was routed according to erroneous internet protocols, and many users around the world could not access our

A leading net professional told BBC News: "This was probably a simple mistake by an engineer at Pakistan Telecom. There's

s unique address by IP hijacking . corrupting the internet's routing tables, which direct the flow of data around the world.

Some recent cases ...

208.65.153.0/24 originated by AS17557

Advertisement of a more specific route by Pakistan Telecom that managed to take YouTube off the air in February 2008

61.0.0.0/8 originated by AS4678


Advertisement of a more general route by a spammer in order to conceal their identity by using an anonymous source ip address, occurring intermittently 2004 – 2007

d000::/8 originated by AS28716

Advertisement of a massive bogon more general route in IPV6 from 13 Nov 2009 until 15 Jan 2010 – and noone noticed for 2 months!

How many advertisements in today's BGP are "lies"?

www.cidr-report.org





CIDR Report			
A A A C	www.cidr-report.org/as2.0/#Bogons	♂ Google	
. <u>-</u>	CIDR F	eport	
192.145.251.0/24 AS38091		192.145.231.0 - 192.146.0.255	
	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	192.153.147.0 - 192.153.147.255	
192.154.32.0/19 AS81	NCREN - MCNC	192.154.59.0 - 192.154.59.255	
192.154.64.0/19 AS81	NCREN - MCNC DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	192.154.80.0 - 192.154.80.255 192.188.223.0 - 192.188.223.255	
192.168.208.0/20 AS2/064 196.2.224.0/22 AS24863		196.2.224.0 - 196.2.255.255	
196.6.108.0/24 AS5713	SAIX-NET	196.6.103.0 - 196.6.120.255	
196.13.201.0/24 AS2018	TENET-1	196.13.201.0 - 196.13.204.255	
196.13.202.0/24 AS2018	TENET-1	196.13.201.0 - 196.13.204.255	
196.13.203.0/24 AS2018	TENET-1	196.13.201.0 - 196.13.204.255	
196.13.204.0/24 AS2018	TENET-1	196.13.201.0 - 196.13.204.255	
196.202.224.0/21 AS8818	TELE Greenland Autonomous System	196.202.224.0 - 196.202.231.255	
198.1.2.0/24 AS4761	INDOSAT-INP-AP INDOSAT Internet Network Provider	198.0.0.0 - 198.1.7.255	
198.23.26.0/24 AS33052	VZUNET - Verizon Data Services LLC	198.23.26.0 - 198.23.31.255	
198.73.210.0/24 AS21570		198.73.209.0 - 198.73.210.255	
198.97.72.0/21 AS27064 198.97.96.0/19 AS27064		198.97.77.0 - 198.97.77.255 198.97.102.0 - 198.97.102.255	
	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DOD Network Information Center DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	198.97.102.0 - 198.97.102.255	
198.135.236.0/24 AS4358	XNET - XNet Information Systems, Inc.	198.135.236.0 - 198.135.236.255	
	ALLST-15290 - Allstream Corp.	198.161.83.0 - 198.161.83.255	
198.161.87.0/24 AS6539	GT-BELL - Bell Canada	198.161.87.0 - 198.161.87.255	
198.161.92.0/24 AS6539	GT-BELL - Bell Canada	198.161.92.0 - 198.161.92.255	
198.163.214.0/24 AS21804	ACCESS-SK - Access Communications Co-operative Limited	198.163.214.0 - 198.163.216.255	
198.163.215.0/24 AS6327	SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc.	198.163.214.0 - 198.163.216.255	
198.163.216.0/24 AS6327	SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc.	198.163.214.0 - 198.163.216.255	
198.167.0.0/16 AS7456	INTERHOP - Interhop Network SERVICES Inc.	198.167.0.0 - 198.167.0.255	
198.168.0.0/16 AS701	UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business	198.167.255.0 - 198.168.0.255	
198.169.0.0/16 AS803 198.180.198.0/24 AS23715	SASKTEL - Saskatchewan Telecommunications SEOUL-INTGW-GXS-AP Global Exchange Services	198.169.10.0 - 198.169.11.255 198.180.198.0 - 198.180.198.255	
198.180.196.0/24 AS23715 198.182.235.0/24 AS3356	LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications	198.182.235.0 - 198.182.235.255	
199.10.0.0/16 AS27064	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.10.4.0 - 199.10.7.255	
199.16.32.0/19 AS6389	BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK - BellSouth.net Inc.	199.16.31.0 - 199.16.63.255	
199.26.183.0/24 AS701	UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business	199.26.183.0 - 199.26.184.255	
199.114.128.0/18 AS27064	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255	
199.114.130.0/24 AS6045	DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255	
199.114.131.0/24 AS6045	DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255	
199.114.132.0/24 AS6045	DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255	
199.114.136.0/24 AS27044	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255	
199.114.138.0/24 AS6045 199.114.140.0/24 AS3544	DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center ITSDN-U7 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255 199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255	
199.114.140.0/24 AS3544 199.114.142.0/24 AS6045	DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255	
199.114.144.0/24 AS6045	DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255	
199.114.148.0/24 AS6045	DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255	
199.114.150.0/24 AS6045	DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255	
199.114.152.0/24 AS27033	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255	
199.114.153.0/24 AS27034	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255	
199.114.154.0/24 AS1733	CENTAF-SWA - 754th Electronic Systems Group	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255	
199.114.156.0/24 AS1733	CENTAF-SWA - 754th Electronic Systems Group	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255	
199.114.160.0/24 AS1733	CENTAF-SWA - 754th Electronic Systems Group	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255	
199.121.0.0/16 AS27064		199.120.255.0 - 199.121.3.255	
	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.123.0.0 - 199.123.3.255 199.123.30.0 - 199.123.31.255	
199.123.16.0/20 AS2/064 199.123.80.0/21 AS27064		199.123.30.0 - 199.123.31.255	
	UNISERVE-ONLINE - Uniserve On Line	199.185.130.0 - 199.185.131.255	
199.202.0.0/16 AS701	UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business	199.201.255.0 - 199.202.31.255	
199.202.216.0/21 AS577	BACOM - Bell Canada	199.202.216.0 - 199.202.223.255	
199.233.92.0/24 AS26896	D102-ITC - Data 102, LLC	199.233.92.0 - 199.233.92.255	
199.246.116.0/24 AS813	UUNET-CANADA - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business	199.246.116.0 - 199.246.116.255	
200.1.112.0/24 AS29754	GO2TEL GO2TEL.COM INC.	200.1.112.0 - 200.1.112.255	
200.108.176.0/20 AS14551	UUNET-SA - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business	200.108.144.0 - 200.108.191.255	
202.6.176.0/20 AS24316	AART AART II N	202.6.176.0 - 202.6.191.255	
202.9.55.0/24 AS2764	AAPT AAPT Limited	202.9.51.0 - 202.9.55.255	
202.9.57.0/24 AS2764	AAPT AAPT Limited	202.9.57.0 - 202.9.95.255	
202.58.113.0/24 AS19161	CONCENTRIV BH. AS. AB Concentrix Technologies. Inc.	202.58.112.0 - 202.58.115.255	




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204.19.14.0/23 A5577 204.89.214.0/24 A54323 204.197.0.0/16 A53356 204.209.114.0/24 A513768 205.150.0.0/15 A5701 205.189.134.0/24 A511814 205.210.145.0/24 A511814 205.108.96.0/19 A5577	CONCENTRIX-PH-AS-AP Concentrix Technologies, Inc CONCENTRIX-PH-AS-AP Concentrix Technologies, Inc PHILCOMNET-PH A Multihomed ISP Company GENESIS-AP Dipixian.com Limited TMNET-AS-AP TM Net, Internet Service Provider VERTELNET Vertical Telecoms Pty Ltd PI-HK Pacnet Internet (Hong Kong) Limited RESOLINK-AS-AP AP Resources Link Network Limited HUTCHISON-AS-AP Hutchison Global Communications PKTELECOM-AS-PK Pakistan Telecommunication Comp. CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network China169 Beijing CYBERNET-AP Cyber Internet Services (PtY) Ltd. CYBERNET-AP Cyber Cybe	200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200	2.58.112.0 - 202.58.115.255 2.61.64.0 - 202.61.127.255 2.61.64.0 - 202.61.127.255 2.61.64.0 - 202.61.127.255 2.61.64.0 - 202.61.127.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.86.128.0 - 202.73.159.255 2.89.196.0 - 202.80.255.255 2.89.196.0 - 202.86.255.255 2.86.252.0 - 202.86.255.255 2.86.252.0 - 202.86.255.255 2.86.252.0 - 202.86.255.255 2.87.80.0 - 202.182.127.255 2.125.80.0 - 202.125.127.255 2.125.80.0 - 202.125.127.255 2.125.80.0 - 202.133.79.255 2.133.64.0 - 202.133.79.255 2.133.64.0 - 202.133.79.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.139.240.0 - 202.112.255 2.139.240.0 - 202.112.127.255 2.139.240.0 - 203.112.127.255 2.174.61.0 - 202.174.127.255 2.174.61.0 - 203.112.127.255 3.112.96.0 - 203.112.127.255 3.11		


yes, there's more

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	INTERNAP-BLK3 - Internap Network Services Corporation	207.174.128.0 - 207.174.129.255			
207.174.131.0/24 AS26116		207.174.131.0 - 207.174.136.255			
207.174.132.0/23 AS26116 207.174.152.0/23 AS26116		207.174.131.0 - 207.174.136.255 207.174.144.0 - 207.174.156.255			
207.174.152.0/23 AS26116		207.174.144.0 - 207.174.156.255			
207.174.155.0/24 AS26116	INDRA - Indra's Net Inc.	207.174.144.0 - 207.174.156.255			
207.174.182.0/24 AS29831		207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255			
207.174.188.0/24 AS26116 207.174.189.0/24 AS26116		207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255 207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255			
207.174.190.0/24 AS26116		207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255			
207.174.191.0/24 AS26116	INDRA - Indra's Net Inc.	207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255			
207.174.192.0/24 AS29831 207.174.200.0/24 AS22658	FONENET - FONE NET, LLC EARTHNET - Earthnet, Inc.	207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255 207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255			
	PRIVATEI - privateI, LLC	207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255			
	NUNETPA - NuNet Inc.	207.231.104.0 - 207.231.111.255			
208.73.4.0/22 AS27630	PREMIER - Premier Innovations, LLC	208.73.4.0 - 208.73.7.255			
208.77.224.0/22 AS174 208.77.229.0/24 AS174	COGENT Cogent/PSI COGENT Cogent/PSI	208.77.224.0 - 208.77.231.255 208.77.224.0 - 208.77.231.255			
	COGENT Cogent/PSI COGENT Cogent/PSI	208.77.224.0 - 208.77.231.255			
208.78.164.0/24 AS16565		208.78.164.0 - 208.78.167.255			
208.78.165.0/24 AS16565		208.78.164.0 - 208.78.167.255			
208.78.167.0/24 AS16565 209.54.123.0/24 AS6062	NETPLEX - NETPLEX	208.78.164.0 - 208.78.167.255 209.54.0.0 - 209.54.255.255			
209.87.208.0/24 AS31997	NETPLEX - NETPLEX	209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255			
209.87.209.0/24 AS31997		209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255			
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209.87.211.0/24 AS31997 209.87.212.0/22 AS31997		209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255 209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255			
209.87.212.0/22 AS31997 209.87.216.0/24 AS31997		209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255			
209.87.217.0/24 AS31997		209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255			
209.87.218.0/24 AS31997		209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255			
209.87.219.0/24 AS31997 209.87.220.0/24 AS31997		209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255 209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255			
209.87.221.0/24 AS31997 209.87.221.0/24 AS31997		209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255			
209.87.222.0/23 AS31997		209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255			
209.105.224.0/19 AS20074	NET COLUETONS	209.105.224.0 - 209.105.255.255			
	NTSL - NET SOLUTIONS NTSL - NET SOLUTIONS	209.140.0.0 - 209.141.255.255 209.140.0.0 - 209.141.255.255			
	ELTOPIA - Eltopia.com, LLC	209.213.0.0 - 209.213.15.255			
209.213.1.0/24 AS7849	CROCKERCOM - CROCKER COMMUNICATIONS	209.213.0.0 - 209.213.15.255			
	CROCKERCOM - CROCKER COMMUNICATIONS	209.213.0.0 - 209.213.15.255			
	CHINA169-BACKBONE CNCGROUP China169 Backbone INTECH-TRANSIT-BD InTech Online Limited, INTERNET SERVICE LIMITED	210.5.128.0 - 210.5.143.255 210.56.144.0 - 210.56.151.255			
	WEBCENTRAL-AS WebCentral	210.247.240.0 - 210.247.255.255			
216.21.192.0/20 AS14697	VDOTNET - VDot.Net	216.21.192.0 - 216.21.207.255			
	INVISION - Invision.com, Inc.	216.21.192.0 - 216.21.207.255 216.21.192.0 - 216.21.207.255			
	INVISION - Invision.com, Inc. INVISION - Invision.com, Inc.	216.21.192.0 - 216.21.207.255			
216.21.206.0/23 AS12251	INVISION - Invision.com, Inc.	216.21.192.0 - 216.21.207.255			
216.58.192.0/24 AS22702	X5SOLUTIONS - X5 Solutions, Inc.	216.58.192.0 - 216.58.223.255			
	X5SOLUTIONS - X5 Solutions, Inc. ISOMEDIA-1 - Isomedia Inc.	216.58.192.0 - 216.58.223.255 216.58.192.0 - 216.58.223.255			
	LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications	216.58.192.0 - 216.58.223.255			
216.144.240.0/23 AS11351	RR-NYSREGION-ASN-01 - Road Runner HoldCo LLC	216.144.240.0 - 216.144.255.255			
	RR-NYSREGION-ASN-01 - Road Runner HoldCo LLC	216.144.240.0 - 216.144.255.255			
	RR-NYSREGION-ASN-01 - Road Runner HoldCo LLC	216.144.240.0 - 216.144.255.255 216.163.144.0 - 216.163.159.255			
	ONERINGNET-ATL-1 - One Ring Networks, Inc. ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications Inc.	216.163.144.0 - 216.163.159.255			
	ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications Inc.	216.172.0.0 - 216.172.255.255			
216.243.240.0/20 AS12182	INTERNAP-2BLK - Internap Network Services Corporation	216.243.240.0 - 216.243.255.255			
	ALCHEMYNET - Alchemy Communications, Inc. UNI-MARKETING-ALLIANCE - Webhost4life.com	216.250.112.0 - 216.250.127.255			
	UNI-MARKETING-ALLIANCE - Webhost4life.com SPRINTLINK - Sprint	216.250.112.0 - 216.250.127.255 216.251.192.0 - 216.251.207.255			


getting the point yet?




still more!




wake me up when we're done




ZZZZZZZ



almost done ...







What's the base problem here?

Noone seems to want to care enough about the integrity of the network to address routing integrity!

Today's Routing Environment is Insecure

- Routing is built on sloppy mutual trust models
- Routing auditing is a low value activity that noone performs with any level of thoroughness
- We have grown used to lousy solutions and institutionalized lying in the routing system

Three Basic Issues:

- Session Integrity
 - Protect the TCP session from various forms of attack and/ or disruption
- Route Object Integrity
 - Protect a BGP speaker from learning false routing information
- Routing Integrity
 - Ensure that the forwarding tables matches the policy intent of each BGP speaker

BGP Session Integrity

- Protect the long held TCP session from
 - RST attacks
 - MITM attacks
- Responses:
 - Narrow the RST window in BGP's TCP
 - Use the TTL hack for multi-hop BGP
 - Use MD5 session encryption
- All of these measures are available in most BGP implementations – and all are in use to some extent

Route Object Integrity

- Prefix Hijacking: originate an unauthorized more specific route
 - This route will take precedence and traffic will be diverted to the new route

Can we tweak BGP so that it can detect the difference between good and evil, and only accept good routes?

A (random) BGP Update

2010/01/26 00:03:35 rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:

nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561

3356 4657 4773

124.197.64.0/19

Routing Security

- The basic routing payload security questions that need to be answered are:
 - Who injected this address prefix into the network?
 - Did they have the necessary credentials to inject this address prefix? Is this a valid address prefix?
 - Is the forwarding path to reach this address prefix trustable?
- And can these questions be answered by any BGP speaker quickly and cheaply?

```
rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:
```

```
nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561 3356 4657 4773
```

124.197.64.0/19

- is 124.197.64.0/19 a "valid" prefix?

```
rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:
```

```
nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561 3356 4657 4773 124.197.64.0/19
```

- is 124.197.64.0/19 a "valid" prefix?
- is AS4773 a "valid" ASN?

rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:

```
nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561 3356 4657 4773 124.197.64.0/19
```

- is 124.197.64.0/19 a "valid" prefix?
- is AS4773 a "valid" ASN?
- Is 4773 an "authorized AS to advertise a route to this prefix?

rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:

nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561 3356 4657 4773 124.197.64.0/19

- is 124.197.64.0/19 a "valid" prefix?
- is AS4773 a "valid" ASN?
- Is 4773 an "authorized AS to advertise a route to this prefix?
- Is the AS Path valid?
 - Is AS 4657 a valid AS, and did AS 4773 advertise this route to AS 4657?
 - Is AS 3356 a valid AS, and did AS 4657 advertise this route to AS 3356?
 - etc

A Foundation for Routing Security

- The use of authenticatable attestations to allow automated validation of:
 - the authenticity of the route object being advertised
 - authenticity of the origin AS
 - the binding of the origin AS to the route object
- Such attestations used to provide a cost effective method of validating routing requests
 - as compared to the today's state of the art based on techniques of vague trust and random whois data mining

A Foundation for Routing Security

Adoption of some basic security functions into the Internet's routing domain:

- Injection of reliable trustable data
 A Resource PKI as the base of validation of network data
- Explicit verifiable mechanisms for integrity of data distribution
 Adoption of some form of certified authorization mechanism to
 support validation of credentials associated with address and
 routing information

A Starting Point

- How can you certify who what which address?
 - follow the allocation trail
 - Certification of the "Right-of-Use" of IP Addresses and AS numbers as a linked attribute of the Internet's number resource allocation and distribution framework

For example:

APNIC (the "Issuer") certifies that:

the certificate "Subject"

whose public key is contained in the certificate


is the current holder of a set of IP address and AS resources

that are listed in the certificate extension

APNIC does NOT certify the identity of the subject, nor their good (or evil) intentions!


Resource Certificates

Resource Allocation Hierarchy




Resource Certificates

Resource Allocation Hierarchy




Resource Certificates

Resource Allocation Hierarchy




Resource Certificates

Resource Allocation Hierarchy



Resource Certificates

Resource Allocation Hierarchy




What could you do with Resource Certificates?

 You could sign "routing authorities" with your private key, providing an authority for an AS to originate a route for the named prefix. Any Relying Party could validate this authority in the RPKI

Signed Objects

Resource Allocation Hierarchy



Signed Object Validation

Resource Allocation Hierarchy

AFRINIC

RIPE NCC

Route Origination Authority
"ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix 192.2.200.0/24"

Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert>

Signed, ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv> [%]

Validation Outcomes

- 1. ISP4 authorized this Authority document
- 2. 192.2.200.0/24 is a **valid** address, derived from an APNIC allocation
- 3. ISP4 holds a current right-of-use of 192.2 200.0/24
- 4. A route object, where AS65000 originates an advertisement for the address prefix 192.2.200.0/24, has the explicit authority of ISP4, who is the current holder of this address prefix

A (partial) architecture for securing BGP origination **BGP** Local **BGP** Filter Speaker **RPKI** (Origin AS + processor prefix mask) Synchronization


Distributed RPKI Publication Repositories (Certificates and Routing Authorities)

What about AS Path Validation?

Use AS Certificates

- Each router has a router key issued by the AS
 - -Each router adds a signature to a route attribute that is a signature across its own router certificate id, its own AS, and the AS to whom the update is being passed "forward signing" in the AS Path validation

Example: Announcement AS1 to AS2



BGP Update Validation

rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:

nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561 3356 4657 4773 124.197.64.0/19

- Is the AS Path valid?
 - Validate the Path Validation chain object
 - Router in AS4773 signs across AS4773 and AS4657?
 - Router in AS 4657 signs across AS 4657 and AS 3356 ?
 - etc

It's work in progress!

Current Issues:

- Validation overhead in particular, with router resets and full table re-advertisement
- Expiry and re-advertisement intervals and incremental load on BGP
- IXP Route Reflectors and Path Validation
- Certificate repository maintenance and distribution
- Route "leaks"?
- iBGP?

Concerns:

- Will this work for securing BGP?
 - The major issue here is that of partial use and deployment
 - Any security mechanism has to cope with partial deployment
 - Which means that the basic conventional approach of "what is not certified and proved as good must be bad" will not work until everyone adopts this approach
 - This is a problem is the task of validation of origination
 - In BGP we need to think about both origination and the AS
 Path of a route object
 - And AS path validation is going to be very challenging indeed in an environment of piecemeal use of secure credentials
 - A partially secured environment may be more operationally expensive, but no more secure than what we have today

Concerns:

- Is a Certificate trust hierarchy the best approach to use?
 - concentration of vulnerability
 - If validation of routing information is dependant on the availability and validity of a single root trust anchor then what happens when this single digital artifact is attacked?
 - But can you successfully incorporate robust diversity into a supposedly secure trust framework?
 - This is challenging!

distribution of certificates

 Can you use the DNS instead and use DNSSEC and DANE to provide the security framework for distribution of credentials

Concerns:

- Is this the only way to achieve generally useful outcomes?
 - Is this form of augmentation to BGP to enforce "protocol payload correctness" over-engineered, and does it rely on impractical models of universal adoption?
 - Can routing anomaly detectors adequately detect the most prevalent forms of typos and deliberate lies in routing with a far lower overhead, and allow for unilateral detection of routing anomalies?

Routing is a shared problem

It's a "tragedy of the commons" situation:

- Nobody can single-handedly apply rigorous tests on the routing system
- And the lowest common denominator approach that everyone can apply is to apply no integrity tests at all

Thank You

Questions?