Securing the Internet's Foundations: Addresses and Routing

AUSCERT 2011

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On the Internet...

...there are many ways to be bad!



An Ascending Scale of Badness

Port Scan for known exploits

General annoyance

Spew spam

Yes, there are still gullible folk out there!

Mount a fake web site attack

And lure victims

Enlist a bot army and mount multi-gigabit DOS attacks

Extortion leverage and general mayhem

Mount a routing attack

And bring down an entire region / country / global network!



If I were bad (and greedy)...

I'd attack routing.



If I were bad (and greedy)...

- Through routing I'd attack the DNS
- Through the DNS I'd lure traffic through an interceptor web server
- And be able to quietly collect users' details quietly, selectively and (if I am careful) undetectably

Welcome to today's online fraud industry




I'd still attack routing.



If I were really bad (and evil)...

- Through routing I'd attack:
 - the route registry server system
 - the DNS root system
 - trust anchors for TLS and browser certificates
 - isolate critical public servers and resources
 - overwhelm the routing system with spurious information

And bring selected parts of the network to a complete chaotic halt!



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engineers.

routers around the globe. That's because Hong Kong-based PCCW, which provides the Internet link to

This is not a new problem. A network provider in Turkey once pretended to be the entire Internet, snarl

Web sites unreachable. Con Edison accidentally hijacked the Internet addresses for Panix customers

It's also not an infrequent problem. An automatically-updated list of suspicious broadcasts created by

Omnimedia and the New York Daily News, Problems with errant broadcasts go back as far as 1997.

the misleading broadcast-which is what most large providers in the United States and Europe do.

A statement from Google said that the problems lasted for "about two hours".

nothing to suggest this was malicious."

site." it said

66 The fact YouTube is back in action makes me revise my thoughts on the clash between governments and freedom of speech

Rory Cellan-Jones

Read Rory's blog

"Traffic to YouTube was routed according to erroneous internet protocols, and many users around the world could not access our

A leading net professional told BBC News: "This was probably a simple mistake by an engineer at Pakistan Telecom. There's

s unique address by IP hijacking . corrupting the internet's routing tables, which direct the flow of data around the world.

Some recent cases ...

208.65.153.0/24 originated by AS17557

Advertisement of a more specific route by Pakistan Telecom that managed to take YouTube off the air in February 2008

61.0.0.0/8 originated by AS4678


Advertisement of a more general route by a spammer in order to conceal their identity by using an anonymous source ip address, occurring intermittently 2004 – 2007

d000::/8 originated by AS28716

Advertisement of a massive bogon more general route in IPV6 from 13 Nov 2009 until 15 Jan 2010 – and noone noticed for 2 months!

How many advertisements in today's BGP are "lies"?

www.cidr-report.org





	ww.cidr-report.org/as2.0/#Bogons		♂ Google	
		CIDR Report	C) (4 doog.e	
192 145 251 0/24 4538091	HELLONET-AS-KR CJ-CABLENET	192.145.231.0 - 192.146.0.255		
	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	192.153.147.0 - 192.153.147.255		
	NCREN - MCNC	192.154.59.0 - 192.154.59.255		
192.154.64.0/19 AS81	NCREN - MCNC	192.154.80.0 - 192.154.80.255		
	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	192.188.223.0 - 192.188.223.255		
	LINKdotNET-AS	196.2.224.0 - 196.2.255.255		
	SAIX-NET	196.6.103.0 - 196.6.120.255		
	TENET-1 TENET-1	196.13.201.0 - 196.13.204.255 196.13.201.0 - 196.13.204.255		
	TENET-1	196.13.201.0 - 196.13.204.255		
	TENET-1	196.13.201.0 - 196.13.204.255		
	TELE Greenland Autonomous System	196.202.224.0 - 196.202.231.255		
	INDOSAT-INP-AP INDOSAT Internet Network Provider	198.0.0.0 - 198.1.7.255		
	VZUNET - Verizon Data Services LLC	198.23.26.0 - 198.23.31.255		
	ACI-1 - Accelerated Connections Inc.	198.73.209.0 - 198.73.210.255		
	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	198.97.77.0 - 198.97.77.255		
	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	198.97.102.0 - 198.97.102.255 198.97.241.0 - 198.97.242.255		
	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center XNET - XNet Information Systems, Inc.	198.97.241.0 - 198.97.242.255 198.135.236.0 - 198.135.236.255		
198.161.82.0/23 AS15290		198.161.83.0 - 198.161.83.255		
198.161.87.0/24 AS6539	GT-BELL - Bell Canada	198.161.87.0 - 198.161.87.255		
	GT-BELL - Bell Canada	198.161.92.0 - 198.161.92.255		
	ACCESS-SK - Access Communications Co-operative Limited	198.163.214.0 - 198.163.216.255		
	SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc.	198.163.214.0 - 198.163.216.255		
	SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc.	198.163.214.0 - 198.163.216.255		
198.167.0.0/16 AS7456	INTERHOP - Interhop Network SERVICES Inc.	198.167.0.0 - 198.167.0.255		
	UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business SASKTEL - Saskatchewan Telecommunications	198.167.255.0 - 198.168.0.255 198.169.10.0 - 198.169.11.255		
	SEOUL-INTGW-GXS-AP Global Exchange Services	198.180.198.0 - 198.180.198.255		
	LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications	198.182.235.0 - 198.182.235.255		
	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.10.4.0 - 199.10.7.255		
199.16.32.0/19 AS6389	BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK - BellSouth.net Inc.	199.16.31.0 - 199.16.63.255		
	UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business	199.26.183.0 - 199.26.184.255		
	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255		
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	DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255		
	ITSDN-U7 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199.114.203.255		
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199.121.0.0/16 AS27064	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.120.255.0 - 199.121.3.255		
199.123.0.0/18 AS27064	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.123.0.0 - 199.123.3.255		
	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.123.30.0 - 199.123.31.255		
	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.123.83.0 - 199.123.83.255		
	UNISERVE-ONLINE - Uniserve On Line	199.185.130.0 - 199.185.131.255		
	UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business BACOM - Bell Canada	199.201.255.0 - 199.202.31.255 199.202.216.0 - 199.202.223.255		
199.202.216.0/21 AS3// 199.233.92.0/24 AS26896		199.202.216.0 - 199.202.223.255		
199.246.116.0/24 AS813	UUNET-CANADA - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Busine	255 199.246.116.0 - 199.246.116.255		
	GOZTEL GOZTEL.COM INC.	200.1.112.0 - 200.1.112.255		
200.108.176.0/20 AS14551	UUNET-SA - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business	200.108.144.0 - 200.108.191.255		
202.6.176.0/20 AS24316		202.6.176.0 - 202.6.191.255		
	AAPT AAPT Limited	202.9.51.0 - 202.9.55.255		
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202.58.113.0/24 AS19161		202.58.112.0 - 202.58.115.255		




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204.19.14.0/23 A5577 204.89.214.0/24 A54323 204.197.0.0/16 A53356 204.209.114.0/24 A513768 205.150.0.0/15 A5701 205.189.134.0/24 A511814 205.210.145.0/24 A511814 205.108.96.0/19 A5577	CONCENTRIX-PH-AS-AP Concentrix Technologies, Inc CONCENTRIX-PH-AS-AP Concentrix Technologies, Inc PHILCOMNET-PH A Multihomed ISP Company GENESIS-AP Dipixian.com Limited TMNET-AS-AP TM Net, Internet Service Provider VERTELNET Vertical Telecoms Pty Ltd PI-HK Pacnet Internet (Hong Kong) Limited RESOLINK-AS-AP AP Resources Link Network Limited HUTCHISON-AS-AP Hutchison Global Communications PKTELECOM-AS-PK Pakistan Telecommunication Comp. CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network China169 Beijing CYBERNET-AP Cyber Internet Services (PtY) Ltd. CYBERNET-AP Cyber Cybe	200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200	2.58.112.0 - 202.58.115.255 2.61.64.0 - 202.61.127.255 2.61.64.0 - 202.61.127.255 2.61.64.0 - 202.61.127.255 2.61.64.0 - 202.61.127.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 2.86.128.0 - 202.73.159.255 2.89.196.0 - 202.80.255.255 2.89.196.0 - 202.86.255.255 2.86.252.0 - 202.86.255.255 2.86.252.0 - 202.86.255.255 2.86.252.0 - 202.86.255.255 2.87.80.0 - 202.182.127.255 2.125.80.0 - 202.125.127.255 2.125.80.0 - 202.125.127.255 2.125.80.0 - 202.133.79.255 2.133.64.0 - 202.133.79.255 2.133.64.0 - 202.133.79.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255 2.139.240.0 - 202.112.525 3.132.96.0 - 203.112.127.255 3.112.			


yes, there's more

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207.1	74.0.0/16 A	S13790	INTERNAP-BLK3 - Internap Network Services Corporation	-	207.174.128.0 - 207.174.129.255		
			INDRA - Indra's Net Inc.		207.174.131.0 - 207.174.136.255		
207.17	74.132.0/23 A	S26116	INDRA - Indra's Net Inc.		207.174.131.0 - 207.174.136.255		
			INDRA - Indra's Net Inc.		207.174.144.0 - 207.174.156.255		
			INDRA - Indra's Net Inc.		207.174.144.0 - 207.174.156.255		
			INDRA - Indra's Net Inc.		207.174.144.0 - 207.174.156.255		
			FONENET - FONE NET, LLC		207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255		
	74.188.0/24 A		INDRA - Indra's Net Inc. INDRA - Indra's Net Inc.		207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255 207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255		
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			INDRA - Indra's Net Inc.		207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255		
	74.192.0/24 A		FONENET - FONE NET, LLC		207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255		
207.17	74.200.0/24 A	S22658	EARTHNET - Earthnet, Inc.		207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255		
207.1	74.248.0/21 A		PRIVATEI - privateI, LLC		207.174.212.0 - 207.174.255.255		
207.23	31.96.0/19 A		NUNETPA - NuNet Inc.		207.231.104.0 - 207.231.111.255		
			PREMIER - Premier Innovations, LLC		208.73.4.0 - 208.73.7.255		
	7.224.0/22 A		COGENT Cogent/PSI		208.77.224.0 - 208.77.231.255		
	7.229.0/24 A		COGENT Cogent/PSI		208.77.224.0 - 208.77.231.255		
	7.230.0/23 A		COGENT Cogent/PSI		208.77.224.0 - 208.77.231.255		
	3.164.0/24 A 3.165.0/24 A	NS16565			208.78.164.0 - 208.78.167.255 208.78.164.0 - 208.78.167.255		
	3.167.0/24 A				208.78.164.0 - 208.78.167.255		
	1.123.0/24 A		NETPLEX - NETPLEX		209.54.0.0 - 209.54.255.255		
	7.208.0/24 A		HEITER HEITER		209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255		
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	7.212.0/22 A				209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255		
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	7.217.0/24 A				209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255		
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	7.222.0/23 A				209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255		
	05.224.0/19 A				209.105.224.0 - 209.105.255.255		
	10.90.0/24 A		NTSL - NET SOLUTIONS		209.140.0.0 - 209.141.255.255		
	\$1.48.0/22 A		NTSL - NET SOLUTIONS		209.140.0.0 - 209.141.255.255		
			ELTOPIA - Eltopia.com, LLC		209.213.0.0 - 209.213.15.255		
		S7849	CROCKERCOM - CROCKER COMMUNICATIONS		209.213.0.0 - 209.213.15.255		
			CROCKERCOM - CROCKER COMMUNICATIONS		209.213.0.0 - 209.213.15.255		
	5.150.0/23 A	S4837	CHINA169-BACKBONE CNCGROUP China169 Backbone INTECH-TRANSIT-BD InTech Online Limited, INTERNET SERVICE LIMITED		210.5.128.0 - 210.5.143.255 210.56.144.0 - 210.56.151.255		
210.50	17.224.0/19 A	S7496	WEBCENTRAL-AS WebCentral		210.247.240.0 - 210.247.255.255		
	1.192.0/20 A		VDOTNET - VDot.Net		216.21.192.0 - 216.21.207.255		
	1.196.0/24 A		INVISION - Invision.com, Inc.		216.21.192.0 - 216.21.207.255		
216.2	1.201.0/24 A	S12251	INVISION - Invision.com, Inc.		216.21.192.0 - 216.21.207.255		
216.2	1.202.0/24 A	S12251	INVISION - Invision.com, Inc.		216.21.192.0 - 216.21.207.255		
216.2	1.206.0/23 A	\S12251	INVISION - Invision.com, Inc.		216.21.192.0 - 216.21.207.255		
			X5SOLUTIONS - X5 Solutions, Inc.		216.58.192.0 - 216.58.223.255		
			X5SOLUTIONS - X5 Solutions, Inc.		216.58.192.0 - 216.58.223.255		
		NS18530	ISOMEDIA-1 - Isomedia Inc.		216.58.192.0 - 216.58.223.255		
	9.20.0/24 A 44.240.0/23 A	103350	LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications RR-NYSREGION-ASN-01 - Road Runner HoldCo LLC		216.99.16.0 - 216.99.23.255 216.144.240.0 - 216.144.255.255		
216.14	14.243.0/23 A	S11351	RR-NYSREGION-ASN-01 - Road Runner HoldCo LLC		216.144.240.0 - 216.144.255.255		
216.1	14.244.0/22	S11351	RR-NYSREGION-ASN-01 - Road Runner HoldCo LLC		216.144.240.0 - 216.144.255.255		
216.1	3.144.0/20 A	S35985	ONERINGNET-ATL-1 - One Ring Networks, Inc.		216.163.144.0 - 216.163.159.255		
216.1	72.198.0/24 A	S22773	ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications Inc.		216.172.0.0 - 216.172.255.255		
216.17	72.199.0/24 A	S22773	ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications Inc.		216.172.0.0 - 216.172.255.255		
216.24	43.240.0/20 A	S12182	INTERNAP-2BLK - Internap Network Services Corporation		216.243.240.0 - 216.243.255.255		
	0.112.0/20 A	S7296	ALCHEMYNET - Alchemy Communications, Inc.		216.250.112.0 - 216.250.127.255		
216.2	0.116.0/24 A	\S36066	UNI-MARKETING-ALLIANCE - Webhost4life.com		216.250.112.0 - 216.250.127.255		
216.25	51.207.0/24 A		SPRINTLINK - Sprint		216.251.192.0 - 216.251.207.255		
	υ.υ/Ծ A	\S9484	MOBINET-AS-MN Mobicom Company. AS Mobinet Internet Service Provider		222.229.88.0 - 222.229.95.255		


getting the point yet?




still more!




wake me up when we're done




ZZZZZZZ



almost done ...







What's the base problem here?

Addresses and Routing are insecure

- Routing is built on sloppy mutual trust models
- Routing auditing is a low value activity that noone performs with any level of thoroughness
- We have grown used to lousy solutions and institutionalized lying in the routing system
- And because instances of abuse are supposedly relatively infrequent we are prepared to tolerate the risk of having a completely insecure routing system

What's the base problem here?

Noone seems to want to care enough about the integrity of the network to address routing integrity!

Routing Security is a shared problem

It's a tragedy of the commons situation

- Nobody can single-handedly apply rigorous tests on the routing system
- And the lowest common denominator approach is to apply no integrity tests at all
- It's all trust and absolutely no defence


Routing Security

1. Protecting **routing protocols** and their operation

- Threat model:
 - Disrupt the operation of the routing protocol by a "man-in-the-middle" attack
 - Compromise the topology discovery / reachability operation of the routing protocol by injection of false routing information


– Response:

 Current operational best practice uses TCP-MD5 and avoids eBGPmultihop




Routing Integrity

- 2. Protecting the **routing protocol payload**
 - Threat model:
 - Compromised router or compromised Routing Entity (AS)
 - Insert corrupted address information into your network's routing tables
 - Insert corrupt reachability information into your network's forwarding tables
 - Allow the routing protocol to disseminate the corrupted information across the entire internet



Threats

- Corrupting the routers' forwarding tables can result in:
 - Misdirecting traffic (subversion, denial of service, third party inspection, passing off)
 - Dropping traffic (denial of service)
 - Adding false addresses into the routing system (anon attacks)
 - Isolating or removing the router from the network



Can we tweak BGP so that it can detect the difference between good and evil, and only advertise and propagate the good routes?

Routing Security

- The basic routing payload security questions that need to be answered are:
 - Who injected this address prefix into the network?
 - Did they have the necessary credentials to inject this address prefix? Is this a valid address prefix?
 - Is the forwarding path to reach this address prefix trustable?
- And can these questions be answered by any BGP speaker quickly and cheaply?

A (random) BGP Update

2010/01/26 00:03:35 rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:

nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561

3356 4657 4773

124.197.64.0/19

2010/01/26 00:03:35 rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:
nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561
3356 4657 4773
124.197.64.0/19
Is 124.197.64.0/19 a "valid" prefix?

2010/01/26 00:03:35 rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:
nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561
3356 4657 4773
124.197.64.0/19

Is 124.197.64.0/19 a "valid" prefix?

Is AS4773 a "valid" ASN?

2010/01/26 00:03:35 rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:
nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561
3356 4657 4773
124.197.64.0/19

Is 124.197.64.0/19 a "valid" prefix?

Is AS4773 a "valid" ASN?

Is 4773 an "authorized AS to advertise a route to this prefix?

2010/01/26 00:03:35 rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:
nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561
3356 4657 4773
124.197.64.0/19

Is 124.197.64.0/19 a "valid" prefix?

Is AS4773 a "valid" ASN?

Is 4773 an "authorized AS to advertise a route to this prefix?

Is the AS Path valid?

- Is AS 4657 a valid AS, and did AS 4773 advertise this route to AS 4657?
- Is AS 3356 a valid AS, and did AS 4657 advertise this route to AS 3356?
- etc

A Foundation for Routing Security

- The use of authenticatable attestations to allow automated validation of:
 - the authenticity of the route object being advertised
 - authenticity of the origin AS
 - the binding of the origin AS to the route object
- Such attestations used to provide a cost effective method of validating routing requests
 - as compared to the today's state of the art based on techniques of vague trust and random whois data mining

A Foundation for Routing Security

Adoption of some basic security functions into the Internet's routing domain:

- Injection of reliable trustable data
 A Resource PKI as the base of validation of network data
- Explicit verifiable mechanisms for integrity of data distribution
 Adoption of some form of certified authorization mechanism to
 support validation of credentials associated with address and
 routing information

A Starting Point

- How can you certify who what which address?
 - follow the allocation trail
 - Certification of the "Right-of-Use" of IP Addresses and AS numbers as a linked attribute of the Internet's number resource allocation and distribution framework

For example:

APNIC (the "Issuer") certifies that:


the certificate's "Subject"


whose public key is contained in the certificate


is the current holder of a set of IP address and AS resources.


that are listed in the certificate extension


APNIC does NOT certify the identity of the subject, nor their good (or evil) intentions!














What could you do with Resource Certificates?


- You could sign "routing authorities" with your private key, providing an authority for an AS to originate a route for the named prefix. Any Relying Party could validate this authority in the RPKI
- You could use the private key to sign routing information in an Internet Route Registry
- You could attach a digital signature to a protocol element in a routing protocol
- You could issue signed derivative certificates for any suballocations of resources

Signed Objects









Resource Allocation Hierarchy

AFRINIC

RIPE NCC

Route Origination Authority
"ISP4 permits AS65000 to
originate a route for the prefix
192.2.200.0/24"

Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert>

Signed, ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv> %

Validation Outcomes


- 1. ISP4 authorized this Authority document
- 2. 192.2.200.0/24 is a **valid** address, derived from an APNIC allocation
- 3. ISP4 holds a current right-of-use of 192.2 200.0/24
- 4. A route object, where AS65000 originates an advertisement for the address prefix 192.2.200.0/24, has the explicit authority of ISP4, who is the current holder of this address prefix

A (partial) architecture for securing BGP origination **BGP** Local Router **BGP Filter RPKI** (Origin AS + processor prefix mask) Synchronization

Distributed RPKI Publication Repositories (Certificates and Routing Authorities)

ROA-based Filtering

• If a ROA exists for (10.0.1.0.24, AS 3) then the AS666 attack is detectable and preventable at AS 4




What about AS Path Validation?

Securing the AS PATH

We need two additional components:


- An RPKI router certificate (AS and BGP router ID)
- a new BGP attribute
- Each eBGP Router "forward signs" the AS Path with its private key
- Each validating routing can validate the chain of signatures against the AS Path to match the path to the sig chain



Securing the AS PATH

We need two additional components:

- An RPKI router certificate (AS and BGP router ID)
- a new BGP attribute



Securing the AS Path

- Each router to sign across the triplet of: the signature of what was received, its own AS and the next hop AS
- BGPsec routers are required to unchain the signature set and match it to the AS Path in the update, using the local RPKI cache to validate the router signatures

Signing the AS Path

- The AS Path represents the inter-AS propagation path of the route from the origin to the BGP speaker
- Attempts to manipulate the AS Path by adding or removing AS's will invalidate this signature chain attribute of the update
- "validation" of an update allows the receiver to assure themselves that each AS propagated the route in the order shown in the AS Path

Securing the AS Path

BUT this does not all happen for free:

- It adds size and weight to the operation of BGP
- It's slow and cumbersome
- It cannot be deployed incrementally piecewise
- Partial deployment has limited benefits
- It's brittle
- It's not clear that gain > pain!

Concerns

A major issue here is that of partial use and deployment

- This security mechanism has to cope with partial deployment in the routing system
 - The basic conventional approach of "what is not certified and proved as good must be bad" will not work in a partial deployment scenario
- In BGP we need to think about both origination and the AS Path of a route object in a partial deployed environment
 - AS path validation is challenging indeed in an environment of piecemeal use of secure credentials, as the mechanism cannot tunnel from one BGPsec "island" to the next "island"
- A partially secured environment may incur a combination of high incremental cost with only marginal net benefit to those deploying BGPsec

Concerns

Is a *trust hierarchy* the best approach to use?

- The concern here is concentration of vulnerability
 - If validation of routing information is dependent on the availability and validity of a single root trust anchor then what happens when this single digital artifact is attacked?
- But is there a viable alternative approach?
 - Can you successfully incorporate robust diversity of authentication of security credentials into a supposedly highly resilient secure trust framework?
 - This is very challenging!

Concerns

Is certification the *only way* to achieve useful outcomes in securing routing?

- Is this form of augmentation to BGP to enforce "protocol payload correctness" over-engineered, and does it rely on impractical models of universal adoption?
- Can various forms of routing anomaly detectors adequately detect the most prevalent forms of typos and deliberate lies in routing with a far lower overhead, and allow for unilateral detection of routing anomalies?
- Or are such anomaly detectors yet another instance of "cheap security pantomime" that offer a thinly veiled placebo of apparent security that is easily circumvented or fooled by determined malicious attack?

Good, Fast, or Cheap? Pick one!

We can't make secure routing mechanisms cheaper, faster, more robust, and more effective than existing routing tools ...

- We can make it robust, but it won't be cheap!
- We can make it fast, but it won't be robust and it won't be cheap!
- We can make it cheap, but it won't be robust!

Thank You

Questions?