

Auto-Detecting Hijacked Prefixes?

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Address hijacking

- Unauthorized use of an address prefix as an advertised route object on the Internet
 - -Not a bogon
 - address block has been assigned by an RIR for use
 - -May include identity fraud
 - may involve misrepresentation of identity in order to undertake a database change
 - -Commonly associated with identity cloaking
 - Spam generation, attack launching platforms, etc
- How prevalent is this?
 –Very hard to isolate hijacking incidents

What is a hijack signature?

- What address blocks would not be noticed if they were used for a short period?
 - -Has been unadvertised for a 'long time'
 - -Is used only for a 'short time'

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-Uses an entirely different origin AS and first hop AS

Reannouncement interval

-Is not covered by an aggregate announcement

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Network Information

Pacific

Asia

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Data collections

- Aggregated BGP route collection data
- Can provide information for any prefix:
 - -When was this prefix advertised and withdrawn?
 - -What was the announcing AS?
 - -What was the first hop AS?
 - –What other prefixes were also advertised at the same time?

Noise reduction in BGP data


- BGP update logs are possibly unhelpful here
 - -High frequency noise of BGP convergence is different from the longer frequency signal of prefix use through network connectivity and prefix advertisement
- Use successive static BGP snapshots

 Highest frequency component of 2 hours
 reduces protocol-induced noise levels in the
 data

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Initial results

 Readvertisement of prefixes with different Origin AS and First Hop AS




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
2nd Pass

Very short window announce
 2 months down, < 3 days up, > 1 month down



3rd Pass

Short window 2 months down, 5 - 14 days up, > 1 month down



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Some comments

- Address announcement patterns do not appear to be a reliable hijack indicator in isolation.
 - -There is no clear signature in the patterns of prefix appearance that forms a reliable indicator of misuse.
- Address use profiles can assist in the process of identifying address hijacking for suspect prefixes.
 - -Additional information is necessary to reliably identify candidate hijack prefixes.
- Careful checking of the provenance of an address before accepting it into the routing system make good sense
 - -But thorough checks of a prefix's history of use as a precondition to accepting it into the local routing session as a valid advertisement consume time and increase an ISPs' operating overhead costs



It's not a very reassuring answer.

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Address and Routing Security

The basic routing payload security questions that need to be answered are:

-Is this a valid address prefix?

–Who injected this address prefix into the network?

-Did they have the necessary credentials to inject this address prefix?

–Is the forwarding path to reach this address prefix an acceptable representation of the network's forwarding state?

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Address and Routing Security

What we have today is a relatively insecure system that is vulnerable to various forms of deliberate disruption and subversion

Address hijacking is just one aspect of the insecurity of the Internet's routing system

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What I really would like to see...

The use of a public key infrastructure to support attestations that allow automated validation of:

-the authenticity of the address object being advertised

-authenticity of the origin AS

-the explicit authority given from the address to AS that permits a routing announcement

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What would also be good...

• If the attestation referred to the address allocation path

-use of an RIR issued certificate to validate the attestation signature chain

• If the attestation was associated with the route advertisement

-Such attestations to be carried in BGP as an Update attribute

• If validation these attestations was treated as a route object preference indicator

-Attestation validation to be a part of the BGP route acceptance process

But...

We are nowhere near where we need to be:

-We need more than "good router housekeeping" – it's trusting the protocol payload as well as trusting the protocol's operation and the routing engines

-We need so much more than piecemeal distributed 2nd hand bogon and martian lists, filters and heuristics about use patterns for guessing at 'bad' addresses and 'bad' routes

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What I'd like to see...

We adopt some basic security functions into the Internet's routing domain:

• Injection of reliable trustable data

 Address and AS certificate PKI as the base of validation of network data

• Explicit verifiable mechanisms for integrity of data distribution

 Adoption of some form of certification mechanism to support validation of distributed address and routing information


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Oh yes, and about address hijacking...

 This type of resource security framework would make address hijacking much harder to perform!

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Thank You