# The ISP Column

*A column on various things Internet*

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# DNS and the DELEG Proposal

I wrote about the DNS DELEG proposal around a year ago (<https://www.potaroo.net/ispcol/2024-02/deleg.html>). This article is an update to that work, following the most meeting of the IETF’s DELEG Working Group, a group chartered to generate a Standards Track RFC for the specification of DELEG, at the March 2025 meeting of the IETF.

The Internet's Domain Name System (DNS) is implemented as a distributed database. The mechanism of this distribution is *delegation* where control of a name in the DNS namespace is passed to a different entity, who is then the point of authority of this name, and all subordinate names (that this this name as a common suffix).

Parent zones denote a delegation point within the name space (a *zone cut*) by using a **NS** Resource Record in the zone data. The value of the NS record is the name of a DNS server that is authoritative for that delegated zone (yes, the specification allows only for a DNS server name, and not its IP address). If a zone is served by multiple authoritative name servers, then multiple NS records are used. Prior to the introduction of DNSSEC, the only resource record in the parent zone for this delegation point was the NS record. All other data about this name was found in the child zone including a copy of the NS records seen in the parent zone.

If the parent zone is DNSSEC-signed, then the delegation NS records located in the parent zone are unsigned. The reason for this apparently anomalous handling of NS records was that the delegated domain has assumed authority over the delegated domain name, including the nameservers for this domain. So, the NS records for the nameservers for this domain are signed by the delegated domain’s key in the delegated zone in recognition of this assumed authority. The NS records in the parent zone are supposed to be the same as the records for this domain held in the delegated zone but are not signed by the parent zone key as the parent is not the point of authority for this information. Also, if the parent zone is DNSSEC-signed, then there will also be an NSEC (or NSEC3) record for this name, and the NSEC record's associated RRSIG signature. If the delegated zone is DNSSEC-signed, then the parent zone will also hold a DS record for this zone, and its associated RRSIG record.

It’s a subtle distinction that the while the child zone is authoritative for the key used as the secure entry point for the zone, and this key value is stored in the child zone as a DNSKEY record (signed using the child zone’s key), the hash of this key value is stored in the parent zone as a DS record, and signed with the parent zone’s key, indicating that the parent zone is authoritative for the hash of the child zone’s key. It’s necessary for the parent to “sign over” the child zone’s key as part of establishing a “chain of trust” from the root zone to the zone in question, and this use of a parent-side DS record to contain this hash value of the child’s key, signed by the parent key is an effective way of implementing this link in the chain.

But why the parent cannot be authoritative for the child’s NS records, but can be authoritative for the hash of the child’s DNSKEY value is a question I find difficult to answer.

The names of these name servers are not enough to allow a resolver to query these servers, as we also need to know their IP addresses. If the name servers are named by a name that exists within the child zone, then there is a circular dependency that cannot be resolved. To aid resolvers, and speed up the name resolution process, parent zones also usually carry *Glue Records*, which are the IP addresses of the nameservers. Such glue records are used in the Additional Section of referral responses. Such non-authoritative Glue Records are necessary when the names are contained within the child zone, but are otherwise optional. When a resolver encounters a delegation and there is no accompanying Glue Record to provide the IP addresses of the nameserver, the recursive resolve must suspend the current name resolution task and turn its attention to resolving the name of the nameserver.

You may have observed that this recursive mode of the resolution of nameserver names can involve an arbitrary depth of indirection or even contain loops. Most sensible recursive resolvers will limit the time the resolver will spend on resolving any single name and also detect loops. Less sensible recursive resolver implementations are prone to denial of service attacks.

The NS records that are located at the apex of a child zone list of authoritative name servers in the child zone and should match the list that is held in the parent zone. If the zone is DNSSEC-signed, then these child-zone NS records will be signed by the child zone's zone-signing key, as the child zone that is authoritative for the names of the name servers that serve this zone.

In summary, the links within the DNS that maintain the cohesion of this distributed data framework are these NS records, which are duplicated across both sides of each delegation point.

"As the last installation step, the delegation NS RRs and glue RRs necessary to make the delegation effective should be added to the parent zone. The administrators of both zones should insure[\*] that the NS and glue RRs which mark both sides of the cut are consistent and remain so."

RFC 1034, sec 4.2.2

\* Yes, that should be “ensure” as in ‘make certain’ rather than “insure” as in ‘protect against potential financial loss’. I guess the IANA’s proof reading standards were different in 1987 when this RFC was published.

This structure has served the DNS adequately for many decades, so why change it?

### Changing the DNS Mechanisms for Delegation

There are a number of pressures for change here. One source of such pressure is that this referral response is not protected with DNSSEC signatures, and is accordingly prone to on-path substitution attacks. An attacker would simply substitute different nameservers and the resolver would be misled.

While the parent-provided NS records are not DNSSEC-signed, it is still possible to confirm the authenticity of the NS records provided in a referral response if the delegated zone is DNSSEC-signed, and that is to use these nameservers and ask the child zone for its signed NS record(s), as proposed in a [draft on delegation revalidation](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-ns-revalidation).

A different approach was proposed in 2020 by Kazunori Fujiwara in the (now expired) draft [delegation-information-signer](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-fujiwara-dnsop-delegation-information-signer), where the delegation information is hashed and signed within the parent zone, allowing a querier to retrieve and validate this hash value and confirm that it is the hash of the delegation information.

However, this is not the only pressure on the delegation mechanism. A second pressure is the incomplete work in the DNS Privacy area on the use of encrypted transport for DNS queries and responses. The use of encrypted transports, namely DNS over TLS, DNS over HTTPS and DNS over QUIC have been defined by the IETF’s DPRIVE Working Group, but the mechanisms to trigger the use of these encrypted protocols is unclear. For stub resolvers querying recursive resolvers, the anticipated future query load is large enough that the overhead of probing the recursive resolver for its transport capabilities can be amortised over subsequent queries, but the same consideration does not necessarily apply to querying authoritative resolvers. For example, a stub resolver can attempt to open a DNS over HTTPS session with a configured recursive resolver, and if successful it can then continue to use this encrypted session.

The use of Service Binding records in the DNS offers a mechanism for a client to efficiently discover the capabilities of a server. The IETF published [RFC 9460](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9460.txt), Service Binding and Parameter Specification via the DNS (SVCB and HTTPS Resource Records) in November 2023, which defines a DNS resource record that is associated with a service name that not only provides the IP address(es) of the service point, but also can define the transport protocol, port value, and aliases. This approach is sufficiently generic that it can be used for many service types, including the DNS itself, and at the same time the IETF published [RFC9461](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9461.txt), Service Binding Mapping for DNS servers:

“The SVCB DNS resource record type expresses a bound collection of endpoint metadata, for use when establishing a connection to a named service. DNS itself can be such a service, when the server is identified by a domain name. This document provides the SVCB mapping for named DNS servers, allowing them to indicate support for encrypted transport protocols.”

[RFC 9461](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9461.txt)

Using the SVCB service record its possible for an authoritative DNS server of a zone to indicate that queries should be made over a non-default port or can nominate the transport protocol via the "alpn" key value. In the following example, the server ns1.potaroo.net could indicate its support for queries using DNS over TLS with the record:

\_dns.ns1.potaroo.net. 172800 IN SVCB 1 ns1.potaroo.net. (

alpn=dot ipv4hint=203.133.248.2 ipv6hint=2401:2000:6660::2)

As [RFC9461](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9461.txt) also points out "nothing in this document indicates whether the service is intended for use as a recursive or authoritative DNS server."

The record exists in the context of the zone in which the name is defined, so it can be signed and potentially secure. In our example, the label \_dns.ns1.potaroo.net. is defined in the zone potaroo.net, and as potaroo.net is DNSSEC-signed, then the record is signed by the zone signing key for this zone. The parent zone is not necessarily aware of this record, and still provides the simple NS records and associated glue. A resolver would still encounter these NS records on first use, even when attempting to resolve a query for the SVCB record for \_dns.ns1.potaroo.net it would still have to use DNS over UDP port 53 to make this query for the first time, as implicitly defined by the parent-served NS record. The resolver may then choose to query for a DNS Service record for this name server.

Note that there are two DNS mechanisms at play in this example. The first is the use of an underscore label as the left-most label of this DNS name. This label, “\_dns” is a distinguished label intended to denote that this is the name of a DNS server, while the SVCB resource record type denotes the service parameters that are associated with this particular named service.

The question is whether the semantics of the DNS Service Binding record could be merged with the name delegation function of the NS record. So, how could we combine the DNS service SVCB profile with name server functionality to the extent the combined data of name server and service profile could be used in referral responses?

### The DELEG Resource Record

One approach is to use a new RR at the parent which can be used in referral responses that combines the semantics of delegation and the listing the name server name and the IP addresses of this service in the current NS and Glue records, but also adding the transport protocol capabilities, and combine all of this information in a single RR. This is the intention of the [proposed](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dnsop-deleg) **DELEG** Resource Record. This proposal borrows the semantics of the DNS [SVCB record](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9460.txt) but uses the delegation label rather than the service name as the binding point in the DNS, and builds upon an earlier proposal for NS2 and NST records, that were described in an [earlier draft](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-tapril-ns2-01).

Taking our example delegated domain potaroo.net, and the DNS service binding example from above, a comparable DELEG record would be:

potaroo.net. 172800 IN DELEG 1 ns1.potaroo.net.

(alpn=dot ipv4hint=203.133.248.2 ipv6hint=2401:2000:6660::2)

This record indicates that potaroo.net is a delegation point in the net zone, and the server should be queried using DNS over TLS on the default TCP port 853. As the net zone is a DNSSEC-signed zone, this record would also have an associated RRSIG signature record in the .net zone.

When used as a referral response, the parent server is not necessarily aware if the querier is capable of processing of the DELEG record, so simply responding with this response as a referral response would be ineffectual if the querier was not aware of the use of the DELEG record.

One possible solution to this would be for the querier to include an EDNS(0) option in the query to indicate that the querier is capable of processing a DELEG referral response (in a similar manner to the description of querier capabilities of the earlier work on the REFER response).

Another approach is to fold in backward compatibility with the existing referral mechanism. The server would assemble a referral response that includes both the DELEG records and the NS records in the Authority Section, and the unsigned glue records in the Additional Section. If the EDNS(0) DO bit was set in the query, then the RRSIG for the DELEG record would also be included in the response.

The draft specification of the DELEG record also specifies that the referral response would also include the DS RRset and its associated RRSIG signature.

If the ability to nominate additional DNS transport protocols is all the DELEG RR is good for, then I think it’s highly unlikely that it will gain much acceptance in the DNS environment. Any change to the domain name provisioning imposes additional cost, and its challenging to quantify the benefits that would balance against the cost of implementing the necessary change for this particular resource record. In theory, a parent zone operator could synthesise a DELEG record from the existing NS and associated glue information, but as the response would already contain the NS and glue records, then it’s reasonable to ask why this additional record in the referral response would be of any value if it’s a simple syntactic repackaging of the referral information. The community of users who place tangible value on using an encrypted channel between the recursive resolver and the authoritative server is not exactly large. (Don’t forget that the IP identity of the original querier is not present is such queries.)

### The IDELEG Resource Record

There are generally many ways

A signed DELEG record would allow a querier to validate the referral and detect potential attacks that attempt to perform substitution in the referral response. This is pushing DNSSEC into a new space. At present DNSSEC will provide a validating resolver some assurance that the response they received to their query is authentic and current. This assurance relates only to the final response itself, and not the “correctness” of the sequence of name servers used to discover the authoritative nameservers for the zone. Signing these DELEG records would allow a validator to provide some assurance as to the authenticity of these referral responses, but this would only be at the cost of additional validation queries, particularly for the DNSKEY records of the zone in which the DELEG record is located, and other queries if the DELEG record is an alias record that leads to a different validation path. A validating client being led astray would presumably detect the attempted attack when the response fails validation in any case, so the time saved by performing validation checks on the DELEG records and stopping as soon as the DELEG record fails validation would be offset of the additional time spent on assembling the validation information for each of these delegations.

However, there is one aspect of the DELEG record that appears to offer some benefit over the existing NS referral functionality. The service hosting industry relies heavily on the DNS CNAME structure. CNAMEs allow individual names to be "lifted" out of the original locus of administrative control and shifted over to the control of the service hosting entity. For example, the domain name www.apple.com is provisioned using Akamai, and the DNS name www.apple.com is passed across to Akamai's control using the CNAME alias transform:

$ dig A www.apple.com

[www.apple.com](http://www.apple.com). 1750 IN CNAME www.apple.com.edgekey.net.

www.apple.com.edgekey.net. 13319 IN CNAME www.apple.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net.

www.apple.com.edgekey.net.globalredir.akadns.net. 2069 IN CNAME e6858.dscx.akamaiedge.net.

e6858.dscx.akamaiedge.net. 10 IN A 23.204.64.212

If CNAME RRs are so useful for content service hosting, then why not use CNAMEs for NS records to facilitate DNS service hosting? The current DNS specification stipulates that CNAMES cannot be used for Nameserver records:

“The domain name used as the value of a NS resource record, or part of the value of a MX resource record must not be an alias. Not only is the specification clear on this point, but using an alias in either of these positions neither works as well as might be hoped, nor well fulfills the ambition that may have led to this approach. This domain name must have as its value one or more address records. Currently those will be A records, however in the future other record types giving addressing information may be acceptable. It can also have other RRs, but never a CNAME RR.”

RFC 2181, section 10.3

The SVCB specification allows for Alias Mode (Sec 2.4.2, RFC94360). It also allows for Alias Mode SVCB records to exist at the zone apex, where CNAME records are not permitted. The DELEG specification allows for the equivalent of Alias Mode name server records. For example:

The .net zone is contains alias model DELEG record:

potaroo.net 172800 IN DELEG 0 potaroo.net.dnshosting.example.com

The dnshosting.example.com zone can contain the SVCB record for the dns hosting service:

potaroo.net.dnshosting.example.com. 3600 IN SVCB . (

alpn=dot ipv4hint=203.133.248.2 ipv6hint=2401:2000:6660::2)

This has a limitation in that the alias mode DELEG record contains no other attributes, so it is not possible to alias into an "in-domain" name (a name in the same zone as the zone that is being delegated, or a descendent zone to avoid circular dependencies - RFC8499, Sec. 7).

Like a CNAME, this construct can be used to shift the administrative control of a name server to a DNS operator, who can then make changes to the name server without any further need to update the parent zone. How to handle the backward compatible glue records for an alias mode record is an open issue. Presumably if the alias refers to a zone that is unrelated to the parent zone, then the backward compatible NS records can refer to the alias name and the glue records can be omitted, leaving it to the resolver client to resolve the SVCB alias name.

Whether this additional alias behaviour in delegation is enough to impel the DELEG record into a mode of general adoption remains to be seen. The observation is that the DNS name industry has worked for some decades within the current framework of delegation, and the changes being contemplated with the DELEG record do not seem to offer any fundamental new efficiencies or capabilities that would motivate its general adoption.

What this proposed DELEG record does not do is alter the inter-zone communication requirement. As the draft specification notes:

“Construction of a DELEG RR requires knowledge which implies communication between the operators of the child and parent zones. This communication is an operational matter not covered by this document.”

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dnsop-deleg/>

Where the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) (RFC 3731) is used to pass configuration parameters between registrars and registries, then the EPP process would need to be extended to allow the specification of a DELEG record to be included.

An alternative for DNSSEC-signed zones is to use the Child-to-Parent Synchronisation mechanism (RFC 7477) and add the DELEG record to the child’s signed CSYNC record for the parent to pick up this record, validate it, and then add it to the parent zone with the parent’s signature. How the parent zone operator is to detect a change in this record is a topic in its own right!

### Observations

All large engineered systems accrete stasis and resist change over time. This implies that changes to very large systems become more like piecemeal local customisations that need to coexist with the general status quo.

The DELEG record is still in its early stages of consideration and it’s not even clear whether this approach will garner widespread support or not.

DELEG attempts to address three shortcomings of the current DNS delegation process.

The first is that the parent’s presentation of the NS records to a resolver is unsigned and is therefore prone to various forms of substitution attacks. DELEG, like a number of other proposals, attempts to address this by proposing a new delegation resource record that is authoritative in the parent zone, so that can be served with a DNSSEC signature. This is an extension to DNSSEC-signing in the DNS, where it’s not just the DNS response that it being authenticated, but the resolution path being used. The marginal benefit of this additional function is difficult to assess, given that a resolution path that misleads the recursive resolver will more than likely end with a response that will fail DNSSEC validation in any case.

The second is an inability to specify an alternative transport protocol to use to query the authoritative servers of the delegated zone. Again, the general benefit of this is unclear. The encrypted channel transport protocols need to perform an initial packet exchange to set up the shared encryption state. In the stub-to-recursive resolver situation this overhead can be offset by the subsequent queries that use the established channel, and there is a marginal gain in avoiding the delays in switching over from UDP to TCP for large responses. However, this is not necessarily the case in the recursive-to-authoritative scenario, as a single recursive resolver may query a large number of authoritative servers in a relatively short span of time.

It’s the final shortcoming where the DELEG resource record may offer a useful function. The inability to use a CNAME record as a target of an NS record means that it’s hard to move a DNS name server name away from the control of the child zone operator. If a DNS operator wishes to dynamically generate name server records that can perform load balancing or offer records that are located close to the querier to improve DNS performance, then this is practically impossible in the current NS record structure.

This looks promising, but there is the residual consideration of the backward compatibility of the proposed DELEG structure. Do the NS and glue records that are also packaged in the delegation response have to match the DELEG record contents? Or do the DELEG records specify additional name servers that may be queried in a higher level of preference to the servers listed in the NS records? Do we need this somewhat clumsy stuffing of referral responses with both DELEG and NS records in any case? Why not just borrow from the earlier REFER proposal and respond with only DELEG records if the query indicates via an EDNS(0) option setting that it can handle DELEG referrals? Otherwise the server would respond with NS and Glue records as it does today to indicate a zone cut and referral.

The only material about the DELEG records is posted in a first version of an Internet draft, and it’s highly likely that the material will be further refined in the coming months. Or maybe even dropped completely!

T. April, P. Špaček, R. Weber, and D. Lawrence, “Extensible Delegation for DNS”, Work in progress: draft-dnsop-deleg-00, January 2024. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-dnsop-deleg/



### Disclaimer

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