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                    HMAC-Authenticated Diffie-Hellman
                  for Multimedia Internet KEYing (MIKEY)

Status of This Memo

   This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
   Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
   improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
   Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
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Abstract

   This document describes a lightweight point-to-point key management
   protocol variant for the multimedia Internet keying (MIKEY) protocol
   MIKEY, as defined in RFC 3830. In particular, this variant deploys
   the classic Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol for key
   establishment featuring perfect forward secrecy in conjunction with a
   keyed hash message authentication code for achieving mutual
   authentication and message integrity of the key management messages
   exchanged. This protocol addresses the security and performance
   constraints of multimedia key management in MIKEY.

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1. Introduction

   There is work done in IETF to develop key management schemes. For
   example, IKE [12] is a widely accepted unicast scheme for IPsec, and
   the MSEC WG is developing other schemes, addressed to group
   communication [17], [18]. For reasons discussed below, there is,
   however, a need for a scheme with low latency, suitable for demanding
   cases such as real-time data over heterogeneous networks and small
   interactive groups.

   As pointed out in MIKEY (see [2]), secure real-time multimedia
   applications demand a particular adequate lightweight key management
   scheme that takes care to establish dynamic session keys securely and
   efficiently in a conversational multimedia scenario.

   In general, MIKEY scenarios cover peer-to-peer, simple one-to-many,
   and small-sized groups. MIKEY in particular describes three key

management schemes for the peer-to-peer case that all finish their
task within one roundtrip:

-   a symmetric key distribution protocol (MIKEY-PS) based on pre-
    shared master keys

-   a public-key encryption-based key distribution protocol (MIKEY-PK
    and reverse-mode MIKEY-RSA-R [33]) assuming a public-key
    infrastructure with RSA-based (Rivest, Shamir and Adleman)
    private/public keys and digital certificates

-   a Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol (MIKEY-DHSIGN) deploying
    digital signatures and certificates.

All of these three key management protocols are designed so that they
complete their work within just one roundtrip. This requires
depending on loosely synchronized clocks and deploying timestamps
within the key management protocols.

However, it is known [6] that each of the three key management
schemes has its subtle constraints and limitations:

-   The symmetric key distribution protocol (MIKEY-PS) is simple to
    implement; however, it was not intended to scale to support any
    configurations beyond peer-to-peer, simple one-to-many, and
    small-size (interactive) groups, due to the need for mutually
    pre-assigned shared master secrets.

    Moreover, the security provided does not achieve the property of
    perfect forward secrecy; i.e., compromise of the shared master
    secret would render past and even future session keys susceptible
    to compromise.

    Further, the generation of the session key happens just at the
    initiator. Thus, the responder has to fully trust the initiator
    to choose a good and secure session secret; the responder is able
    neither to participate in the key generation nor to influence that
    process. This is considered a specific limitation in less trusted
    environments.

-   The public-key encryption scheme (MIKEY-PK and MIKEY-RSA-R [33])
    depends upon a public-key infrastructure that certifies the
    private-public keys by issuing and maintaining digital
    certificates. While such key management schemes provide full
    scalability in large networked configurations, public-key
    infrastructures are still not widely available, and, in general,
    implementations are significantly more complex.

Further, additional roundtrips and computational processing might
be necessary for each end system in order to ascertain
verification of the digital certificates. For example, typical
operations in the context of a public-key infrastructure may
involve extra network communication handshakes with the public-key
infrastructure and with certification authorities and may
typically involve additional processing steps in the end systems.
These operations would include validating digital certificates
(RFC 3029, [24]), ascertaining the revocation status of digital
certificates (RFC 2560, [23]), asserting certificate policies,
construction of certification path(s) ([26]), requesting and
obtaining necessary certificates (RFC 2511, [25]), and management
of certificates for such purposes ([22]). Such steps and tasks
all result in further delay of the key agreement or key
establishment phase among the end systems, which negatively
affects setup time. Any extra PKI handshakes and processing are
not in the scope of MIKEY, and since this document only deploys
symmetric security mechanisms, aspects of PKI, digital
certificates, and related processing are not further covered in
this document.

Finally, as in the symmetric case, the responder depends
completely upon the initiator's choosing good and secure session
keys.

-   The third MIKEY-DHSIGN key management protocol deploys the
    Diffie-Hellman key agreement scheme and authenticates the exchange
    of the Diffie-Hellman half-keys in each direction by using a
    digital signature. This approach has the same advantages and
    deficiencies as described in the previous section in terms of a
    public-key infrastructure.

    However, the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol is known for
    its subtle security strengths in that it is able to provide full
    perfect forward secrecy (PFS) and further have to both parties
    actively involved in session key generation. This special
    security property (despite the somewhat higher computational
    costs) makes Diffie-Hellman techniques attractive in practice.

In order to overcome some of the limitations as outlined above, a
special need has been recognized for another efficient key agreement
protocol variant in MIKEY. This protocol variant aims to provide the
capability of perfect forward secrecy as part of a key agreement with
low latency without dependency on a public-key infrastructure.

This document describes a fourth lightweight key management scheme for MIKEY that could somehow be seen as a synergetic optimization between the pre-shared key distribution scheme and the Diffie-Hellman key agreement.

The idea of the protocol in this document is to apply the Diffie-Hellman key agreement, but rather than deploy a digital signature for authenticity of the exchanged keying material, it instead uses a keyed-hash for symmetrically pre-assigned shared secrets. This combination of security mechanisms is called the HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement for MIKEY (DHHMAC).

The DHHMAC variant closely follows the design and philosophy of MIKEY and reuses MIKEY protocol payload components and MIKEY mechanisms to its maximum benefit and for best compatibility.

Like the MIKEY Diffie-Hellman protocol, DHHMAC does not scale beyond a point-to-point constellation; thus, both MIKEY Diffie-Hellman protocols do not support group-based keying for any group size larger than two entities.

1.1. Definitions

The definitions and notations in this document are aligned with MIKEY; see [2] sections 1.3 - 1.4.

All large integer computations in this document should be understood as being mod p within some fixed group G for some large prime p; see [2] section 3.3. However, the DHHMAC protocol is also applicable generally to other appropriate finite, cyclical groups as well.

It is assumed that a pre-shared key s is known by both entities (initiator and responder). The authentication key auth_key is derived from the pre-shared secret s using the pseudo-random function PRF; see [2] sections 4.1.3 and 4.1.5.

In this text, [X] represents an optional piece of information. Generally throughout the text, X SHOULD be present unless certain circumstances MAY allow X to be optional and not to be present, thereby potentially resulting in weaker security. Likewise, [X, Y] represents an optional compound piece of information where the pieces X and Y either SHOULD both be present or MAY optionally both be absent. {X} denotes zero or more occurrences of X.

1.2. Abbreviations

```
    auth_key        Pre-shared authentication key, PRF-derived from
                    pre-shared key s.
    DH              Diffie-Hellman
    DHi             Public Diffie-Hellman half key g^(xi) of the
                    Initiator
    DHr             Public Diffie-Hellman half key g^(xr) of the
                    Responder
    DHHMAC          HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman
    DoS             Denial-of-service
    G               Diffie-Hellman group
    HDR             MIKEY common header payload
    HMAC            Keyed Hash Message Authentication Code
    HMAC-SHA1       HMAC using SHA1 as hash function (160-bit result)
    IDi             Identity of initiator
    IDr             Identity of receiver
    IKE             Internet Key Exchange
    IPsec           Internet Protocol Security
    MIKEY           Multimedia Internet KEYing
    MIKEY-DHHMAC    MIKEY Diffie-Hellman key management protocol using
                    HMAC
    MIKEY-DHSIGN    MIKEY Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol
    MIKEY-PK        MIKEY public-key encryption-based key distribution
                    protocol
    MIKEY-PS        MIKEY pre-shared key distribution protocol
    p               Diffie-Hellman prime modulus
    PKI             Public-key Infrastructure
    PRF             MIKEY pseudo-random function (see [2] section
                    4.1.3)
    RSA             Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman
    s               Pre-shared key
    SDP             Session Description Protocol
    SOI             Son-of-IKE, IKEv2
    SP              MIKEY Security Policy (Parameter) Payload
    T               Timestamp
    TEK             Traffic Encryption Key
    TGK             MIKEY TEK Generation Key, as the common Diffie-
                    Hellman shared secret
    TLS             Transport Layer Security
    xi              Secret, (pseudo) random Diffie-Hellman key of the
                    Initiator
    xr              Secret, (pseudo) random Diffie-Hellman key of the
                    Responder
```

1.3. Conventions Used in This Document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].

2. Scenario

   The HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol (DHHMAC)
   for MIKEY addresses the same scenarios and scope as the other three
   key management schemes in MIKEY address.

   DHHMAC is applicable in a peer-to-peer group where no access to a
   public-key infrastructure can be assumed to be available. Rather,
   pre- shared master secrets are assumed to be available among the
   entities in such an environment.

   In a pair-wise group, it is assumed that each client will be setting
   up a session key for its outgoing links with its peer using the DH-
   MAC key agreement protocol.

   As is the case for the other three MIKEY key management protocols,
   DHHMAC assumes, at least, loosely synchronized clocks among the
   entities in the small group.

   To synchronize the clocks in a secure manner, some operational or
   procedural means are recommended. MIKEY-DHHMAC does not define any
   secure time synchronization measures; however, sections 5.4 and 9.3
   of [2] provide implementation guidance on clock synchronization and
   timestamps.

2.1. Applicability

   MIKEY-DHHMAC and the other MIKEY key management protocols are
   intended for application-level key management and are optimized for
   multimedia applications with real-time session setup and session
   management constraints.

   As the MIKEY-DHHMAC key management protocol terminates in one
   roundtrip, DHHMAC is applicable for integration into two-way
   handshake session or call signaling protocols such as

   a) SIP [13] and SDP, where the encoded MIKEY messages are
      encapsulated and transported in SDP containers of the SDP
      offer/answer see RFC 3264 [27]) handshake, as described in [4];
      and

   b) H.323 (see [15]), where the encoded MIKEY messages are transported
      in the H.225.0 fast start call signaling handshake. Appendix A
      outlines the usage of MIKEY-DHHMAC within H.235.

   MIKEY-DHHMAC is offered as an option to the other MIKEY key
   management variants (MIKEY-pre-shared, MIKEY-public-key and MIKEY-
   DH-SIGN) for all those cases where DHHMAC has its particular
   strengths (see section 5).

2.2. Relation to GKMARCH

   The Group key management architecture (GKMARCH) [19] describes a
   generic architecture for multicast security group key management
   protocols. In the context of this architecture, MIKEY-DHHMAC may
   operate as a registration protocol; see also [2] section 2.4. The
   main entities involved in the architecture are a group controller/key
   server (GCKS), the receiver(s), and the sender(s). Due to the pair-
   wise nature of the Diffie-Hellman operation and the 1-roundtrip
   constraint, usage of MIKEY-DHHMAC rules out any deployment as a group
   key management protocol with more than two group entities. Only the
   degenerate case with two peers is possible where, for example, the
   responder acts as the group controller.

   Note that MIKEY does not provide re-keying in the GKMARCH sense, only
   updating of the keys by normal unicast messages.

3. DHHMAC Security Protocol

   The following figure defines the security protocol for DHHMAC:

```
            Initiator                      Responder

   I_message = HDR, T, RAND, [IDi], IDr,
           {SP}, DHi, KEMAC
               ----------------------->  R_message = HDR, T,
                                          [IDr], IDi, DHr,
                                           DHi, KEMAC
               <---------------------
```

       Figure 1: HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key-based exchange,
         where xi and xr are (pseudo) randomly chosen, respectively,
                 by the initiator and the responder.

   The DHHMAC key exchange SHALL be done according to Figure 1. The
   initiator chooses a (pseudo) random value, xi, and sends an HMACed
   message including $g^{(xi)}$ and a timestamp to the responder. It is
   recommended that the initiator SHOULD always include the identity

payloads IDi and IDr within the I_message; unless the receiver can
defer the initiator's identity by some other means, IDi MAY
optionally be omitted. The initiator SHALL always include the
recipient's identity.

The group parameters (e.g., the group G) are a set of parameters
chosen by the initiator. Note that like in the MIKEY protocol, both
sender and receiver explicitly transmit the Diffie-Hellman group G
within the Diffie-Hellman payload DHi or DHr through an encoding
(e.g., OAKLEY group numbering; see [2] section 6.4). The actual
group parameters g and p, however, are not explicitly transmitted but
can be deduced from the Diffie-Hellman group G. The responder
chooses a (pseudo) random positive integer, xr, and sends an HMACed
message including g^(xr) and the timestamp to the initiator. The
responder SHALL always include the initiator's identity IDi
regardless of whether the I_message conveyed any IDi. It is
RECOMMENDED that the responder SHOULD always include the identity
payload IDr within the R_message; unless the initiator can defer the
responder's identity by some other means, IDr MAY optionally be left
out.

Both parties then calculate the TGK as g^(xi * xr).

The HMAC authentication provides authentication of the DH half-keys
and is necessary to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.

This approach is less expensive than digitally signed Diffie-Hellman
in that both sides compute one exponentiation and one HMAC first,
then one HMAC verification, and finally another Diffie-Hellman
exponentiation.

With off-line pre-computation, the initial Diffie-Hellman half-key
MAY be computed before the key management transaction and thereby MAY
further reduce the overall roundtrip delay, as well as the risk of
denial-of-service attacks.

Processing of the TGK SHALL be accomplished as described in MIKEY [2]
section 4.

The computed HMAC result SHALL be conveyed in the KEMAC payload field
where the MAC fields holds the HMAC result. The HMAC SHALL be
computed over the entire message, excluding the MAC field using
auth_key; see also section 4.2.

3.1. TGK Re-keying

   TGK re-keying for DHHMAC generally proceeds as described in [2]
   section 4.5. Specifically, Figure 2 provides the message exchange
   for the DHHMAC update message.

```
                 Initiator                        Responder

   I_message = HDR, T, [IDi], IDr,
               {SP}, [DHi], KEMAC
                        ----------------------> R_message = HDR, T,
                                                  [IDr], IDi,
                                                  [DHr, DHi], KEMAC
                        <----------------------
```

                  Figure 2: DHHMAC update message

   TGK re-keying supports two procedures:

   a) True re-keying by exchanging new and fresh Diffie-Hellman half-
      keys. For this, the initiator SHALL provide a new, fresh DHi, and
      the responder SHALL respond with a new, fresh DHr and the received
      DHi.

   b) Non-key related information update without including any Diffie-
      Hellman half-keys in the exchange. Such a transaction does not
      change the actual TGK but updates other information such as
      security policy parameters. To update the non-key related
      information only, [DHi] and [DHr, DHi] SHALL be left out.

4. DHHMAC Payload Formats

   This section specifies the payload formats and data type values for
   DHHMAC; see also [2] section 6, for a definition of the MIKEY
   payloads.

   This document does not define new payload formats but re-uses MIKEY
   payloads for DHHMAC as referenced:

   * Common header payload (HDR); see section 4.1 and [2] section 6.1.

   * SRTP ID sub-payload; see [2] section 6.1.1.

   * Key data transport payload (KEMAC); see section 4.2 and [2] section
     6.2.

   * DH data payload; see [2] section 6.4.

   * Timestamp payload; see [2] section 6.6.

   * ID payload; [2] section 6.7.

   * Security Policy payload (SP); see [2] section 6.10.

   * RAND payload (RAND); see [2] section 6.11.

   * Error payload (ERR); see [2] section 6.12.

   * General Extension Payload; see [2] section 6.15.

4.1. Common Header Payload (HDR)

   Referring to [2] section 6.1, the following data types SHALL be used
   for DHHMAC:

Data type	Value	Comment
DHHMAC init	7	Initiator's DHHMAC exchange message
DHHMAC resp	8	Responder's DHHMAC exchange message
Error	6	Error message; see [2] section 6.12

                         Table 4.1.a

   Note: A responder is able to recognize the MIKEY DHHMAC protocol by
   evaluating the data type field as 7 or 8. This is how the responder
   can differentiate between MIKEY and MIKEY DHHMAC.

   The next payload field SHALL be one of the following values:

Next payload	Value	Section
Last payload	0	-
KEMAC	1	section 4.2 and [2] section 6.2
DH	3	[2] section 6.4
T	5	[2] section 6.6
ID	6	[2] section 6.7
SP	10	[2] section 6.10
RAND	11	[2] section 6.11
ERR	12	[2] section 6.12
General Ext.	21	[2] section 6.15

                         Table 4.1.b

   Other defined next payload values defined in [2] SHALL not be applied
   to DHHMAC.

   In case of a decoding error or of a failed HMAC authentication
   verification, the responder SHALL apply the Error payload data type.

4.2. Key Data Transport Payload (KEMAC)

   DHHMAC SHALL apply this payload for conveying the HMAC result along
   with the indicated authentication algorithm. When used in
   conjunction with DHHMAC, KEMAC SHALL not convey any encrypted data;
   thus, Encr alg SHALL be set to 2 (NULL), Encr data len SHALL be set
   to 0, and Encr data SHALL be left empty. The AES key wrap method
   (see [16]) SHALL not be applied for DHHMAC.

   For DHHMAC, this key data transport payload SHALL be the last payload
   in the message. Note that the Next payload field SHALL be set to
   Last payload. The HMAC is then calculated over the entire MIKEY
   message, excluding the MAC field using auth_key as described in [2]
   section 5.2, and then stored within the MAC field.

MAC alg	Value	Comments
HMAC-SHA-1	0	Mandatory, Default (see [3])
NULL	1	Very restricted use; see [2] section 4.2.4

                          Table 4.2.a

   HMAC-SHA-1 is the default hash function that MUST be implemented as
   part of the DHHMAC. The length of the HMAC-SHA-1 result is 160 bits.

4.3. ID Payload (ID)

   For DHHMAC, this payload SHALL only hold a non-certificate-based
   identity.

4.4. General Extension Payload

   For DHHMAC, to avoid bidding-down attacks, this payload SHALL list
   all key management protocol identifiers of a surrounding
   encapsulation protocol, such as SDP [4]. The General Extension
   Payload SHALL be integrity protected with the HMAC using the shared
   secret.

Type	Value	Comments
SDP IDs	1	List of SDP key management IDs (allocated for use in [4]); see also [2] section 6.15.

                          Table 4.4.a

5. Security Considerations

    This document addresses key management security issues throughout.
    For a comprehensive explanation of MIKEY security considerations,
    please refer to MIKEY [2] section 9.

    In addition, this document addresses security issues according to
    [7], where the following security considerations apply in particular
    to this document:

5.1. Security Environment

    The DHHMAC security protocol described in this document focuses
    primarily on communication security; i.e., the security issues
    concerned with the MIKEY DHHMAC protocol. Nevertheless, some system
    security issues are also of interest that are not explicitly defined
    by the DHHMAC protocol, but that should be provided locally in
    practice.

    The system that runs the DHHMAC protocol entity SHALL provide the
    capability to generate (pseudo) random numbers as input to the
    Diffie-Hellman operation (see [8]). Furthermore, the system SHALL be
    capable of storing the generated (pseudo) random data, secret data,
    keys, and other secret security parameters securely (i.e.,
    confidential and safe from unauthorized tampering).

5.2. Threat Model

    The threat model, to which this document adheres, covers the issues
    of end-to-end security in the Internet generally, without ruling out
    the possibility that MIKEY DHHMAC can be deployed in a corporate,
    closed IP environment. This also includes the possibility that MIKEY
    DHHMAC can be deployed on a hop-by-hop basis with some intermediate
    trusted "MIKEY DHHMAC proxies" involved.

    Since DHHMAC is a key management protocol, the following security
    threats are of concern:

    * Unauthorized interception of plain TGKs: For DHHMAC, this threat
      does not occur since the TGK is not actually transmitted on the
      wire (not even in encrypted fashion).

    * Eavesdropping of other, transmitted keying information: DHHMAC
      protocol does not explicitly transmit the TGK at all. Instead, by
      using the Diffie-Hellman "encryption" operation, which conceals the
      secret (pseudo) random values, only partial information (i.e., the
      DH half-key) for construction of the TGK is transmitted. It is
      fundamentally assumed that availability of such Diffie-Hellman

half-keys to an eavesdropper does not result in any substantial
security risk; see 5.4. Furthermore, the DHHMAC carries other data
such as timestamps, (pseudo) random values, identification
information or security policy parameters; eavesdropping of any
such data is not considered to yield any significant security risk.

* Masquerade of either entity: This security threat must be avoided,
  and if a masquerade attack would be attempted, appropriate
  detection means must be in place. DHHMAC addresses this threat by
  providing mutual peer entity authentication.

* Man-in-the-middle attacks: Such attacks threaten the security of
  exchanged, non-authenticated messages. Man-in-the-middle attacks
  usually come with masquerade and or loss of message integrity (see
  below). Man-in-the-middle attacks must be avoided and, if present
  or attempted, must be detected appropriately. DHHMAC addresses
  this threat by providing mutual peer entity authentication and
  message integrity.

* Loss of integrity: This security threat relates to unauthorized
  replay, deletion, insertion, and manipulation of messages.
  Although any such attacks cannot be avoided, they must at least be
  detected. DHHMAC addresses this threat by providing message
  integrity.

* Bidding-down attacks: When multiple key management protocols, each
  of a distinct security level, are offered (such as those made
  possible by SDP [4]), avoiding bidding-down attacks is of concern.
  DHHMAC addresses this threat by reusing the MIKEY General Extension
  Payload mechanism, where all key management protocol identifiers
  are to be listed within the MIKEY General Extension Payload.

Some potential threats are not within the scope of this threat model:

* Passive and off-line cryptanalysis of the Diffie-Hellman algorithm:
  Under certain reasonable assumptions (see 5.4, below), it is widely
  believed that DHHMAC is sufficiently secure and that such attacks
  are infeasible, although the possibility of a successful attack
  cannot be ruled out.

* Non-repudiation of the receipt or of the origin of the message:
  These are not requirements within the context of DHHMAC in this
  environment, and thus related countermeasures are not provided at
  all.

* Denial-of-service or distributed denial-of-service attacks: Some
  considerations are given on some of those attacks, but DHHMAC does
  not claim to provide full countermeasure against any of those
  attacks. For example, stressing the availability of the entities
  is not thwarted by means of the key management protocol; some other
  local countermeasures should be applied. Further, some DoS attacks
  are not countered, such as interception of a valid DH- request and
  its massive instant duplication. Such attacks might at least be
  countered partially by some local means that are outside the scope
  of this document.

* Identity protection: Like MIKEY, identity protection is not a major
  design requirement for MIKEY-DHHMAC, either; see [2]. No security
  protocol is known so far that is able to provide the objectives of
  DHHMAC as stated in section 5.3, including identity protection
  within just a single roundtrip. MIKEY-DHHMAC trades identity
  protection for better security for the keying material and shorter
  roundtrip time. Thus, MIKEY-DHHMAC does not provide identity
  protection on its own but may inherit such property from a security
  protocol underneath that actually features identity protection.

  The DHHMAC security protocol (see section 3) and the TGK re-keying
  security protocol (see section 3.1) provide the option not to
  supply identity information. This option is only applicable if
  some other means are available to supply trustworthy identity
  information; e.g., by relying on secured links underneath MIKEY
  that supply trustworthy identity information some other way.
  However, it is understood that without identity information, the
  MIKEY key management security protocols might be subject to
  security weaknesses such as masquerade, impersonation, and
  reflection attacks, particularly in end-to-end scenarios where no
  other secure means of assured identity information are provided.

  Leaving identity fields optional (if doing so is possible) thus
  should not be seen as a privacy method, either, but rather as a
  protocol optimization feature.

5.3. Security Features and Properties

   With the security threats in mind, this document provides the
   following security features and yields the following properties:

   * Secure key agreement with the establishment of a TGK at both peers:
     This is achieved using an authenticated Diffie-Hellman key
     management protocol.

   * Peer-entity authentication (mutual): This authentication
     corroborates that the host/user is authentic in that possession of
     a pre-assigned secret key is proven using keyed HMAC.
     Authentication occurs on the request and on the response message;
     thus authentication is mutual.

     The HMAC computation corroborates for authentication and message
     integrity of the exchanged Diffie-Hellman half-keys and associated
     messages. The authentication is absolutely necessary in order to
     avoid man-in-the-middle attacks on the exchanged messages in
     transit and, in particular, on the otherwise non-authenticated
     exchanged Diffie-Hellman half-keys.

     Note: This document does not address issues regarding
     authorization; this feature is not provided explicitly. However,
     DHHMAC authentication means support and facilitate realization of
     authorization means (local issue).

   * Cryptographic integrity check: The cryptographic integrity check is
     achieved using a message digest (keyed HMAC). It includes the
     exchanged Diffie-Hellman half-keys but covers the other parts of
     the exchanged message as well. Both mutual peer entity
     authentication and message integrity provide effective
     countermeasures against man-in-the-middle attacks.

     The initiator may deploy a local timer that fires when the awaited
     response message did not arrive in a timely manner. This is
     intended to detect deletion of entire messages.

   * Replay protection of the messages is achieved using embedded
     timestamps: In order to detect replayed messages, it is essential
     that the clocks among initiator and sender be roughly synchronized.
     The reader is referred to [2] section 5.4, and [2] section 9.3,
     which provide further considerations and give guidance on clock
     synchronization and timestamp usage. Should the clock
     synchronization be lost, end systems cannot detect replayed
     messages anymore, and the end systems cannot securely establish
     keying material. This may result in a denial-of-service; see [2]
     section 9.5.

   * Limited DoS protection: Rapid checking of the message digest allows
     verifying the authenticity and integrity of a message before
     launching CPU intensive Diffie-Hellman operations or starting other
     resource consuming tasks. This protects against some denial-of-
     service attacks: malicious modification of messages and spam
     attacks with (replayed or masqueraded) messages. DHHMAC probably
     does not explicitly counter sophisticated distributed, large-scale
     denial-of-service attacks that compromise system availability, for

example. Some DoS protection is provided by inclusion of the
initiator's identity payload in the I_message. This allows the
recipient to filter out those (replayed) I_messages that are not
targeted for him and to avoid creating unnecessary MIKEY sessions.

* Perfect-forward secrecy (PFS): Other than the MIKEY pre-shared and
  public-key-based key distribution protocols, the Diffie-Hellman key
  agreement protocol features a security property called perfect
  forward secrecy. That is, even if the long-term pre-shared key is
  compromised at some point in time, this does not compromise past or
  future session keys.

  Neither the MIKEY pre-shared nor the MIKEY public-key protocol
  variants are able to provide the security property of perfect-
  forward secrecy. Thus, none of the other MIKEY protocols is able
  to substitute the Diffie-Hellman PFS property.

  As such, DHHMAC and digitally signed DH provide a far superior
  security level to that of the pre-shared or public-key-based key
  distribution protocol in that respect.

* Fair, mutual key contribution: The Diffie-Hellman key management
  protocol is not a strict key distribution protocol per se, in which
  the initiator distributes a key to its peers. Actually, both
  parties involved in the protocol exchange are able to contribute to
  the common Diffie-Hellman TEK traffic generating key equally. This
  reduces the risk of either party cheating or unintentionally
  generating a weak session key. This makes the DHHMAC a fair key
  agreement protocol. One may view this property as an additional
  distributed security measure that increases security robustness
  over that of the case where all the security depends just on the
  proper implementation of a single entity.

  For Diffie-Hellman key agreement to be secure, each party SHALL
  generate its xi or xr values using a strong, unpredictable pseudo-
  random generator if a source of true randomness is not available.
  Further, these values xi or xr SHALL be kept private. It is
  RECOMMENDED that these secret values be destroyed once the common
  Diffie-Hellman shared secret key has been established.

* Efficiency and performance: Like the MIKEY-public key protocol, the
  MIKEY DHHMAC key agreement protocol securely establishes a TGK
  within just one roundtrip. Other existing key management
  techniques, such as IPsec-IKE [12], IPsec-IKEv2 [14], TLS [11], and
  other schemes, are not deemed adequate in addressing those real-
  time and security requirements sufficiently; they all use more than
  a single roundtrip. All the MIKEY key management protocols are
  able to complete their task of security policy parameter

negotiation, including key-agreement or key distribution, in one roundtrip. However, the MIKEY pre-shared and MIKEY public-key protocol are both able to complete their task even in a half-roundtrip when the confirmation messages are omitted.

Using HMAC in conjunction with a strong one-way hash function (such as SHA1) may be achieved more efficiently in software than expensive public-key operations. This yields a particular performance benefit of DHHMAC over signed DH or the public-key encryption protocol.

If a very high security level is desired for long-term secrecy of the negotiated Diffie-Hellman shared secret, longer hash values may be deployed, such as SHA256, SHA384, or SHA512 provide, possibly in conjunction with stronger Diffie-Hellman groups. This is left as for further study.

For the sake of improved performance and reduced roundtrip delay, either party may pre-compute its public Diffie-Hellman half-key off-line.

On the other side and under reasonable conditions, DHHMAC consumes more CPU cycles than the MIKEY pre-shared key distribution protocol. The same might hold true quite likely for the MIKEY public-key distribution protocol (depending on choice of the private and public key lengths). As such, it can be said that DHHMAC provides sound performance when compared with the other MIKEY protocol variants.

The use of optional identity information (with the constraints stated in section 5.2) and optional Diffie-Hellman half-key fields provides a means to increase performance and shorten the consumed network bandwidth.

* Security infrastructure: This document describes the HMAC-authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol, which completely avoids digital signatures and the associated public-key infrastructure, as would be necessary for the X.509 RSA public-key-based key distribution protocol or the digitally signed Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol as described in MIKEY. Public-key infrastructures may not always be available in certain environments, nor may they be deemed adequate for real-time multimedia applications when additional steps are taken for certificate validation and certificate revocation methods with additional roundtrips into account.

      DHHMAC does not depend on PKI, nor do implementations require PKI
      standards. Thus, it is believed to be much simpler than the more
      complex PKI facilities.

      DHHMAC is particularly attractive in those environments where
      provisioning of a pre-shared key has already been accomplished.

   * NAT-friendliness: DHHMAC is able to operate smoothly through
      firewall/NAT devices as long as the protected identity information
      of the end entity is not an IP/transport address.

   * Scalability: Like the MIKEY signed Diffie-Hellman protocol, DHHMAC
      does not scale to any larger configurations beyond peer-to-peer
      groups.

5.4. Assumptions

   This document states a couple of assumptions upon which the security
   of DHHMAC significantly depends. The following conditions are
   assumed:

   * The parameters xi, xr, s, and auth_key are to be kept secret.

   * The pre-shared key s has sufficient entropy and cannot be
      effectively guessed.

   * The pseudo-random function (PRF) is secure, yields the pseudo-
      random property, and maintains the entropy.

   * A sufficiently large and secure Diffie-Hellman group is applied.

   * The Diffie-Hellman assumption holds saying basically that even with
      knowledge of the exchanged Diffie-Hellman half-keys and knowledge
      of the Diffie-Hellman group, it is infeasible to compute the TGK or
      to derive the secret parameters xi or xr. The latter is also
      called the discrete logarithm assumption. Please see [6], [9], or
      [10] for more background information regarding the Diffie-Hellman
      problem and its computational complexity assumptions.

   * The hash function (SHA1) is secure; i.e., it is computationally
      infeasible to find a message that corresponds to a given message
      digest, or to find two different messages that produce the same
      message digest.

   * The HMAC algorithm is secure and does not leak the auth_key. In
      particular, the security depends on the message authentication
      property of the compression function of the hash function H when it
      is applied to single blocks (see [5]).

   * A source capable of producing sufficiently many bits of (pseudo)
     randomness is available.

   * The system upon which DHHMAC runs is sufficiently secure.

5.5. Residual Risk

   Although these detailed assumptions are non-negligible, security
   experts generally believe that all these assumptions are reasonable
   and that the assumptions made can be fulfilled in practice with
   little or no expenses.

   The mathematical and cryptographic assumptions of the properties of
   the PRF, the Diffie-Hellman algorithm (discrete log-assumption), the
   HMAC algorithm, and the SHA1 algorithms have been neither proven nor
   disproven at this time.

   Thus, a certain residual risk remains, which might threaten the
   overall security at some unforeseeable time in the future.

   The DHHMAC would be compromised as soon as any of the listed
   assumptions no longer hold.

   The Diffie-Hellman mechanism is a generic security technique that is
   not only applicable to groups of prime order or of characteristic
   two. This is because of the fundamental mathematical assumption that
   the discrete logarithm problem is also a very hard one in general
   groups. This enables Diffie-Hellman to be deployed also for GF(p)*,
   for sub-groups of sufficient size, and for groups upon elliptic
   curves. RSA does not allow such generalization, as the core
   mathematical problem is a different one (large integer
   factorization).

   RSA asymmetric keys tend to become increasingly lengthy (1536 bits
   and more) and thus very computationally intensive. Nevertheless,
   Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) allows key lengths to be cut
   down substantially (say 170 bits or more) while maintaining at least
   the security level and providing even more significant performance
   benefits in practice. Moreover, it is believed that elliptic-curve
   techniques provide much better protection against side channel
   attacks due to the inherent redundancy in the projective coordinates.
   For all these reasons, one may view elliptic-curve-based Diffie-
   Hellman as being more "future-proof" and robust against potential
   threats than RSA is. Note that Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
   variants of MIKEY are defined in [31].

HMAC-SHA1 is a key security mechanism within DHHMAC on which the
overall security of MIKEY DHHMAC depends. MIKEY DHHMAC uses HMAC-
SHA1 in combination with the classic Diffie-Hellman key agreement
scheme. HMAC-SHA1 is a keyed one-way hash function that involves a
secret in its computation. DHHMAC applies HMAC-SHA1 for protection
of the MIKEY payload. Likewise, the pseudo-random function PRF
within MIKEY [2] uses the HMAC-SHA1 mechanism as a key derivation
function. While certain attacks have been reported against SHA1 and
MD5 (see [29]), with current knowledge (see [29], [30]), no attacks
have been reported against the HMAC-SHA1 security mechanism. In
fact, [32] proves that HMAC possesses the property of a pseudo-random
function PRF assuming solely that the (SHA1) hash function is a
pseudo-random function. [32] also provides evidence that HMAC is
robust against collision attacks on the underlying hash function. It
is believed that MIKEY DHHMAC should be considered secure enough for
the time being. Thus, there is no need to change the underlying
security mechanism within the MIKEY DHHMAC protocol.

It is not recommended to deploy DHHMAC for any other use than that
depicted in section 2. Any misapplication might lead to unknown,
undefined properties.

5.6. Authorization and Trust Model

Basically, similar remarks on authorization as those stated in [2]
section 4.3.2 hold also for DHHMAC. However, as noted before, this
key management protocol does not serve full groups.

One may view the pre-established shared secret as yielding some pre-
established trust relationship between the initiator and the
responder. This results in a much simpler trust model for DHHMAC
than would be the case for some generic group key management protocol
and potential group entities without any pre-defined trust
relationship. In conjunction with the assumption of a shared key,
the common group controller simplifies the communication setup of the
entities.

One may view the pre-established trust relationship through the pre-
shared secret as some means for pre-granted, implied authorization.
This document does not define any particular authorization means but
leaves this subject to the application.

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7. IANA Considerations

    This document does not define its own new name spaces for DHHMAC,
    beyond the IANA name spaces that have been assigned for MIKEY; see
    [2] sections 10 and 10.1 and IANA MIKEY payload name spaces [37].

    In order to align Table 4.1.a with Table 6.1.a in [2], IANA is
    requested to add the following entries to their MIKEY Payload Name
    Space:

    Data Type   Value Reference
    --------------   ----- ---------
    DHHMAC init   7   RFC 4650
    DHHMAC resp   8   RFC 4650

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Appendix A.   Usage of MIKEY-DHHMAC in H.235

   This appendix provides informative overview how MIKEY-DHHMAC can be
   applied in some H.323-based multimedia environments. Generally,
   MIKEY is applicable for multimedia applications including IP
   telephony. [15] describes various use cases of the MIKEY key
   management protocols (MIKEY-PS, MIKEY-PK, MIKEY-DHSIGN and MIKEY-
   DHHMAC) with the purpose to establish TGK keying material among H.323
   endpoints. The TGKs are then used for media encryption by applying
   SRTP [20]. Addressed scenarios include point-to-point with one or
   more intermediate gatekeepers (trusted or partially trusted) in
   between.

   One particular use case addresses MIKEY-DHHMAC to establish a media
   connection from an endpoint B calling (through a gatekeeper) to
   another endpoint A that is located within that same gatekeeper zone.
   While EP-A and EP-B typically do not share any auth_key a priori,
   some separate protocol exchange means are achieved outside the actual
   call setup procedure to establish an auth_key for the time while
   endpoints are being registered with the gatekeeper; such protocols
   exist [15] but are not shown in this document. The auth_key between
   the endpoints is being used to authenticate and integrity protect the
   MIKEY-DHHMAC messages.

   To establish a call, it is assumed that endpoint B has obtained
   permission from the gatekeeper (not shown). Endpoint B as the caller
   builds the MIKEY-DHHMAC I_message (see section 3) and sends the
   I_message encapsulated within the H.323-SETUP to endpoint A. A
   routing gatekeeper (GK) would forward this message to endpoint B; in
   case of a non-routing gatekeeper, endpoint B sends the SETUP directly
   to endpoint A. In either case, H.323 inherent security mechanisms
   [21] are applied to protect the (encapsulation) message during
   transfer. This is not depicted here. The receiving endpoint A is
   able to verify the conveyed I_message and can compute a TGK.
   Assuming that endpoint A would accept the call, EP-A then builds the
   MIKEY-DHHMAC R_message and sends the response as part of the
   CallProceeding-to-Connect message back to the calling endpoint B
   (possibly through a routing gatekeeper). Endpoint B processes the
   conveyed R_message to compute the same TGK as the called endpoint A.

   1.) EP-B -> (GK) -> EP-A: SETUP(I_fwd_message [, I_rev_message])
   2.) EP-A -> (GK) -> EP-B: CallProceeding-to-CONNECT(R_fwd_message
       [, R_rev_message])

   Notes: If it is necessary to establish directional TGKs for full-
          duplex links in both directions B->A and A->B, then the
          calling endpoint B instantiates the DHHMAC protocol twice:
          once in the direction B->A using I_fwd_message and another run

      in parallel in the direction A->B using I_rev_message. In
      that case, two MIKEY-DHHMAC I_messages are encapsulated within
      SETUP (I_fwd_message and I_rev_message) and two MIKEY-DHHMAC
      R_messages (R_fwd_message and R_rev_message) are encapsulated
      within CallProceeding-to-CONNECT. The I_rev_message
      corresponds with the I_fwd_message. Alternatively, the called
      endpoint A may instantiate the DHHMAC protocol in a separate
      run with endpoint B (not shown); however, this requires a
      third handshake to complete.

      For more details on how the MIKEY protocols may be deployed
      with H.235, please refer to [15].

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