                    HTTP Header Field X-Frame-Options

Abstract

   To improve the protection of web applications against clickjacking,
   this document describes the X-Frame-Options HTTP header field, which
   declares a policy, communicated from the server to the client
   browser, regarding whether the browser may display the transmitted
   content in frames that are part of other web pages.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
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   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7034.

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1. Introduction

   In 2009 and 2010, many browser vendors ([Microsoft-X-Frame-Options],
   [CLICK-DEFENSE-BLOG], and [Mozilla-X-Frame-Options]) introduced the
   use of a non-standard HTTP [RFC2616] header field "X-Frame-Options"
   to protect against clickjacking [Clickjacking]. HTML-based web
   applications can embed or "frame" other web pages. Clickjacking is a
   type of attack that occurs when an attacker uses multiple transparent
   or opaque layers in the user interface to trick a user into clicking
   on a button or link on another page from server B when they were
   intending to click on the same place of the overlaying page from
   server A. Thus, the attacker is "hijacking" clicks meant for page A
   and routing them to page B. The attacker is tricking the user (who
   sees the overlaying user interface content from page A) into clicking
   specific locations on the underlying page from server B, triggering
   some actions on server B and potentially using an existing session
   context in that step. This is an attack on both the user and on
   server B. In addition, server A may or may not be the attacker.

   This specification provides informational documentation about the
   current use and definition of the X-Frame-Options HTTP header field.
   As described in Section 2.3.2.2, not all browsers implement
   X-Frame-Options in exactly the same way, which can lead to unintended
   results. And, given that the "X-" construction is deprecated
   [RFC6648], the X-Frame-Options header field will be replaced in the
   future by the Frame-Options directive in the Content Security Policy
   (CSP) version 1.1 [CSP-1-1].

   A study [FRAME-BUSTING] demonstrated that existing anti-clickjacking
   measures, e.g., frame-breaking JavaScript, have weaknesses that allow
   their protection to be circumvented.

   Short of configuring the browser to disable frames and scripts
   entirely, which massively impairs browser utility, browser users are
   vulnerable to this type of attack.

   The use of "X-Frame-Options" allows a web page from host B to declare
   that its content (for example, a button, links, text, etc.) must not
   be displayed in a frame (<frame> or <iframe>) of another page (e.g.,
   from host A). This is done by a policy declared in the HTTP header
   and enforced by browser implementations as documented here.

1.1. Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].

2. X-Frame-Options Header

   The X-Frame-Options HTTP header field indicates a policy that
   specifies whether the browser should render the transmitted resource
   within a <frame> or an <iframe>. Servers can declare this policy in
   the header of their HTTP responses to prevent clickjacking attacks,
   which ensures that their content is not embedded into other pages or
   frames.

2.1. Syntax

   The header field name is:

      X-Frame-Options

   There are three different values for the header field. These values
   are mutually exclusive; that is, the header field MUST be set to
   exactly one of the three values.

   DENY
      A browser receiving content with this header field MUST NOT
      display this content in any frame.

   SAMEORIGIN
      A browser receiving content with this header field MUST NOT
      display this content in any frame from a page of different origin
      than the content itself.

      If a browser or plugin cannot reliably determine whether or not
      the origin of the content and the frame are the same, this MUST be
      treated as "DENY".

      Please note that current implementations vary on the
      interpretation of this criteria. In some, it only allows a page
      to be framed if the origin of the top-level browsing context is
      identical to the origin of the content using the X-Frame-Options
      directive; in others, it may consider the origin of the framing
      page instead. Also see Section 2.3.2.2 for more details on the
      nesting of frames and variations in the handling of this header
      field by different browsers. In addition, refer to Section 4,
      paragraph 2 for the resulting potential security problems.

   ALLOW-FROM (followed by a serialized-origin [RFC6454])
      A browser receiving content with this header MUST NOT display this
      content in a frame from any page with a top-level browsing context
      of different origin than the specified origin. While this can

        expose the page to risks by the trusted origin, in some cases, it
        may be necessary to allow the framing by content from other
        domains.

    The meaning of the term "serialized-origin" is given in [RFC6454].
    If the ALLOW-FROM value is used, it MUST be followed by a valid
    origin [RFC6454] (as a subset of the URI [RFC3986]).

    Any data beyond the domain address (i.e., any data after the "/"
    separator) is to be ignored. The algorithm to compare origins from
    [RFC6454] SHOULD be used to verify that a referring page is of the
    same origin as the content (in the case of SAMEORIGIN) or that the
    referring page's origin is identical with the ALLOW-FROM serialized-
    origin (in the case of ALLOW-FROM). Though in conflict with
    [RFC6454], current implementations do not consider the port as a
    defining component of the origin; i.e., existing implementations
    differ with [RFC6454] in that origins with the same protocol but
    different port values are considered equivalent.

    Wildcards or lists to declare multiple domains in one ALLOW-FROM
    statement are not permitted (see Section 2.3.2.3).

2.2.   Augmented Backus-Naur Form (ABNF)

    The RFC 5234 [RFC5234] ABNF of the X-Frame-Options header field value
    is the following:

        X-Frame-Options = "DENY"
                    / "SAMEORIGIN"
                    / ("ALLOW-FROM" RWS SERIALIZED-ORIGIN)

        RWS   = 1*(SP / HTAB)
                    ; required whitespace

    with serialized-origin as defined in [RFC6454] and required
    whitespace (RWS) as defined in [HTTPbis-P1].

    RWS is used when at least one linear whitespace octet is required to
    separate field tokens. RWS SHOULD be generated as a single space
    (SP). Multiple RWS octets that occur within field-content SHOULD
    either be replaced with a SP or transformed to all SP octets before
    interpreting the field value or forwarding the message downstream.

    SP and horizontal tab (HTAB) are as defined in Appendix B.1 of RFC
    5234 [RFC5234].

    The values are specified as ABNF strings; therefore, they are case-
    insensitive.

2.2.1. Examples of X-Frame-Options

      X-Frame-Options: DENY

      X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN

      X-Frame-Options: ALLOW-FROM https://example.com/

2.3. Design Issues

2.3.1. Enable HTML Content from Other Domains

   There are a number of main direct vectors that enable HTML content
   from other domains, and browser implementations of X-Frame-Options
   cover all of them:

   o IFRAME tag

   o Frame tag

   o Object tag (requires a redirect)

   o Applet tag

   o Embed tag

   Besides these, other ways to host HTML content can be possible. For
   example, some plugins may host HTML views directly. If these plugins
   appear essentially as frames (as opposed to top-level windows), the
   plugins must conform to the X-Frame-Options policy as specified in
   this document as well.

2.3.2. Browser Behavior and Processing

   To allow secure implementations, browsers must behave in a consistent
   and reliable way.

   If an X-Frame-Options HTTP header field prohibits framing, the user
   agent of the browser MAY immediately abort downloading or parsing of
   the document.

2.3.2.1. Violation of X-Frame-Options

   When a browser discovers that loaded content with the X-Frame-Options
   header field would be displayed in a frame against the specified
   orders of the header, the browser SHOULD redirect to a "NOFRAME" page
   as soon as possible. For example, this can be a noframe.html page
   that also states the full URL and hostname of the protected page.

   The NOFRAME page could provide the user with an option to open the
   target URL in a new window.

   Implementations of this vary: some browsers will show a message that
   allows the user to safely open the target page in a new window,
   whereas other implementations will simply render an empty frame.

2.3.2.2. Variation in Current Browser Behavior

   There are currently variations in the implementation of the
   X-Frame-Options header. For example, not all browsers support the
   "ALLOW-FROM" option. "ALLOW-FROM" was initially an Internet Explorer
   extension and, at the time of writing, has not been uniformly
   implemented by other user agents.

   Furthermore, the criteria for the SAMEORIGIN (and ALLOW-FROM)
   directive may not be evaluated unanimously either: the known
   implementations in Appendix A evaluate the SAMEORIGIN directive based
   on the origin of the framed page and the top-level browsing context,
   while other implementations might evaluate it based on the framed
   page and the framing page, or the whole chain of nested frames in
   between.

   To illustrate the difference between the comparison of the "framing
   page" and the "top-level browsing context", consider the following
   scenario: web pages may embed frames with other pages that, in turn,
   embed frames with other pages as well, and so on. In theory, this
   can result in an infinite nesting of framed pages. For example, web
   page A may contain web page B in a frame, and web page B may contain
   web page C in a frame.

   Web page A
   <html>
   ....
   <frame src="https://URI_of_web_page_B" />
   </html>

   Web page B
   <html>
   ....
   <frame src="https://URI_of_web_page_C" />
   </html>

   and so forth.

   In this example, for the nested frames with the inner-framed web page
   C, the most outer web page A would be the "top-level browsing
   context", and web page B would be the "framing page".

These potential variations in the evaluation of the header by
different implementations impair the usage and reliability of this
HTTP header and have security implications as described in Section 4.
A revised version of X-Frame-Options in the form of a Frame-Options
directive in CSP 1.1 [CSP-1-1] will unify the behavior, and it is
expected that newer implementations will use it rather than the
mechanisms documented here.

2.3.2.3. Usage Design Pattern and Example Scenario for the ALLOW-FROM
          Parameter

As the "ALLOW-FROM" field only supports one serialized-origin, in
cases when the server wishes to allow more than one resource to frame
its content, the following design pattern can fulfill that need:

1. A page that wants to render the requested content in a frame
    supplies its own origin information to the server providing the
    content to be framed via a query string parameter.

2. The server verifies that the hostname meets its criteria, so that
    the page is allowed to be framed by the target resource. This
    may, for example, happen via a lookup of a whitelist of trusted
    domain names that are allowed to frame the page. For example,
    for a Facebook "Like" button, the server can check to see that
    the supplied hostname matches the hostname(s) expected for that
    "Like" button.

3. The server returns the hostname in "X-Frame-Options: ALLOW-FROM"
    if the proper criteria was met in step #2.

4. The browser enforces the "X-Frame-Options: ALLOW-FROM" header.

2.3.2.4. No Caching of the X-Frame-Options Header

Caching the X-Frame-Options header for a resource is not recommended.
Caching the X-Frame-Options response could result in problems
because:

1. For every http-request of the resource, the browser has to check
    whether the X-Frame-Options header has been set and then act
    accordingly, as a resource itself might be created dynamically
    and the header could change with it, too.

2. Also, as outlined in Section 2.3.2.3, servers may generate
    X-Frame-Options header responses depending on the request.
    Example case: Considering that we have only one serialized-origin
    in the ALLOW-FROM directive, imagine a user has multiple pages
    open in his browser tabs with web page 1 from domain A and web

page 2 from domain B, and both frame the same page from domain C
with the ALLOW-FROM directive. In that case, the page needs to
reply to both requests with different X-Frame-Options headers,
with the first pointing to origin A and the second pointing to
origin B.

However, we found that none of the major browsers listed in
Appendix A cache the responses.

3. IANA Considerations

IANA has included the specified HTTP header in the "Permanent Message
Header Field Name" registry as outlined in "Registration Procedures
for Message Header Fields" [RFC3864].

3.1. Registration Template

Permanent Message Header Field Names Template:

Header field name: X-Frame-Options

Applicable protocol: http [RFC2616]

Status: Informational

Author/change controller: IETF

Specification document(s): RFC 7034

Related information: None

4. Security Considerations

The introduction of the X-Frame-Options HTTP header field improves
the protection against clickjacking. However, it is not self-
sufficient enough to protect against all kinds of these attack
vectors. It must be used in conjunction with other security measures
like secure coding (e.g., input validation, output encoding, etc.)
and the Content Security Policy version 1.0 [CSP].

It is important to note that current implementations do not check the
origins of the framing resources' entire ancestor tree of frames, and
this may expose the resource to attack in multiple-nested scenarios.

The browser implementations evaluate based on the origin of the
framed page and the top-level browsing context (i.e., the most outer
frame):

If a resource from origin A embeds untrusted content from origin B, that untrusted content can embed another resource from origin A with an "X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN" policy, and that check would pass when the user agent only verifies the top-level browsing context. Therefore, web developers should be aware that embedding content from other sites can leave their web pages vulnerable to clickjacking even if the X-Frame-Options header is used.

Furthermore, X-Frame-Options must be sent as an HTTP header field and is explicitly ignored by user agents when declared with a meta http-equiv tag.

4.1. Privacy Considerations

There are two kinds of potential data leakage to consider:

1. Using X-Frame-Options with the parameter ALLOW-FROM allows a page to guess or infer information about who is framing it. A web server may answer requests with the "X-Frame-Options: ALLOW-FROM" header and thus determine which other page is framing it. This is inherent by design, but it may lead to data-leakage or data-protection concerns.

2. The web server using the ALLOW-FROM directive effectively discloses the origin specified in the header. If a web server wishes to reduce this leakage, it is recommended to generate the ALLOW-FROM header for each request based on the design pattern as described in Section 2.3.2.3.

5. References

5.1. Normative References

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Appendix A. Browsers That Support X-Frame-Options

   o   Internet Explorer 8+

   o   Firefox 3.6.9+

   o   Opera 10.5+

   o   Safari 4+

   o   Chrome 4.1+

Appendix B. Description of a Clickjacking Attack

   A more detailed explanation of clickjacking scenarios follows.

B.1. Shop

   An Internet marketplace/shop offering a feature with a link/button to
   "Buy this" gadget wants their affiliates (who could be malicious
   attackers) to be able to stick the "Buy such and such from XYZ"
   IFRAMES into their pages. There is a possible clickjacking threat
   here, which is why the marketplace/online shop needs to then
   immediately navigate the main browsing context (or a new window) to a
   confirmation page that is protected by anti-clickjacking protections.

B.2. Online Shop Confirm Purchase Page

   The "Confirm Purchase" page of an online shop must be shown to the
   end-user without the risk of an overlay or misuse by an attacker.
   For that reason, the confirmation page uses a combination of
   anti-CSRF (Cross Site Request Forgery [CSRF]) tokens and the
   X-Frame-Options HTTP header field, mitigating clickjacking attacks.

B.3. Flash Configuration

   Macromedia Flash configuration settings are set by a Flash object
   that can run only from a specific configuration page on Macromedia's
   site. The object runs inside the page and thus can be subject to a
   clickjacking attack. In order to prevent clickjacking attacks
   against the security settings, the configuration page uses the
   X-Frame-Options directive.

Appendix C. Acknowledgements

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   various browser vendors such as Microsoft (Eric Lawrence and David
   Ross), Mozilla, Google, Opera, and Apple.

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