Internet Engineering Task Force H. Sharma, Ed.
Internet-Draft Netskope Inc
Obsoletes: 8954 (if approved) 24 February 2024
Updates: 6960, 5912 (if approved)
Intended status: Standards Track
Expires: 27 August 2024
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension
draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01
Abstract
This document updates the Nonce extension section of RFC-8954. Nonce
extension is an optional extension for Online Certificate Status
Protocol (OCSP) request and response messages. OCSP is used for
checking the status of a certificate, and the Nonce extension is used
to cryptographically bind an OCSP response message to a particular
OCSP request message. Some environments use cryptographic algorithms
that generate a Nonce that is longer than 32 octets. This document
updates the maximum allowed length of Nonce to 128 octets.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 27 August 2024.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
Sharma Expires 27 August 2024 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01 February 2024
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. OCSP Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1. Nonce Extension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Replay Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A.1. OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A.2. OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1. Introduction
Nonce extension was previously defined in Section 4.4.1 of [RFC6960]
and updated in [RFC8954]. [RFC8954] enforces the maximum Nonce
length to 32 octets. To support cryptographic algorithms that
generate a Nonce that is longer than 32 octets, this document updates
the maximum allowed size of the Nonce to 128 octets. In addition,
this document recommends that the OCSP client and responder use a
Nonce with a minimum length of 32 octets.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. OCSP Extensions
The message formats for OCSP requests and responses are defined in
[RFC6960] and Nonce extension was updated in [RFC8954]. [RFC6960]
also defines the standard extensions for OCSP messages based on the
extension model employed in X.509 version 3 certificates (see
[RFC5280]). [RFC8954] replaces this section to enforce the minimum
and maximum length for the Nonce value. This document extends the
Sharma Expires 27 August 2024 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01 February 2024
maximum allowed nonce length to 128 octets and does not change the
specifications of any of the other standard extensions defined in
[RFC6960].
2.1. Nonce Extension
This section replaces the entirety of Section 2.1 of [RFC8954], which
describes the OCSP Nonce extension.
The Nonce cryptographically binds a request and a response to prevent
replay attacks. The Nonce is included as one of the
requestExtensions in requests; in responses, it would be included as
one of the responseExtensions.In both the request and the response,
the Nonce will be identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp-
Nonce, while the extnValue is the value of the Nonce. If the Nonce
extension is present, then the length of the Nonce MUST be at least 1
octet and can be up to 128 octets.
An OCSP client that implements this document SHOULD use a minimum
length of 32 octets for Nonce in the Nonce extension. RFC
8954-compliant implementations will be unable to process nonces
generated per the new specification with sizes in excess of what was
permitted by RFC 8954.
OCSP resonder that implements this document MUST reject any OCSP
request that has a Nonce in the Nonce extension with a length of
either 0 octets or more than 128 octets, with the malformedRequest
OCSPResponseStatus as described in Section 4.2.1 of [RFC6960].
Responders, supporting the Nonce extension, MUST accept lengths of at
least 16 octets and MAY choose to ignore the Nonce extension for
requests where the length of the nonce is less than 16 octets or more
than 32 octets.
The value of the Nonce MUST be generated using a cryptographically
strong pseudorandom number generator (see [RFC4086]). The minimum
Nonce length of 1 octet is defined to provide backward compatibility
with older clients that follow [RFC6960].
id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
id-pkix-ocsp-Nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))
Sharma Expires 27 August 2024 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01 February 2024
3. Security Considerations
The security considerations of OCSP, in general, are described in
[RFC6960]. During the interval in which the previous OCSP response
for a certificate is not expired but the responder has a changed
status for that certificate, a copy of that OCSP response can be used
to indicate that the status of the certificate is still valid.
Including a client's nonce value in the OCSP response makes sure that
the response is the latest response from the server and not an old
copy.
3.1. Replay Attack
The Nonce extension is used to avoid replay attacks. Since the OCSP
responder may choose not to send the Nonce extension in the OCSP
response even if the client has sent the Nonce extension in the
request [RFC5019], an on-path attacker can intercept the OCSP request
and respond with an earlier response from the server without the
Nonce extension. This can be mitigated by configuring the server to
use a short time interval between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate
fields in the OCSP response.
4. IANA Considerations
For the ASN.1 Module in Appendix A.1, IANA is requested to assign an
object identifier (OID) for the module identifier to replace TBD1.
The OID for the module should be allocated in the "SMI Security for
PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0), and the
Description for the new OID should be set to "id-mod-ocsp-2024-88".
For the ASN.1 Module in Appendix A.2, IANA is requested to assign an
object identifier (OID) for the module identifier to replace TBD2.
The OID for the module should be allocated in the "SMI Security for
PKIX Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0), and the
Description for the new OID should be set to "id-mod-ocsp-2024-08".
5. References
5.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
Sharma Expires 27 August 2024 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01 February 2024
[RFC2560] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S., and C.
Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online
Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP", RFC 2560,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2560, June 1999,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2560>.
[RFC4086] Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4086, June 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086>.
[RFC5019] Deacon, A. and R. Hurst, "The Lightweight Online
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume
Environments", RFC 5019, DOI 10.17487/RFC5019, September
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5019>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912>.
[RFC6960] Santesson, S., Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A.,
Galperin, S., and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP",
RFC 6960, DOI 10.17487/RFC6960, June 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8954] Sahni, M., Ed., "Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
Nonce Extension", RFC 8954, DOI 10.17487/RFC8954, November
2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8954>.
5.2. Informative References
[Errata5891]
RFC Errata, Erratum ID 5891, RFC 6960,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5891>.
Sharma Expires 27 August 2024 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01 February 2024
Appendix A. ASN.1 Modules
This section includes the ASN.1 modules for OCSP and replaces the
entirity of Section 5 of [RFC8954]. It addresses Errata id 5891
[Errata5891] as well.
Appendix A.1 includes an ASN.1 module that conforms to the 1998
version of ASN.1 for all syntax elements of OCSP. This module
replaces the modules Appendix B.1 of [RFC6960].
Appendix A.2 includes an ASN.1 module, corresponding to the module
present in A.1, that conforms to the 2008 version of ASN.1. This
module replaces the modules in Section 4 of [RFC5912] and
Appendix B.2 of [RFC6960]. Although a 2008 ASN.1 module is provided,
the module in Appendix A.1 remains the normative module as per the
policy of the PKIX working group.
A.1. OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax
OCSP-2024-88
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-ocsp-2024-88(TBD1)}
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
-- PKIX Certificate Extensions
AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, CRLReason, GeneralName
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19) }
Name, CertificateSerialNumber, Extensions,
id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) };
OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsRequest TBSRequest,
optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
Sharma Expires 27 August 2024 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01 February 2024
requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
requestList SEQUENCE OF Request,
requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }
Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))
Request ::= SEQUENCE {
reqCert CertID,
singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus,
responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
successful (0), -- Response has valid confirmations
malformedRequest (1), -- Illegal confirmation request
internalError (2), -- Internal error in issuer
tryLater (3), -- Try again later
-- (4) is not used
sigRequired (5), -- Must sign the request
unauthorized (6) -- Request unauthorized
}
ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
responseType OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
response OCTET STRING }
BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsResponseData ResponseData,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
Sharma Expires 27 August 2024 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01 February 2024
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
responderID ResponderID,
producedAt GeneralizedTime,
responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
byName [1] Name,
byKey [2] KeyHash }
KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
-- (i.e., the SHA-1 hash of the value of the
-- BIT STRING subjectPublicKey [excluding
-- the tag, length, and number of unused
-- bits] in the responder's certificate)
SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certID CertID,
certStatus CertStatus,
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }
CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
good [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }
RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
revocationTime GeneralizedTime,
revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
UnknownInfo ::= NULL
ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime
AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER
ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer Name,
locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }
CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF PreferredSignatureAlgorithm
Sharma Expires 27 August 2024 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01 February 2024
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier,
certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL }
-- Object Identifiers
id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
id-pkix-ocsp-crl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
id-pkix-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }
END
A.2. OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax
OCSP-2024-08
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-ocsp-2024-08(TBD2)}
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
Extensions{}, EXTENSION, ATTRIBUTE
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57)}
AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM, SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}
AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, GeneralName, CrlEntryExtensions, CRLReason
FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
Sharma Expires 27 August 2024 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01 February 2024
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59)}
Name, CertificateSerialNumber, id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51)}
sa-dsaWithSHA1, sa-rsaWithMD2, sa-rsaWithMD5, sa-rsaWithSHA1
FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
{iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56)};
OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsRequest TBSRequest,
optionalSignature [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }
TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
requestorName [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
requestList SEQUENCE OF Request,
requestExtensions [2] EXPLICIT Extensions {{re-ocsp-nonce |
re-ocsp-response, ...,
re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms}} OPTIONAL }
Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
{ SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }
Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))
Request ::= SEQUENCE {
reqCert CertID,
singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT Extensions
{ {re-ocsp-service-locator,
...}} OPTIONAL }
CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier
{DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
issuerNameHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
issuerKeyHash OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
serialNumber CertificateSerialNumber }
Sharma Expires 27 August 2024 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01 February 2024
OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
responseStatus OCSPResponseStatus,
responseBytes [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }
OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
successful (0), -- Response has valid confirmations
malformedRequest (1), -- Illegal confirmation request
internalError (2), -- Internal error in issuer
tryLater (3), -- Try again later
-- (4) is not used
sigRequired (5), -- Must sign the request
unauthorized (6) -- Request unauthorized
}
RESPONSE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER
ResponseSet RESPONSE ::= {basicResponse, ...}
ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
responseType RESPONSE.
&id ({ResponseSet}),
response OCTET STRING (CONTAINING RESPONSE.
&Type({ResponseSet}{@responseType}))}
basicResponse RESPONSE ::=
{ BasicOCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-basic }
BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
tbsResponseData ResponseData,
signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
{sa-dsaWithSHA1 | sa-rsaWithSHA1 |
sa-rsaWithMD5 | sa-rsaWithMD2, ...}},
signature BIT STRING,
certs [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL }
ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
responderID ResponderID,
producedAt GeneralizedTime,
responses SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
responseExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
{{re-ocsp-nonce, ...,
re-ocsp-extended-revoke}} OPTIONAL }
ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
byName [1] Name,
Sharma Expires 27 August 2024 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01 February 2024
byKey [2] KeyHash }
KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
-- (excluding the tag and length fields)
SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
certID CertID,
certStatus CertStatus,
thisUpdate GeneralizedTime,
nextUpdate [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
singleExtensions [1] EXPLICIT Extensions{{re-ocsp-crl |
re-ocsp-archive-cutoff |
CrlEntryExtensions, ...}
} OPTIONAL }
CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
good [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
revoked [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
unknown [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }
RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
revocationTime GeneralizedTime,
revocationReason [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }
UnknownInfo ::= NULL
ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime
AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF RESPONSE.&id({ResponseSet})
ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
issuer Name,
locator AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }
CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
crlUrl [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
crlNum [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
crlTime [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }
PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF PreferredSignatureAlgorithm
PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
sigIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier{SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier{PUBLIC-KEY, {...}} OPTIONAL
}
-- Certificate Extensions
Sharma Expires 27 August 2024 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01 February 2024
ext-ocsp-nocheck EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED
BY id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck }
-- Request Extensions
re-ocsp-nonce EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX Nonce
IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nonce }
re-ocsp-response EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX AcceptableResponses IDENTIFIED
BY id-pkix-ocsp-response }
re-ocsp-service-locator EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX ServiceLocator
IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator }
re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms EXTENSION ::= {
SYNTAX PreferredSignatureAlgorithms
IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs }
-- Response Extensions
re-ocsp-crl EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX CrlID IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-crl }
re-ocsp-archive-cutoff EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX ArchiveCutoff
IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff }
re-ocsp-extended-revoke EXTENSION ::= { SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke }
-- Object Identifiers
id-kp-OCSPSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
id-pkix-ocsp OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-ad-ocsp
id-pkix-ocsp-basic OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
id-pkix-ocsp-crl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
id-pkix-ocsp-response OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }
END
Sharma Expires 27 August 2024 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-01 February 2024
Author's Address
Himanshu Sharma (editor)
Netskope Inc
2445 Augustine Dr 3rd floor
Santa Clara, California 95054
United States of America
Email: himanshu@netskope.com
URI: www.netskope.com
Sharma Expires 27 August 2024 [Page 14]