IDR J. Snijders Internet-Draft Fastly Updates: 4271 (if approved) B. Cartwright-Cox Intended status: Standards Track Port 179 Ltd Expires: 20 September 2024 Y. Qu Futurewei Technologies 19 March 2024 Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4) Send Hold Timer draft-ietf-idr-bgp-sendholdtimer-03 Abstract This document defines the SendHoldtimer and the SendHoldTimer Expired events for the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Finite State Machine (FSM). Implementation of the SendHoldTimer helps overcome situations where a BGP session is not terminated after the local system detects that the remote system is not processing BGP messages. This document specifies that the local system should close the BGP connection and not solely rely on the remote system for session closure when the SendHoldTimer expires. This document updates RFC4271. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 20 September 2024. Snijders, et al. Expires 20 September 2024 [Page 1] Internet-Draft BGP SendHoldTimer March 2024 Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2. Example of a problematic scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. SendHoldTimer - Changes to RFC 4271 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3.1. Session Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. Timer Event: SendHoldTimer_Expires . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.3. Changes to the FSM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.4. Changes to BGP Timers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. Send Hold Timer Expired Error Handling . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Appendix A. Implementation status - RFC EDITOR: REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1. Introduction This document defines the SendHoldtimer and the SendHoldTimer Expired events for the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [RFC4271] Finite State Machine (FSM) defined in section 8. Failure to terminate a blocked BGP session can result in Denial Of Service, and the subsequent failure to generate and deliver BGP WITHDRAW and UPDATE messages to other BGP peers of the local system is detrimental to all participants of the inter-domain routing system. This phenomena is theorized to have contributed to IP traffic blackholing events in global Internet routing system [bgpzombies]. Snijders, et al. Expires 20 September 2024 [Page 2] Internet-Draft BGP SendHoldTimer March 2024 This specification intends to improve this situation by requiring sessions to be terminated if the local system has detected that the remote system cannot possibly have received any BGP messages for the duration of the SendHoldTime. Through codification of the aforementioned requirement, operators will benefit from consistent behavior across different BGP implementations. BGP speakers following this specification do not exclusively rely on remote systems closing blocked connections, but will also locally close connections. 2. Example of a problematic scenario In implementations lacking the concept of a SendHoldTimer, a malfunctioning or overwhelmed remote peer may cause data on the BGP socket in the local system to accumulate ad infinitum. This could result in forwarding failure and traffic loss, as the overwhelmed peer continues to utilize stale routes. An example fault state: as BGP runs over TCP [RFC9293], it is possible for a BGP speaker in the ESTABLISHED state to encounter a BGP peer that is advertising a TCP Receive Window (RCV.WND) of size zero. This 0 window prevents the local system from sending KEEPALIVE, CEASE, WITHDRAW, UPDATE, or any other critical BGP messages across the network socket to the remote peer. Generally BGP implementations have no visibility into lower-layer subsystems such as TCP or the peer's current Receive Window size, and there is no existing BGP mechanism for such a blocked session to be torn down. Hence BGP implementations are not able to handle this situation in a consistent fashion. This document provides a mechanism for BGP implementations to detect whether the TCP socket to a BGP peer is progressing (data is being transmitted), or persisting in a stalled state. In case of a stalled state, the BGP session can be restarted. 3. SendHoldTimer - Changes to RFC 4271 BGP speakers are implemented following a conceptual model "BGP Finite State Machine" (FSM), which is outlined in section 8 of [RFC4271]. This specification adds a BGP timer, SendHoldTimer, and updates the BGP FSM as following: Snijders, et al. Expires 20 September 2024 [Page 3] Internet-Draft BGP SendHoldTimer March 2024 3.1. Session Attributes The following mandatory session attributes for each connection are added to Section 8, before "The state session attribute indicates the current state of the BGP FSM": 9) SendHoldTimer 10) SendHoldTime (an initial value of 8 minutes is recommended) The SendHoldTime determines how long a BGP speaker would stay in Established state before the TCP connection is dropped because no BGP messages can be transmitted to its peer. A BGP speaker can configure the value of the SendHoldTime to each peer independently. 3.2. Timer Event: SendHoldTimer_Expires Another timer event is added to Section 8.1.3 of [RFC4271] as following: Event XX1: SendHoldTimer_Expires Definition: An event generated when the SendHoldTimer expires. Status: Mandatory 3.3. Changes to the FSM The following changes are made to section 8.2.2 in [RFC4271]. In "OpenConfirm State", the handling of Event 26 is revised as follows: Old Text: If the local system receives a KEEPALIVE message (KeepAliveMsg (Event 26)), the local system: - restarts the HoldTimer and - changes its state to Established. Next Text: If the local system receives a KEEPALIVE message (KeepAliveMsg (Event 26)), the local system: - restarts the HoldTimer, - sets the SendHoldTimer to the default or configured value, and Snijders, et al. Expires 20 September 2024 [Page 4] Internet-Draft BGP SendHoldTimer March 2024 - changes its state to Established. The following paragraph is added to section 8.2.2 in "Established State", after the paragraph which ends "unless the negotiated HoldTime value is zero.": If the SendHoldTimer_Expires (Event XX1), the local system: - sends a NOTIFICATION message with the BGP Error Code "Send Hold Timer Expired", - logs an error message in the local system with the BGP Error Code "Send Hold Timer Expired", - releases all BGP resources, - sets the ConnectRetryTimer to zero, - drops the TCP connection, - increments the ConnectRetryCounter by 1, - (optionally) performs peer oscillation damping if the DampPeerOscillations attribute is set to TRUE, and - changes its state to Idle. Each time the local system sends a KEEPALIVE, UPDATE, and/or NOTIFICATION message, it restarts its SendHoldTimer. 3.4. Changes to BGP Timers In Section 10 of [RFC4271] summarizes BGP Timers. This document adds another BGP timer: SendHoldTimer. SendHoldTime is a mandatory FSM attribute that stores the initial value for the SendHoldTimer. The suggested default value for SendHoldTime is 8 minutes. An implementation MAY make it configurable. 4. Send Hold Timer Expired Error Handling If a system does not send successive KEEPALIVE, UPDATE, and/or NOTIFICATION messages within the period specified in the Send Hold Time, then the BGP connection is closed and a log message is emitted. Snijders, et al. Expires 20 September 2024 [Page 5] Internet-Draft BGP SendHoldTimer March 2024 5. Operational Considerations When the local system recognizes a remote peer is not processing any BGP messages for the duration of the SendHoldTime, likely the local system will not be able to inform the remote peer through a BGP message as to why the session is being closed by sending a NOTIFICATION. This documents suggests that a NOTIFICATION message with the "Send Hold Timer Expired" error code is still sent, meanwhile an error message SHOULD be logged into the local system. Other mechanisms can be used as well, for example BGP speakers SHOULD provide this reason as part of their operational state; e.g. bgpPeerLastError in the BGP MIB [RFC4273]. 6. Security Considerations This specification addresses the vulnerability of a BGP speaker to a potential attack whereby a BGP peer can pretend to be unable to process BGP messages and in doing so create a scenario where the local system is poisoned with stale routing information. There are three detrimental aspects to the problem of not robustly handling blocked peers: * Failure to send BGP messages to a peer implies the peer is operating based on stale routing information. * Failure to disconnect from a blocked peer hinders the local system's ability to construct a non-stale local Routing Information Base (RIB). * Failure to disconnect from a blocked peer hinders the local system's ability to inform other BGP peers with current network reachability information. In other respects, this specification does not change BGP's security characteristics. 7. IANA Considerations IANA has registered code 8 for "Send Hold Timer Expired" in the "BGP Error (Notification) Codes" sub-registry under the "Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Parameters" registry. Snijders, et al. Expires 20 September 2024 [Page 6] Internet-Draft BGP SendHoldTimer March 2024 8. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank William McCall, Theo de Raadt, John Heasley, Nick Hilliard, Jeffrey Haas, Tom Petch, and Susan Hares for their helpful review of this document. 9. References 9.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC4271] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, . [RFC4273] Haas, J., Ed. and S. Hares, Ed., "Definitions of Managed Objects for BGP-4", RFC 4273, DOI 10.17487/RFC4273, January 2006, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC9293] Eddy, W., Ed., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)", RFC 9293, DOI 10.17487/RFC9293, August 2022, . 9.2. Informative References [bgpzombies] Fontugne, R., "BGP Zombies", April 2019, . [BIRD] Kubecova, K., "BIRD Internet Routing Daemon", October 2023, . [frr] Lamparter, D., "bgpd: implement SendHoldTimer", May 2022, . [neo-bgp] Cartwright-Cox, B., "What does bgp.tools support", August 2022, . Snijders, et al. Expires 20 September 2024 [Page 7] Internet-Draft BGP SendHoldTimer March 2024 [openbgpd] Jeker, C., "bgpd send side hold timer", December 2020, . Appendix A. Implementation status - RFC EDITOR: REMOVE BEFORE PUBLICATION This section records the status of known implementations of the protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in RFC 7942. The description of implementations in this section is intended to assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to RFCs. Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may exist. According to RFC 7942, "this will allow reviewers and working groups to assign due consideration to documents that have the benefit of running code, which may serve as evidence of valuable experimentation and feedback that have made the implemented protocols more mature. It is up to the individual working groups to use this information as they see fit". * OpenBGPD [openbgpd] * FRRouting [frr] * neo-bgp (bgp.tools) [neo-bgp] * BIRD [BIRD] Patches to recognize error code 8 were merged into OpenBSD's and the- tcpdump-group's tcpdump implementations. Authors' Addresses Job Snijders Fastly Amsterdam Netherlands Email: job@fastly.com Snijders, et al. Expires 20 September 2024 [Page 8] Internet-Draft BGP SendHoldTimer March 2024 Ben Cartwright-Cox Port 179 Ltd London United Kingdom Email: ben@benjojo.co.uk Yingzhen Qu Futurewei Technologies Santa Clara, United States Email: yingzhen.ietf@gmail.com Snijders, et al. Expires 20 September 2024 [Page 9]