Internet DRAFT - draft-zhang-opsawg-capwap-eap

draft-zhang-opsawg-capwap-eap






Internet Engineering Task Force                                 R. Zhang
Internet-Draft                                             China Telecom
Intended status: Informational                                    Z. Cao
Expires: August 22, 2013                                          H. Luo
                                                                 H. Deng
                                                            China Mobile
                                                           S. Gundavelli
                                                                   Cisco
                                                       February 18, 2013


         Encapsulation of EAP Messages in CAPWAP Control Plane
                    draft-zhang-opsawg-capwap-eap-00

Abstract

   This document describes the scenario and requirement of encapsulating
   Extensible Authnetication Protocol (EAP) in the CAPWAP control plane.
   After the analysis and description, this document proposes the design
   of the new message types to encapsulate EAP messages.

Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 22, 2013.

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   Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect



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   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     1.1.  Conventions used in this document . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
     1.2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
   2.  Scenario and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
   3.  Encapsulation of EAP in CAPWAP-CTL Plane  . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     3.1.  Control Message Type for EAP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
     3.2.  Message Element of the EAP  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   6.  Contributors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8





























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1.  Introduction

   Control and Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) was
   designed as an interoperable protocol between the wireless access
   point and the access controller.  This architecture makes it possible
   for the access controller to manage a huge number of wireless access
   points.  With the goals and requirements established in[RFC4564] ,
   CAPWAP protocols were specified in [RFC5415] , [RFC5416]and
   [RFC5417].

   The specificaitons mentioned above mainly design the different
   control message types used by the AC to control multiple APs.  The
   EAP messages, as key protocol exchange elements in the WLAN
   architecture also need to be encapsulated in the CAPWAP.  However,
   the CAPWAP protocol does not specifies how to encapsulate the EAP
   message in its control plane.  This situation makes it default to
   encapsulate the EAP messages in the CAPWAP-DATA plane.

   We found issues of encapsulating EAP in the CAPWAP-DATA plane in the
   scenario where there is a split betweent the CAPWAP-DATA and CAPWAP-
   CTL plane.  This document describes such scenario and proposes a
   resolution to the problem.

1.1.  Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL","SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]

1.2.  Terminology

   Access Controller (AC): The network entity that provides AP access to
   the network infrastructure in the data plane, control plane,
   management plane, or a combination therein.

   Access Point (AP): the same with Wireless Termination Point, The
   physical or network entity that contains an RF antenna and wireless
   Physical Layer (PHY) to transmit and receive station traffic for
   wireless access networks.

   CAPWAP Control Plane: A bi-directional flow over which CAPWAP Control
   packets are sent and received.

   CAPWAP Data Plane: A bi-directional flow over which CAPWAP Data
   packets are sent and received.

   EAP: Extensible Authentication Protocol, the EAP framework is
   specified in [RFC3748].



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2.  Scenario and Analysis

   The following figure shows where and how the problem arises.  In many
   operators' network, the Access Controller is placed remotely at the
   central data center.  In order to avoid the traffic aggregation at
   the AC, the data traffic from the AP is directed to the Access Router
   (AR).  In this scenario, the CAPWAP-CTL plane and CAPWAP-DATA plane
   are separated from each other.

   Note: a powerful AC that aggregates the data flows is not a long-term
   solution to the problem.  Because operators always plan the network
   capacity at a certain level, but with the air interface bandwidth
   increasing (e.g., from 11g to 11n and 11ac), and the increasing
   number of access requests on each AP, the powerful AC could not
   always be "powerful" enough in the long run.


                         CAPWAP-CTL +--------+
                      ++============+   AC   |
                     //             +--------+
                    //
            +-----+//   CAPWAP-DATA           +----------------+
            | AP  |===========================|  Access Router |
            +-----+                           +----------------+



         Figure 1: Split between CAPWAP-CTL and CAPWAP-DATA Plane

   Because there are no explict message types to support the
   encapsulation of EAP packets in the CAPWAP-CTL plane, the EAP
   messages are tunneled via the CAPWAP-DATA plane to the AR.  AR acts
   as authenticator in the EAP framework.  After authentication, the AR
   receives the EAP keying message for the session.  But AC is supposed
   to delieve these keying messages to the AP, and AR has no standard
   interface to ship them to the AP or the AC.  This is unacceptable in
   the scenario of EAP-based auto-authentication.

   Another scenario is the third-party WLAN deployment scenario, in
   which the access network is a rental property from an broadband
   operator different from the one who provides authentication services.
   As shown in Figure 2, The AP is broadcasting a SSID of the Operator
   #1, say "Operator-1-WLAN", but broadband access network is provided
   by another Operator #2.  To authenticate the users of operator one,
   the users should be authenticated by the AC in operator one.  The
   data traffic can be routed locally with the access router of operator
   #2.  In this case, there is also a need of separation between CAPWAP-
   CTL and CAPWAP-DATA traffics.



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                                       *----------*
  +-----+                             (             )        +---------+
  | AP  |===============++============+  Internet   +========| AC(OP#1)|
  +-----+               ||             (___________)         +---------+
                        ||
               +-------------------+
               |Access Router(OP#2)|
               +-------------------+


      Figure 2: Access Service and Authentication Service Provided by
                            different Operators


3.  Encapsulation of EAP in CAPWAP-CTL Plane

   In order to encapsulate EAP message in CAPWAP-CTL plane, we can reuse
   the control message header defined in RFC5415 and extend the message
   type to accommodate EAP messages.

   The CAPWAP Control message header is shown in Figure 3.  Only 26
   message types have been defined in Section 4.5.5.1 of RFC5415.  We
   can extend the message type here to encapsulate EAP messages.

        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                       Message Type                            |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |    Seq Num    |        Msg Element Length     |     Flags     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       | Msg Element [0..N] ...
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                Figure 3: The CAPWAP Control Message Header

3.1.  Control Message Type for EAP

   This document defines a new control message type for EAP,
   i.e."AUTHENTICATION CONTROL".  The message type value is to be
   defined by IANA.










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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |             Message Type = AUTHENTICATION CONTROL             |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |    Seq Num    |        Msg Element Length     |     Flags     |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       | Msg Element [0..N] ...
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

              Figure 4: The CAPWAP-EAP Control Message Header

   The Seq Num is design to match the response with the request for
   other control messages like "Discovery Request" and "Discovery
   Response".  But this field is not useful for authentication control,
   because the EAP message encapsulated between the AP and AC is not
   handled in a request-response way.  For AUTHENTICATION CONTROL
   messages, the AP and AC do not need to handle the 'Seq Num' field.

   Msg Element Length field indicates the number of bytes following the
   Sequence Number field.

   Flags field is left for future definition.

3.2.  Message Element of the EAP

   The message element(s) carry the information pertinent to each of the
   control message types.  Every control message in this specification
   specifies which message elements are permitted.

   We define the message element of EAP message in the following figure.
        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |  Type=Authentication Payload  |             Length            |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |   Value ...   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                          Message Element for EAP

   Section 4.6 of [RFC5415] defines the semantics of Message Element
   Types.  Type values from 1-49 have been used.  An extended message
   element type is requested by this document to carry the EAP
   authentication payload.






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4.  IANA Considerations

   This document has the following requests to the IANA.

   CAPWAP Control Message Type Value for the EAP-AUTHENTICATION-CONTROL,
   as defined in Section. 3.1 of this document.

   CAPWAP Control Message Element Type Value for the EAP-AUTHENTICATION-
   PAYLOAD, as defined in Section. 3.2 of this document.


5.  Security Considerations

   Security considerations for the CAPWAP protocol has been analyzed in
   Section 12 of [RFC5415].  This document extends the CAPWAP CONTROL
   Message Type and Control Message Element Type, and it does not
   introduce other security issues besides what has been analyzed in
   RFC5415.


6.  Contributors

   This document stems from the joint work of Hong Liu, Yifan Chen,
   Chunju Shao from China Mobile Research.  Thank all the contributors
   of this document.


7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC5415]  Calhoun, P., Montemurro, M., and D. Stanley, "Control And
              Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) Protocol
              Specification", RFC 5415, March 2009.

7.2.  Informative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC3118]  Droms, R. and W. Arbaugh, "Authentication for DHCP
              Messages", RFC 3118, June 2001.

   [RFC3748]  Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
              Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)",
              RFC 3748, June 2004.

   [RFC4564]  Govindan, S., Cheng, H., Yao, ZH., Zhou, WH., and L. Yang,



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              "Objectives for Control and Provisioning of Wireless
              Access Points (CAPWAP)", RFC 4564, July 2006.

   [RFC5416]  Calhoun, P., Montemurro, M., and D. Stanley, "Control and
              Provisioning of Wireless Access Points (CAPWAP) Protocol
              Binding for IEEE 802.11", RFC 5416, March 2009.

   [RFC5417]  Calhoun, P., "Control And Provisioning of Wireless Access
              Points (CAPWAP) Access Controller DHCP Option", RFC 5417,
              March 2009.


Authors' Addresses

   Rong Zhang
   China Telecom
   No.109 Zhongshandadao avenue
   Guangzhou,   510630
   China

   Phone:
   Fax:
   Email: zhangr@gsta.com
   URI:


   Zhen Cao
   China Mobile
   Xuanwumenxi Ave. No. 32
   Beijing,   100871
   China

   Phone: +86-10-52686688
   Email: zehn.cao@gmail.com, caozhen@chinamobile.com


   Haiyun Luo
   China Mobile
   United States

   Phone:
   Fax:
   Email: haiyunluo@chinamobile.com
   URI:







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   Hui Deng
   China Mobile
   Xuanwumenxi Ave. No. 32
   Beijing,   100053
   China

   Phone:
   Fax:
   Email: denghui@chinamobile.com
   URI:


   Sri Gundavelli
   Cisco
   170 West Tasman Drive
   San Jose, CA 95134,
   USA

   Phone:
   Fax:
   Email: sgundave@cisco.com
   URI:





























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