Internet DRAFT - draft-ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying
draft-ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying
Network Working Group S. Turner
Internet-Draft IECA, Inc.
Intended status: BCP K. Patel
Expires: September 2, 2012 Cisco Systems
R. Bush
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
March 5, 2012
Router Keying for BGPsec
draft-ymbk-bgpsec-rtr-rekeying-00
Abstract
BGPsec-speaking routers must be provisioned with private keys and the
corresponding public key must be published in the global Resource
PKI. This document describes two ways of doing so, router-driven and
operator-driven.
Status of this Memo
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Table of Contents
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Router-Generated Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Operator-Generated Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Provisioning a New Router . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. Other Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Appendix A. Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction
BGPsec-speaking routers must be provisioned with private keys and the
corresponding public key must be published in the global RPKI
(Resource Public Key Infrastructure). Note that the public key is
published in the RPKI in the form of a certificate [I-D.sidr-bgpsec-
pki-profiles]. This document describes two methods for generating the
necessary public/private key-pair: router-driven and operator-driven.
In the router-driven method, the router generates its own
public/private key-pair, uses the private key to sign a certification
request [I-D.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles] (a PKCS#10 - includes the
public key), and sends the certification request to the RPKI CA
(Certification Authority). The CA returns a PKCS#7, which includes
the certified public key in the form of a certificate, to the router
and the CA also publishes the certificate in the RPKI.
The router-driven model mirrors the model used by most PKI
subscribers. In many cases, the private key never leaves trusted
storage (e.g., HSM (Hardware Security Model)). This is by design and
supports CPs (Certification Policies), often times for human
subscribers, that require the private key only ever be controlled by
the subscriber to ensure that no one can impersonate the subscriber.
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For non-humans, this model does not always work. For example, when
an operator wants to support hot-swappable routers the same private
key needs to be installed in the soon-to-be online router that was
installed in the soon-to-be offline router. This motivated the
operator-driven model.
In the operator-driven model, the operator generates the
private/public key-pair and sends them to the router in a PKCS#8
[RFC5958].
In both cases, the key pair is for algorithms defined in [I-D.sidr-
bgpsec-algs]. The first version specifies ECDSA on the P-256 curve.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
It is assumed that the reader understands BGPsec, see [I-D.lepinski-
bgpsec-overview] and [I-D.lepinski-bgpsec-protocol], and the RPKI,
see [RFC6480] and [I-D.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles].
3. Router-Generated Keys
For router-generated keys, the public/private keys are made by the
router, a PKCS#10 is made by the router, the PKCS#10 is signed by the
private key. The CA returns a PKCS#7 and the router picks the
certificate out of the PKCS#7. Even if the operator can not get the
private key off the router this still provides a linkage between a
private key and a router.
4. Operator-Generated Keys
For operator-generated keys, the public/private keys are made by the
operator with their RPKI management software. The private key pair
MUST be as specified in [RFC5915], which supports ECDSA keys. That
format MUST then be inserted to a PKCS#8 [RFC5958] along with the
certificate. If the operator wants to ship the keys around they can
use the .p8 file extension and optional PEM encoding also from
[RFC5958].
EDITOR NOTE: One thing we should consider is whether the certificate
needs to returned to the router like in the router-generated keys
method. PKCS#8 supports including the certificate so it's not a big
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deal to add it if we do.
5. Provisioning a New Router
When commissioning a new router, the operator may use either of the
above methods.
Using the Router-Generated Keys method, see Section 3, the operator
decides on the AS number and the BGP RouterID of the router, logs on
to the new router using the craft port, ssh, etc., and requests that
the router generate a public/private key-pair and generate and sign
(with the private key) a PKCS#10 request. The operator then off-
loads the PKCS#10 request and uploads the request to their RPKI
software management tools. The tools create and publish the RPKI
Router-Key object for the public key, and return the PKCS#7. The
operator uploads the PKCS#7 to the router which then extracts its
certificate.
Using the Operator-Generated Key method, see Section 4, the operator
decides on the AS number and the BGP RouterID of the new router and
uses their RPKI software management tools to generate the
public/private key-pair and publish the public key in the RPKI. The
tools also produce the PKCS#8 object which the operator then uploads
into the new router via the craft port, ssh, NetConf, etc. The
router installs the PKS#8 and installs the public/private key-
pair.</t>
6. Other Use Cases
Current router code generates private keys for uses such as ssh, but
the private keys may not be seen or off-loaded via CLI or any other
means. While this is good security, it creates difficulties when a
routing engine or whole router must be replaced in the field and all
software which accesses the router must be updated with the new keys.
Also, the initial contact with a new routing engine requires trust
in the public key presented on first contact.
To allow operators to quickly replace routers without requiring
update and distribution of the corresponding public keys in the RPKI,
routers SHOULD allow the private BGPsec key to be off-loaded via the
CLI, NetConf (see [RFC6470]), SNMP, etc. This lets the operator
upload the old private key via the mechanism used for Operator-
Generated Keys, see Section 5.
7. Security Considerations
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Keys could be intercepted in transport and the recipient, RPKI or
router, would have no way of knowing a substitution had been made by
a monkey in the middle. Hence transport security is strongly
advised.
8. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA Considerations.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5915] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Elliptic Curve Private Key
Structure", RFC 5915, June 2010.
[RFC5958] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", RFC 5958, August
2010.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC6470] Bierman, A., "Network Configuration Protocol (NETCONF)
Base Notifications", RFC 6470, February 2012.
[I-D.sidr-bgpsec-overview]
Lepinski, M. and S. Turner, "An Overview of BGPSEC",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-overview-01 (work in progress),
October 2011.
[I-D.sidr-bgpsec-protocol]
Lepinski, M., "BGPSEC Protocol Specification",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-protocol-01 (work in progress),
October 2011.
[I-D.sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles]
Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
BGPSEC Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
and Certification Requests",
draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-pki-profiles-01 (work in progress),
December 2011.
[I-D.sidr-bgpsec-algs]
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Turner, S., "BGP Algorithms, Key Formats, & Signature
Formats", draft-ietf-sidr-bgpsec-algs-01 (work in
progress), December 2011.
Appendix A. Examples
The examples provided in this appendix were generated using OpenSSL
0.9.8.r.
Appendix A.1. Operator-Generated Keys
To generate the EC public and private keys:
openssl ecparam -genkey -name secp256v1 -noout -out ecKey.pem
The result is (note this ought not be reproducible because each
key better be unique, but you ought to get the same format):
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIEzFLfqklXUpodvaqGuivapVRzRxiITh4UdlJ/JTAgKxoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAEM4VgV/qUB06BZ9bzqYyXIfacC5NDr9yavwxfbZnGejIaeXXt2OO/
qkmQQq3E7m/GEJ+XFyciLv2da9waZMTVQg==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
To convert the result to PKCS#8, issue the following command:
openssl pkcs8 -topk8 -inform PEM -outform PEM -in ecKey.pem -out
ecKey-p8.pem -nocrypt
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIGHAgEAMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHBG0wawIBAQQgTMUt+qSVdSmh29qo
a6K9qlVHNHGIhOHhR2Un8lMCArGhRANCAAQzhWBX+pQHToFn1vOpjJch9pwLk0Ov
3Jq/DF9tmcZ6Mhp5de3Y47+qSZBCrcTub8YQn5cXJyIu/Z1r3BpkxNVC
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
Appendix A.1. Router-Generated Keys
TBD
Authors' Addresses
Sean Turner
IECA, Inc.
3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106
Fairfax, Virginia 22031
US
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Email: turners@ieca.com
Keyur Patel
Cisco Systems
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
US
Email: keyupate@cisco.com
Randy Bush
Internet Initiative Japan, Inc.
5147 Crystal Springs
Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110
US
Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1
Email: randy@psg.com
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