Internet DRAFT - draft-wing-pcp-third-party-authz

draft-wing-pcp-third-party-authz







PCP                                                              D. Wing
Internet-Draft                                                  T. Reddy
Intended status: Standards Track                                P. Patil
Expires: October 4, 2014                                        R. Penno
                                                                   Cisco
                                                           April 2, 2014


              PCP Extension for Third Party Authorization
                  draft-wing-pcp-third-party-authz-03

Abstract

   It is often desirable for an application server to permit a flow
   across a firewall, as happens today when a firewall includes an
   Application Layer Gateway (ALG) function.  However, an ALG has
   several weaknesses.

   This document describes a cryptographic technique for an application
   server to permit a flow across a firewall.  This technique uses OAuth
   and a new PCP option.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on October 4, 2014.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents



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   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Notational Conventions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Solution Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Obtaining a Token Using OAuth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     5.1.  ACCESS_TOKEN Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     5.2.  Generating the ACCESS_TOKEN option  . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     5.3.  PCP server processing ACCESS_TOKEN option . . . . . . . .  10
     5.4.  Processing the PCP response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   6.  PCP Server and Proxy behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   7.  Usage with PCP Authentication mechanism . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   8.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
   9.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15

1.  Introduction

   It is desirable for a third party to permit flows across a firewall.
   A typical use-case is a SIP proxy (which is aware of legitimate
   calls) which is not co-located with a firewall.  Today, this
   functionality is provided by a firewall implementing a SIP-aware
   Application Layer Gateway function, which examines the SIP signaling
   to that SIP proxy and opens the appropriate pinholes for the RTP
   media.  This has disadvantages, as described in detail in section
   Section 3.

   This document addresses requirement "Third Party Authorization"
   explained in section 4 of [I-D.reddy-pcp-auth-req].

   This document proposes that a PCP [RFC6887] client communicate with
   an OAuth Authorization Server to obtain a cryptographic token for its
   media flow.  That token is included in the PCP request and validated
   by the PCP server.

   Note: There is no relationship with the THIRD_PARTY option defined in
   [RFC6887], which serves a different purpose.  THIRD_PARTY Option for



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   MAP and PEER Opcodes described in [RFC6887] is only applicable when
   all entities i.e the PCP client, PCP server and Application Server,
   are deployed within the same administrative domain.  Since PCP server
   does not listen on a public interface, an Application Server outside
   the site will not be able to use THIRD_PARTY option to request
   services on behalf of the client.

2.  Notational Conventions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

   WebRTC Server: A web server that supports WebRTC
   [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview].

3.  Problem Statement

   To protect networks using real-time communications, firewalls or
   session border controllers [RFC5853] are typically deployed.
   Firewalls usually implement Application Layer Gateway functionality,
   which intercepts and analyzes session signaling traffic such as
   Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [RFC3261] messages and creates a
   dynamic mapping to permit the corresponding media traffic.  In
   particular, a firewall extracts media transport addresses, transport
   protocol and ports from session description and creates a dynamic
   mapping for media to flow through.  This model will not work in the
   following cases:

   1.  Session signaling is end-to-end encrypted (say, using TLS).

   2.  Firewall does not understand the session signaling protocol, or
       extensions to the protocol, used by the endpoints.

   3.  Session signaling and media traverse different firewalls (e.g.,
       signaling exits a network via one firewall whereas media exits a
       network via a different firewall)

   When an enterprise deploys WebRTC, the above problems are relevant
   because:

   1.  Session signaling between WebRTC application running in a browser
       and a web server will use TLS.

   2.  WebRTC does not enforce a particular session signaling protocol;
       therefore, a firewall is unlikely to understand the signaling
       protocol.




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   3.  Session signaling and peer-to-peer media may traverse different
       firewalls.

   As a result firewalls block media traffic.

   A mitigation to the problems above is for an enterprise to deploy a
   TURN server in the DMZ and have WebRTC clients use the TURN server.
   The use-case explained in Section 4.2.5.1 of
   [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-use-cases-and-requirements] refers to deploying a
   TURN [RFC5766] server to audit all media sessions from inside the
   company premises to any external peer.

   However, using TURN for all such communication causes some problems
   for an enterprise network administrator :

   o  Enterprise firewalls would typically have granular policies to
      permit calls initiated using selected WebRTC servers (Dr. Good) it
      trusts and block the rest (Dr. Evil).

   o  A TURN server just provides a 5-tuple (source IP address,
      destination IP address, protocol number, source port number, and
      destination port number) for auditing and no other details of the
      WebRTC or SIP server being used to establish the call.

   o  A TURN server could increase media latency as explained in section
      4.1.2.2 of [RFC5245].

   o  A TURN server could either be located in the DMZ of the enterprise
      network or located in the public Internet.  If the TURN server is
      located in the public Internet it comes at a high cost to the
      provider of the TURN server, since the server typically needs a
      high-bandwidth connection to the Internet as explained in the
      Introduction of [RFC5766].  As a consequence, it is best to use a
      TURN server only when a direct communication path cannot be found.
      When the client and a peer use ICE to determine communication
      path, ICE will use hole punching techniques to search for a direct
      path first and only use a TURN server when a direct path cannot be
      found.

   o  Other limitations of TURN are explained in section 2.6 of
      [RFC5766].  For example the value of Diffserv field may not be
      preserved, Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) field may be
      reset etc.








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4.  Solution Overview

   In the below topology, the main functional elements involved are :

                  =========================
                  |  WebRTC Server        |
                  =========================
                            |  3rd Party Network
                            |
                            |
                    ==================
                    |    WAN         |-----+-+----+---+----+-+---
                    ==================                 |
                              |                        |
                              |                        |
                              |                        |
                      +-------+-------+                |
                      | Firewall  -   |                |
                      | PCP Server    |                |
                      +-------+-------+                |
                              |                        |
                              |                        |
      Branch office           |                        | Mobile Network
   -+-+-----+-----------+-+-----+--------         ----+-+-------+------
                              |                        |
                           +-+----------+           +--------+
                           | Alice  -   |           | Bob    |
                           | PCP Client |           |        |
                           +------------+           +--------+


   Users : Alice, Bob
   WebRTC Server : OAuth 2.0 Authorization server


       Figure 1: WebRTC server in a different administrative domain

   In the topology, a WebRTC Server is deployed in a third party network
   trusted by the Enterprise.  For the two endpoints to successfully
   establish media sessions, a firewall needs to permit ICE [RFC5245]
   connectivity checks and subsequent media traffic.

   In such a scenario this specification proposes that a PCP client
   follows the steps described below:

   1.  The PCP client makes a PCP request without any authorization.  If
       the PCP server returns an AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED error message,




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       the PCP client concludes that the PCP server is mandating the use
       of third party authorization.

   2.  The PCP client then obtains a cryptographic token from an OAuth
       2.0 Authorization server.

   3.  The PCP client sends a PCP request including the cryptographic
       token in the TOKEN_ACCESS option, defined below.  Alternatively,
       the PCP client could first obtain a cryptographic token from the
       OAuth 2.0 Authorization server and send the PCP request with the
       TOKEN_ACCESS option by default.

   4.  The PCP server uses the TOKEN_ACCESS option to perform third
       party authorization.

   The technique proposed in the specification can be used by any other
   Application Function trusted by the network to permit time-bound,
   encrypted, peer-to-peer traffic.

5.  Obtaining a Token Using OAuth

   This section explains OAuth 2.0 authorization framework [RFC6749] to
   solve the "Third Party Authorization" requirement explained in
   section 4 of [I-D.reddy-pcp-auth-req].

   The following mapping of OAuth concepts to PCP is used :

                 +----------------------+----------------------------+
                 |         OAuth        |            PCP             |
                 +======================+============================+
                 | Client               | PCP Client                 |
                 +----------------------+----------------------------+
                 | Resource owner       | Authorization Server. For  |
                 |                      | example the WebRTC server  |
                 +----------------------+----------------------------+
                 | Authorization server | Authorization server.      |
                 +----------------------+----------------------------+
                 | Resource server      | PCP Server                 |
                 +----------------------+----------------------------+

           Figure 2: OAuth terminology mapped to PCP terminology

   Using the OAuth 2.0 authorization framework, a PCP client (third-
   party application) obtains limited access to a PCP server (resource
   server) on behalf of the WebRTC server (resource owner or
   authorization server).  The PCP client requests access to resources
   controlled by the resource owner (WebRTC server) and hosted by the
   resource server (PCP server).  The PCP client obtains an access



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   token, lifetime, and other access attributes like the PCP options and
   opcodes that the PCP client is permitted to use from the
   authorization server.  The PCP client conveys the token in the PCP
   ACESS_TOKEN option to access the protected resources hosted by the
   resource server (PCP server).  The PCP server validates the token and
   takes appropriate action e.g., allows the PCP request to create
   mappings on the PCP server.

                         +---------------+
         +-------------->|               +-------+
         |               | Authorization |       |
         |      +--------| Server        |       |
         |      |        |(WebRTC Server)|       |  Authorization
         |      |        |               |<--+   | (e.g Permit MAP/PEER)
   (1)   |      |        +---------------+   |   |   (5)
  Access |      |  Access                    |   |
  Token  |      |  Token          Get Token  |   |
  Request|      |   (2)            Resource  |   |
         |      |                    (4)     |   |
         |      |                            |   |
         |      V                            |   V
      +-------+---+                       +-+----=-----+
      |           |         (3)           |            |
      |           | PCP Request + Access  |            |
      | PCP       | Token                 | PCP        |
      | Client    |---------------------->| Server     |
      | (Alice)   | PCP Response (6)      | (Firewall) |
      |           |<----------------------|            |
      +-----------+                       +------------+

 User : Alice


                          Figure 3: Interactions

   OAuth in [RFC6749] defines four grant types.  This specification uses
   the OAuth grant type "Implicit" explained in section 1.3.2 of
   [RFC6749] where the PCP client is issued an access token directly.
   The scope of the access token explained in section 3.3 of [RFC6749]
   MUST be PCP.

5.1.  ACCESS_TOKEN Option

   This specification defines a new PCP ACCESS_TOKEN Option that is
   described inFigure 4.






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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |Option Code=TBD|  Reserved     |   Option Length               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       | Domain Name Length            |    Reserved1                  |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                    Domain Name                                |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                    Timestamp                                  |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                    Lifetime                                   |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                        key id                                 |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       | access token length           |    Reserved3                  |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                    access token                               |
       |                                                               |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

                     Figure 4: PCP ACCESS_TOKEN Option

   The fields are described below:

   Option Length:  16 bits.  Indicates the length of the enclosed data,
      in octets.  Variable, but MUST NOT be 0.

   Domain Name Length:  Length of the 'Domain Name' field in octets.

   Reserved1:  set to 0 by sender and ignored by the receiver.

   Server Domain Name:  The domain name of the Authorized Server that
      generated the access token.

   Timestamp:  64-bit unsigned integer field containing a timestamp.
      The value indicates the time since January 1, 1970, 00:00 UTC, by
      using a fixed point format.  In this format, the integer number of
      seconds is contained in the first 48 bits of the field, and the
      remaining 16 bits indicate the number of 1/64K fractions of a
      second (Native format - Unix).

   Lifetime:  The lifetime of the access token since the response was
      generated, in seconds.  For example, the value 3600 indicates one




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      hour.  The Lifetime value SHOULD be equal to the "expires_in"
      parameter defined in section 4.2.2 of [RFC6749].

   key id:  An ephemeral and unique key identifier generated by the
      authorization server.  The authorization server MUST NOT generate
      the same key identifier twice within the lifetime of the access
      token.

   access token length:  Length of the access token field in octets.
      OAuth does not impose any limitation on the length of the access
      token but since PCP messages cannot exceed 1100 octets (Section 7
      of [RFC6887]), access token length needs to be restricted to fit
      within the maximum PCP message size.  The access token is defined
      in section 1.4 of [RFC6749].  TBD : what is the recommended/
      maximum token length for PCP.  We need a discussion of this
      maximum length and analysis of what that means

   Reserved3:  set to 0 by sender and ignored by the receiver.

   access token:  The access token issued by the authorization server.

   Option Name:  ACCESS_TOKEN

   Number:  TBA in the mandatory-to-process range (IANA)

   Purpose:  This option conveys the token granted by the authorization
      server for third party authorization.

   Valid for Opcodes:  MAP, PEER

   May appear in :  request.

   Maximum occurrences :  1

5.2.  Generating the ACCESS_TOKEN option

   The mechanism used by an OAuth client to obtain a token from the
   OAuth authorization server is outside the scope of this document.
   The OAuth client could obtain the token via in-band signaling or an
   exclusive out-of-band protocol.  This specification uses the token
   type Handle described in [RFC6819].  A handle token is a reference to
   some internal data structure within the OAuth authorization server;
   the internal data structure contains the attributes of the token such
   as allowed PCP Opcode or PCP Option, etc.  The PCP client, after
   receiving the access token from the OAuth authorization server,
   generates the ACCESS_TOKEN option which is included in the PCP
   request to the PCP server.




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5.3.  PCP server processing ACCESS_TOKEN option

   A PCP server performs processing in the order described below.

   When a PCP server receives a PCP request with an ACCESS_TOKEN option,
   it will verify that the access token is valid.  To address replay
   attacks, the PCP server MUST perform the following check :

   When a PCP request with an ACCESS_TOKEN Option is received, the
   received timestamp (TSnew in the Timestamp field) is checked and the
   cryptographic token is accepted if the timestamp is recent enough to
   the reception time of the PCP request, RDnew :

   Lifetime + Delta > abs(RDnew - TSnew)

   The RECOMMENDED value for the allowed Delta is 5 seconds.  If the
   timestamp is NOT within the boundaries then discard the PCP request
   with AUTHORIZATION-FAILED error response defined in
   [I-D.ietf-pcp-authentication].

   After the validation described above, the PCP server communicates
   with the authorization server in order to validate the token and
   obtain token-bound data.  The mechanism for communication is outside
   the scope of this document.  The PCP server makes a request to the
   authorization server to validate the token but produces no other data
   with the request.  If the token is successfully validated, the
   authorization server just returns the token bound authorization data
   in the response.  The PCP server then matches this authorization data
   with what is requested in the PCP request sent by the PCP client.  If
   the authorization sets match, the PCP server honors the PCP request
   made by the PCP client.

   If the token is invalid or the request exceeds what is authorized by
   the token then the PCP server generates an AUTHORIZATION-FAILED error
   response.  An example might be that an OAuth authorization server
   permits creating 5 mappings, and the PCP request made by the client
   is trying to create a 6th mapping.

   Handle token type was selected for the following reasons :

   1.  The Authorization Server can inform the PCP server to revoke the
       access token after the call is terminated.  This mechanism
       ensures that even if the PCP client does not close the dynamic
       mapping created, the PCP server based on the revocation
       notification from the Authorization Server can close the dynamic
       mapping.





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   2.  A PCP-controlled Firewall with restrictive policies may also want
       to validate with the Authorization Server if the selected
       candidate pairs in the final offer/answer match the 5-tuple {dest
       addr, source addr, protocol, dest port, source port} sessions
       traversing the Firewall.  This validation ensures that the PCP
       client is using the token only to send and receive the media
       streams finalized in the call to the remote peer.  Thus the PCP
       server can make sure that the token cannot be used for anything
       else.

   3.  If PCP authentication [I-D.ietf-pcp-authentication] is used then
       the PCP server may also validate with the authorization server if
       the access token is issued and used by the same user or not.

   Another approach, not discussed in this document, is a self-contained
   token where all the information necessary to authenticate the
   validity of the token is contained within the token itself.  This
   approach has the benefit of avoiding a protocol between the PCP
   server and the OAuth authentication server for token validation, thus
   reducing latency.  However, this approach has the drawback of needing
   a large PCP packet to accommodate the token.  Because PCP messages
   are limited to 1100 octets, using the handle approach is more
   flexible and the trade-off for additional latency is reasonable.  The
   other disadvantages of self-contained tokens, such as difficulties
   with revocation etc., are discussed in[RFC6819].

5.4.  Processing the PCP response

   Upon receiving a PCP response, the PCP client performs the normal
   processing described in Section 8.3 of [RFC6887].  If the PCP
   response was SUCCESS (0), the PCP server has determined that the
   token is valid.  If the PCP response was AUTHORIZATION-FAILED, it
   indicates that the token could be invalid, expired or the PCP request
   exceeded what is authorized by the token.

6.  PCP Server and Proxy behavior

   The ACCESS_TOKEN option is mandatory-to-process (its most significant
   bit is clear).  Thus, per existing behavior described in [RFC6887], a
   PCP server receiving this option MUST return the error
   MALFORMED_OPTION if the option contents are malformed, or
   UNSUPP_OPTION if the option is unrecognized, unimplemented, or
   disabled, or if the client is not authorized to use the option.

   A PCP Proxy MUST follow the rules mentioned in section of 3.4 of
   [I-D.ietf-pcp-proxy] when processing the ACCESS_TOKEN option.





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7.  Usage with PCP Authentication mechanism

   The following steps MUST be followed when PCP third party
   authorization is used with PCP authentication mechanism.

   o  PCP client MUST send the access token after successful EAP
      authentication.  This provides integrity protection for
      ACCESS_TOKEN option.

   o  If PCP Auth session lifetime expires before the authorization
      token expires and the PCP client, PCP server fail to trigger re-
      authentication then dynamic mappings created because of third
      party authorization MUST be deleted.

8.  Security Considerations

   Security considerations discussed in [RFC6887] and PCP authentication
   [I-D.ietf-pcp-authentication] are to be taken into account.  If left
   unprotected the Authorization server could present a means for an
   attacker to poll a series of possible token values, fishing for a
   valid token.  Therefore, the Authorization Server SHOULD issue
   special credentials to PCP server to access it and the communication
   between PCP server and Authorization server MUST be protected using
   TLS.

   A PCP server will delete explicit dynamic mappings after the lifetime
   of the cryptographic token expires.  The PCP client must obtain a new
   cryptographic token from the authorization server before the current
   token becomes invalid or expires.  The PCP client must propagate the
   new cryptographic token to the PCP server to refresh lifetime of
   mappings before the current token becomes invalid or expires.  The
   PCP server in addition to timestamp checking can also maintain a
   cache of used key id as an effective countermeasure against replay
   attacks.

   Discussion: If the additional latency needs to be avoided and it is
   permissible to create a PCP mapping briefly for PCP clients, an
   implementation could create PCP mappings while the token is being
   validated.  The PCP server could create a mapping immediately, send a
   PCP response and in parallel start verification of the token.  If the
   verification request times out or returns a failure response, the PCP
   mapping can be destroyed and a PCP mapping update is sent to the PCP
   client.  The PCP server while waiting for the validation response to
   arrive from Authorization server can either drop or buffer the
   traffic matching the mapping created.






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9.  IANA Considerations

   We request IANA register the PCP option ACCESS_TOKEN and the result
   code AUTHORIZATION_REQUIRED in [pcp-registry].

10.  Acknowledgements

   Authors would like to thank Dave Thaler, Charles Eckel, Paul Jones,
   Dacheng Zhang, Anca Zamfir, Parthasarathi R and Suresh kumar for
   their comments and review.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-pcp-authentication]
              Wasserman, M., Hartman, S., and D. Zhang, "Port Control
              Protocol (PCP) Authentication Mechanism", draft-ietf-pcp-
              authentication-03 (work in progress), February 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-pcp-proxy]
              Perreault, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., Wing, D., and S.
              Cheshire, "Port Control Protocol (PCP) Proxy Function",
              draft-ietf-pcp-proxy-05 (work in progress), February 2014.

   [I-D.reddy-pcp-auth-req]
              Reddy, T., Patil, P., Wing, D., and R. Penno, "PCP
              Authentication Requirements", draft-reddy-pcp-auth-req-04
              (work in progress), July 2013.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [RFC5389]  Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and D. Wing,
              "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5389,
              October 2008.

   [RFC6407]  Weis, B., Rowles, S., and T. Hardjono, "The Group Domain
              of Interpretation", RFC 6407, October 2011.

   [RFC6749]  Hardt, D., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", RFC
              6749, October 2012.

   [RFC6887]  Wing, D., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and P.
              Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 6887, April
              2013.





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   [pcp-registry]
              IANA, , "Port Control Protocol (PCP) Parameters", May
              2013, <http://www.iana.org/assignments/pcp-parameters/
              pcp-parameters.xml>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-overview]
              Alvestrand, H., "Overview: Real Time Protocols for Brower-
              based Applications", draft-ietf-rtcweb-overview-09 (work
              in progress), February 2014.

   [I-D.ietf-rtcweb-use-cases-and-requirements]
              Holmberg, C., Hakansson, S., and G. Eriksson, "Web Real-
              Time Communication Use-cases and Requirements", draft-
              ietf-rtcweb-use-cases-and-requirements-14 (work in
              progress), February 2014.

   [RFC3261]  Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
              A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
              Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", RFC 3261,
              June 2002.

   [RFC5245]  Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment
              (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT)
              Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", RFC 5245, April
              2010.

   [RFC5766]  Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and J. Rosenberg, "Traversal Using
              Relays around NAT (TURN): Relay Extensions to Session
              Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", RFC 5766, April 2010.

   [RFC5853]  Hautakorpi, J., Camarillo, G., Penfield, R., Hawrylyshen,
              A., and M. Bhatia, "Requirements from Session Initiation
              Protocol (SIP) Session Border Control (SBC) Deployments",
              RFC 5853, April 2010.

   [RFC6342]  Koodli, R., "Mobile Networks Considerations for IPv6
              Deployment", RFC 6342, August 2011.

   [RFC6819]  Lodderstedt, T., McGloin, M., and P. Hunt, "OAuth 2.0
              Threat Model and Security Considerations", RFC 6819,
              January 2013.








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Authors' Addresses

   Dan Wing
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   170 West Tasman Drive
   San Jose, California  95134
   USA

   Email: dwing@cisco.com


   Tirumaleswar Reddy
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Cessna Business Park, Varthur Hobli
   Sarjapur Marathalli Outer Ring Road
   Bangalore, Karnataka  560103
   India

   Email: tireddy@cisco.com


   Prashanth Patil
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   Bangalore
   India

   Email: praspati@cisco.com


   Reinaldo Penno
   Cisco Systems, Inc.
   170 West Tasman Drive
   San Jose  95134
   USA

   Email: repenno@cisco.com















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