Internet DRAFT - draft-vvv-tls-alps

draft-vvv-tls-alps







TLS Working Group                                            V. Vasiliev
Internet-Draft                                                    Google
Intended status: Standards Track                            26 June 2020
Expires: 28 December 2020


           TLS Application-Layer Protocol Settings Extension
                         draft-vvv-tls-alps-00

Abstract

   This document describes a Transport Layer Security (TLS) extension
   for negotiating application-layer protocol settings (ALPS) within the
   TLS handshake.  Any application-layer protocol operating over TLS can
   use this mechanism to indicate its settings to the peer in parallel
   with the TLS handshake completion.

Discussion Venues

   This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.

   Discussion of this document takes place on the TLS Working Group
   mailing list (tls@ietf.org), which is archived at
   https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/
   (https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/).

   Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
   https://github.com/vasilvv/tls-alps (https://github.com/vasilvv/tls-
   alps).

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 December 2020.





Vasiliev                Expires 28 December 2020                [Page 1]

Internet-Draft                  TLS ALPS                       June 2020


Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
   as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  Wire protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Author's Address  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   An application-layer protocol often starts with both parties
   negotiating parameters under which the protocol operates; for
   instance, HTTP/2 [RFC7540] uses a SETTINGS frame to exchange the list
   of protocol parameters supported by each endpoint.  This is usually
   achieved by waiting for TLS handshake [RFC8446] to complete and then
   performing the application-layer handshake within the application
   protocol itself.  This approach, despite its apparent simplicity at
   first, has multiple drawbacks:

   1.  While the server is technically capable of sending configuration
       to the peer as soon as it sends its Finished message, most TLS
       implementations do not allow any application data to be sent
       until the Finished message is received from the client.  This
       adds an extra round-trip to the time of when the server settings
       are available to the client.






Vasiliev                Expires 28 December 2020                [Page 2]

Internet-Draft                  TLS ALPS                       June 2020


   2.  In QUIC, any settings delivered within the application layer can
       arrive after other application data; thus, the application has to
       operate under the assumption that peer's settings are not always
       available.

   3.  If the application needs to be aware of the server settings in
       order to send 0-RTT data, the application has to manually
       integrate with the TLS stack to associate the settings with TLS
       session tickets.

   This document introduces a new TLS extension, "application_settings",
   that allows applications to exchange settings within the TLS
   handshake.  Through doing that, the settings can be made available to
   the application as soon as the handshake completes, and can be
   associated with TLS session tickets automatically at the TLS layer.
   This approach allows the application protocol to be designed with the
   assumption that it has access to the peer's settings whenever it is
   able to send data.

2.  Conventions and Definitions

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Semantics

   Settings are defined to be an opaque blob that is specified by the
   application when initiating a TLS connection.  The settings are meant
   to be a _declaration_ of the protocol parameters supported by the
   sender.  While in this version of the extension the server settings
   are always sent first, this may change in future versions; thus, the
   application MUST NOT vary client settings based on the ones received
   from the server.

   ALPS is _not_ a negotiation mechanism: there is no notion of
   rejecting peer's settings, and the settings are not responses to one
   another.  Nevertheless, it is possible for parties to coordinate
   behavior by, for instance, requiring a certain parameter to be
   present in both client and server settings.  This makes ALPS
   mechanism similar to QUIC transport parameters
   [I-D.ietf-quic-transport] or HTTP/2 SETTINGS frame [RFC7540], but
   puts it in contrast to similar mechanisms in TLS.






Vasiliev                Expires 28 December 2020                [Page 3]

Internet-Draft                  TLS ALPS                       June 2020


   Settings are exchanged as a part of the TLS handshake that is
   encrypted with the handshake keys.  When the server settings are
   sent, the identity of the client has not been yet established;
   therefore, an application MUST NOT use ALPS if it requires the
   settings to be available only to the authenticated clients.

   The ALPS model provides applications with a guarantee that the
   settings are available before any application data can be written.
   Note that this implies that when the full handshake is performed, the
   server can no longer send data immediately after sending its Finished
   message; it has to wait for the client to respond with its settings.
   This may negatively impact the latency of the protocols where the
   server sends the first message, however it should be noted that
   sending application data before receiving has not been widely
   supported by TLS implementations, nor has it been allowed in
   situations when establishing client identity through TLS is required.

   ALPS can only be used in conjunction with Application-Layer Protocol
   Negotiation: the client MUST offer ALPN [RFC7301] if advertising ALPS
   support, and the server MUST NOT reply with ALPS unless it is also
   negotiating ALPN.  The ALPS payload is protocol-dependent, and as
   such it MUST be specified with respect to a selected ALPN.

   For application protocols that support 0-RTT data, both the client
   and the server have to remember the settings provided by the both
   sides during the original connection.  If the client sends 0-RTT data
   and the server accepts it, the ALPS values SHALL be the same values
   as were during the original connection.  In all other cases
   (including session resumption that does not result in server
   accepting early data), new ALPS values SHALL be negotiated.

   If the client wishes to send different client settings for the 0-RTT
   session, it MUST NOT offer 0-RTT.  Conversely, if the server would
   send different server settings, it MUST reject 0-RTT.  Note that the
   ALPN itself is similarly required to match the one in the original
   connection, thus the settings only need to be remembered or checked
   for a single application protocol.

4.  Wire protocol

   ALPS is only supported in TLS version 1.3 or later, as the earlier
   versions do not provide any confidentiality protections for the
   handshake data.  The exchange is performed in three steps:

   1.  The client sends an extension in ClientHello that enumerates all
       ALPN values for which ALPS is supported.





Vasiliev                Expires 28 December 2020                [Page 4]

Internet-Draft                  TLS ALPS                       June 2020


   2.  The server sends an encrypted extension containing the server
       settings.

   3.  The client sends a new handshake message containing the client
       settings.

          Client                                               Server

          ClientHello
          + alpn
          + alps                    -------->

                                                          ServerHello
                                                {EncryptedExtensions}
                                                             + {alpn}
                                                             + {alps}
                                                                  ...
                                    <--------              {Finished}

          {ClientApplicationSettings}
          {Certificate*}
          {CertificateVerify*}
          {Finished}                -------->

                      +  Indicates extensions sent in the
                         previously noted message.

                      {} Indicates messages protected using
                         the handshake keys.

                      *  Indicates optional messages that are
                         not related to ALPS.

              Figure 1: ALPS exchange in a full TLS handshake

   A TLS client can enable ALPS by specifying an "application_settings"
   extension.  The value of the "extension_data" field for the ALPS
   extension SHALL be a ApplicationSettingsSupport struct:

       struct {
           ProtocolName supported_protocols<2..2^16-1>;
       } ApplicationSettingsSupport;

   Here, the "supported_protocols" field indicates the names of the
   protocols (as defined in [RFC7301]) for which ALPS exchange is
   supported; this is necessary for the situations when the client
   offers multiple ALPN values but only supports ALPS in some of them.




Vasiliev                Expires 28 December 2020                [Page 5]

Internet-Draft                  TLS ALPS                       June 2020


   If the server chooses an ALPN value for which the client has offered
   ALPS support, the server MAY send an "application_settings" extension
   in the EncryptedExtensions.  The value of the "extension_data" field
   in that case SHALL be an opaque blob containing the server settings
   as specified by the application protocol.

   If the client receives an EncryptedExtensions message containing an
   "application_settings" extension from the server, after receiving
   server's Finished message it MUST send a ClientApplicationSettings
   handshake message before sending the Finished message:

       enum {
           client_application_settings(TBD), (255)
       } HandshakeType;

       struct {
           opaque application_settings<0..2^16-1>;
       } ClientApplicationSettings;

   The value of the "application_settings" field SHALL be an opaque blob
   containing the client settings as specified by the application
   protocol.  If the client is providing a client certificate, the
   ClientApplicationSettings message MUST precede the Certificate
   message sent by the client.

   If the ClientApplicationSettings message is sent or received during
   the handshake, it SHALL be appended to the end of client's Handshake
   Context context as defined in Section 4.4 of [RFC8446].  In addition,
   for Post-Handshake Handshake Context, it SHALL be appended after the
   client Finished message.

   When performing session resumption with 0-RTT data, the settings are
   carried over from the original connection.  The server SHALL send an
   empty "application_settings" extension if it accepts 0-RTT, and the
   client SHALL NOT send a ClientApplicationSettings message.

5.  Security Considerations

   ALPS is protected using the handshake keys, which are the secret keys
   derived as a result of (EC)DHE between the client and the server.

   In order to ensure that the ALPS values are authenticated, the TLS
   implementation MUST NOT reveal the contents of peer's ALPS until
   peer's Finished message is received, with exception of cases where
   the ALPS has been carried over from the previous connection.






Vasiliev                Expires 28 December 2020                [Page 6]

Internet-Draft                  TLS ALPS                       June 2020


6.  IANA Considerations

   IANA will update the "TLS ExtensionType Values" registry to include
   "application_settings" with the value of TBD; the list of messages in
   which this extension may appear is "CH, SH".

   IANA will also update the "TLS HandshakeType" registry to include
   "client_application_settings" message with value TBD, and "DTLS-OK"
   set to "Y".

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC7301]  Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
              Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
              July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-quic-transport]
              Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
              and Secure Transport", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-quic-transport-29, 9 June 2020,
              <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-quic-
              transport-29.txt>.

   [RFC7540]  Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.






Vasiliev                Expires 28 December 2020                [Page 7]

Internet-Draft                  TLS ALPS                       June 2020


Acknowledgments

   This document has benefited from contributions and suggestions from
   David Benjamin, Nick Harper, David Schinazi, Renjie Tang and many
   others.

Author's Address

   Victor Vasiliev
   Google

   Email: vasilvv@google.com







































Vasiliev                Expires 28 December 2020                [Page 8]