Internet DRAFT - draft-tbruijnzeels-sidr-validation-local-cache
draft-tbruijnzeels-sidr-validation-local-cache
SIDR T. Bruijnzeels
Internet-Draft O. Muravskiy
Intended status: Informational RIPE NCC
Expires: April 21, 2016 October 19, 2015
RPKI Repository Validation Using Local Cache
draft-tbruijnzeels-sidr-validation-local-cache-02
Abstract
This document describes the approach to validate the content of the
RPKI repository, which is independent of a particular object
retrieval mechanism. This allows it to be used with repositories
available over rsync protocol (see Section 3 of[RFC6481]), and delta
protocol ( [I-D.tbruijnzeels-sidr-delta-protocol]), as well as
repositories that use a mix of both.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on April 21, 2016.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Top-down Validation of a Single Repository . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1. Fetching Trust Anchor Certificate Using Trust Anchor
Locator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2. Resource Certificate Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2.1. Finding most recent valid manifest and CRL . . . . . 4
2.2.2. Manifest entries validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3. Store Cleanup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Remote Objects Fetcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. Fetcher Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.1. Fetch repository objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1.2. Fetch single repository object . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Local Object Store . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Store Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.1. Store Repository Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.2. Update object's last fetch time . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.3. Get objects by hash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.4. Get certificate objects by URI . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.5. Get manifest objects by AKI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.6. Delete objects for URI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.7. Delete outdated objects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1.8. Update object's validation time . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1. Introduction
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
2. Top-down Validation of a Single Repository
The validation of one repository is independent from any other
repository, and thus, multiple repositories could be validated
concurrently.
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The validation of a repository starts from it's Trust Anchor (TA)
certificate. To retrieve the TA, the Trust Anchor Locator (TAL)
object is used, as described in Section 2.1.
If the TA certificate is retrieved, it is validated according to the
Section 2.2 of [RFC6490].
Then the TA certificate is validated as a resource certificate, as
described in Section 2.2.
For all repository objects that were validated during this validation
run, their validation timestamp is updated in the local store (see
Section 4.1.8).
Outdated objects are removed from the store as described in
Section 2.3. This completes the validation of a repository.
2.1. Fetching Trust Anchor Certificate Using Trust Anchor Locator
The following steps are performed in order to fetch the Trust Anchor
Certificate:
o If the Trust Anchor Locator contains "prefetch.uris" field, pass
the URIs contained there to the fetcher (see Section 3.1.1).
o Pass to the fetcher (Section 3.1.2) the URI from the TAL (see
Section 2.1 of [RFC6490]).
o Retrieve from the local store (see Section 4.1.4) all certificate
objects, for which the URI matches the URI extracted from the TAL
in the previous step, and the public key matches the
subjectPublicKeyInfo field of the TAL (Section 2.1 of [RFC6490]).
o If no, or more than one such objects are found, issue an error and
stop validation process. Otherwise, use that object as a Trust
Anchor certificate.
2.2. Resource Certificate Validation
The following steps describe the validation of a single resource
certificate:
o If both the caRepository (Section 4.8.8.1 of [RFC6487]), and the
id-ad-rpkiNotify (Section 3.5 of
[I-D.tbruijnzeels-sidr-delta-protocol]) SIA pointers are present
in the given resource certificate, use a local policy to determine
which pointer to use. Extract the URI from the selected pointer
and pass it to the fetcher (see Section 3.1.1).
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o For a given resource certificate, find it's manifest and
certificate revocation list (CRL), using the procedure described
in Section 2.2.1. If no such manifest and CRL could be found,
issue an error and stop processing current certificate.
o Compare given resource certificate's manifest URI with the URI of
the manifest found in the previous step. If they are different,
issue a warning.
o Get from the local store and validate repository objects that
correspond to the manifest entries, using the procedure described
in the Section 2.2.2.
o Validate all resource certificate objects found on the manifest,
using the CRL object found on the manifest, according to Section 7
of [RFC6487].
o Validate all ROA objects found on the manifest, using the CRL
object found on the manifest, according to the Section 4 of
[RFC6482].
o Validate all Ghostbusters Record objects found on the manifest,
using the CRL object found on the manifest, according to the
Section 7 of [RFC6493].
o For every valid resource certificate object found on the manifest,
apply the procedure described in this section (Section 2.2),
recursively, provided that this resource certificate (identified
by it's SKI) has not yet been validated during current repository
validation run.
2.2.1. Finding most recent valid manifest and CRL
Fetch from the store (see Section 4.1.5) all objects of type
manifest, whose certificate's AKI field matches the SKI of the
current CA certificate.
Find the manifest object with the highest manifest number, for which
all following conditions are met:
o There is only one entry in the manifest for which the store
contains exactly one object of type CRL, whose hash matches the
hash of the entry.
o The manifest's certificate AKI equals the above CRL's AKI
o The above CRL is a valid object according to Section 6.3 of
[RFC5280]
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o The manifest is a valid object according to Section 4.4 of
[RFC6486], using the CRL found above
Report an error for every invalid manifest with the number higher
than the number of the valid manifest.
2.2.2. Manifest entries validation
For every entry in the manifest object:
o Construct an entry's URI by appending the entry name to the
current CA's publication point URI.
o Get all objects from the store whose hash attribute equals entry's
hash (see Section 4.1.3).
o If no such objects found, issue an error.
o For every found object, compare it's URI with the URI of the
manifest entry. If they do not match, issue a warning.
o If no objects with matching URI found, issue a warning.
o If some objects with non-matching URI found, issue a warning.
2.3. Store Cleanup
At the end of repository validation, the store cleanup is performed.
Given all objects that were validated during current validation run,
it removes from the store (Section 4.1.7) all objects whose URI
attribute matches URI of validated object(s), but the hash attribute
is different.
3. Remote Objects Fetcher
The fetcher is responsible for downloading objects from remote
repositories. Currently rsync and RRDP repositories are supported.
3.1. Fetcher Operations
3.1.1. Fetch repository objects
This operation receives one parameter - a URI. For rsync protocol
this URI points to a directory in a remote rsync repository. For
RRDP repository it points to the repository's notification file.
The fetcher performs following steps:
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o If the given URI has been downloaded recently (as specified by the
local policy), do nothing.
o Download remote objects using the URI provided (for rsync
repository use recursive mode).
o For every new object that is downloaded, try to parse it as an
object of specific RPKI type (certificate, manifest, CRL, ROA,
Ghostbusters record), based on the object's filename extension
(.cer, .mft, .crl, .roa, and .gbr, respectively), and perform
basic RPKI object validation, as specified in [RFC6487] and
[RFC6488].
o For every downloaded valid object, record it in the local store
(Section 4.1.1), and set it's last fetch time to the time it was
downloaded (Section 4.1.2).
3.1.2. Fetch single repository object
This operation receives one parameter - a URI that points to an
object in a remote repository.
The fetcher performs following operations:
o If the given URI has been downloaded recently (as specified by the
local policy), do nothing.
o Download the remote object using the URI provided.
o Try to parse downloaded object as an object of a specific RPKI
type (certificate, manifest, CRL, ROA, Ghostbusters record), based
on the object's filename extension (.cer, .mft, .crl, .roa, and
.gbr, respectively), and perform basic RPKI object validation, as
specified in [RFC6487] and [RFC6488].
o If the downloaded object is not valid, issue an error and skip
further steps.
o Delete objects from the local store (Section 4.1.6) using given
URI.
o Put validated object in the local store (Section 4.1.1), and set
it's last fetch time to the time it was downloaded
(Section 4.1.2).
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4. Local Object Store
4.1. Store Operations
4.1.1. Store Repository Object
Put given object in the store, along with it's type, URI, hash, and
AKI, if there is no record with the same hash and URI fields.
4.1.2. Update object's last fetch time
For all objects in the store whose URI matches the given URI, set the
last fetch time attribute to the given timestamp.
4.1.3. Get objects by hash
Retrieve all objects from the store whose hash attribute matches the
given hash.
4.1.4. Get certificate objects by URI
Retrieve from the store all objects of type certificate, whose URI
attribute matches the given URI.
4.1.5. Get manifest objects by AKI
Retrieve from the store all objects of type manifest, whose AKI
attribute matches the given AKI.
4.1.6. Delete objects for URI
For a given URI, delete all objects in the store with matching URI
attribute.
4.1.7. Delete outdated objects
For a given URI and a list of hashes, delete all objects in the store
with matching URI, whose hash attribute is not in the given list of
hashes.
4.1.8. Update object's validation time
For all objects in the store whose hash attribute matches the given
hash, set the last validation time attribute to the given timestamp.
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5. Acknowledgements
6. IANA Considerations
7. Security Considerations
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/
RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
Resource Certificate Repository Structure", RFC 6481, DOI
10.17487/RFC6481, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481>.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482, DOI 10.17487/
RFC6482, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
"Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6486, DOI 10.17487/RFC6486, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6486>.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", RFC 6487, DOI 10.17487/
RFC6487, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487>.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
(RPKI)", RFC 6488, DOI 10.17487/RFC6488, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488>.
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[RFC6490] Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michaelson, G., and S. Kent,
"Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Trust Anchor
Locator", RFC 6490, DOI 10.17487/RFC6490, February 2012,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6490>.
[RFC6493] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
Ghostbusters Record", RFC 6493, DOI 10.17487/RFC6493,
February 2012, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6493>.
8.2. Informative References
[I-D.tbruijnzeels-sidr-delta-protocol]
Bruijnzeels, T., Muravskiy, O., Weber, B., Austein, R.,
and D. Mandelberg, "RPKI Repository Delta Protocol",
draft-tbruijnzeels-sidr-delta-protocol-03 (work in
progress), December 2014.
Authors' Addresses
Tim Bruijnzeels
RIPE NCC
Email: tim@ripe.net
Oleg Muravskiy
RIPE NCC
Email: oleg@ripe.net
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