Internet DRAFT - draft-schaad-plasma-cms
draft-schaad-plasma-cms
Network Working Group J. Schaad
Internet-Draft Soaring Hawk Consulting
Intended status: Standards Track February 12, 2014
Expires: August 16, 2014
Plasma Service Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Processing
draft-schaad-plasma-cms-05
Abstract
Secure MIME (S/MIME) defined a method of placing security labels on a
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) object. These labels are placed
as part of the data signed and validated by the parties. This means
that the message content is visible to the recipient prior to the
label enforcement. A new model for enforcement of policy using a
third party is described in RFC TBD
[I-D.freeman-plasma-requirements]. This is the Policy Augmented S/
MIME (PLASMA) system. This document provides the details needed to
implement the new Plasma model in the CMS infrastructure.
An additional benefit of using the Plasma module is that the server,
based on policy, manages who has access to the message and how the
keys are protected.
The document details how the client encryption and decryption
processes are performed, defines how to construct the CMS recipient
info structure, a new content to hold the data required for the
Plasma server to store the keys and policy information. The document
does not cover the protocol between the client and the Plasma policy
enforcement server. One example of the client/server protocol can be
found in RFC TBD [I-D.schaad-plasma-service].
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
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This Internet-Draft will expire on August 16, 2014.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Vocabulary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Recipient Info Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. PLASMA Encrypted Key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.2. PLASMA Content Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.3. CMS Signed Data signed attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3.1. PLASMA URL Authenticated Attribute . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3.2. PLASMA Encrypted Content Hash Attribute . . . . . . . 16
3.4. Plasma Lockbox Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.4.1. Audit Trail Identifier Attribute . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.4.2. Signer Info Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4.3. XACML Generic Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
4. Sender Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.1. Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5. Recipient Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.1. Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5.2. Reply Processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
6. S/MIME Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
7. Mandatory Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.1. Plasma Servers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
7.2. Plasma Clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix A. 2009 ASN.1 Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
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Appendix B. Policy Encoding Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1. Introduction
In the traditional S/MIME (Secure MIME) e-mail system, the sender of
a message is responsible for determining the list of recipients for a
message, obtaining a valid public or group key for each recipient,
applying a security label to a message, and sending the message. The
recipient of a message is responsible for the enforcement of any
security labels on the message. While this system works in theory,
in practice it has some difficulties that have led to problems in
getting S/MIME mail widely deployed. This document is part of an
effort to provide an alternative method of allocating the
responsibilities above to different entities in an attempt to make
the process work better.
In a Policy Augmented S/MIME (PLASMA) deployment of S/MIME, the
sender of the message is still responsible for determining the list
of recipients for the message and determining the security label to
be applied to the message; however the Plasma server is now
responsible for obtaining valid keys for recipients and checking the
policy access for the recipients. The recipient is no longer
responsible for enforcement of the policy as this is off-loaded to
the Plasma server component. Doing this allows for the following
changes in behavior of the system:
o The sender is no longer responsible for finding and validating the
set of public keys used for the message. This simplifies the
complexity of the sender and lowers the resources required by the
sender. This is especially true when a large number of recipients
are involved.
o The set of recipients that can decrypt the message can be change
dynamically after the message is sent, without resorting to a
group keying strategy.
o The enforcement of the policy is done centrally, this means that
updates to the policy are instantaneous and the enforcement policy
can be centrally audited.
o The label enforcement is done before the message is decrypted;
this means there are no concerns about the message contents being
leaked by poor client implementations.
o Many of the same components used in a web-based deployment of
policy enforcement in a confederation can be used for e-mail based
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deployment of information. This includes using credentials other
than X.509 certificates.
While this document describes the processes in terms of dealing with
email system, a Plasma server can be used with any number of clients
that need to protected content. Thus the same system could be used
for protection of documents without having to specify in advance the
individuals who should be able to open the document; it would just be
allowed by the server based on the policy applied to the document.
This document is laid out as follows:
o In Section 2 a more complete description of the components
involved in the model are discussed.
o In Section 3 is description the new ASN.1 structures that are used
to carry the additional information, and the way that these
structures are used in a recipient info structure.
o In Section 4 is a description of the modifications from the sender
processing rules outlined in [RFC5751].
o In Section 5 is a description of the modification from the
recipient processing rules outlined in [RFC5751].
1.1. Vocabulary
Some of the terms used in this document include:
Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD): Are a set of
encryption algorithms where an authentication method stronger than
the PKCS #1 packing method is used for authentication and,
optionally, a set of unencrypted attribute values are included in
the authentication step.
Content Encryption Key (CEK): The symmetric key used to encryption
the content of a message.
Key Encryption Key (KEK): A key, usually a symmetric key, which is
used to encrypt another key, usually a content encryption key.
1.2. Requirements Terminology
When capitalized, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY",
and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
[RFC2119].
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2. Model
Details on the model and the requirements for the Plasma system can
be found in [I-D.freeman-plasma-requirements].
3. Recipient Info Encoding
In order for the Plasma system to function in CMS, a method needs to
be chosen and described for how the CEK is to be protected and
carried with the message, such that the recipient will be able to
identified that this is a Plasma enabled message, know which Plasma
server to contact and be able to get back the CEK needed to decrypt
the message. Not all recipients of a message that has been encrypted
using a Plasma server will need to contact the server in order to
decrypt the message. There is nothing in what we are doing that
prevents a message sender from building recipient info structures in
a normal manner, except the possibly that the policy applied to the
encrypted content could restrict it from happening. Additionally the
Plasma server could return the standard recipient info structures to
be added to the message for recipients, if it can pre-authorize them
for access to the message and it can obtain the appropriate keying
material.
There are two distinct methods that were considered for identifying a
recipient info structure as being a Plasma enabled object. The first
would be to define a new recipient info structure placed in the Other
Recipient Info structure. The second option is to force the new
recipient info structure into one of the existing strucutres.
The use of a new recipient info structure would have been the easiest
to document and implement, if most major CMS implementations had kept
up with the latest versions. However it is known that several
implementations stopped with RFC 2630 [RFC2630] and it was not until
RFC 3369 [RFC3369] that the Other Recipient Info choice was
introduced along with the language stating that implementations need
to gracefully handle unimplemented alternatives in the recipient info
choice. This means that if a new recipient info structure was
defined and adopted, the mail message would fail decoding for many
recipients, even for those recipients that had a key transfer or key
agreement recipient info structure.
Given the current state of implementations, it was determined that
the second method would be used as it will work with more
implementations. After implementation it might be found that using
the first method is the better way to go, in that case the decision
can be re-visited.
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The use of the KEKRecipientInfo type may seem to be a stretch at
first, it was defined for those situations where a symmetric key had
already been distributed and either a specific key or a specific
transformation on the key was to be applied in order to decrypt the
KEK value. However, the Plasma recipient info can be thought of as a
strange way to do the transformation and thus it kind of fits into
the model. It is in a structure that will be supported by the most
basic CMS implementiation and it is easy for client implementations
to make the determination of a Plasma recipient info by looking at
the OID in the key encryption algorithm identifier.
A recipient info structure as defined in this document MUST be
created by a Plasma server and MUST NOT be created by client
software. A protocol such as the one in RFC TBD1
[I-D.schaad-plasma-service] is used to transport the recipient info
structure between the client and the server.
For the convenience of the reader we include the KEKRecipientInfo
structure pieces here (copied from [RFC5911]):
KEKRecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
version CMSVersion, -- always set to 4
kekid KEKIdentifier,
keyEncryptionAlgorithm KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
encryptedKey EncryptedKey }
KEKIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
keyIdentifier OCTET STRING,
date GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
other OtherKeyAttribute OPTIONAL }
OtherKeyAttribute ::= SEQUENCE {
keyAttrId KEY-ATTRIBUTE.
&id({SupportedKeyAttributes}),
keyAttr KEY-ATTRIBUTE.
&Type({SupportedKeyAttributes}{@keyAttrId})}
For a Plasma KEKRecipientInfo structure, the fields are filled in as
follows:
version is set to the value of 4.
kekid is a sequence where the fields are:
keyIdentifier contains the constant string "Plasma".
date is not used and is omitted.
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other is not used and is omitted.
keyEncryptionAlgorithm contains the value id-kek-plasma-token. The
parameter field MUST be omitted.
encryptedKey contains the Plasma Encrypted Key object. The details
of this are covered in Section 3.1
3.1. PLASMA Encrypted Key
We defined a new Key Wrapping algorithm which uses the Plasma server
to wrap the CEK in an encrypted lock box. In addition to the KEK,
the lock box also contains the information that is needed by the
Plasma Server to know the policy(s) applied to the encrypted data and
possible parameters for the policy and for the client to validate
that the lock box applies to the encrypted content.
The relevant section from the ASN.1 module which contains the content
is:
--
-- New key wrap algorithm object for Plasma
--
kwa-plasma-lockbox KEY-WRAP ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-plasma-lockbox
PARAMS ARE absent
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-plasma-lockbox }
}
-- SignedData IDENTIFIED BY id-keyatt-plasma-token
id-alg-plasma-lockbox OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) alg(3) TBD2 }
We define a new KEW-WRAP object called kwa-plasma-lockbox. This key
wrap algorithm is identified by the id-kwa-plasma-lockbox OID. The
key wrap algorithm has no parameters and the parameters field MUST be
absent the algorithm identifier is encoded. The encypted key object
which is emitted by the algorithm is a CMS SignedData structure. The
CMS SignedData structure is used directly without a CMS ContentInfo
structure wrapping it.
The SignedData structure fields are filled as follows (some less
significant fields are omitted):
encapContentInfo is a structure containing the fields:
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eContentType is id-ct-authEnvelopedData.
eContent is CMS AuthEnvelopedData [RFC5083] structure with the
following fields:
recipientInfos contains the lock box(s) for the Plasma
servers(s) to get access to the encrypted data. There MUST
NOT be recipient info structures added for any entity not
trusted to correctly perform the policy decision processing.
See below for some additional discussion on what lock boxes
need to be created.
authEncryptedContentInfo is a structure containing the
following elements:
contentType is id-ct-plasma-LockBox.
contentEncryptionAlgorithm contains the identifier and
parameters for the content encryption algorithm. This
algorithm only needs to be understood by the Plasma
service.
encryptedContent contains the encrypted PLASMA LockBox
content. Details on this type are in the next section.
certificates SHOULD contain the set of certificates (up to but not
including the trust anchor) needed to validate the set of signer
info structures.
signerInfos will contain one or more signer info structures. In
each signature the signed attributes:
* MUST contain the signing time, the message digest, the content
type, the PLASMA hash attribute and the PLASMA url attributes.
* SHOULD contain the multiple signature attribute [RFC5752] if
more than one signature exists.
* MAY contain the ESS security label attribute.
* other attributes can also be included.
When creating the recipient info structures for the AuthEnvelopedData
structure, there will normally only need to be a single entry in the
sequence as the only entity that needs to decrypt the PLASMA Lockbox
is the Plasma Service. In the event that the service is distributed
over multiple servers then multiple lock boxes may need to be
created. One of the implications of the fact that the originator of
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the message is the only recipient is that, although the signing key
needs to be contained in a certificate, there is no corresponding
requirement that the encryption key needs to be in a certificate.
Instead of using a certificate, a subject key identifier that is
meaningful only to the Plasma Service can be used.
There are a number of circumstances that a Plasma server would apply
multiple signatures to a single lockbox. These circumstances include
during key rollover while a certificate is approaching expiration,
esp. if there is going to be a change in the trust anchor being used.
Another circumstance would be if a new signature algorithm is being
rolled out, having the old and the new algorithm on the message
during the rollout period increases the chances that the signature
can be validated. In these circumstances, the multiple signature
attribute defined in RFC 5752 [RFC5752] allows for a client to
determine that a signature has been removed which might be attempted
as part of an attack to use a more insecure algorithm.
3.2. PLASMA Content Type
The inner-most content type for a Plasma Key Wrap Algorithm is a
Plasma Lockbox. This content is contained in an encrypted CMS object
which is encrypted by and for the Plasma server itself, as such the
contents and structure is known just to the Plasma server.
The content type is designed so that the Plasma server does not need
to keep any state dealing with a message on the server itself. This
allows for minimal information to be kept on the server, it only
needs the state of it's current transactions, and the message can be
processed by any of a number of servers without needing to replicate
state about the message between them.
The relevant section from the ASN.1 module which defines this content
is:
--
-- PLASMA Content Type
--
ct-plasma-LockBox CONTENT-TYPE ::= {
TYPE PLASMA-LockBox
IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-plasma-LockBox
}
id-ct-plasma-LockBox OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) TBD1}
PLASMA-LockBox ::= SEQUENCE {
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policy OCTET STRING,
keyList KeyList,
attrList AttributeList OPTIONAL
}
KeyList ::= SEQUENCE {
namedRecipients [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
NamedRecipient OPTIONAL,
defaultRecipients [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
OneCek OPTIONAL,
...
}
(WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
namedRecipients PRESENT
} |
WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
defaultRecipients PRESENT
})
NamedRecipient ::= SEQUENCE {
recipientName UTF8String, -- name of the recipient
keyPolicy [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
keyIdentifier OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
keyValue [1] ProtectedKey,
...
}
ProtectedKey ::= CHOICE {
cms [0] RecipientInfo,
xml [1] OCTET STRING,
...
}
OneCek ::= SEQUENCE {
keyPolicy [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
keyIdentifier [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
keyValue OCTET STRING,
...
}
AttributeList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
SingleAttribute{{PlasmaLockboxAttributes}}
PlasmaLockboxAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= {
aa-plasma-AuditTrailIdentifier | aa-plasma-SignerInfo |
aa-plasma-Xacml-Attribute, ... }
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PlasmaSignedAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= {
aa-plasma-url | aa-plasma-econtent-hash
}
In the above ASN.1, the following items are defined:
ct-plasma-LockBox is a new CMS content type object, this object is
added to the set of content type objects in ContentSet (defined in
the ASN.1 module in [RFC5911]). The content type associates the
object identifier id-ct-plasma-LockBox with the data type PLASMA-
LockBox.
id-ct-plasma-LockBox is the identifier defined for the new content
type.
PLASMA-LockBox is the new type defined for new content type. This
is a sequence with the following fields:
policy contains the policy label that is to be applied to the KEK
values in the keyList field. The exact content of the field
will be specific to the set of Plasma servers involved.
Servers MUST be able to deal with an XML encoding of the policy
in this location. See Appendix B for some alternate encodings.
keyList contains the key values.
attrList contains a set of attributes which are considered as
significant by the Plasma server internally. One example of an
attribute that goes into this location is the audit trail
identifier attribute. This attribute allows for an identifier
to tagged to the message that can be used by all entities that
are going to create entries in an audit log. Since they all
have access to a unique identifier for this message, they can
all use that identifier when creating their respective log
entries for creation, granting of access and refusing access.
The identifier can then be used to correlate all of these audit
trail events back to a single message. This document defines
three attributes to be placed in this location: Audit Trail
Identifier Section 3.4.1, Signer Info Section 3.4.2 and XACML
attribute Section 3.4.3.
KeyList is a new type that contains CEK values or KeyRecipientInfo
structures. This allows for messages to be sent with either
early-binding, where a RecipientInfo structure is filled out for
the receiving agent, or late-binding, where the CEK value is sent
from the Plasma Service to the receiving agent. It is required
that at least one of these fields is populated.
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namedRecipients contains the recipient info structures for
individually identified recipients.
defaultRecipients contains the CEK keys for those recipients that
are not individual identified with their own recipient info
structures.
NamedRecipient contains the information identifying a single named
recipient along with the recipient info structures for that
recipient.
recipientName contains the name of the name of the recipient in
the form of an RFC5321 email address.
keyPolicy contains a policy string specific to this key. If
present the policy MUST be evaluated as accept before this
recipient info structure is released. Servers MUST be able to
deal with an XML encoding of the policy in this location. See
Appendix B for some alternate encodings.
keyIdentifier contains the identification value for the CEK.
keyValue contains the encrypted key for the named recipient. The
ProtectedKey structure is marked as extensible. If an
unrecognized choice is made in the ProtectedKey structure, the
NamedRecipient structure is to fail returning the key as it's
type will not be recognized. There could be another named key
with a different return type which can be returned
successfully.
This structure is tagged as extensible; this was done because
there may be a need to add additional fields such as other name
types in the future.
ProtectedKey contains the CEK encrypted in some manner. The choice
has the following fields:
cms contains a CMS recipient info structure for the named
recipient.
xml contains an XML EncryptedKey structure from the XML
Encryption standard [W3C.WD-xmlenc-core1-20101130].
The structure is marked as extensible. Servers MUST be able to
deal with unrecognized encrypted key fields from future versions.
OneCek contains the information that defines a single CEK to be
used. The sequence has the fields:
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keyPolicy contains a policy string specific to this key. If
present the policy MUST be evaluated as accept before this key
is released. Servers MUST be able to deal with an XML encoding
of the policy in this location. See Appendix B for some
alternate encodings.
keyIdentifier contains the identification value for the CEK.
keyValue contains the CEK value.
This structure is tagged as extensible; this was done because
there may be a need to add additional fields such as other name
types in the future.
AttributeList defines a structure where a set of attributes can be
included.
PLASMAAttributes defines an Object Set of attributes which can be
included. The object set is intentionally open ended for later
expansion. The object set is initialized with the three
attributes defined in this document.
PlasmaSignedAttributes defines an Object Set of attributes that are
intended for use as signed attributes for CMS SignedData objects.
This item is intended to be added to the SignedAttributesSet in
the CMS module in [RFC5911].
The recipientName field of the NamedRecipient structure is designed
so that a client can build a CMS recipient info structure targeted to
a specific recipient. In order for the Plasma server to know which
of these named recipient structure to return it requires that the
sender identify the recipient for the CMS recipient info structure
and that the recipient identify itself so that the Plasma server can
find the correct structure. We are using Email names in the form of
internationalized RFC 5321 [RFC5321] address names. There are a
number of issues that are associated with the use of this name form
for comparison purposes. As stated in Section 2.3.11 of RFC 5321,
the local-part MUST be interpreted and assigned semantics only by
the host specified in the domain part of the address.
While many platforms do case-insensitive comparisons of mailbox
names, there is not a way for an independent server to know if this
is appropriate behavior. A similar issue exists with Unicode
normalization as pointed out in Section 10.1 of RFC 6530 [RFC6530].
The server that holds the mailbox can have a consistent rule for
normalization, but a Plasma server in separate domain may not know
the appropriate rules to use.
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Plasma servers SHOULD do the following when comparing the Email
addresses found in the recipientName field:
1. The domain name portion is compared using procedure in
Section 2.3.2.4 of [RFC5890]. The rules are:
* Exact (bit-string identity) matches between pairs of U-labels.
* Matches between a pair of A-labels, using normal DNS case-
insensitive matching rules.
* Equivalence between a U-label and an A-label determined by
translating the U-label form into an A-label form and then
testing for a match between the A-labels using normal DNS
case-insensitive rules.
2. The local name portion of the name is compared using bit-string
identity. Plasma servers MAY apply appropriate transformations
for local domain names, Plasma servers MAY provide for
administration configuration to allow for appropriate
transformations to non-local domains, but SHOULD NOT apply any
transformations in the absence of administrative configureation.
3.3. CMS Signed Data signed attributes
3.3.1. PLASMA URL Authenticated Attribute
It is required that the name of the Plasma Server be securely
communicated to the message recipient. For this purpose a URL is
used as this can communicate both a server name as well as additional
parameters that can be used to identify a specific service on the
server.
The relevant section from the ASN.1 module for this attribute is:
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--
-- Define the Signed Attribute to carry the
-- Email Policy Server URL
--
-- This attribute is added to the SignedAttributSet set of
-- attributes in [CMS-ASN]
--
aa-plasma-url ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE UTF8String IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-plasma-url
}
id-aa-plasma-url OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) TBD3}
From this we can see the following:
A new attribute aa-plasma-url has been defined.
The OID value of id-aa-plasma-url has been created to identify the
new attribute.
The type of the value associated with the attribute is a
UTF8String which contains the URL for the Plasma Server. The URL
defines both the destination server and the protocol to be used.
When the schema for the URL is "plasma", then the protocol used is
[I-D.schaad-plasma-service].
The new attribute is to appear only as a Signed Attribute in a
SignedData structure. It is therefore to be added to the
attribute set SignedAttributeSet in the update ASN.1 module
contained in [RFC5911].
The attribute structure defined for signed attributes allows for
multiple values to be carried in a single attribute. For this
attribute there MUST be at least one value. If there is more than
one value, each value MUST be unique. Multiple values are allowed as
there can be multiple Plasma servers that can be used to evaluate the
policy. Since the URLs will be sorted during encoding, the order of
URLs does not indicate any order of priority, any of the values may
be used.
This attribute is only included in a SignedData object by a Plasma
Server. There are no processing rules for the sender of a message.
The processing rules for a recipient can be found in Section 5.
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3.3.2. PLASMA Encrypted Content Hash Attribute
For privacy reasons, it is highly desirable that the recipient of a
message can validate that the Plasma lock box embedded in a message
is associated with encrypted data it is attached to. For this
reason, in addition to the requirement that a recipient validate the
signature of the Plasma server over the lock box, a new attribute is
defined which contains the hash of the encrypted content.
--
-- Define the Signed Attribute to carry the
-- hash of encrypted data
--
-- This attribute is added to the SignedAttributeSet set of
-- attributes in [CMS-ASN]
--
aa-plasma-econtent-hash ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE HashValue IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-plasma-econtent-hash
}
id-aa-plasma-econtent-hash OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) TBD4}
HashValue ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
hashValue OCTET STRING
}
The above ASN.1 fragment defines the following items:
aa-plasma-econtent-hash defines a new ATTRIBUTE object describing
the encrypted content hash attribute. This attribute is always a
signed object and is to be added to the SignedAttributeSet in the
CMS ASN.1 mdoule contained in [RFC5911].
id-aa-plasma-econtent-hash defines the unique identifier of the
attribute.
HashValue defines the data value to be associated with the
attribute. The fields of this type are:
hashAlgorithm contains the identifier and parameters of the hash
function used.
hashValue contains the value of the hash operation.
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The hash is computed over the encrypted content, without including
any of the ASN.1 wrapping around the content. Thus this value does
not cover the content type identifier, the encryption algorithm and
parameters or any authenticated attributes for AEAD algorithms.
3.4. Plasma Lockbox Attributes
3.4.1. Audit Trail Identifier Attribute
The Audit Trail Identifier attribute allows for a unique and
persistent identifier to be carried as part of a Plasma Lockbox
message. This identifier can then be used by Plasma servers when
creating log entries in the audit trail to designate a single Plasma
message. This use of a single identifier allows for better
correlation to occur by auditors, however as the identifier is hidden
from all viewers except the Plasma server, the message itself is not
locatable from the log entries.
The relevant section from the ASN.1 module which defines this
attribute is:
--
-- Attribute to hold an Audit Trail Identifier
--
aa-plasma-AuditTrailIdentifier ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE OCTET STRING
IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-plasma-Audit-Trail-Identifier
}
id-aa-plasma-Audit-Trail-Identifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) TBD6}
In this ASN.1, the following items are defined:
aa-plasma-AuditTrailIdentifier
This is an object of type ATTRIBUTE that associates the identifier
id-aa-plasma-Audit-Trail-Identifier with the type OCTET STRING.
When used in attrList field of a PLASMA-LockBox, the values set
MUST contain a single value. The value is the audit trail
identifier value.
id-aa-plasma-Audit-Trail-Identifier
This is the OID used to identifier this attribute.
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The use of OCTET STRING for the content allows for the greatest
flexibility for Plasma Servers in devising the value to use. The
content of the Audit Tail Identifier is intended to be an opaque
value to all entities, all Plasma servers MUST be able to ignore how
the value is structured.
3.4.2. Signer Info Attribute
Some policies require that the inner content of an encrypted message
be signed as well. However the encrypted data stream of the message
is not provided to the Plasma server for it to verify that it was
done successfully. The only places to check is in the audit trail
for the message and/or to allow the client to do the check that the
signature is present. This attribute provides a location for the
Plasma server to place the provided CMS SignerInfo structure(s)
provided by the client to be carried with the message. The server
can then push the structure(s) to the client and the client can
validate that the actual signatures on the message match the
signatures provided by the server. All servers MUST be able to parse
this attribute and convert it to an appropriate XACML attribute to
return to clients.
The relevant section from the ASN.1 module which defines this
attribute is:
--
-- Attribute to hold a SignerInfo structure
--
aa-plasma-SignerInfo ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE SignerInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-plasma-signerInfo
}
id-aa-plasma-signerInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) TBD7}
In this ASN.1, the following items are defined:
aa-plasma-SignerInfo
This is an object of type ATTRIBUTE that associates the identifier
id-aa-plasma-SignerInfo with the type SignerInfo.
id-aa-plasma-SignerInfo
This OID is used to identify the attribute, it's associated type
and it's semantics.
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There can be one or more attribute values in the attribute set. Each
of the values is to be treated independently and returned to the
client. The values may be returned in a single Attributes XML
element.
3.4.3. XACML Generic Attribute
Many times Plasma servers be in situation where they will need to
return various values to the clients. These decisions will
frequently be taken by the originating Plasma server, since it may be
the only one that has the data to be returned. This attribute allows
for any data to be carried in the form of an XACML [XACML] attribute
XML structure. Since the content is an XACML attribute, it can be
pushed to the client without the client needing to understand or
evaluate the content being presented. The Signer Info attribute
presented in the previous section could have been implemented using
this attribute rather than defining it's own attribute, however the
space savings was deemed sufficient to justify the creation of the
new attribute.
The relevant section from the ASN.1 module which defines this
attribute is:
--
-- Attribute to hold an arbitrary XACML XML attribute
-- structure
--
aa-plasma-Xacml-Attribute ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-plasma-Xacml-Attribute
}
id-aa-plasma-Xacml-Attribute OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) TBD8}
In this ASN.1, the following items are defined:
aa-plasma-Xacml-Attribute
This is an object of type ATTRIBUTE that associates the identifier
of id-aa-plasma-Xacml-Attribute with the type OCTET STRING.
id-aa-plasma-Xacml-Attribute
This OID is used to identify the attribute, its associated type
and it's semantics.
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There can be one or more attributes values associated with the
attribute set. Each of the values is to be treated independently and
returned as separate items to the client.
The data type is an OCTET STRING to allow for alternate XML encodings
to be used. All servers MUST be able to deal with a UTF8 string XML
encoding of the policy in this location. See Appendix B for
alternate encoding methods. If a server cannot understand the
encoding presented, the server MUST fail processing of the lockbox.
If the server cannot understand the attribute, and the attribute is
required for processing the access control statement, the server MUST
fail that portion of the access control evaluation.
4. Sender Processing Rules
4.1. Flow
This is the set of processing steps that a sender needs to do (the
order of the steps is not normative):
1. Sender Agent obtains the set of policies under which it can send
a message.
2. Sender Agent composes the message content.
3. Sender Agent determines the policy label to be applied to the
message.
4. Sender Agent determines the set of recipients for the message.
5. Sender Agent selects the content encryption algorithm (with
input from the policies chosen) and randomly creates the CEK.
6. Sender Agent encrypts the content with the CEK and computes the
encrypted hash value.
7. Sender Agent may optionally create lock boxes for one or more
message recipients. (These are for the early-bind recipients
that are protected by the policy server.)
8. Sender Agent transmits the CEK, the list of recipients, the set
of policy protected recipient lock boxes, the encrypted hash
value and the policy label to the PLASMA server.
9. Sender Agent receives a set of recipient info structures from
the policy server. If the policy validation fails then the
sender agent cannot send the message under the current policy
label.
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10. Sender Agent verifies the signature on the signed data structure
inside of the PLASMA-KEK attribute.
A. Signature is current and passes cryptographic processing.
B. Signed attributes contains the PLASMA URL attribute and the
PLASMA Encrypted Hash attribute.
C. The certificate used to validate the signature MUST have the
Plasma XXXX EKU (defined in Section X.Y of RFC XXXX).
D. Other standard signature checks.
The Sender Agent SHOULD validate all of the signatures if more
than one signature exists.
11. Sender Agent adds the recipient info structures returned from
the Plasma server to those it creates for early bind recipients
which are not protected by policy.
12. Sender Agent finishes encoding the message and transmits it to
the MTA.
5. Recipient Processing Rules
5.1. Flow
When looking at the validation steps that are given here, the results
need to be the same but the order that the steps are taken can be
different. As an example, it can make sense to do the policy check
in step Paragraph 5 before doing the signature validation as this
would not require any network access.
This is the set of processing that the recipient needs to do:
1. The Receiving Agent obtains the message from a Mail Transfer
Agent using IMAP, POP or a similar protocol.
2. The Receiving Agent recognizes that a KEK recipient info exists
with a PLASMA-KEK attribute. It is recommended that the entire
list of recipient info structures be checked for one that can be
processed directly before processing a Plasma receipient
structure.
3. The Receiving Agent validates the PLASMA-KEK attribute. The
following steps need to be taken for validation.
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A. The signature on the SignedData structure is validated. If
the validation fails then processing ends. If more than one
SignerInfo element exists on the structure, then the
validation needs to succeed only on one SignerInfo element,
the signed attributes from that SignerInfo structure are
used. The order of performing the validation of the
SignerInfo structures may be influenced by the content of
PLASMA URL attribute.
B. The certificate used to validate the signature MUST contain
the XXXX value in the EKU extension. The certificate MUST
NOT contain the anyPolicy value in the EKU extension. Local
policy can dictate that content of the Plasma URL attribute
be used in selecting trust anchors for the signing
certificate.
C. If an ESS security label attribute ([RFC2634]) is present,
then it must be evaluated and processing ends if the security
label processing fails or is denied.
D. If the PLASMA URL attribute is absent, then processing fails.
E. The URL value in the PLASMA URL attribute is checked against
local policy. If the check fails then processing fails.
This check is performed so that information about the user is
not given to a random Plasma server. The schema of the URL
MUST be one that the client implements. (For example the
"plasma" schema associated with RFC XXX
[I-D.schaad-plasma-service].) As discussed in Section 4.5 of
[I-D.freeman-plasma-requirements], policy can be enforced on
the edge of an enterprise, this means that if multiple URLs
are present in the Plasma URL attribute they all need to be
checked for policy and ability to use before this step fails.
F. The PLASMA Encrypted Hash attribute value is checked against
the encrypted content. If this attribute is absent then
processing fails. If the value does not matched the computed
value on the encrypted content then processing fails.
4. The recipient gathers the necessary identity and attribute
statements, usual certificates or SASL statements.
5. The recipient establishing a secure connection to the Plasma
server and passes in the identity and attribute statements and
receives back the CEK or a lock box to allow it to obtain the CEK
value.
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5.2. Reply Processing
In some circumstances a message recipient may be permitted to read a
message sent under a certan policy, but it not permitted to send a
message for that policy. In the event that a complex policy is used
the recipient may be permitted to read under one policy, but not have
any rights under a second policy. In both of these case a recipient
of a message would be unable to either reply or forward a message
using the same policy as they received it under. For this reason,
the protocol used to communicate with the Plasma server will
frequently return a single purpose policy that permits a recipient to
reply to a message using the same policy as the original message.
6. S/MIME Capability
The SMIMECapabilities attribute was defined by S/MIME in [RFC5751] so
that the abilities of a client can be advertised to the recipients of
an S/MIME message. This information can be advertised either
directly in an S/MIME message sent from a client to a recipient, or
more indirectly by publishing the information in an LDAP directory
[RFC4262].
A new S/MIME capability is defined by this document so that a client
can advertise to others that it understands how to deal with Plasma
recipient information. The ASN.1 for this attribute is:
--
-- Create an S/MIME capability for advertising that
-- a client can understand the PLASMA recipient info
-- structure information
--
cap-Plasma-RecipientInfo SMIME-CAPS ::= {
IDENTIFIED BY id-cap-plasma-recipientInfo
}
id-cap-plasma-recipientInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
id-cap TBD5
}
We define a new SMIME-CAPS object called cap-Plasma-RecipentInfo.
This attribute is identified by the the OID id-cap-plasma-
recipientInfo and has no data structure associated with it. When
encoded as an S/MIME capability the parameters MUST to be absent and
not NULL.
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7. Mandatory Algorithms
7.1. Plasma Servers
Servers MUST implement AES-GCC-128 [RFC5084] for the content
encryption algorithm in section 3.1. Other authenticated encryption
algorithms MAY be implemented.
Servers MUST implement RSA v1.5 as a key transport algorithm for
lockboxes created in section 3.1 and for pre-authenticated lock boxes
returned in step 8 of section 4.1. Servers SHOULD implement RSA OAEP
as a key transport algorithm in the same locations. Other key
transport algorithms MAY be implemented.
Servers MUST implement EC-DH as a key agreement algorithm for
lockboxes created in section 3.1 and for pre-authenticated lock boxes
returned in step 8 of section 4.1. Servers MAY implement other key
agreement algorithms.
Servers MUST implement the RSA v1.5 signature algorithm with SHA-256
and SHA-512. Servers MUST implement the EC-DSA signature algorithm
with SHA-256 and SHA-512 for producing signature on the Plasma lock
box. Other signature algorithms MAY be implemented as well.
7.2. Plasma Clients
Clients MUST implement the mandatory algorithms defined for S/MIME
[RFC5751] for the lock boxes created in step 7 and transmitted to the
server in step 8 of Section 4. Other algorithms MAY be implemented.
Clients MUST implement SHA-256 and SHA-512 for computation of the
Plasma Encrypted Content Hash in section 3.4. Other algorithms MAY
be implemented, but doing so can cause clients that do not implement
this algorithm to not attempt to read the message.
When verifying signatures on the Plasma lock boxes, clients MUST be
able to verify the RSA v1.5 signature algorithm with SHA-256 and
SHA-512. Clients MUST also be able to verify the EC-DSA signature
algorithm with SHA-256 and SHA-512 signature algorithm. Clients MAY
be able to verify other signature algorithms.
8. Security Considerations
Man in the middle attack on the protocol from the sending agent to
the email policy server.
Man in the middle attack on the protocol from the receiving agent to
the email policy server.
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Still more expansion....
The hash computed for the Plasma Encrypted Content Hash attribute has
different security concerns that a hash used for signature
computation. This hash value is used to get a degree of assurance
that the encrypted content is associated with Plasma lock box. In
the event that a collision exists, then the client will go and talk
to the server to get a content encryption key when that key will not
successfully decrypt the content. However this does not affect the
privacy of the client as the client's decision to talk to the server
is based on the URL(s) of the server and the validation of the
server's signature. This means that an attacker that substitutes an
encrypted content needs not only to have the hash of the encrypted
content be correct, but the decrypted content needs to make sense.
In order for an attacker to have the client talk to it, it needs to
attack the certificates or signature produced on the lock box and not
the encrypted content itself.
9. IANA Considerations
This document requires that a number of Object Identifiers be
assigned. These are now under the control of IANA following
[I-D.housley-smime-oids].
IANA is requested to assign the following identifiers:
o TBD9 is to be assigned from the "SMI Security for S/MIME Module
Identifer" registry. The description for the entry is suggested
as id-mod-plasma-2013.
o TBD1 is to be assigned from the "SMI Security for S/MIME CMS
Content Type" registry. The description for the entry is
suggested as id-ct-plasma-LockBox.
o TBD2 is to be assigned from the "SMI Security for S/MIME
Algorithms" registry. The description for the entry is suggested
as id-alg-plasma-lockbox.
o TBD3 is to be assigned from the "SMI Security for S/MIME
Attributes" registry. The description for the entry is suggested
as id-aa-plasma-url.
o TBD4 is to be assigned from the "SMI Security for S/MIME
Attributes" registry. The description for the entry is suggested
as id-aa-plasma-econtent-hash.
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o TBD5 is to be assigned from the "SMI Security for S/MIME
Capabilities" registry. The description for the entry is
suggested as id-cap-plasma-recipientInfo.
o TBD6 is to be assigned from the "SMI Security for S/MIME
Attributes" registry. The description for the entyr is suggested
as id-aa-plasma-Audit-Trail-Identifier.
o TBD7 is to be assigned from the "SMI Security for S/MIME
Attributes" registry. The description for the entry is suggested
as id-aa-plasma-signerInfo.
o TBD8 is to be assigned from the "SMI Security for S/MIME
Attributes" registry. THe description for the entry is suggested
as id-aa-plasma-Xacml-Attribute.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
[RFC5911] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) and S/MIME", RFC 5911,
June 2010.
[RFC5083] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)
Authenticated-Enveloped-Data Content Type", RFC 5083,
November 2007.
[RFC2634] Hoffman, P., "Enhanced Security Services for S/MIME", RFC
2634, June 1999.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[RFC5751] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet
Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message
Specification", RFC 5751, January 2010.
[RFC5752] Turner, S. and J. Schaad, "Multiple Signatures in
Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC 5752, January
2010.
[RFC5321] Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
October 2008.
[RFC5890] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
RFC 5890, August 2010.
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[RFC6530] Klensin, J. and Y. Ko, "Overview and Framework for
Internationalized Email", RFC 6530, February 2012.
[I-D.freeman-plasma-requirements]
Freeman, T., Schaad, J., and P. Patterson, "Requirements
for Message Access Control", draft-freeman-plasma-
requirements-08 (work in progress), October 2013.
[W3C.WD-xmlenc-core1-20101130]
Roessler, T., Reagle, J., Hirsch, F., and D. Eastlake,
"XML Encryption Syntax and Processing Version 1.1", World
Wide Web Consortium LastCall WD-xmlenc-core1-20101130,
November 2010,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2010/WD-xmlenc-core1-20101130>.
10.2. Informative References
[RFC3369] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC
3369, August 2002.
[RFC2630] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax", RFC 2630,
June 1999.
[RFC4262] Santesson, S., "X.509 Certificate Extension for Secure/
Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)
Capabilities", RFC 4262, December 2005.
[RFC5084] Housley, R., "Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated
Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", RFC
5084, November 2007.
[I-D.schaad-plasma-service]
Schaad, J., "Plasma Service Trust Processing", draft-
schaad-plasma-service-04 (work in progress), January 2013.
[XACML] Rissanen, E., Ed., "eXtensible Access Control Markup
Language (XACML) Version 3.0", OASIS Standard
xacml-201008, August 2010, <http://docs.oasis-open.org/
xacml/3.0/xacml-3.0-core-spec-cs-01.en.doc>.
[EXI] Kamiya, T. and J. Schneider, "Efficient XML Interchange
(EXI) Format 1.0", World Wide Web Consortium CR CR-
exi-20091208, December 2009,
<http://www.w3.org/TR/2009/CR-exi-20091208>.
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[I-D.housley-smime-oids]
Housley, R., "Object Identifier Registry for the S/MIME
Mail Security Working Group", draft-housley-smime-oids-00
(work in progress), October 2013.
Appendix A. 2009 ASN.1 Module
PolicySMime-2008 { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0)
id-mod-plasma-2013(TBD9) }
DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN
IMPORTS
-- Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) [RFC5652]
CONTENT-TYPE, RecipientInfo, SignedData,
DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, SignerInfo, KEY-WRAP
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax-2010
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549)
pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-cms-2009(58) }
-- Common PKIX structures [RFC5912]
SMIME-CAPS
FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58)}
ATTRIBUTE, SingleAttribute{}
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
ESSSecurityLabel
FROM ExtendedSecurityServices-2009
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-ess-2006-02(42) }
id-cap
FROM SecureMimeMessage
{ iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9)
smime(16) modules(0) id-mod-msg-v3dot1-02(39) }
;
--
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-- PLASMA Content Type
--
ct-plasma-LockBox CONTENT-TYPE ::= {
TYPE PLASMA-LockBox
IDENTIFIED BY id-ct-plasma-LockBox
}
id-ct-plasma-LockBox OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs7(7) TBD1}
PLASMA-LockBox ::= SEQUENCE {
policy OCTET STRING,
keyList KeyList,
attrList AttributeList OPTIONAL
}
KeyList ::= SEQUENCE {
namedRecipients [0] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
NamedRecipient OPTIONAL,
defaultRecipients [1] SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
OneCek OPTIONAL,
...
}
(WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
namedRecipients PRESENT
} |
WITH COMPONENTS {
...,
defaultRecipients PRESENT
})
NamedRecipient ::= SEQUENCE {
recipientName UTF8String, -- name of the recipient
keyPolicy [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
keyIdentifier OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
keyValue [1] ProtectedKey,
...
}
ProtectedKey ::= CHOICE {
cms [0] RecipientInfo,
xml [1] OCTET STRING,
...
}
OneCek ::= SEQUENCE {
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keyPolicy [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
keyIdentifier [1] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
keyValue OCTET STRING,
...
}
AttributeList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
SingleAttribute{{PlasmaLockboxAttributes}}
PlasmaLockboxAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= {
aa-plasma-AuditTrailIdentifier | aa-plasma-SignerInfo |
aa-plasma-Xacml-Attribute, ... }
PlasmaSignedAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::= {
aa-plasma-url | aa-plasma-econtent-hash
}
--
-- New key wrap algorithm object for Plasma
--
kwa-plasma-lockbox KEY-WRAP ::= {
IDENTIFIER id-alg-plasma-lockbox
PARAMS ARE absent
SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-plasma-lockbox }
}
-- SignedData IDENTIFIED BY id-keyatt-plasma-token
id-alg-plasma-lockbox OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) smime(16) alg(3) TBD2 }
--
-- Define the Signed Attribute to carry the
-- Email Policy Server URL
--
-- This attribute is added to the SignedAttributSet set of
-- attributes in [CMS-ASN]
--
aa-plasma-url ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE UTF8String IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-plasma-url
}
id-aa-plasma-url OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) TBD3}
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--
-- Define the Signed Attribute to carry the
-- hash of encrypted data
--
-- This attribute is added to the SignedAttributeSet set of
-- attributes in [CMS-ASN]
--
aa-plasma-econtent-hash ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE HashValue IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-plasma-econtent-hash
}
id-aa-plasma-econtent-hash OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) TBD4}
HashValue ::= SEQUENCE {
hashAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier,
hashValue OCTET STRING
}
--
-- Create an S/MIME capability for advertising that
-- a client can understand the PLASMA recipient info
-- structure information
--
cap-Plasma-RecipientInfo SMIME-CAPS ::= {
IDENTIFIED BY id-cap-plasma-recipientInfo
}
id-cap-plasma-recipientInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
id-cap TBD5
}
--
-- Attribute to hold an Audit Trail Identifier
--
aa-plasma-AuditTrailIdentifier ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE OCTET STRING
IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-plasma-Audit-Trail-Identifier
}
id-aa-plasma-Audit-Trail-Identifier OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {
iso(1) member-body(2)
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) TBD6}
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--
-- Attribute to hold a SignerInfo structure
--
aa-plasma-SignerInfo ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE SignerInfo IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-plasma-signerInfo
}
id-aa-plasma-signerInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) TBD7}
--
-- Attribute to hold an arbitrary XACML XML attribute
-- structure
--
aa-plasma-Xacml-Attribute ATTRIBUTE ::= {
TYPE OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY id-aa-plasma-Xacml-Attribute
}
id-aa-plasma-Xacml-Attribute OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {iso(1)
member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs9(9) TBD8}
END
Appendix B. Policy Encoding Techniques
This appendix is informative.
The fields for encoding a policy expression is an ASN.1 OCTET STRING.
This field type was chosen so that servers would have the widest
choice of methods to encode the policy expressions. For stand alone
servers, the only issue is that the server will be able to correctly
extract and use the policy expression, as such it can be kept in XML
or converted into a format that is more natural to the policy
evaluation engine used by the server. When one wants to use multiple
servers, then all of the servers involved need to be able to use the
encoded format(s) and re-map them into the internal versions that are
used locally. This is far more complicated when the servers are
hosted by different organizations that might be using different local
policy evaluation engines.
It is RECOMMENDED that what ever encoding method is used normally, a
provision exist for the XML version of the policy string as presented
in RFC XXX [I-D.schaad-plasma-service] exist without change. Doing
so allows for a single common format to be shared among all Plasma
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servers independent of the organization providing the server and the
one operating the server. The server will be able to determine the
set of other servers that will be able to process the content, as the
server must be configured with that information in order to create
the appropriate lock boxes for the other servers to access the
encrypted content.
There are two different methods that exist where the XML encoding can
be compressed before placing it into the OCTET STRING. The first
would be to use the Efficient XML Interchange (EXI) Format documented
in [EXI]. A second method would be to use the standard DEFLATE
algorithm either with or without a pre-defined library.
A possible method of encoding would to be use the first byte to
identify the encoding technique, reserving 0x3C for vanilla XML
strings. Following bytes could be used to determine which pre-
defined table was used and then the compressed encoding.
Author's Address
Jim Schaad
Soaring Hawk Consulting
Email: ietf@augustcellars.com
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