Internet DRAFT - draft-richardson-secdispatch-idevid-considerations
draft-richardson-secdispatch-idevid-considerations
anima Working Group M. Richardson
Internet-Draft Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Standards Track J. Yang
Expires: 28 January 2021 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
27 July 2020
Security and Operational considerations for manufacturer installed keys
and anchors
draft-richardson-secdispatch-idevid-considerations-02
Abstract
This document provides a nomenclature to describe ways in which
manufacturers secure private keys and public trust anchors in
devices.
RFCEDITOR: please remove this paragraph. This work is occuring in
https://github.com/mcr/idevid-security-considerations
Status of This Memo
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Applicability Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. A reference manufacturing/boot process . . . . . . . . . 6
3. Types of Trust Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.1. Secured First Boot Trust Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.2. Software Update Trust Anchor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.3. Trusted Application Manager anchor . . . . . . . . . . . 8
3.4. Public WebPKI anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.5. DNSSEC root . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.6. What else? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4. Types of Identities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.1. Manufacturer installed IDevID certificates . . . . . . . 10
4.1.1. Operational Considerations for Manufacturer IDevID
Public Key Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.1.2. Key Generation process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1. Number of levels of certification authorities . . . . . . 14
5.2. Protection of CA private keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3. Supporting provisioned anchors in devices . . . . . . . . 16
6. Evaluation Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6.1. Integrity and Privacy of on-device data . . . . . . . . . 16
6.2. Integrity and Privacy of device identify
infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6.3. Integrity and Privacy of included trust anchors . . . . . 17
7. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
11. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
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1. Introduction
An increasing number of protocols derive a significant part of their
security by using trust anchors that are installed by manufacturers.
Disclosure of the list of trust anchors does not usually cause a
problem, but changing them in any way does. This includes adding,
replacing or deleting anchors.
Many protocols also leverage manufacturer installed identities.
These identities are usually in the form of [ieee802-1AR] Initial
Device Identity certificates (IDevID). The identity has two
components: a private key that must remain under the strict control
of a trusted part of the device, and a public part (the certificate),
which (ignoring, for the moment, personal privacy concerns) may be
freely disclosed.
There also situations where identities which are tied up in the
provision of symmetric shared secret. A common example is the SIM
card ([_3GPP.51.011]), which now comes as a virtual SIM, but which is
usually not provisioned at the factory. The provision of an initial,
per-device default password also falls into the category of symmetric
shared secret.
It is further not unusual for many devices (particularly smartphones)
to also have one or more group identity keys. This is used in, for
instance, in [fidotechnote] to make claims about being a particular
model of phone (see [I-D.richardson-rats-usecases]). The keypair
that does this is loaded into large batches of phones for privacy
reasons.
The trust anchors are used for a variety of purposes. The following
uses are specifically called out:
* to validate the signature on a software update (as per
[I-D.ietf-suit-architecture]).
* to verify the end of a TLS Server Certificate, such as when
setting up an HTTPS connection.
* to verify the [RFC8366] format voucher that provides proof of an
ownership change
Device identity keys are used when performing enrollment requests (in
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra], and in some uses of
[I-D.ietf-emu-eap-noob]. The device identity certificate is also
used to sign Evidence by an Attesting Environment (see
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]).
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These security artifacts are used to anchor other chains of
information: an EAT Claim as to the version of software/firmware
running on a device (XXX and [I-D.birkholz-suit-coswid-manifest]), an
EAT claim about legitimate network activity (via
[I-D.birkholz-rats-mud], or embedded in the IDevID in [RFC8520]).
Known software versions lead directly to vendor/distributor signed
Software Bill of Materials (SBOM), such as those described by
[I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid] and the NTIA/SBOM work [ntiasbom] and CISQ/OMG
SBOM work underway [cisqsbom].
In order to manage risks and assess vulnerabilities in a Supply
Chain, it is necessary to determine a degree of trusthworthiness in
each device. A device may mislead audit systems as to its
provenance, about its software load or even about what kind of device
it is. (see [RFC7168] for a humourous example). In order to properly
assess the security of a Supply Chain it is necessary to understand
the kinds and severity of the threats which a device has been
designed to resist. To do this, it is necessary to understand the
ways in which the different trust anchors and identities are
initially provisioned, are protected, and are updated.
To do this, this document details the different trust anchors (TrA)
and identities (IDs) found in typical devices. The privacy and
integrity of the TAs and IDs is often provided by a different,
superior artifacts. This relationship is examined.
While many might desire to assign numerical values to different
mitigation techniques in order to be able to rank them, this document
does not attempt to do, as there are too many other (mostly human)
factors that would come into play. Such an effort is more properly
in the purvue of a formal ISO9001 process such as ISO14001.
1.1. Terminology
This document is not a standards track document, and it does not make
use of formal requirements language.
This section will be expanded to include needed terminology as
required.
The words Trust Anchor are contracted to TrA rather than TA, in order
not to confuse with [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]'s "Trusted
Application".
This document defines a number of hyphenated terms, and they are
summarized here:
device-generated : a private or symmetric key which is generated on
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the device
infrastructure-generated : a private or symmetric key which is
generated by some system, likely located at factory that built the
device
mechanically-installed : when a key or certificate is programmed
into flash by out-of-band mechanism like JTAG
mechanically-transfered : when a key or certificate is transfered
into a system via private interface, such as serial console, JTAG
managed mailbox, or other physically private interface
network-transfered : when a key or certificate is transfered into a
system using a network interface which would be available after
the device has shipped. This applies even if the network is
physically attached using a bed-of-nails.
device/infrastructure-co-generated : when a private or symmetric key
is derived from a secret previously synchronized between the
silicon vendor and the factory using a common algorithm.
2. Applicability Model
There is a wide variety of devices to which this analysis can apply.
(See [I-D.bormann-lwig-7228bis]) This document will use a J-group
class C13 as a sample. This class is sufficiently large to
experience complex issues among multiple CPUs, packages and operating
systems, but at the same time, small enough that this class is often
deployed in single-purpose IoT-like uses. Devices in this class
often have Secure Enclaves (such as the "Grapeboard"), and can
include silicon manufacturer controlled processors in the boot
process (the Raspberry PI boots under control of the GPU).
Almost all larger systems (servers, laptops, desktops) include a
Baseboard Management Controller (BMC), which ranges from a M-Group
Class 3 MCU, to a J-Group Class 10 CPU (see, for instance [openbmc]
which uses a Linux kernel and system inside the BMC). As the BMC
usually has complete access to the main CPU's memory, I/O hardware
and disk, the boot path security of such a system needs to be
understood first as being about the security of the BMC.
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2.1. A reference manufacturing/boot process
In order to provide for immutability and privacy of the critical TANs
and IDs, many CPU manufacturers will provide for some kind of private
memory area which is only accessible when the CPU is in certain
priviledged states. See the Terminology section of
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture], notably TEE, REE, and TAM, and also
section 4, Architecture.
The private memory that is important is usually non-volatile and
rather small. It may be located inside the CPU silicon die, or it
may be located externally. If the memory is external, then it is
usually encrypted by a hardware mechanism on the CPU, with only the
key kept inside the CPU.
The entire mechanism may be external to the CPU in the form of a
hardware-TPM module, or it may be entirely internal to the CPU in the
form of a firmware-TPM. It may use a custom interface to the rest of
the system, or it may implement the TPM 1.2 or TPM 2.0
specifications. Those details are important to performing a full
evaluation, but do not matter that to this model (see initial-
enclave-location below).
During the manufacturing process, once the components have been
soldered to the board, the system is usually put through a system-
level test. This is often done on as a "bed-of-nails" test
[BedOfNails], where the board has key points attached mechanically to
a test system. A [JTAG] process tests the System Under Test, and
then initializes some firmware into the still empty flash storage.
It is now common for a factory test image to be loaded first: this
image will include code to initialize the private memory key
described above, and will include a first-stage bootloader and some
kind of (primitive) Trusted Application Manager (TAM). Embedded in
the stage one bootloader will be a Trust Anchor that is able to
verify the second-stage bootloader image.
After the system has undergone testing, the factory test image is
erased, leaving the first-stage bootloader. One or more second-stage
bootloader images is installed. The production image may be
installed at that time, or if the second-stage bootloader is able to
install it over the network, it may be done that way instead.
There are many variations of the above process, and this section is
not attempting to be prescriptive, but to be provide enough
illustration to motivate subsequent terminology.
There process may be entirely automated, or it may be entirely driven
by humans working in the factory.
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Or a combination of the above.
These steps may all occur on an access-controlled assembly line, or
the system boards may be shipped from one place to another (maybe
another country) before undergoing testing.
Some systems are intended to be shipped in a tamper-proof state, but
it is usually not desireable that bed-of-nails testing be possible
without tampering, so the initialization process is usually done
prior to rendering the system tamper-proof.
Quality control testing may be done prior to as well as after the
application of tamper-proofing, as systems which do not pass
inspection may be reworked to fix flaws, and this should ideally be
impossible once the system has been made tamper-proof.
3. Types of Trust Anchors
Trust Anchors are fundamentally public keys. They are used to
validate other digitally signed artifacts. Typically, these are
chains of PKIX certificates leading to an End-Entity certificate
(EE).
The chains are usually presented as part of an externally provided
object, with the term "externally" to be understood as being as close
as untrusted flash, to as far as objects retrieved over a network.
There is no requirement that there be any chain at all: the trust
anchor can be used to validate a signature over a target object
directly.
The trust anchors are often stored in the form of self-signed
certificates. The self-signature does not offer any cryptographic
assurange, but it does provide a form of error detection, providing
verification against non-malicious forms of data corruption. If
storage is at a premium (such as inside-CPU non-volatile storage)
then only the public key itself need to be stored. For a 256-bit
ECDSA key, this is 32-bytes of space.
When evaluating the degree of trust for each trust anchor there are
four aspects that need to be determined:
* can the trust anchor be replaced or modified?
* can additional trust anchors be added?
* can trust anchors be removed?
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* how is the private key associated with the trust anchor stored?
The first three things are device specific properties of how the
integrity of the trust anchor is maintained.
The fourth property has nothing to do with the device, but has to do
with the reputation and care of the entity that maintains the private
key.
Different anchors have different purposes.
These are:
3.1. Secured First Boot Trust Anchor
This anchor is part of the first-stage boot loader, and it is used to
validate a second-stage bootloader which may be stored in external
flash.
3.2. Software Update Trust Anchor
This anchor is used to validate the main application (or operating
system) load for the device.
It can be stored in a number of places. First, it may be identical
to the Secure Boot Trust Anchor.
Second, it may be stored in the second-stage bootloader, and
therefore it's integrity is protected by the Secured First Boot Trust
Anchor.
Third, it may be stored in the application code itself, where the
application validates updates to the application directly (update in
place), or via a double-buffer arrangement. The initial (factory)
load of the application code initializes the trust arrangement.
In this situation the application code is not in a secured boot
situation, as the second-stage bootloader does not validate the
application/operating system before starting it, but it may still
provide measured boot mechanism.
3.3. Trusted Application Manager anchor
This anchor is part of a [I-D.ietf-teep-architecture] Trusted
Application Manager. Code which is signed by this anchor will be
given execution privileges as described by the manifest which
accompanies the code. This privilege may include updating anchors.
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3.4. Public WebPKI anchors
These anchors are used to verify HTTPS certificates from web sites.
These anchors are typically distributed as part of desktop browsers,
and via desktop operating systems.
The exact set of these anchors is not precisely defined: it is
usually determined by the browser vendor (e.g., Mozilla, Google,
Apple, Safari, Microsoft), or the operating system vendor (e.g.,
Apple, Google, Microsoft, Ubuntu). In most cases these vendors look
to the CA/Browser Forum ([CABFORUM]) for inclusion criteria.
3.5. DNSSEC root
This anchor is part of the DNS Security extensions. It provides an
anchor for securing DNS lookups. Secure DNS lookups may be important
in order to get access to software updates. This anchor is now
scheduled to change approximately every 3 years, with the new key
announced several years before it is used, making it possible to
embed a keys that will be valid for up to five years.
This trust anchor is typically part of the application/operating
system code and is usually updated by the manufacturer when they do
updates. However, a system which is connected to the Internet may
update the DNSSEC anchor itself through the mechanism described in
[RFC5011].
There are concerns that there may be a chicken and egg situation for
devices have remained in a powered off state (or disconnected from
the Internet) for some period of years. That upon being reconnected,
that the device would be unable to do DNSSEC validation. This
failure would result in them being unable to obtain operating system
updates that would then include the updates to the DNSSEC key.
3.6. What else?
TBD?
4. Types of Identities
Identities are installed during manufacturing time for a variety of
purposes.
Identities require some private component. Asymmetric identities
(e.g., RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA systems) require a co-responding public
component, usually in the form of a certificate signed by a trusted
third party.
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The process of making this coordinated key pair and then installing
it into the device is called identity provisioning.
4.1. Manufacturer installed IDevID certificates
[ieee802-1AR] defines a category of certificates that are to
installed by the manufacturer, which contain at the least, a device
unique serial number.
A number of protocols depend upon this certificate.
* [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] introduces a mechanism for
new devices (called pledges) to be onboarded into a network
without intervention from an expert operator. A number of derived
protocols such as {{I-D.
* [I-D.ietf-rats-architecture] depends upon a key provisioned into
the Attesting Environment to sign Evidence.
* [I-D.ietf-suit-architecture] may depend upon a key provisioned
into the device in order to decrypt software updates.
* TBD
4.1.1. Operational Considerations for Manufacturer IDevID Public Key
Infrastructure
The manufacturer has the responsability to provision a keypair into
each device as part of the manufacturing process. There are a
variety of mechanisms to accomplish this, which this document will
overview.
There are three fundamental ways to generate IDevID certificates for
devices:
1. generating a private key on the device, creating a Certificate
Signing Request (or equivalent), and then returning a certificate
to the device.
2. generating a private key outside the device, signing the
certificate, and the installing both into the device.
3. deriving the private key from a previously installed secret seed,
that is shared with only the manufacturer
There is a fourth situation where the IDevID is provided as part of a
Trusted Platform Module (TPM), in which case the TPM vendor may be
making the same tradeoffs.
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The document [I-D.moskowitz-ecdsa-pki] provides some practical
instructions on setting up a reference implementation for ECDSA keys
using a three-tier mechanism.
This document recommends the use of ECDSA keys for the root and
intermediate CAs, but there may be operational reasons why an RSA
intermediate CA will be required for some legacy TPM equipment.
4.1.2. Key Generation process
4.1.2.1. On-device private key generation
Generating the key on-device has the advantage that the private key
never leaves the device. The disadvantage is that the device may not
have a verified random number generator. [factoringrsa] is an example
of this scenario!
There are a number of options of how to get the public key securely
from the device to the certification authority.
This transmission must be done in an integral manner, and must be
securely associated with the assigned serial number. The serial
number goes into the certificate, and the resulting certificate needs
to be loaded into the manufacturer's asset database. This asset
database needs to be shared with the MASA.
One way to do the transmission is during a factory Bed of Nails test
(see [BedOfNails]) or Boundary Scan. When done via a physical
connection like this, then this is referred to as a _device-
generated_ / _mechanically-transfered_ .
There are other ways that could be used where a certificate signing
request is sent over a special network channel when the device is
powered up in the factory. This is referered to as the _device-
generated_ / _network-transfered_ method.
Regardless of how the certificate signing request is sent from the
device to the factory, and the certificate is returned to the device,
a concern from production line managers is that the assembly line may
have to wait for the certification authority to respond with the
certificate.
After the key generation, the device needs to set a flag such that it
no longer generates a new key, or will accept a new IDevID via the
factory connection. This may be a software setting, or could be as
dramatic as blowing a fuse.
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The risk is that if an attacker with physical access is able to put
the device back into an unconfigured mode, then the attacker may be
able to substitute a new certificate into the device. It is
difficult to construct a rational for doing this, unless the network
initialization also permits an attacker to load or replace trust
anchors at the same time.
Because the key is generated inside the device, it is assumed that
the device can never be convinced to disclose the private key.
4.1.2.2. Off-device private key generation
Generating the key off-device has the advantage that the randomness
of the private key can be better analyzed. As the private key is
available to the manufacturing infrastructure, the authenticity of
the public key is well known ahead of time.
If the device does not come with a serial number in silicon, then one
should be be assigned and placed into a certificate. The private key
and certificate could be programmed into the device along with the
initial bootloader firmware in a single step.
Aside from the the change of origin for the randomness, a major
advantage of this mechanism is that it can be done with a single
write to the flash. The entire firmware of the device, including
configuration of trust anchors and private keys can be loaded in a
single write pass. Given some pipelining of the generation of the
keys and the creation of certificates, it may be possible to install
unique identities without taking any additional time.
The major downside to generating the private key off-device is that
it could be seen by the manufacturing infrastructure. It could be
compromised by humans in the factory, or the equipment could be
compromised. The use of this method increases the value of attacking
the manufacturing infrastructure.
If keys are generated by the manufacturing plant, and are immediately
installed, but never stored, then the window in which an attacker can
gain access to the private key is immensely reduced.
As in the previous case, the transfer may be done via physical
interfaces such as bed-of-nails, giving the _infrastructure-
generated_ / _mechanically-transfered_ method.
There is also the possibility of having a _infrastructure-generated_
/ _network-transfered_ key. There is a support for "server-
generated" keys in [RFC7030], [I-D.gutmann-scep], and [RFC4210]. All
methods strongly recommend encrypting the private key for transfer.
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This is difficult to comply with as there is not yet any private key
material in the device, so in many cases it will not be possible to
encrypt the private key.
4.1.2.3. Key setup based on 256-bit secret seed
A hybrid of the previous two methods leverages a symmetric key that
is often provided by a silicon vendor to OEM manufacturers.
Each CPU (or a Trusted Execution Environment
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture], or a TPM) is provisioned at fabrication
time with a unique, secret seed, usually at least 256-bits in size.
This value is revealed to the OEM board manufacturer only via a
secure channel. Upon first boot, the system (probably within a TEE,
or within a TPM) will generate a key pair using the seed to
initialize a Pseudo-Random-Number-Generator (PRNG). The OEM, in a
separate system, will initialize the same PRNG and generate the same
key pair. The OEM then derives the public key part, signs it and
turns it into a certificate. The private part is then destroyed,
ideally never stored or seen by anyone. The certificate (being
public information) is placed into a database, in some cases it is
loaded by the device as its IDevID certificate, in other cases, it is
retrieved during the onboarding process based upon a unique serial
number asserted by the device.
This method appears to have all of the downsides of the previous two
methods: the device must correctly derive its own private key, and
the OEM has access to the private key, making it also vulnerable.
The secret seed must be created in a secure way and it must also be
communicated securely.
There are some advantages to the OEM however: the major one is that
the problem of securely communicating with the device is outsourced
to the silicon vendor. The private keys and certificates may be
calculated by the OEM asynchronously to the manufacturing process,
either done in batches in advance of actual manufacturing, or on
demand when an IDevID is demanded. Doing the processing in this way
permits the key derivation system to be completely disconnected from
any network, and requires placing very little trust in the system
assembly factory. Operational security such as often incorrectly
presented fictionalized stories of a "mainframe" system to which only
physical access is permitted begins to become realistic. That trust
has been replaced with a heightened trust placed in the silicon
(integrated circuit) fabrication facility.
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The downsides of this method to the OEM are: they must be supplied by
a trusted silicon fabrication system, which must communicate the set
of secrets seeds to the OEM in batches, and they OEM must store and
care for these keys very carefully. There are some operational
advantages to keeping the secret seeds around in some form, as the
same secret seed could be used for other things. There are some
significant downsides to keeping that secret seed around.
5. Public Key Infrastructures (PKI)
[RFC5280] describes the format for certificates, and numerous
mechanisms for doing enrollment have been defined (including: EST:
[RFC7030], CMP: [RFC4210], SCEP [I-D.gutmann-scep]).
[RFC5280] provides mechanisms to deal with multi-level certification
authorities, but it is not always clear what operating rules apply.
PKIs can suffer two kinds of failures: 1. disclosure of a private
key. 2. loss of a private key.
A PKI which discloses one or more private certification authority
keys is no longer secure. An attacker can create new identities, and
forge certificates connecting existing identities to attacker
controlled public/private keypairs. This can permit the attacker to
impersonate the specific device.
If the PKI uses Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL)s, then an attacker
can also revoke existing identities.
In the other direction, a PKI which loses access to a private key can
no longer function. Existing identities may continue to function,
unless CRLs or OCSP is in use, in which case, the inability to sign a
fresh CRL or OCSP response will result in all identities becoming
invalid.
This section details some nomenclature about the structure of
certification authorities.
5.1. Number of levels of certification authorities
The certification authority (CA) starts with a Trust Anchor (TA).
This is counted as the zeroth level of the authority.
In the degenerate case of a self-signed certificate, then this a
level zero PKI.
.-------<-. |Issuer= X | | |Subject=X |-' '-------'
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The Trust Anchor signs one or more certificates. When this first
level authority trusts only End-Entity (EE) certificates, then this
is a level one PKI.
.-------.<-. |Issuer= X | | |Subject=X |-' '-------' | -----\ v | .
---EE---. .---EE---. |Issuer= X | |Issuer=
X | |Subject=Y1| |Subject=Y2| '-------' '-------'
When this first level authority signs intermediate certification
authorities, and those certification authorities sign End-Entity
certificates, then this is a level two PKI.
.-------.<-. |Issuer= X | | |Subject=X |-' '-------' |
----------------\ v | .-------. .-------. |Issuer= X | |Issuer=
X | |Subject=Y1| |Subject=Y2| '-------' '-------' | ------\ | ------\
V | V | .---EE---. .---EE---. .---EE---. .---EE---. |Issuer=
Y1| |Issuer= Y1| |Issuer= Y2| |Issuer=
Y2| |Subject=Z1| |Subject=Z1| |Subject=Z3| |Subject=Z4| '-------'
'-------' '-------' '-------'
In general, when arranged as a tree, with the End-Entity certificates
at the bottom, and the Trust Anchor at the top, then the level is
where the deepest EE certificates are, counting from zero.
It is quite common to have a two-level PKI, where the root of the CA
is stored in a Hardware Security Module, while the level one
intermediate CA is available online.
5.2. Protection of CA private keys
The private key for the certification authorities must be protected
from disclosure. The strongest protection is afforded by keeping
them in a offline device, passing Certificate Signing Requests (CSR)s
to the offline device by human process.
For examples of extreme measures, see [kskceremony]. There is
however a wide spectrum of needs, as exampled in [rootkeyceremony].
The SAS70 audit standard is usually used as a basis for the Ceremony,
see [keyceremony2].
This is inconvenient, and may involve latencies of days, possibly
even weeks to months if the offline device is kept in a locked
environment that requires multiple keys to be present.
There is therefore a tension between protection and convenience.
This is often accomplished by having some levels of the PKI be
offline, and some levels of the PKI be online.
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There is usually a need to maintain backup copies of the critical
keys. It is often appropriate to use secret splitting technology
such as Shamir Secret Sharing among a number of parties [shamir79]
This mechanism can be setup such that some threshold k (less than the
total n) of shares are needed in order to recover the secret.
5.3. Supporting provisioned anchors in devices
IDevID-type Identity (or Birth) Certificates which are provisioned
into devices need to be signed by a certification authority
maintained by the manufacturer. The manufacturer needs to maintain
availability of this PKI.
Trust anchors which are provisioned in the devices will have
corresponding private keys maintained by the manufacturer. The trust
anchors will often anchor a PKI which is going to be used for a
particular purpose. There will be End-Entity (EE) certificates of
this PKI which will be used to sign particular artifacts (such as
software updates), or communications protocols (such as TLS
connections). The private key associated with these EE certificates
are not stored in the device, but are maintained by the manufacturer.
These need even more care than the private keys stored in the
devices, as compromise of the software update key compromises all of
the devices, not just a single device.
6. Evaluation Questions
This section recaps the set of questions that may need to be
answered. This document does not assign valuation to the answers.
6.1. Integrity and Privacy of on-device data
initial-enclave-location : Is the location of the initial software
trust anchor internal to the CPU package?
initial-enclave-integrity-key : If the first-stage bootloader is
external to the CPU, and it is integrity protected, where is the
key used to check the integrity?
initial-enclave-privacy-key : If the first-stage data is external to
the CPU, is it encrypted?
first-stage-initialization : The number of people involved in the
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first stage initialization. An entirely automated system would
have a number zero. A factory with three 8 hour shifts might have
a number that is a multiple of three. A system with humans
involved may be subject to bribery attacks, while a system with no
humans may be subject to attacks on the system which are hard to
notice.
first-second-stage-gap : If a board is initialized with a first-
stage bootloader in one location (factory), and then shipped to
another location, there may situations where the device can not be
locked down until the second step.
6.2. Integrity and Privacy of device identify infrastructure
For IDevID provisioning, which includes a private key and matching
certificate installed into the device, the associated public key
infrastructure that anchors this identity must be maintained by the
manufacturer.
identity-pki-level : how deep are the IDevID certificates that are
issued?
identity-time-limits-per-intermediate : how long is each
intermediate CA maintained before before a new intermediate CA key
is generated? There may be no time limit, only a device count
limit.
identity-number-per-intermediate : how many identities are signed by
a particular intermediate CA before it is retired? There may be
no numeric limit, only a time limit.
identity-anchor-storage : how is the root CA key stored? How many
people are needed to recover it?
6.3. Integrity and Privacy of included trust anchors
For each trust anchor (public key) stored in the device, there will
be an associated PKI. For each of those PKI the following questions
need to be answered.
pki-level : how deep is the EE that will be evaluated
pki-level-locked : (a boolean) is the level where the EE cert will
be found locked by the device, or can levels be added or deleted
by the PKI operator without code changes to the device.
pki-breadth : how many different EE certificates exist in this PKI
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pki-lock-policy : can any EE certificate be used with this trust
anchor to sign? Or, is there some kind of policy OID or Subject
restriction? Are specific intermediate CAs needed that lead to
the EE?
pki-anchor-storage: how is the root CA stored? How many people are
needed to recover it?
7. Privacy Considerations
many yet to be detailed
8. Security Considerations
This entire document is a security considerations.
9. IANA Considerations
This document makes no IANA requests.
10. Acknowledgements
Robert Martin of MITRE provides some guidance about citing the SBOM
efforts.
11. Changelog
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[BCP14] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[I-D.moskowitz-ecdsa-pki]
Moskowitz, R., Birkholz, H., Xia, L., and M. Richardson,
"Guide for building an ECC pki", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-moskowitz-ecdsa-pki-08, 14 February
2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
moskowitz-ecdsa-pki-08.txt>.
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[ieee802-1AR]
IEEE Standard, ., "IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier",
2009, <http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
12.2. Informative References
[I-D.richardson-anima-masa-considerations]
Richardson, M. and W. Pan, "Operatonal Considerations for
Voucher infrastructure for BRSKI MASA", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-richardson-anima-masa-
considerations-04, 9 June 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/
internet-drafts/draft-richardson-anima-masa-
considerations-04.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]
Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructures (BRSKI)", Work in Progress, Internet-
Draft, draft-ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-41, 8 April
2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-
anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra-41.txt>.
[RFC5011] StJohns, M., "Automated Updates of DNS Security (DNSSEC)
Trust Anchors", STD 74, RFC 5011, DOI 10.17487/RFC5011,
September 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5011>.
[RFC8366] Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
"A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
[I-D.gutmann-scep]
Gutmann, P., "Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-gutmann-scep-16, 27
March 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
gutmann-scep-16.txt>.
[RFC4210] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4210, September 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4210>.
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[_3GPP.51.011]
3GPP, "Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module -
Mobile Equipment (SIM-ME) interface", 3GPP TS 51.011
4.15.0, 15 June 2005,
<http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/51011.htm>.
[BedOfNails]
Wikipedia, ., "Bed of nails tester", July 2020,
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In-
circuit_test#Bed_of_nails_tester>.
[pelionfcu]
ARM Pelion, "Factory provisioning overview", 28 June 2020,
<https://www.pelion.com/docs/device-management-
provision/1.2/introduction/index.html>.
[factoringrsa]
"Factoring RSA keys from certified smart cards:
Coppersmith in the wild", 16 September 2013,
<https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/204886987.pdf>.
[RambusCryptoManager]
Qualcomm press release, "Qualcomm Licenses Rambus
CryptoManager Key and Feature Management Security
Solution", 2014, <https://www.rambus.com/qualcomm-
licenses-rambus-cryptomanager-key-and-feature-management-
security-solution/>.
[kskceremony]
Verisign, "DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone ZSK
Operator", 2017, <https://www.iana.org/dnssec/dps/zsk-
operator/dps-zsk-operator-v2.0.pdf>.
[rootkeyceremony]
Community, "Root Key Ceremony, Cryptography Wiki", April
2020,
<https://cryptography.fandom.com/wiki/Root_Key_Ceremony>.
[keyceremony2]
Digi-Sign, "SAS 70 Key Ceremony", April 2020,
<http://www.digi-sign.com/compliance/key%20ceremony/
index>.
[shamir79] Shamir, A., "How to share a secret.", 1979,
<https://www.cs.jhu.edu/~sdoshi/crypto/papers/
shamirturing.pdf>.
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[nistsp800-57]
NIST, "SP 800-57 Part 1 Rev. 4 Recommendation for Key
Management, Part 1: General", 1 January 2016,
<https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-57-part-
1/rev-4/final>.
[fidotechnote]
FIDO Alliance, ., "FIDO TechNotes: The Truth about
Attestation", July 2018, <https://fidoalliance.org/fido-
technotes-the-truth-about-attestation/>.
[ntiasbom] NTIA, ., "NTIA Software Compoment Transparency", n.d.,
<https://www.ntia.doc.gov/SoftwareTransparency>.
[cisqsbom] CISQ/Object Management Group, ., "TOOL-TO-TOOL SOFTWARE
BILL OF MATERIALS EXCHANGE", July 2020, <https://www.it-
cisq.org/software-bill-of-materials/index.htm>.
[openbmc] Linux Foundation/OpenBMC Group, ., "Defining a Standard
Baseboard Management Controller Firmware Stack", July
2020, <https://www.openbmc.org/>.
[JTAG] IEEE Standard, ., "1149.7-2009 - IEEE Standard for
Reduced-Pin and Enhanced-Functionality Test Access Port
and Boundary-Scan Architecture", 2009,
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5412866>.
[rootkeyrollover]
ICANN, ., "Proposal for Future Root Zone KSK Rollovers",
2019, <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/
proposal-future-rz-ksk-rollovers-01nov19-en.pdf>.
[CABFORUM] CA/Browser Forum, ., "CA/Browser Forum Baseline
Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-
Trusted Certificates, v.1.2.2", October 2014,
<https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/BRv1.2.2.pdf>.
[I-D.richardson-rats-usecases]
Richardson, M., Wallace, C., and W. Pan, "Use cases for
Remote Attestation common encodings", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-richardson-rats-usecases-07, 9 March
2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
richardson-rats-usecases-07.txt>.
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[I-D.ietf-suit-architecture]
Moran, B., Tschofenig, H., Brown, D., and M. Meriac, "A
Firmware Update Architecture for Internet of Things", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-suit-architecture-
11, 27 May 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
draft-ietf-suit-architecture-11.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-emu-eap-noob]
Aura, T. and M. Sethi, "Nimble out-of-band authentication
for EAP (EAP-NOOB)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-emu-eap-noob-02, 12 July 2020,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-emu-eap-
noob-02.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-rats-architecture]
Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and
W. Pan, "Remote Attestation Procedures Architecture", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-architecture-
05, 10 July 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
draft-ietf-rats-architecture-05.txt>.
[I-D.birkholz-suit-coswid-manifest]
Birkholz, H., "A SUIT Manifest Extension for Concise
Software Identifiers", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-birkholz-suit-coswid-manifest-00, 17 July 2018,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-birkholz-suit-
coswid-manifest-00.txt>.
[I-D.birkholz-rats-mud]
Birkholz, H., "MUD-Based RATS Resources Discovery", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-birkholz-rats-mud-00, 9
March 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
birkholz-rats-mud-00.txt>.
[RFC8520] Lear, E., Droms, R., and D. Romascanu, "Manufacturer Usage
Description Specification", RFC 8520,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8520, March 2019,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8520>.
[I-D.ietf-sacm-coswid]
Birkholz, H., Fitzgerald-McKay, J., Schmidt, C., and D.
Waltermire, "Concise Software Identification Tags", Work
in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-sacm-coswid-15, 1
May 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-
sacm-coswid-15.txt>.
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[RFC7168] Nazar, I., "The Hyper Text Coffee Pot Control Protocol for
Tea Efflux Appliances (HTCPCP-TEA)", RFC 7168,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7168, April 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7168>.
[I-D.bormann-lwig-7228bis]
Bormann, C., Ersue, M., Keranen, A., and C. Gomez,
"Terminology for Constrained-Node Networks", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-bormann-lwig-7228bis-06, 9
March 2020, <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
bormann-lwig-7228bis-06.txt>.
[I-D.ietf-teep-architecture]
Pei, M., Tschofenig, H., Thaler, D., and D. Wheeler,
"Trusted Execution Environment Provisioning (TEEP)
Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-teep-architecture-12, 13 July 2020,
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-teep-
architecture-12.txt>.
Authors' Addresses
Michael Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
Jie Yang
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Email: jay.yang@huawei.com
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