Internet DRAFT - draft-rafiee-sdnauth-usecase

draft-rafiee-sdnauth-usecase






SDNAuth                                                        H. Rafiee
INTERNET-DRAFT                                               A. Petrescu
Intended Status: Informational                                          
Expires: December 6, 2015                                   June 6, 2015


                    SDNauth Usecases and Requirements
                  <draft-rafiee-sdnauth-usecase-01.txt>

Abstract

   This document aims to explain the requirement and usecases for a 
   secure authentication model for different SDN components (e.g. SDN 
   switch, application, etc.). It also covers the standard structure for 
   the communications of two SDN controllers or an application to 
   different SDN controllers via a mediator service. 



Status of this Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the 
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. 

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering 
   Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working 
   documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-Drafts is 
   at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current. 

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months 
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any 
   time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference 
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." 

   This Internet-Draft will expire on December 6, 2015. 

   



Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the 
   document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to 
   BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF 
   Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the 
   date of publication of this document. Please review these documents 
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   to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must 
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of 


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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as 
   described in the Simplified BSD License. 



Table of Contents

   1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Introduction   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   3.  Use cases  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.1.  User movements in carrier WiFi networks  . . . . . . . . .  4
     3.2.  Limited UI devices connections to public hotspot areas   .  5
     3.3.  Distributed SDN controllers  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   4.  Requirements   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   7.  Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
     8.1.  Normative  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9



































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1.  Terminology 

   There is already a good SDN terminology available [RFC74269]. Here is 
   the list of terms that has special meaning in this document. 

   - End system: any device that is used by a user to start its 
   communication ? a laptop, a smartphone, etc. 

   - Network element: any physical or logical network devices such as a 
   switch, a router, virtual switch (vswitch), etc. 

   - Application (App): In this document, application is any piece of 
   software that wants to communicate with SDN controller to exchange 
   information or enforce any policy via SDN controller on target 
   switch(es). e.g. an authentication/authorization app 

   - Traffic flow : a group of traffic with the similar source or 
   destination and port 

   - Foreign SDN controller: a SDN controller that an application is not 
   authorized to run anything on it. 

   - Home SDN controller: a SDN controller that an application is 
   pre-configured with to enforce any policy on. 


2.  Introduction 

   Today, the advances of technology provide us with new capabilities 
   and the possibility to use scalable logical networks and flexible and 
   programmable virtual network devices (which uses Software Defined 
   Network (SDN)[1,2], Network Function Virtualization (NFV) -based 
   techniques or the combination of these two techniques. Since these 
   techniques also promote the openness and abstraction concepts, 
   authentication and authorization are both critical in such 
   infrastructures. 

   This is because, before two SDN components (e.g. an application, an 
   SDN switch, a SDN router, etc.) want to communicate to a SDN 
   controller, they need to be authenticated and authorized. This 
   process will avoid the propagation of attacks on the whole SDN based 
   infrastructure by preventing unauthenticated and unauthorized access 
   to a centralized SDN controller and as a result to the network 
   devices. The existing authentication scheme used in SDN solution is 
   based on TLS certificates. 

   The problem with the use of self-signed certificates is the spoofing 
   attack at the beginning of the TLS establishments. In case the 
   certificates are introduced to both SDN components, the problem is 
   key management and scalability of such solution. 

   The use of the existing public CA solves the scalability and key 


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   management problem but this approach doesn't fit to the nature of a 
   SDN solution. This is because, if the private key of a CA is 
   compromised, then it might affect all SDN based infrastructure that 
   has their certificates signed by the compromised CA which may result 
   in serious damages on the operators' networks. One solution would be 
   the use of local PKI models. This solution will reduce the range of 
   attacks to a limited scope such as only one operator but cannot 
   completely eliminate such attacks. Therefore, improving the 
   authentication model of SDN components and reduce the range of 
   attacks as much as possible is demanding and this is what this group 
   wants to address. 

   Furthermore, an operator might have distributed SDN controllers (each 
   does different task) in different data centers that these SDN 
   controllers belong to a vendor or there might be a case where an 
   operator received its service from different vendors but wants to 
   have overall information about its network. There might be also a 
   case where SDN controllers belong to multi-operators. Therefore, the 
   communications of these SDN controllers is one of the requirements 
   for such distributed networks. At the moment, there is a lack of 
   standard communication protocols for the communication of two SDN 
   controllers for exchanging topology information or any other 
   information which is demanding. 

   Since the security of a SDN controller is really important. Having a 
   single point of communication to a SDN controller reduces the range 
   of attacks on a SDN controller. Therefore, the mediator service can 
   be used to handle these communications among SDN controllers together 
   and applications to SDN controllers. Since there is no standard model 
   for this communication, this document introduces some use case 
   scenarios for the communication of two SDN controller. 

   This document addresses the following problems: 

   - Requirements for a secure authentication model for a SDN based 
   solution 

   - Secure communications of a mediator service to apps that belong to 
   different operators and running on different data centers 

   - Secure communications of SDN controllers to exchange different 
   information such as topology, user session, etc. 


3.  Use cases 

   The following subsections explain example use case scenarios that 
   SDNAuth can address. 


3.1.  User movements in carrier WiFi networks 

   User A belongs to operator A network. It authenticates to the WiFi 


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   interface in its home network (The protocol might be EAP and RADIUS). 
   It moves to a new place that is in the domain of operator B. Operator 
   A does not provide any service there but there is an agreement 
   between these two operators so that user A can connect to this 
   network. Operator B can define different access control for this 
   guest user so that this user receives similar service as it had in 
   its home network. This involves too much administrative works and it 
   is a time consuming process. Here the purpose is to improve this 
   process and reduce human interaction as much as possible by the use 
   of SDN solution. Therefore, the purpose is to offer an improved model 
   for this scenario via the communications of SDN controllers and 
   exchanging user information and user session data. 


3.2.  Limited UI devices connections to public hotspot areas 

   A growing number of constrained devices are equipped with WiFi 
   interfaces. But since they are not featuring full-blown User 
   Interfaces traditionally used in larger devices (screens and 
   keyboards on smartphones, tablets, PCs) these devices can connect to 
   WiFi Access Points only by using pre-configured WiFi parameters, like 
   the "ESSID" and network passwords. The pre-configuration operation 
   involves using a smartphone or other device carrying a full UI. 

   Under mobility conditions, it would be very difficult to manually 
   re-configure these parameters such as to connect to public WiFi 
   hotspots. It is impossible to stop by and and re-set the ESSID on a 
   smartwatch without much additional effort. 

   

   Other use-case involves devices requiring continuous Internet 
   connection during mobility. For example, a multimedia personal device 
   (mp3 player) needs to stream content from a server while the person 
   moves from one hotspot to another. On these devices it is very 
   difficult to re-set the ESSID and password at each public WiFi 
   hotspot. 

   

   Finally, On-Board Units carried by automobiles also need to connect 
   to public WiFi hotspots. Whereas OBUs may be easily equipped with 
   large screens and keyboards, the driver is forbidden from using these 
   while driving the automobile - safety first. In this situation again, 
   it is impossible to manually change the ESSID and password when 
   moving from one public WiFi hotspot to another. 

   

   It should be mentioned that ESSID and password are given only as 
   examples of parameters which need to be re-configured in mobility 
   situations from one public WiFi hotspot to another. Since WiFi 
   Broadband Alliance (WBA) tries to improve the user authentication and 


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   the purpose is to limit the use of web portals, this document only 
   focuses on ESSID/passwords or similar authentication techniques but 
   not web portals. 

   Therefore, this problem can be solved by the use of SDN solution and 
   the communication of SDN controllers can provide the authenticator 
   application with the new place of this user and can assist in this 
   scenario by exchanging information about the user's session. 


3.3.  Distributed SDN controllers 

   Tenant A has a distributed networks in two different data centers 
   that each is under the control of different SDN controller. Tenant A 
   wants to have overview of the overall network topology. At the moment 
   there is no possibility to exchange data among these SDN controllers. 
   Using a mediator service might help this process but lack of standard 
   structure for the communication of this mediator service to different 
   SDN controllers leads to complexity in deployment of such mediator. 
   This is what SDNauth plans to address by offering a simple model for 
   this mediator and divide its tasks to different applications so that 
   the existing implementation of different protocols still can be used. 
   


4.  Requirements 

   This section defines the scope of this document and introduces the 
   requirement. 

   [1] A standard structure for the communications of two SDN 
   controllers via mediator service and the applications (e.g. RADIUS) 

   [2] To reduce human interactions and reduce time to receive service 
   for users 

   [3] To provide the user with similar access control as it had in its 
   home network while by default some services might not be available in 
   its visited network (e.g. VoIP) 

   [4] It needs to provide an improved authentication model for the 
   authentication of different SDN components such as applications to 
   mediator, etc. to facilitate the authentication of application A from 
   domain A to a mediator service in domain B. (a improved SDN based 
   PKI) 

   [5] It needs to provide high security and privacy especially for end 
   systems 

   [6] It needs to support different clients with different resources 
   (Memory, Battery, CPU, etc.) -- Laptops, IPod, Smartphone, etc. 

   Good performance for constrained devices. 


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   [7] It needs to be backward compatible by the possibility to re-use 
   the existing protocols while at the same time keep the mediator 
   service so simple. 

5.  Security Considerations

   There is no security consideration 



6.  IANA Considerations

   There is no IANA consideration 





7.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank people who helped to improve this 
   work. 

   



8.  References

8.1.  Normative References 

   [RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., Simpson, W., 
             " Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",RFC 
             2865, June 2000 

   [RFC6733] Fajardo, V., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., Zorn, G., 
             "Diameter Base Protocol" RFC 6733, October 2012. 

   [RFC7426] Haleplidis, E., Pentikousis , K., Denazis , S., 
             Hadi Salim, J., Meyer, D., Koufopavlou , O., 
             "Software-Defined Networking (SDN): Layers and Architecture 
             Terminology", RFC 7426, January 2015 

   [1] Haleplidis, E., Pentikousis , K., Denazis , S., Hadi Salim, 
       J., Meyer, D., Koufopavlou , O., "Software-Defined Networking 
       (SDN): Layers and Architecture Terminology", RFC 7426, January 
       2015 

   [2] Kreutz, D., Ramos, F.M.V., Esteves Verissimo, P., Esteve 
       Rothenberg, C., "Software-Defined Networking: A Comprehensive 
       Survey", DOI: 10.1109/JPROC.2014.2371999 , January 2015 



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Authors' Addresses

      Hosnieh Rafiee
      Huawei
      Munich, Germany
      Phone: +49 (0)162 204 74 58
      E-mail: ietf@rozanak.com


      Alexandru Petrescu
      Email: alexandru.petrescu@gmail.com










































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