Internet DRAFT - draft-pusateri-dhc-dns-driu

draft-pusateri-dhc-dns-driu







Internet Engineering Task Force                              T. Pusateri
Internet-Draft                                              Unaffiliated
Intended status: Informational                                 W. Toorop
Expires: January 3, 2019                                      NLnet Labs
                                                            July 2, 2018


                DHCPv6 Options for private DNS Discovery
                     draft-pusateri-dhc-dns-driu-00

Abstract

   This draft provides a series of DHCPv6 options for a DHCPv6 client to
   request from a DHCPv6 server to aid in configuring DNS servers that
   support private requests/responses.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 3, 2019.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.




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Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
     1.1.  Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  DHCPv6 Encapsulating Options  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  DHCPv6 DNS over TLS Encapsulated Options  . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  IPv6 Address Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.2.  ADN Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.3.  Port Option . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   5.  DHCPv6 DNS over DTLS Encapsulated Options . . . . . . . . . .   7
   6.  DHCPv6 DNS over HTTPS (DoH) Encapsulated Options  . . . . . .   7
     6.1.  URI Option  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   7.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   9.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   10. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     10.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
     10.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  10
   Appendix A.  ISC DHCPv6 Configuration Example . . . . . . . . . .  11
     A.1.  ISC DHCPv6 Server Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     A.2.  ISC DHCPv6 Client Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11

1.  Introduction

   There are three standardized forms for providing privacy to DNS
   including DNS over TLS (as defined in [RFC7858]), DNS over DTLS (as
   defined in [RFC8094]), and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) as defined in
   [I-D.ietf-doh-dns-over-https].  In order to use these encrypted forms
   of DNS securely, more information is needed by the client than the
   DNS Server list defined in Section 3 of [RFC3646].  This document
   defines three new DHCPv6 encapsulating options containing additional
   DHCPv6 options for clients to configure secure DNS in one of these
   forms.  Each top level option specifies ONE server.  Multiple servers
   are specified by including multiple instances of the same top level
   option with different encapsulated options.

1.1.  Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].








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2.  Trust

   Encrypting the DNS transport provides privacy of the information
   contained in the DNS requests/responses across the connection.  It
   does not provide privacy at the endpoints of the connection.  The
   private DNS configuration parameters obtained by a client via DHCPv6
   are not automatically trusted.  Trust is established in many ways or
   not at all.  The environment a client finds itself in will determine
   how trustworthy the DHCPv6 reply may or may not be.  There should be
   no false sense of privacy derived from the presence of these options
   in a DHCPv6 reply.

   The following points may assist the DHCPv6 client:

   1.  clients can choose whether or not to use the DNS server
       configuration parameters they receive via DHCPv6 and may simply
       override these parameters with their own configuration.

   2.  DHCPv6 servers already provide unencrypted DNS server parameters
       to clients that are regularly used because the client has decided
       to trust the server reply in that environment.

   3.  client implementations (or operating system vendors) could
       establish whitelists (or blacklists) of known good (bad) servers.

   4.  the community could establish a registry of trusted DNS privacy
       servers.

3.  DHCPv6 Encapsulating Options

   Encrypted DNS DHCPv6 configuration parameters will be encapsulated in
   one or more of the following top level encapsulating options.  These
   options can be repeated as many times as necessary to configure a
   list of secure DNS servers with one secure server per encapsulation.
   This is permitted by Section 22 of [RFC3315].  There is no order
   implied by the order of options sent or received.  It is up to the
   receiving client to determine which order to use the DNS server
   configurations.

   The format for the DNS over TLS [RFC7858] encapsulating option code
   is:










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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |        OPTION_DNS_TLS         |         option-length         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       .            encapsulated-options (variable length)             .
       .                                                               .
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


                       Figure 1: DNS over TLS option

   option-code:  OPTION_DNS_TLS (TBD)

   option-len:  Length of the sum of the lengths of the encapsulated
         options.

   The format for the DNS over DTLS [RFC8094] encapsulating option code
   is:


        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |        OPTION_DNS_DTLS        |         option-length         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       .            encapsulated-options (variable length)             .
       .                                                               .
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


                      Figure 2: DNS over DTLS option

   option-code:  OPTION_DNS_DTLS (TBD)

   option-len:  Length of the sum of the lengths of the encapsulated
         options.

   The format for the DNS over HTTPS [I-D.ietf-doh-dns-over-https]
   encapsulating option code is:









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        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |       OPTION_DNS_HTTPS        |         option-length         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       .            encapsulated-options (variable length)             .
       .                                                               .
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


                      Figure 3: DNS over HTTPS option

   option-code:  OPTION_DNS_HTTPS (TBD)

   option-len:  Length of the sum of the lengths of the encapsulated
         options.

4.  DHCPv6 DNS over TLS Encapsulated Options

   There are four possible DHCPv6 encapsulated options contained in a
   top level OPTION_DNS_TLS option.  Each sub-option MUST NOT appear
   more than once within a top level option.

4.1.  IPv6 Address Option

   The first is an OPTION_IPV6 which is REQUIRED.  This is a fixed
   length and contains the IPv6 address of the server.


        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |           OPTION_IPV6         |       option-length (16)      |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |                                                               |
       |                         IPv6 address                          |
       |                                                               |
       |                                                               |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


                           Figure 4: IPv6 option

   option-code:  OPTION_IPV6 (TBD)

   option-len:  16 bytes




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4.2.  ADN Option

   The second is OPTION_ADN.  This is a variable length string
   containing the Authentication Domain Name as specified in [RFC8310].
   This name MUST be verified in accordance with [RFC6125] or subsequent
   updates to this document.  The client SHOULD send the Authenticated
   Domain Name when establishing the TLS connection to the DNS server
   using the TLS Server Name Indication (SNI) extension as defined in
   Section 3 of [RFC6066].  The use of OPTION_ADN by the server is
   OPTIONAL but strongly encouraged.  The string is a DNS FQDN encoded
   according to Section 3.1 of [RFC1035].


        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |           OPTION_ADN          |        option-length          |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       .                           server ADN                          .
       .                        (variable length)                      .
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


                  Figure 5: Server Name Indication option

   option-code:  OPTION_ADN (TBD)

   option-len:  Length of the encoded string

4.3.  Port Option

   The third option is OPTION_PORT.  This is a fixed length option
   containing the port number of the listening server.  It defaults to
   port 853 as defined in Section 3.1 of [RFC7858].  This DHCPv6 option
   is OPTIONAL and there is no need to specify it when the server is
   listening on port 853.


        0                   1                   2                   3
        0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |          OPTION_PORT          |       option-length (2)       |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
       |           port number         |
       +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


                           Figure 6: Port option



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   option-code:  OPTION_PORT (TBD)

   option-len:  2 bytes

5.  DHCPv6 DNS over DTLS Encapsulated Options

   DNS over DTLS has the exact same set of possible DHCPv6 options as
   DNS over TLS.  The OPTION_IPV6 defined in Section 4.1 is REQUIRED.
   OPTION_ADN defined in Section 4.2 is OPTIONAL.  OPTION_PORT defined
   in Section 4.3 is OPTIONAL.  Please refer the these sections for
   their definitions and descriptions.

6.  DHCPv6 DNS over HTTPS (DoH) Encapsulated Options

   The DNS over HTTPS top level OPTION_DNS_HTTPS encapsulation has only
   one option defined at this time which is OPTION_URI.  This option is
   REQUIRED.

   [[Q1: Should we allow OPTION_IPV6? --TJP]]

6.1.  URI Option

   OPTION_URI includes a server URI string that provides the necessary
   components to connect to a DNS over HTTPS server as defined in
   [I-D.ietf-doh-dns-over-https].  Note that the DNS over HTTPS
   specification requires a server to respond to both GET and POST
   methods.  The URI MUST NOT include the query component beginning with
   a "?" and including the "dns" variable that is used in a GET method
   request.  It is up to the client to decide whether to issue a GET or
   POST method in the HTTP request.  Therefore, the client is
   responsible for appending the "?" and "dns" variable along with its
   base64 encoded value to the URI for GET method HTTP requests.


       0                   1                   2                   3
       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      |          OPTION_URI           |         option-length         |
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
      .                           server URI                          .
      .                        (variable length)                      .
      +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+


                           Figure 7: URI option

   option-code:  OPTION_URI (TBD)




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   option-len:  Length of server URI string

7.  Security Considerations

   Compromising domain name resolution may provide a way to direct
   client network traffic to non-authentic service providers.  Sending a
   DNS client to a non-authentic DNS server could return DNS responses
   with IPv6 addresses that do not represent the actual authoritative
   AAAA records for the names queried but pretend to do so.  Then
   applications on the client computer would attempt to connect to the
   server carrying out man-in-the-middle or trojan attacks.  Before this
   specification existed, DHCPv6 domain name servers could have directed
   DHCPv6 clients to compromised DNS servers.  Adding encrypted DNS
   configuration parameters does not change this fact.

   There are ways to verify the integrity of unencrypted DNS responses
   using DNSSEC if a client begins with the root trust anchor.  This
   ensures the entire DNS root hasn't been replaced with a forgery.

   In the same way, the integrity of the responses must still be
   verified when the responses are received over an encrypted DNS
   connection.

   There are additional verification checks that can be done given the
   additional parameters provided with these private DNS DHCPv6 options
   to increase the likelihood a client is connecting to an authentic DNS
   recursive resolver that are not possible if only the IPv6 address of
   the DNS server is known:

   1.  When the ADN option is present, the client can use DNSSEC to
       validate the address records for the DNS server and the matching
       authentication domain name, followed by verifying the certificate
       of the encrypted DNS Server through verification of the
       corresponding TLSA records as described in DANE [RFC6698] and
       updated in [RFC7671].

   2.  There is intentionally no option for the SPKI pin as defined in
       [RFC7469] and usage as related to DNS as described in Section 4.2
       of [RFC7858].  This is because there is no way for a client to
       check the integrity of the pin when received from the network
       operator via DHCPv6.  The SPKI pin can still be used to validate
       a private DNS server certificate but the SPKI pin must be
       obtained out of band through a trusted method to be useful for
       verification.







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8.  IANA Considerations

   This document identifies several new DHCPv6 Option Codes that require
   an assigned number.

             +------------------+-------------+-------------+
             | Name             | Option Code | Definition  |
             +------------------+-------------+-------------+
             | OPTION_DNS_TLS   |     TBD     | Section 3   |
             | OPTION_DNS_DTLS  |     TBD     | Section 3   |
             | OPTION_DNS_HTTPS |     TBD     | Section 3   |
             | OPTION_IPV6      |     TBD     | Section 4.1 |
             | OPTION_ADN       |     TBD     | Section 4.2 |
             | OPTION_PORT      |     TBD     | Section 4.3 |
             | OPTION_URI       |     TBD     | Section 6.1 |
             +------------------+-------------+-------------+

                                  Table 1

9.  Acknowledgements

   This document was motivated in part by Section 7.3.1 of [RFC8310].
   Thanks to the authors Sara Dickinson, Daniel Kahn Gillmor, and
   Tirumaleswar Reddy for documenting the issue.  Thanks also to Ted
   Lemon for appropriate warnings about this work.

10.  References

10.1.  Normative References

   [I-D.ietf-doh-dns-over-https]
              Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", draft-ietf-doh-dns-over-https-12 (work in
              progress), June 2018.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC3315]  Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins,
              C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
              for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July
              2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>.



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   [RFC6066]  Eastlake 3rd, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Extensions: Extension Definitions", RFC 6066,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6066, January 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6066>.

   [RFC6125]  Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
              Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
              within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
              (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
              Security (TLS)", RFC 6125, DOI 10.17487/RFC6125, March
              2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6125>.

   [RFC6698]  Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
              of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
              Protocol: TLSA", RFC 6698, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
              2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698>.

   [RFC7469]  Evans, C., Palmer, C., and R. Sleevi, "Public Key Pinning
              Extension for HTTP", RFC 7469, DOI 10.17487/RFC7469, April
              2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7469>.

   [RFC7671]  Dukhovni, V. and W. Hardaker, "The DNS-Based
              Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Protocol: Updates
              and Operational Guidance", RFC 7671, DOI 10.17487/RFC7671,
              October 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7671>.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC8094]  Reddy, T., Wing, D., and P. Patil, "DNS over Datagram
              Transport Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 8094,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8094, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8094>.

   [RFC8310]  Dickinson, S., Gillmor, D., and T. Reddy, "Usage Profiles
              for DNS over TLS and DNS over DTLS", RFC 8310,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8310, March 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8310>.

10.2.  Informative References

   [RFC3646]  Droms, R., Ed., "DNS Configuration options for Dynamic
              Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3646,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3646, December 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3646>.




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Appendix A.  ISC DHCPv6 Configuration Example

   The DHCPv6 options defined in this specification were tested with the
   ISC DHCPv6 server _dhcpd_ and client _dhclient_ version 4.4.1.  Using
   this version, it was possible to send a single DNS over TLS
   encapsulated option containing an IPv6 address, authentication domain
   name, and port number.  Multiple servers using multiple DNS over TLS
   encapsulated options were not available via the client hooks script.

A.1.  ISC DHCPv6 Server Configuration


         option space tls;
         option tls.ipv6 code 226 = ip6-address;
         option tls.port code 227 = unsigned integer 16;
         option tls.adn code 228 = domain-list;
         option dhcp6.tls-encapsulation code 225 = encapsulate tls;

         subnet6 2001:DB8:01::/64 {
             option tls.ipv6 2a04:b900:0:100::37;
             option tls.adn "getdnsapi.net";

             option tls.ipv6 2620:fe::fe;
             option tls.adn "dns.quad9.net";
         }


A.2.  ISC DHCPv6 Client Configuration


         option space tls;
         option tls.ipv6 code 226 = ip6-address;
         option tls.port code 227 = unsigned integer 16;
         option tls.adn code 228 = domain-list;
         option dhcp6.tls-encapsulation code 225 = encapsulate tls;

         request dhcp6.tls-encapsulation;


Authors' Addresses

   Tom Pusateri
   Unaffiliated
   Raleigh, NC  27608
   USA

   Phone: +1 919 867 1330
   Email: pusateri@bangj.com



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   Willem Toorop
   NLnet Labs
   Science Park 400
   Amsterdam  1098 XH
   Netherlands

   Email: willem@nlnetlabs.nl












































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