Internet DRAFT - draft-madi-sidrops-rush

draft-madi-sidrops-rush







SIDROPS                                                            D. Ma
Internet-Draft                                                      ZDNS
Intended status: Standards Track                                  H. Yan
Expires: 23 October 2023                                          CNCERT
                                                              M. Aelmans
                                                        Juniper Networks
                                                                S. Zhang
                                                                    NNIX
                                                           21 April 2023


         RPKI validated cache Update in SLURM over HTTPs (RUSH)
                       draft-madi-sidrops-rush-08

Abstract

   This document defines a method for transferring RPKI validated cache
   update information in JSON object format over HTTPs.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on 23 October 2023.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.











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   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
   license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
   Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
   and restrictions with respect to this document.  Code Components
   extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as
   described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are
   provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   2
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  RUSH Usecase  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   4.  RUSH Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.1.  Use of SLURM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.2.  Use of HTTPs as Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     4.3.  RUSH Example  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   5.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   6.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
   8.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     8.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8

1.  Introduction

   This document defines a mechanism called “RPKI validated cache Update
   in SLURM [RFC 8416] over HTTPs (RUSH)”, for the use of SLURM in
   updating RPKI cache data over HTTP [RFC7540] using HTTPs [RFC2818]
   URIs (and therefore TLS [RFC8446] security for integrity and
   confidentiality).  Integration with HTTPs provides a secure transport
   for distributing cache data, which is in alignment with SLURM file
   format in order to take advantage of using one same API for a cache
   server to do both remote update and local override.

   The RPKI validated cache in this document refers to the validated
   data of assertion information certified by corresponding RPKI signed
   objects such as ROA [RFC6482] and BGPsec router certificate
   [RFC8209], which are transferred from the RPKI cache server to
   routers by RTR protocol [RFC8210] for the use of the RPKI.  SLURM
   offers a standardized method for describing RPKI cache data in JSON
   format [RFC8259], and SLURM is designed to carry out incremental
   update.






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   Note that RUSH merely focuses on a standardized transport and data
   format of the RPKI cache data.  RUSH has nothing to do with
   synchronization at the RUSH end system, that is, more sophisticated
   functions such as automatic re-synchronization and access control is
   out of this scope and MAY be left to private implementation.

2.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT","REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  RUSH Usecase

   • Cache Distribution

   RUSH can be used to distribute a RPKI validated cache within a single
   ASN or network, for example a confederation composed of a number of
   ASes.  A small site or enterprise network MAY also use RUSH by
   synchronizing with a third-party RPKI cache provider over external
   networks.

   • Local Control over Networks

   Network operators MAY want to inject SLURM Assertions/Filters via an
   API offered by RPKI validator/cache.  RUSH is therefore able to carry
   out such local control signals inside an administrative bailiwick in
   a secure manner.

   • Private Assertions Within IXP Members

   IXP members MAY peer with one another by exchanging private IP
   address or private AS numbers, where the very IXP operator assumes
   the responsibility of coordinating the INR assignment within its
   bailiwick of local peering.  This scenario calls for a mechanism of
   distributing those local assertions expressed in SLURM file from this
   IXP operator to relying parties systems deployed by IXP members in
   question in alignment with RPKI validation.

   To summarize, RUSH MUST be used in scenarios where the authenticity
   of SLURM files can be assured when carried over multiple
   administrative domains.  Alternatively, RUSH SHOULD be used inside an
   administrative domain to provide extra security by the virtue of pre-
   configured trust anchors.





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4.  RUSH Operations

4.1.  Use of SLURM

   RUSH uses SLURM file format to indicate the intended update.  A SLURM
   file consists of a single JSON object containing some members.  Among
   others, "validationOutputFilters" [Section 3.3 of [RFC8416]] and
   "locallyAddedAssertions" [Section 3.4 of [RFC8416]] are defined to
   describe actions of deleting some of existing data items and adding
   new data items respectively.

   Note that RUSH re-uses the JSON members of SLURM object, not implying
   the very actions are taken locally to any extent.  Typically, RUSH
   takes place over networks remotely while take effects to the cache in
   question locally.

   The RUSH-aware HTTPs server/client MUST be prepared to parse SLURM
   object.

4.2.  Use of HTTPs as Transport

   HTTPs is employed by RUSH to transfer RPKI validated cache update
   information as expressed as a SLURM object.  A new data type is
   therefore defined to identify SLURM object in HTTPs message body.

   The RUSH-aware HTTPs server/client MUST be prepared to process media
   type "application/json-slurm".

4.3.  RUSH Example

   Figure 1 shows an example of using RUSH to carry out RPKI validated
   cache by HTTP POST method.


  POST /rpki-cache HTTP/2
  Host: rpki.example.com
  Content-Type : application/json-slurm
  Content-Length:964
  <964 bytes represented by the following json string>
  {
         "slurmVersion": 1,
         "validationOutputFilters": {
           "prefixFilters": [
             {
               "prefix": "192.0.2.0/24",
               "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix"
             },
             {



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               "asn": 64496,
               "comment": "All VRPs matching ASN"
             },
             {
               "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
               "asn": 64497,
               "comment": "All VRPs encompassed by prefix, matching ASN"
             }
           ],
           "bgpsecFilters": [
             {
               "asn": 64496,
               "comment": "All keys for ASN"
             },
             {
               "SKI": "Zm9v",
               "comment": "Key matching Router SKI"
             },
             {
               "asn": 64497,
               "SKI": "YmFy",
               "comment": "Key for ASN 64497 matching Router SKI"
             }
           ]
         },
         "locallyAddedAssertions": {
           "prefixAssertions": [
             {
               "asn": 64496,
               "prefix": "198.51.100.0/24",
               "comment": "My other important route"
             },
             {
               "asn": 64496,
               "prefix": "2001:DB8::/32",
               "maxPrefixLength": 48,
               "comment": "My other important de-aggregated routes"
             }
           ],
           "bgpsecAssertions": [
             {
               "asn": 64496,
               "comment" : "My known key for my important ASN",
               "SKI": "<some base64 SKI>",
               "routerPublicKey": "<some base64 public key>"
             }
           ]
         }



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  }

      Figure 1: Figure 1.Example of an HTTP message for use of RUSH

5.  IANA Considerations

   Type name: application

   Subtype name: json-slurm

   Subtype name: json-slurm

   Optional parameters: N/A

   Encoding considerations: This is a JSON object.

   Security considerations: N/A

   Interoperability considerations: [RFC8416]

   Published specification:

   Applications that use this media type:

   Systems that want to exchange RPKI cache data update information in
   SLURM file format [RFC8416] over HTTPs.

   Person&email address to contact for further information: Di Ma
   <madi@zdns.cn>

   Intended usage: COMMON

   Restrictions on usage: N/A

   Author: Di Ma <madi@zdns.cn>

   Change controller: IESG

6.  Security Considerations

   Note that RPKI offers signed-object-oriented security, which is not
   provided by RUSH any longer.  There are some security issues must be
   handled properly as per different usecases as described in Section 3.

   Cache Identity: RUSH is designed to carry out RPKI cache data update
   from one to another, with out-of-band trust established between those
   cache servers.  That is, the scope of RUSH usage is convergent.
   Cache subscription management might be employed to implement cache



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   identification and verification.  The RPKI cache server security and
   the trust model for the interaction between cache servers is out of
   the scope of this document.

   Transport Security: Updating RPKI validated cache over HTTPs relies
   on the security of the underlying HTTPs transport.  Implementations
   utilizing HTTP/2 benefit from the TLS profile defined in Section 9.2
   of [RFC7540].

   Data Integrity: An HTTPS connection provides transport security for
   the interaction between cache servers, but it does not provide data
   integrity detection.  An adversary that can control the cache used by
   the subscriber can affect that subscriber's view of the RPKI.

7.  Acknowledgments

   TBD

8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2818]  Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818>.

   [RFC6482]  Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
              Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", RFC 6482,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6482, February 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6482>.

   [RFC7540]  Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
              Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.







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   [RFC8209]  Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
              BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
              and Certification Requests", RFC 8209,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8209>.

   [RFC8259]  Bray, T., Ed., "The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data
              Interchange Format", STD 90, RFC 8259,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8259, December 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259>.

   [RFC8416]  Ma, D., Mandelberg, D., and T. Bruijnzeels, "Simplified
              Local Internet Number Resource Management with the RPKI
              (SLURM)", RFC 8416, DOI 10.17487/RFC8416, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8416>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

8.2.  Informative References

   [RFC8210]  Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
              Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol, Version 1",
              RFC 8210, DOI 10.17487/RFC8210, September 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8210>.

Authors' Addresses

   Di Ma
   ZDNS
   4 South 4th St. Zhongguancun
   Haidian
   Beijing, 100190
   China
   Email: madi@zdns.cn


   Hanbing Yan
   CNCERT
   Email: yhb@cert.org.cn


   Melchior Aelmans
   Juniper Networks
   Boeing Avenue 240
   Email: maelmans@juniper.net




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   Shicong Zhang
   NNIX
   No. 198, Qidi Road
   Hangzhou
   Zhejiang, 310000
   China
   Email: zsc@ix.cn












































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