Internet DRAFT - draft-madden-jose-siv-mode
draft-madden-jose-siv-mode
Network Working Group N. Madden
Internet-Draft ForgeRock
Intended status: Standards Track December 22, 2017
Expires: June 25, 2018
Synthetic IV (SIV) encryption modes for JWE
draft-madden-jose-siv-mode-02
Abstract
This document defines how to use Synthetic Initialization Vector
(SIV) encryption and key-wrapping modes with JSON Web Encryption
(JWE), and registers identifiers for SIV-based key-wrapping and
content encryption algorithms. SIV provides either deterministic
authenticated encryption and key-wrapping, or nonce-based misuse-
resistant authenticated encryption depending on usage.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on June 25, 2018.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Generic SIV Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.1. Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.1.2. Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2. SIV Key Wrapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.1. A128SIVKW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.2. A128SIVKW-HS256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.3. A192SIVKW-HS384 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.4. A256SIVKW-HS512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3. SIV Content Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3.1. A128SIV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.2. A128SIV-HS256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.3. A192SIV-HS384 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.4. A256SIV-HS512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. IANA considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix A. Test Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.1. Test Cases for A128SIVKW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A.2. Test Cases for A192SIVKW-HS384 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
A.3. Test Cases for A128SIV-HS256 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A.4. Test Cases for A256SIV-HS512 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1. Introduction
This specification registers cryptographic algorithms and identifiers
to be used with JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516] for key-wrapping,
deterministic authenticated encryption and nonce-based misuse-
resistant authenticated content encryption based on the Synthetic
Initialization Vector (SIV, or "Synthetic IV") [RFC5297] block cipher
mode of operation. As a content encryption method, SIV mode takes as
input a key, the JWE Protected Header, an optional nonce (IV), and
the plaintext payload, and produces a ciphertext having the same
length as the plaintext and an authentication tag that also serves as
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the synthetic initialization vector. As a JWE Algorithm, SIV key
wrapping is a drop-in replacement for AES Key Wrap.
This extends [RFC7518].
1.1. Requirements Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
1.2. Motivation
The motivations from [RFC5297] apply here.
Compared to the existing JWE AES Key Wrap algorithm [RFC7516]
(Section 4.4), SIV provides a provable security bound, and a more
efficient construction. To wrap a 128-bit key, AES Key Wrap requires
12 calls to the AES block cipher, while SIV (with CMAC and as
described in this specification) requires just 3. AES Key Wrap has
an authentication strength of 64 bits ([SP800-38F],
Appendix A.3)--that is, a randomly selected bit-string of appropriate
length has a 1 in 2^64 chance of being a valid ciphertext, and this
probability will increase as more guesses are made. The SIV modes
specified in this document all provide authentication strength of at
least 128 bits.
For Content Encryption with a nonce, SIV is similar in performance to
other two-pass authenticated encryption methods, such as
AES_CBC_HMAC_SHA2, for short messages and typically slower than the
one-pass AES GCM. However, while the security of AES GCM collapses
catastrophically if a key-nonce pair is reused [SP800-38D]
(Appendix A), in SIV an attacker would only learn whether the same
plaintext (and the same associated data) has been encrypted with the
same key and nonce. This property, known as nonce-reuse misuse
resistant authenticated encryption (MRAE), provides a measure of
safety in the face of programming errors or poor quality nonce
generation, such as misconfigured or compromised random data
generators, or accidental reuse due to logic errors in deterministic
nonce generation algorithms (for instance, reusing nonces after a
restart).
For randomly-generated IVs, AES-GCM can only safely encrypt less than
2^32 messages with the same key, before the risk of an accidental
repetition becomes too high [SP800-38D] (Section 8.3). This limit
can be easily reached in practice. For instance, an application
producing JWE-encrypted tokens at a rate of 1000 per second will need
to rotate the key at most every 49 days. For SIV (and CBC) this
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limit is around 2^48 (for short messages), which would allow the same
application to keep using one key for almost 9000 years.
Where the content or associated data of a JWE is known to contain a
non-repeating value or key (such as a unique JWT ID [RFC7519] or a
high-resolution time-stamp), then the nonce MAY be omitted, resulting
in a more compact serialisation.
For constrained devices, the abstract SIV scheme can be instantiated
with AES in CTR mode for confidentiality, and AES-CMAC [RFC4493] for
authentication. In this instantiation the mode requires only an AES
encryption circuit, providing similar benefits (and comparable
performance) to AES CCM mode [RFC3610], but with the added robustness
of nonce misuse resistance. The MRAE property is particularly
attractive for devices that have limited access to high-quality
sources of entropy, for instance in the Internet of Things (IoT).
Finally, SIV allows a single construction to be used for both
authenticated content encryption and key wrapping, and the
construction itself is simple to describe and implement correctly
from standard building blocks.
The main drawback of SIV is that it cannot be performed on-line as
data is produced. The full data must be processed to produce an
authentication tag (and synthetic IV) before any part can be
encrypted. It is therefore most suitable for relatively short
content such as JWTs [RFC7519].
1.3. Notational Conventions
BASE64URL(OCTETS) denotes the base64url encoding of OCTETS, per
Section 2 of [RFC7515].
UTF8(STRING) denotes the octets of the UTF-8 [RFC3629] representation
of STRING, where STRING is a sequence of zero or more Unicode
[UNICODE] characters.
ASCII(STRING) denotes the octets of the ASCII [RFC20] representation
of STRING, where STRING is a sequence of zero or more ASCII
characters.
The concatenation of two values A and B is denoted as A || B.
1.4. Terminology
These terms defined by the JSON Web Signature (JWS) [RFC7515]
specification are incorporated into this specification: "Base64url
Encoding"
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These terms defined by the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) [RFC7516]
specification are incorporated into this specification: "JSON Web
Encryption (JWE)", "Additional Authenticated Data (AAD)",
"Authentication Tag", "Content Encryption Key (CEK)", "JWE
Authentication Tag", "JWE Ciphertext", "JWE Encrypted Key", "JWE
Initialization Vector", "JWE Protected Header", and "Key Wrapping".
These terms defined by the Internet Security Glossary, Version 2
[RFC4949] are incorporated into this specification: "Ciphertext",
"Message Authentication Code (MAC)", and "Plaintext".
2. Algorithms
2.1. Generic SIV Construction
This section defines a family of authenticated encryption algorithms
built using a combination of AES in Counter (CTR) mode and either
CMAC or HMAC-SHA2 operations. The presentation here is based on the
abstract SIV scheme in Section 4 of [SIV]. The generic construction
is parameterised by the size of the key and the instantiation of the
MAC algorithm. We use MAC(K, M) to denote the application of the MAC
algorithm to the given message M using the given key K. We use AES-
CTR(K, IV, M) to denote the application of AES in CTR mode to the
message M, using the key K and Initialization Vector IV.
Rather than adopting the S2V construction of [RFC5297] for providing
multiple Additional Authentication Data (AAD) blocks to the MAC, we
instead adopt a simpler method based on the base64url-encoded compact
serialisation of the JWE Protected Header and IV separated by dots,
and the unencoded plaintext octets. This encoding uniquely
determines the components of the AAD while being simpler, and uses
encoded components that are already produced if the Compact
Serialization is being used. As stated in Section 5 of [SIV], the
motivation for the S2V construction is efficiency rather than
security, and any unambiguous encoding will suffice. It is expected
that a simpler construction will aid adoption of these safer
encryption modes in situations where performance is not of paramount
importance.
[[CREF1: There is an I-D defining an AES-GCM-SIV mode currently in
progress (https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-gcmsiv-05).
This is a much more high-performance SIV mode than the ones defined
in this document. I have left it out of this specification because
it is more complex to implement and still in draft form. A further
I-D/RFC could be proposed to also add that mode for in this same
framework, but I believe the modes defined in the present I-D will be
useful for many years to come, especially on constrained devices.
--N. Madden]]
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For the CMAC-based algorithms, we only define modes for an overall
128-bit security level. That is, the expected effort for an attacker
to either produce an authentication tag forgery, recover either the
encryption or MAC keys, or to compromise the privacy of a any SIV-
encrypted JWE, is on the order of 2^128 operations. For the HMAC-
based algorithms we define modes at overall 128-bit, 192-bit and
256-bit security levels. The reason for this is that AES-CMAC is
only capable of producing a maximum authentication tag of 128 bits
and so cannot provide more than 128 bits of protection against
authentication tag forgery.
2.1.1. Encryption
The authenticated encryption algorithm takes as input for octet
strings: a secret key K, a plaintext P, additional authenticated data
AAD (computed as per Steps 13-14 of Section 5.1 of [RFC7516]), and an
optional initialization vector IV. It produces the ciphertext value
E and an authentication tag T as outputs. The data in the plaintext
are encrypted, and the additional authenticated data are
authenticated, but not encrypted.
Encryption is performed using the following steps:
1. The secondary keys MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY are generated from the
input key K as follows. Each of these two keys is an octet
string.
MAC_KEY consists of the initial MAC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in
order.
ENC_KEY consists of the final ENC_KEY_LEN octets of K, in
order.
The number of octets in the input key K MUST be the sum of
MAC_KEY_LEN and ENC_KEY_LEN.
2. If a nonce is to be used, then the IV SHOULD be a 128-bit value
generated randomly or pseudorandomly.
3. A message Authentication Tag T is computed as:
T = MAC(MAC_KEY, ASCII(AAD || '.' || BASE64URL(IV) || '.') ||
plaintext).
If no IV (nonce) is being used, then an empty octet sequence MUST
be used instead.
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4. The Synthetic IV, SIV, is set to the first 16 octets of T, in
order.
5. The plaintext is encrypted using AES-CTR with ENC_KEY as the key
and SIV as the IV. We denote the ciphertext output of this step
as E.
6. The ciphertext E and the Authentication Tag T are returned as the
outputs of the authenticated encryption.
The encryption process can be illustrated as follows. Here K, P,
AAD, IV, SIV, T, and E denote the key, plaintext, Additional
Authenticated Data, Initialization Vector, Synthetic IV,
Authentication Tag, and ciphertext, respectively.
MAC_KEY = initial MAC_KEY_LEN octets of K,
ENC_KEY = final ENC_KEY_LEN octets of K,
T = MAC(MAC_KEY, ASCII(AAD || '.' || BASE64URL(IV) || '.') || P),
SIV = initial 16 octets of T,
E = AES-CTR(ENC_KEY, SIV, P).
2.1.2. Decryption
Decryption is performed using the following steps:
1. The secondary keys MAC_KEY and ENC_KEY are generated from the
input key K as in Step 1 of Section 2.1.1.
2. The Synthetic IV is set to the first 16 octets of the
Authentication Tag T. If the Authentication Tag is missing or
not of the expected length for the algorithm (which is always at
least 16 octets) then decryption MUST halt with an indication of
failure.
3. The plaintext P is decrypted using AES-CTR with ENC_KEY as the
key, SIV as the IV, and the ciphertext, E.
4. The Authentication Tag T is checked by recomputing the tag T' as
in Step 3 of Section 2.1.1. If T and T' are identical then H and
P are considered valid and processing is continued. Otherwise,
all of the data used in the MAC computation MUST be discarded and
the decryption operation MUST halt with an indication of failure.
Tag comparison MUST use a constant-time octet string comparison
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operation using the known length of the Authentication Tag as
specified by the algorithm in use.
5. The plaintext P is returned.
2.2. SIV Key Wrapping
The following JWE algorithms are defined here (to be applied as
values of "alg" parameter):
+-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| "alg" Param | Key Management Algorithm |
| Value | |
+-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| A128SIVKW | AES SIV Key Wrap using CMAC and 256 bit key. |
| A128SIVKW-HS256 | AES SIV Key Wrap using HMAC-SHA-256-128 and 256 |
| | bit key. |
| A192SIVKW-HS384 | AES SIV Key Wrap using HMAC-SHA-384-192 and 384 |
| | bit key. |
| A256SIVKW-HS512 | AES SIV Key Wrap using HMAC-SHA-512-256 and 512 |
| | bit key. |
+-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+
All of the key wrapping modes use the generic construction from
Section 2.1, with the following inputs:
The plaintext P is the octets of the Content Encryption Key (CEK)
to be wrapped.
The input key K is the Key Encryption Key (KEK).
The IV is an empty octet sequence.
The AAD is the UTF8 octets of the value of the "alg" parameter
(e.g., "A128SIVKW").
In all cases the output ciphertext length will be the same as the
input plaintext CEK, in octets. The authentication tag will either
be 16, 24 or 32 octets long depending on the algorithm.
The JWE Encrypted Key value is the Ciphertext output.
The Authentication Tag output is represented in base64url encoded
form as the "tag" (authentication tag) Header Parameter value, as in
Section 4.7.1.2 of [RFC7518]. This specification extends that header
value to allow authentication tags of 192 or 256 bits. NB: this has
the added advantage of binding the wrapped key into the JWE
authenticated data, which would otherwise not happen.
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2.2.1. A128SIVKW
This algorithm uses the CMAC message authentication code [RFC4493] to
provide message authentication and the synthetic IV.
The parameters are as follows:
The input key K is 32 octets long.
MAC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets.
ENC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets.
MAC is CMAC.
The output tag length is 16 octets.
2.2.2. A128SIVKW-HS256
This algorithm uses the HMAC-SHA-256-128 message authentication code
as defined in [RFC4868] to provide message authentication and the
synthetic IV.
The parameters are as follows:
The input key K is 32 octets long.
MAC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets.
ENC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets.
MAC is HMAC-SHA-256-128.
The output tag length is 16 octets.
2.2.3. A192SIVKW-HS384
This algorithm uses the HMAC-SHA-384-192 message authentication code
as defined in [RFC4868] to provide message authentication and the
synthetic IV.
The parameters are as follows:
The input key K is 48 octets long.
MAC_KEY_LEN is 24 octets.
ENC_KEY_LEN is 24 octets.
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MAC is HMAC-SHA-384-192.
The output tag length is 24 octets.
2.2.4. A256SIVKW-HS512
This algorithm uses the HMAC-SHA-512-256 message authentication code
as defined in [RFC4868] to provide message authentication and the
synthetic IV.
The parameters are as follows:
The input key K is 64 octets long.
MAC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets.
ENC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets.
MAC is HMAC-SHA-512-256.
The output tag length is 32 octets.
2.3. SIV Content Encryption
The following content encryption methods are defined here (to be
applied as values of the "enc" parameter):
+-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| "enc" Param | Content Encryption Method |
| Value | |
+-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+
| A128SIV | AES SIV using CMAC and 256 bit key. |
| A128SIV-HS256 | AES SIV using HMAC-SHA-256-128 and 256 bit key. |
| A192SIV-HS384 | AES SIV using HMAC-SHA-384-192 and 384 bit key. |
| A256SIV-HS512 | AES SIV using HMAC-SHA-512-256 and 512 bit key. |
+-----------------+-------------------------------------------------+
All of the SIV content encryption methods use the generic
construction from Section 2.1, with the following inputs:
The plaintext P is the octets of JWE plaintext.
The input key K is the Content Encryption Key (CEK).
The IV is either a randomly or pseudorandomly generated 16 octet
value, or an empty octet string.
The AAD is the UTF8 octets of the JWE Protected Header.
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In all cases the output ciphertext length will be the same as the
input plaintext, in octets. The authentication tag will either be
16, 24 or 32 octets long depending on the algorithm. The Ciphertext
and Authentication Tag outputs become the JWE Ciphertext and JWE
Authentication Tag values respectively.
2.3.1. A128SIV
This algorithm uses the CMAC message authentication code [RFC4493] to
provide message authentication and the synthetic IV.
The parameters are as follows:
The input key K is 32 octets long.
MAC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets.
ENC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets.
MAC is CMAC.
The output tag length is 16 octets.
2.3.2. A128SIV-HS256
This algorithm uses the HMAC-SHA-256-128 message authentication code
as defined in [RFC4868] to provide message authentication and the
synthetic IV.
The parameters are as follows:
The input key K is 32 octets long.
MAC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets.
ENC_KEY_LEN is 16 octets.
MAC is HMAC-SHA-256-128.
The output tag length is 16 octets.
2.3.3. A192SIV-HS384
This algorithm uses the HMAC-SHA-384-192 message authentication code
as defined in [RFC4868] to provide message authentication and the
synthetic IV.
The parameters are as follows:
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The input key K is 48 octets long.
MAC_KEY_LEN is 24 octets.
ENC_KEY_LEN is 24 octets.
MAC is HMAC-SHA-384-192.
The output tag length is 24 octets.
2.3.4. A256SIV-HS512
This algorithm uses the HMAC-SHA-512-256 message authentication code
as defined in [RFC4868] to provide message authentication and the
synthetic IV.
The parameters are as follows:
The input key K is 64 octets long.
MAC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets.
ENC_KEY_LEN is 32 octets.
MAC is HMAC-SHA-512-256.
The output tag length is 32 octets.
3. IANA considerations
The following are added to JSON Web Signature and Encryption
Algorithms registry:
o Algorithm Name: "A128SIVKW"
o Algorithm Description: AES SIV Key Wrap with CMAC using 256 bit
key
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2.1
o Algorithm Name: "A128SIVKW-HS256"
o Algorithm Description: AES SIV Key Wrap with HMAC-SHA-256-128
using 256 bit key
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended
o Change Controller: IESG
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o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2.2
o Algorithm Name: "A192SIVKW-HS384"
o Algorithm Description: AES SIV Key Wrap with HMAC-SHA-384-192
using 384 bit key
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2.3
o Algorithm Name: "A256SIVKW-HS512"
o Algorithm Description: AES SIV Key Wrap with HMAC-SHA-512-256
using 512 bit key
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "alg"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.2.4
o Algorithm Name: "A128SIV"
o Algorithm Description: AES SIV with CMAC using 256 bit key
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.3.1
o Algorithm Name: "A128SIV-HS256"
o Algorithm Description: AES SIV with HMAC-SHA-256-128 using 256 bit
key
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Recommended
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.3.2
o Algorithm Name: "A192SIV-HS284"
o Algorithm Description: AES SIV with HMAC-SHA-384-192 using 384 bit
key
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.3.3
o Algorithm Name: "A256SIV-HS512"
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o Algorithm Description: AES SIV with HMAC-SHA-512-256 using 512 bit
key
o Algorithm Usage Location(s): "enc"
o JOSE Implementation Requirements: Optional
o Change Controller: IESG
o Specification Document(s): Section 2.3.4
4. Security Considerations
The security considerations of [RFC5297] apply here.
In total, no more than 16 * 2^48 octets of data (approx. 4 exabytes)
should be encrypted with the same key in any SIV mode. For example,
when using SIV128KW to wrap 128-bit keys, then no more than 2^48
messages should be encrypted with the same key encryption key (KEK).
This is over 281 trillion messages, so is expected to provide
sufficient capacity for extremely long-lived or high-usage keys.
When using SIV for content encryption, it is RECOMMENDED to always
use a nonce or a random IV of at least 128 bits for every message.
While SIV minimises the information that is lost in case of a nonce
reuse, the security of the cipher is still considerably weaker than
it would be otherwise. In technical terms, SIV mode does not achieve
semantic security if unique nonces are not used for each message,
achieving only the weaker notion of deterministic authenticated
encryption (DAE).
SIV uses AES in CTR mode for encryption, which produces ciphertexts
that are exactly the same length as the plaintext. If the length of
the plaintext is sensitive (for instance, when there are only a small
number of possibilities for the plaintext and they are all of
different lengths) then the application should pad such values to
some minimum/fixed size before encryption. If such padding is
performed, then it MUST be applied before calling the AES-SIV
encryption modes defined in this specification, so that the padding
is included in the authentication tag. When decrypting,
authentication tag validation in Step 4 of Section 2.1.2 MUST be
performed before any validation or processing of the padding is
performed.
Care should be taken when combining JWE plaintext compression with
SIV encryption for a related reason: compression varies the size of
the plaintext based on the (confidential) content of that plaintext.
In SIV mode (and other cipher modes, such as GCM and, to a lesser
extent, CBC), this will vary the size of the ciphertext by the same
amount. If an attacker is able to control any part of the content of
the plaintext then they may be able to infer confidential parts of
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the same plaintext according to variations in the size of the
compressed and encrypted ciphertext. It is therefore recommended not
to use compression with SIV mode encryption (or any encryption)
unless the expected information leakage is acceptable.
5. References
5.1. Normative References
[RFC20] Cerf, V., "ASCII format for Network Interchange", RFC 20,
October 1969.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC3629] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
10646", STD 63, RFC 3629, DOI 10.17487/RFC3629, November
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629>.
[RFC4868] Kelly, S. and S. Frankel, "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-
384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec", RFC 4868,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4868, May 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4868>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7516] Jones, M. and J. Hildebrand, "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)",
RFC 7516, DOI 10.17487/RFC7516, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7516>.
[RFC7518] Jones, M., "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)", RFC 7518,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7518, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7518>.
5.2. Informative References
[RFC3610] Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with
CBC-MAC (CCM)", RFC 3610, DOI 10.17487/RFC3610, September
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3610>.
[RFC4493] Song, JH., Poovendran, R., Lee, J., and T. Iwata, "The
AES-CMAC Algorithm", RFC 4493, DOI 10.17487/RFC4493, June
2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4493>.
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[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC5297] Harkins, D., "Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV)
Authenticated Encryption Using the Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES)", RFC 5297, DOI 10.17487/RFC5297, October
2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5297>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[SIV] Rogaway, P. and T. Shrimpton, "Deterministic
Authenticated-Encryption. A Provable-Security Treatment of
the Key-Wrap Problem.", IACR ePrint 2006/221, August 2007.
[SP800-38D]
Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC.", NIST
Special Publication 800-38D, November 2007.
[SP800-38F]
Dworkin, M., "Recommentation for Block Cipher Modes of
Operation: Methods for Key Wrapping.", NIST Special
Publication 800-38F, December 2012.
[UNICODE] The Unicode Consortium, "The Unicode Standard", 1991-,
<http://www.unicode.org/versions/latest/>.
Appendix A. Test Cases
The following test cases can be used to validate implementations of
the AES SIV algorithms defined in this specification.
The variable names are those defined in Section 2.1.1. All values
are hexadecimal.
A.1. Test Cases for A128SIVKW
NB: K here is the KEK, and P is the CEK to be wrapped, T is the
output "tag" value, and E is the wrapped CEK.
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A128SIVKW
K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
ENC_KEY = 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
P = 0f 0e 0d 0c 0b 0a 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00
IV = <empty octet sequence>
AAD = 41 31 32 38 53 49 56 4b 57
T = c3 eb 04 f1 c7 07 8b 92 e0 dc f6 fe 17 f5 82 46
SIV = c3 eb 04 f1 c7 07 8b 92 e0 dc f6 fe 17 f5 82 46
E = ef 96 fd 87 24 ea f9 9b 54 15 8a fa 20 5f 77 de
A.2. Test Cases for A192SIVKW-HS384
NB: K here is the KEK, and P is the CEK to be wrapped, T is the
output "tag" value, and E is the wrapped CEK.
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A192SIVKW-HS384
K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f
MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
ENC_KEY = 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f
P = 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 0f 0e 0d 0c 0b 0a 09 08
07 06 05 04 03 02 01 00
IV = <empty octet sequence>
AAD = 41 31 39 32 53 49 56 4b 57 2d 48 53 33 38 34
T = 27 86 b6 03 3b b1 4f f7 cb 85 6d ae 69 6e 3d 98
ff e2 0b 59 77 b3 e5 36
SIV = c3 eb 04 f1 c7 07 8b 92 e0 dc f6 fe 17 f5 82 46
E = 65 c5 52 72 4e d3 4f 9e ab 20 32 4d af 0d 2d 31
7f df 69 13 06 c5 0a c8
A.3. Test Cases for A128SIV-HS256
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A128SIV-HS256
K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
ENC_KEY = 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
P = 41 20 63 69 70 68 65 72 20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 20
6d 75 73 74 20 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 65 71 75
69 72 65 64 20 74 6f 20 62 65 20 73 65 63 72 65
74 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 69 74 20 6d 75 73 74 20 62
65 20 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 66 61 6c 6c 20 69
6e 74 6f 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 6e 64 73 20 6f 66
20 74 68 65 20 65 6e 65 6d 79 20 77 69 74 68 6f
75 74 20 69 6e 63 6f 6e 76 65 6e 69 65 6e 63 65
IV = 1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04
AAD = 7b 22 61 6c 67 22 3a 22 64 69 72 22 2c 22 65 6e
63 22 3a 22 41 31 32 38 53 49 56 2d 48 53 32 35
36 22 7d
T = 5e cd e7 ca 4a eb 39 bc 05 11 2b a9 00 17 a3 76
SIV = 5e cd e7 ca 4a eb 39 bc 05 11 2b a9 00 17 a3 76
E = 22 70 54 15 99 71 ca d6 01 8c d9 30 29 e6 e5 20
5d 0a d3 d2 1e 8c 10 ce 6f 84 36 e3 68 20 24 42
59 e8 ae bd 55 16 ce 37 ab 5a 44 3b 22 0a 94 a0
03 7f 4a ad 4d 11 57 db 55 cb 6a 01 70 8b 05 0d
6f 39 ad b4 d8 3b 5c 77 ac 16 6a 98 cc 0e 0a 75
93 f6 34 6e 67 b1 9d 4c 43 17 11 95 7b b5 e3 8b
ee cb df 2e 7f 49 c0 ba c3 58 5b 90 32 b4 bc ca
08 6b 51 a8 c5 d3 81 a7 fd d8 c3 fb 99 6e 25 46
A.4. Test Cases for A256SIV-HS512
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A256SIV-HS512
K = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f
30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f
MAC_KEY = 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0a 0b 0c 0d 0e 0f
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 1a 1b 1c 1d 1e 1f
ENC_KEY = 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2a 2b 2c 2d 2e 2f
30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 3a 3b 3c 3d 3e 3f
P = 41 20 63 69 70 68 65 72 20 73 79 73 74 65 6d 20
6d 75 73 74 20 6e 6f 74 20 62 65 20 72 65 71 75
69 72 65 64 20 74 6f 20 62 65 20 73 65 63 72 65
74 2c 20 61 6e 64 20 69 74 20 6d 75 73 74 20 62
65 20 61 62 6c 65 20 74 6f 20 66 61 6c 6c 20 69
6e 74 6f 20 74 68 65 20 68 61 6e 64 73 20 6f 66
20 74 68 65 20 65 6e 65 6d 79 20 77 69 74 68 6f
75 74 20 69 6e 63 6f 6e 76 65 6e 69 65 6e 63 65
IV = 1a f3 8c 2d c2 b9 6f fd d8 66 94 09 23 41 bc 04
AAD = 7b 22 61 6c 67 22 3a 22 64 69 72 22 2c 22 65 6e
63 22 3a 22 41 32 35 36 53 49 56 2d 48 53 35 31
32 22 7d
T = f9 e5 2d 5c 58 9d 3a f8 3f 98 3f ce 3b 98 aa ae
97 aa 0c 02 e1 80 a4 ec a3 0b 5e 7b 47 97 a5 b2
SIV = f9 e5 2d 5c 58 9d 3a f8 3f 98 3f ce 3b 98 aa ae
E = cc 05 71 16 ad 3d 44 9b 50 ba 7b bd b4 42 f7 08
20 fe bc d0 58 0e 8d 4d e0 f3 61 70 6b db b6 17
a6 d6 a9 56 e5 69 cc 74 d3 16 7d 2c a2 a6 54 2e
e7 69 64 9c db 4d 9b 68 b7 01 74 f8 a4 4e eb 9e
a0 26 8a 3c 48 e9 c8 88 56 c4 2c eb 36 95 d2 90
39 18 34 5d d2 f8 17 20 bb ce be 24 bf f1 74 68
26 bb c9 c8 11 92 9d 45 ce dd 63 49 2d ed b6 c0
b2 b5 bd c4 93 a6 0f e6 c7 c6 e7 fd 94 90 3d 03
Author's Address
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Neil Madden
ForgeRock
Broad Quay House
Prince Street
Bristol BS1 4DJ
United Kingdom
Email: neil.madden@forgerock.com
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