Internet DRAFT - draft-liu-ipsecme-ikev2-mtu-dect
draft-liu-ipsecme-ikev2-mtu-dect
IPsecme D. Liu, Ed.
Internet-Draft D. Migault
Intended status: Standards Track R. Liu
Expires: 28 September 2023 C. Zhang
Ericsson
27 March 2023
IKEv2 Link Maximum Atomic Packet and Packet Too Big Notification
Extension
draft-liu-ipsecme-ikev2-mtu-dect-06
Abstract
This document defines the IKEv2 Link Maximum Atomic Packet
Notification and Packet Too Big Extension. This extension enables an
egress security gateway to notify its ingress counter part that
fragmentation is happening or a packet too big is received (and
cannot be decrypted). In both cases, the egress node provides MTU
information that enable the ingress node can configure appropriately
its Tunnel Maximum Transmission Unit or MTU or simply put Tunnel MTU
(TMTU) to prevent fragmentation or too big packets to be transmitted.
This extension does not intent to replace ICMP. It provides
information ICMP does not provide and even when that information
could be provided by ICMP, this extension provides a reliable
authenticated channel that ensures the ingress node receive this
information even when ICMP messages cannot be received by the ingress
node.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 28 September 2023.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Illustrative example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2. Related works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3. Why not using DF=1 to avoid Mid fragmentation ? . . . . . 8
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Link Maximum Atomic Packet and Packet Too Big Support
Negotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Sending a Link Maximum Atomic Packet Notification . . . . . . 11
5. Receiving a Link Maximum Atomic Packet Notification . . . . . 11
6. Sending a Packet Too Big Notification . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Receiving a Packet Too Big Notification . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Payload Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
11. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1. Introduction
Reassembling fragments at the egress security gateway requires
additional resources which under heavy load results in service
degradations. Then, as detailed in [RFC4963], [RFC6864] or
[RFC8900], fragmentation is considered fragile and not sufficiently
robust at high data rates. Typically, the 16-bit IPv4 identification
field is not large enough to prevent duplication making fragmentation
not sufficiently robust at high data rates. In IPv6 the 32 byte
identification field reduces such collisions.
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Figure 1 depicts various fragmentation scenarios that can occur when
Tunnel Transit Packets (TTP) are encapsulated over an IPsec tunnel.
The IPsec packets exchanged between the ingress and the egress
security gateway are designated as Tunnel Link Packet (TLP).
Source Security Security Destination
or Gateway Gateway or
Sender (Ingress node) (Egress node) Receiver
+--+ +---+ +---+ +---+
| | + + + | | + + + + + | | + + + + | |
+--+ routers +---+ routers +---+ routers +---+
<--------------------->
N
+---+---+----+ +---+---+----+
|IPs|IPd|Data| Tunnel Transit Packet |IPs|IPd|Data|
+---+---+----+ (TTP) +---+---+----+
1) No fragmentation
+---+---+---+---+---+----+
|IPi|IPe|ESP|IPs|IPd|Data| Tunnel Link Packet
+---+---+---+---+---+----+ (TLP)
2) Mid-tunnel (performed by a router on N)
(only for IPv4 DF=0 TLP)
+---+---+---+---+---+--+
|IPi|IPe|ESP|IPs|IPd|Da| (TLP)
+---+---+---+---+---+--+
+---+---+--+
|IPi|IPe|ta| (TLP)
+---+---+--+
3) Inner fragmentation (performed by the Ingress node)
(only for IPv4 DF=0 TTP)
+---+---+---+---+---+--+
|IPi|IPe|ESP|IPs|IPd|Da| (TLP)
+---+---+---+---+---+--+
+---+---+---+---+---+--+
|IPi|IPe|ESP|IPs|IPd|ta| (TLP)
+---+---+---+---+---+--+
4) Outer fragmentation (performed by the Ingress node)
(IPv4 or IPv6 TLP)
+---+---+---+---+---+--+
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|IPi|IPe|ESP|IPs|IPd|Da| (TLP)
+---+---+---+---+---+--+
+---+---+--+
|IPi|IPe|ta| (TLP)
+---+---+--+
5) Source fragmentation
(IPv6 or IPv4)
+---+---+--+
|IPs|IPd|Da| (TTP)
+---+---+--+
+---+---+--+
|IPs|IPd|ta|
+---+---+--+
Figure 1: Illustration of Different Type of Fragmentation. IPs
(resp. IPi, IPe, IPd) designates the IP addresse of the Source,
(resp. the Ingress node, the Egress node, the Destination). The
IPsec tunnel is considered as an ESP tunnel. The IP payload is
represented as 'Data'. Fragmentation is illustrated in splicing
'Data' into 'Da' and 'ta'. The figure does not show a difference
between Data being encrypted or not, and the presence of the ESP
header indicates the payload is encrypted.
Reassembling is performed by the egress node in two cases. Firstly
when mid tunnel fragmentation happens (see 2 Figure 1) -- in which
case the TLP header or outer header is using IPv4 with its Do not
Fragment bit set to 0 (DF=0). Secondly when Outer fragmentation is
performed by the ingress node (see 4 in Figure 1). The main
difference between the two scenarios is that with Outer
fragmentation, the ingress node is aware that the egress performs
reassembly. Note also that in both cases, reassembling the TLP in
itself does not prevent the TTP to be deciphered unless the
reassembled TLP exceeds the effective MTU to receive (EMTU_R) - that
is the maximum size of the IPsec protected packet that can be
accepted by the egress node to perform the ESP encapsulation.
Figure 2 summarizes the various operations that are expected given
the size of an IPsec protected TTP size. The optimal size is the
Tunnel maximum atomic packet (TMAP), that is the maximum TTP size
that avoids fragmentation. Such TTP generates a Link maximum atomic
packet (LMAP) LTP. Note that in this case and unless specified
explicitly the link considered is the physical link between the
ingress and egress node.
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TMAP TMTU
+---------+-------------------+--------------> TTP
| |encap |encap
| |<--->| |<--->|
| No frag. (1) | Fragmentation |
| | (2) Mid-tunnel | Packet To Big
| | (4) Outer |
+---------------+-------------------+--------> IPsec encapsulated TTP
LMAP EMTU_R
Figure 2: Fragmentation and Packet Too Big as a function of the
TTP size or LTP size
This document enables a egress node to inform the ingress node that:
* a received packet is fragmented
* a too big packet is received
As depicted in Figure 3, supporting this extension, the ingress and
egress node commit themselves in optimizing the processing of the
IPsec tunnel and prevent or at least limit reassembly operation to be
performed. More specifically, the ingress security gateway limits as
much as possible the use of outer fragmentation and commit to set
their TMTU value so that TTP are not fragmented/reassembled. In
addition, for TTP with IPv4 addresses and DF=0, the ingress node
commit to perform inner fragmentation to prevent reassembly at the
egress node.
The mechanism is especially useful when the tunnel between the
ingress and egress nodes is using IPv4 outer IP addresses with DF=0
as the fragmentation may occur while the ingress may not be aware of
it. With IPv4 DF=1 or IPv6, the mechanism essentially enables the
egress node to send the TTP ICMP PTB information (being sent to the
Source) to the ingress interface as well as to send the LTP ICMP PTB
information being sent to the router of the ingress node) over a
authenticated channel (IKEv2).
This extension does not impact or interfere the ICMP processing and
ICMP messages are sent, received and processed as usual. This
extension may result in the ingress node receiving MTU indications
via two different channels (IKEv2 and ICMP). The use of IKEv2 may
provide additional trust than ICMP (see Section 10 ). The Source is
not involved.
This extension does not intent to replace ICMP. It provides
information ICMP does not provide (see Section 1.3 for more details)
and when that information could be provided by ICMP, this extension
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provides a reliable authenticated channel that ensures the ingress
node receive this information even when ICMP messages cannot be
received by the ingress node.
1.1. Illustrative example
This section provides an illustrative example to provide a high level
overview.
Source Security Security Destination
or Gateway Gateway or
Sender (Ingress node) (Egress node) Receiver
+--+ +---+ +---+ +---+
| | + + + | | + + + + + | | + + + + | |
+--+ routers +---+ routers +---+ routers +---+
<--------------------->
N
1) Mid-tunnel (performed by a router on N)
(only for IPv4 DF=0 TLP)
+---+---+---+---+---+--+
|IPi|IPe|ESP|IPs|IPd|Da| (TLP)
+---+---+---+---+---+--+
+---+---+--+
|IPi|IPe|ta| (TLP)
+---+---+--+
2) Egress node detects fragmentation
- a) it collects IPVersion the IP version of the first fragment
as well as FragLen, the fragment length
- b1) If all segments can be reassembled and the reassembled
packet is properly decrypted a Link Maximum Atomic
Packet Notification (LMAP) is sent on the IKEv2 channel.
[IKEv2]
<--- N( LMAP [ IPVersion, FragLen] )
- b2) If the packet is too big and cannot be decrypted an
additional Packet Too Big Notification (PTB) that specifies
the Link MTU (LMTU) of the router component of the egress
node (on network N) as well as the effective MTU to receive
(EMTU_R). Both are configuration parameters.
An ICMP PTB message may also be sent by the egress node.
Note that this ICMP may not contain even the SPI, and so is
likely to not cary sufficient information to the ingress node,
so any action be taken.
[IKEv2]
<--- N( LMAP [ IPVersion, FragLen] )
N( PTB [LMTU, EMTU_R]
[ESP]
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<--- ESP( ICMP PTB )
3) Upon receiving the LMAP or optionally the ingress node
a) Update the TMTU so that the Source performs source fragmentation
with TTP packet that are not fragmented.
Source fragmentation
(IPv6 or IPv4)
+---+---+--+
|IPs|IPd|Da| (TTP)
+---+---+--+
+---+---+--+
|IPs|IPd|ta|
+---+---+--+
b) Performs inner fragmentation TTP packets that exceeds the TMTU
and will generate some fragments.
Inner fragmentation (performed by the Ingress node)
(only for IPv4 DF=0 TTP)
+---+---+---+---+---+--+
|IPi|IPe|ESP|IPs|IPd|Da| (TLP)
+---+---+---+---+---+--+
+---+---+---+---+---+--+
|IPi|IPe|ESP|IPs|IPd|ta| (TLP)
+---+---+---+---+---+--+
In both cases the egress node does not proceed to reassembly operations
+---+---+--+
|IPs|IPd|Da| (TTP)
+---+---+--+
+---+---+--+
|IPs|IPd|ta|
+---+---+--+
Figure 3: Overview mechanism
1.2. Related works
This work differs from [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels] in that
[I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels] which considers the router component -
carrying the TTP - and the interface component - handling LTP -
independent. Independence of the Tunnel MTU (for TTP) and link layer
MTU for (LTP) is provided by performing outer fragmentation when
needed. [RFC4301] takes another view considers the router component
can adapt to the specific needs of the interface component. In our
case, the router MTU can be changed so the source sends PTP of an
expected TMAP size. Note however, that a significant difference
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between MPA and MTU is that fragmentation is considered as a normal
operation and that ICMP Packet Too Big (PTB) is only expected when
the router is not able to handle the packet - that is when the
(reassembled) packet exceeds the MTU (or more explicitly the
effective MTU to receive (EMTU_R) or the Link MTU (LMTU)).
This mechanism follows the [RFC8900] that recommends each layer
handles fragmentation at their layer and to reduce the reliance on IP
fragmentation to the greatest degree possible. This document does
not describe a Path MTU Discovery (PMTUD) procedure [RFC1191] nor an
Execute Packetization Layer PMTUD (PLMTUD) [RFC4821] procedure.
PLMTUD work has been started in
[I-D.spiriyath-ipsecme-dynamic-ipsec-pmtu]. This document remains
focused on providing information on the state of the egress node to
the ingress node. Information in question is fragmentation related
but is limited to the observation of fragmentation as well as the
EMTU_R and LMTU value - which are configuration parameters. This
document let the ingress node interpret these pieces of information
an take the necessary actions. PLMTUD is much more complex
especially as IPsec considers multiple channels such as IKE and IPsec
protected data and requires to handle black holing scenarios.
Sending EMTU_R when a too big encapsulated TTP is provided to the
egress interface is similar to ICMP PTB, except that this information
is sent between the egress and ingress nodes as opposed to between
the egress and the Source. Sending LMTU when a too big LTP is
received by the egress router is similar to an ICMP PTB except that
the message is carried over the IKEv2 channel, and we ensure that
sufficient information (like the SPI) is provided to the ingress node
so the appropriated traffic selectors can be identified by the
ingress node - see Section 1.3 for more details. In both cases, the
egress node sends this ICMP PTB message and when possible such ICMP
messages are expected to be protected by the SPD.
1.3. Why not using DF=1 to avoid Mid fragmentation ?
One can reasonably question why setting the IPv4 DF=1 is not
sufficient to avoid fragmentation. While DF=1 avoids fragmentation
it can easily fall into black holingscenarios, unless one can ensure
that ICMP PTB message are effectively received with sufficient
information by the ingress node to take appropriated actions. This
is not the case in practice, which i sthe reason DF is set to 0.
Suppose the Don't Fragment bit to 1 in the IPv4 Header of the Tunnel
Link Packet. If that packet becomes larger than the link Maximum
Transmission Unit (LMTU), the packet is dropped by an on-path router
and an ICMPv4 message Packet Too Big (PTB) [RFC0792] is returned to
the sending address. The ICMPv4 PTB message is a Destination
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Unreachable message with Code equal to 4 and was augmented by
[RFC1191] to indicate the acceptable MTU. Unfortunately, one cannot
rely on such procedure as in practice some routers do not check the
MTU and as such do not send ICMPv4 messages. In addition, when
ICMPv4 message are sent these message are unprotected, and may be
blocked by firewalls or ignored. This results in IPv4 packets being
dropped without the security gateways being aware of it which is also
designated as black holing. To prevent this situation, IPv4 packets
often set their DF bit set to 0. In this case, as described in
[RFC0792], when a packet size exceeds its MTU, the node fragments the
incoming packet in multiple fragments.
In addition to the above reasons DF=1 is not appropriate for ESP,
there is another important reason that ICMP does not work almost
completely for ESP.
This is because ICMPv4 PTB has the following format, defined in RFC
1191:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type = 3 | Code = 4 | Checksum |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| unused = 0 | Next-Hop MTU |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Internet Header + 64 bits of Original Datagram Data |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
This means that an ICMP packet contains only the IP header (tunnel IP
header) of ESP and the following 8 bytes. Normally, if ingress node
processes the sent back ICMP PTB packets, it needs to identify the
traffic selector based on the ICMP packet and either forwards the
ICMP PTB packet to the device that sends the original packet or
processes the packet itself. But this does not work for ESP.
For scenarios with UDP or TCP encapsulation, such as NAT, the 8 bytes
are only UDP or TCP port numbers and do not even contain SPI
information of child SA. Therefore, ingress node cannot identify the
traffic selector and proceed to the next step. For scenarios without
L4 encapsulation, these 8 bytes are the SPI and Sequence Number, and
ingress node can know which child SA it is from the SPI, but this
information is also not enough because the traffic selector for a
child's SA can be a range: For example, if the traffic selector of
child SA is 4.4.0/24==7.7.0/24, then 4.4.4.4==7.7.7.7 or
4.4.4.28==7.7.7.28 can both meet, so ingress node also has no way of
knowing which stream sends too big packet.
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Since the PTB packet returned by ICMP is incomplete, ingress node
cannot decrypt the packet and then view the information in the packet
to find the exact stream to further handle. Therefore, set DF=1,
then ICMP PTB is generated, which has no significance for the IPsec
ESP scenario.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
Tunnel, Ingress node, Egress node, Ingress Interface, Egress
interface, Tunnel Transit Packets (TTP), Tunnel Link Packet (TLP),
Link MTU (LMTU), Tunnel MTU (TMTU), Tunnel maximum atomic packet
(TMAP), effective MTU to receive (EMTU_R) are defined in
[I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels].
3. Link Maximum Atomic Packet and Packet Too Big Support Negotiation
During an IKEv2 negotiation, the initiator and the responder indicate
their support for the Link Maximum Atomic Packet and Packet Too Big
Extension by exchanging the LMAP_AND_PTB_SUPPORTED notifications.
This notification MUST be sent in the IKE_AUTH exchange (in case of
multiple IKE_AUTH exchanges - in the first IKE_AUTH message from
initiator and in the last IKE_AUTH message from responder). If both
the initiator and the responder send this notification during the
IKE_AUTH exchange, peers may notify each other with an IPv4 Link
Maximum Atomic Packet Notification when fragmentation is observed.
Upon receiving such notifications, the peers may take the necessary
actions to prevent such fragmentation to occur.
Initiator Responder
-------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR, SA, KEi, Ni -->
<-- HDR, SA, KEr, Nr
HDR, SK {IDi, AUTH,
SA, TSi, TSr,
N(LMAP_AND_PTB_SUPPORTED)} -->
<-- HDR, SK {IDr, AUTH,
SA, TSi, TSr,
N(LMAP_AND_PTB_SUPPORTED)}
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4. Sending a Link Maximum Atomic Packet Notification
The egress security gateway detects fragmentation occurred when it
receives an initial fragment; e.g. with the Flags' More Fragment Bit
set to 1 and the Fragment Offset set to 0. Upon receiving such
packet, the egress node determines the IP version (IPVersion) and the
fragment length FragLen). For an IPv4 packet, FragLen is the Total
Length field ( see [RFC0791]). For an IPv6 packet FragLen is the
Payload Length (see [RFC8200], Section 3. Note that that these
values have different meanings as with an IPv6 fragment, FragLen does
not includes the IPv6 header but only the payload.
The egress node sends the LMAP notification payload that contains
IPVersion and FragLen.
The egress node SHOULD send a maximum of one LMAP notification per
(reassembled) received packet. However, since this extension is
especially expected on nodes dealing with high traffic rates, the
notification is expected to be sent at reasonable rates per Security
Associations. More specifically, the use of the IKEv2 provides a
reliable channel which makes sending redundant notification
unnecessary. Then, the notification rate needs to account for the
time the egress node adjust the TMTU, and that TMTU remains
implemented. More details are provided in Section 10.
Egress Security Gateway Ingress Security Gateway
-------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR SK { N(LMAP)} -->
5. Receiving a Link Maximum Atomic Packet Notification
Upon receiving a LMAP notification, the ingress node derives the
tunnel MAP (TMAP) from the Link MAP (LMAP) derived by the FragLen and
IPVersion.
if IPVersion is 4:
LMAP = FragLen
elif IPVersion is 6:
LMAP = FragLen + 40
TMAP = LMAP - outer IP header - encapsulation overhead
Figure 4: Computation of TMAP
where
IPVersion: The IP version of the fragment provided by the LMAP
notification (see Section 4).
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FragLen: The Fragment length provided by the LMAP notification (see
Section 4).
LMAP: For an IPv4 packet, LMAP is directly provided by the fragment
length of the LMAP Notification. For an IPv6 packet, LMAP needs
to adds the IPv6 Header length (40 bytes) to the fragment length
of the LMAP Notification.
outer IP header: The IP header of the LTP encapsulation overhead:
contains the ESP header, the ESP Trailer including the variable
Pad field. When the padding is minimizing the Pad Len, the
encapsulation header is set to 14 (+ the size of the ICV). The
overhead SHOULD also estimate IP options or IP extensions.
The ingress security gateway SHOULD propagates the TMAP as the tunnel
MTU back to the Source so the size of future TTP packets does not
exceeds the TMAP - eventually performing source fragmentation. To do
so, the ingress node sets the LMTU to TMAP for all traffic designated
by the SA. In this case the LMTU is the MTU associated to the link
of the router interface of the ingress node that facing the Source's
network. Upon receiving a TLP larger than the TMAP, the packet is
discarded and an ICMP PTB message is returned to the Source which
then performs Source Fragmentation (5) (See Section 8.2.1. of
[RFC4301]). It is worth mentioning that only future packets will be
impacted, and not those causing fragmentation.
When the TLP is an IPv4 packet with DF=0, the ingress node SHOULD
perform Source Fragmentation of the TTP, also represented as Inner
Fragmentation (3), sending chunks that do not exceeds TMAP.
Figure 11 in Section 4.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels] with tunnel
MTU set to TMAP achieves both recommendations, while Figure 12 in
Section 4.2.2 describes the inner fragmentation.
6. Sending a Packet Too Big Notification
A packet can be rejected because the size of the LTP exceeds the LMTU
(of the router component) or when the (reassembled) LTP exceeds the
EMTU_R (of the interface component) and so IPsec decapsulation cannot
be done.
When the LTP size exceeds the EMTU_R, the egress node SHOULD send a
Packet Too Big (PTB) notification that includes the EMTU_R and the
LMTU. If the packet results from a reassembly operation, the egress
node MUST send a LMAP notification with the LMAP. If the packet does
not result from a reassembly operation, the egress node MUST NOT send
a LMAP notification.
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Egress Security Gateway Ingress Security Gateway
-------------------------------------------------------------------
HDR SK { N(PTB)} -->
7. Receiving a Packet Too Big Notification
Upon receiving a PTB notification, the egress node computes the
Tunnel MTU (TMTU) as follows:
TMTU = EMTU_R - outer IP header - encapsulation overhead
if LMAP notification is not received:
TMAP is derived from the LMAP notification
else:
TMAP = LMTU - outer IP header - encapsulation overhead
TMAP = min( TMAP, TMTU )
Figure 5: Computation of TMTU
with the same notation as in Figure 4:
EMTU_R: The value provided in the PTB notification related to the
MTU associated to the egress interface (see Section 6)
LMTU : The value provided in the PTB notification related to the
LMTU associated to the egress router (see Section 6)
The ingress node SHOULD proceed with TMAP as described in Section 5.
The ingress node MUST ensure the size of the TTP do not exceed the
computed TMTU and MUST ensure the size of the LTP do not exceed the
LMTU provided in the PTB notification.
8. Payload Description
Figure 6 illustrates the Notify Payload packet format as described in
Section 3.10 of [RFC7296] with a 4 bytes path allowed MTU value as
notification data. This format is used for both the
LMAP_AND_PTB_SUPPORTED, LMAP and PTB notifications.
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1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Next Payload |C| RESERVED | Payload Length |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Protocol ID | SPI Size | Notify Message Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| |
~ Notification Data ~
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 6: Notify Message Format
The fields Next Payload, Critical Bit, RESERVED and Payload Length
are defined in [RFC7296]. Specific fields defined in this document
are:
Protocol ID (1 octet): set to zero.
SPI Size (1 octet): set to zero.
Notify Message Type (2 octets): Specifies the type of notification
message. It is set to TBD1 for the LMAP_AND_PTB_SUPPORTED
notification, TBD2 for the LMAP notification and TBD3 for the PTB
notification.
Notification Data: Specifies the data associated to the notification
message. It is empty for the LMAP_AND_PTB_SUPPORTED notification
or a 4 octets that contains the MTU value for the LMAP and PTB
notification - as represented in Figure 7 and Figure 8.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|IPVers | Reserved | FragLen |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 7: Notification Data for LMAP
with:
IPVersion (4 bits): The IPversion of the received packet
Reserved: Reserved bytes MUST be set by the egress node to zero and
MUST be ignored by th eingress node.
FragLen (2 bytes): The FragLen value (see Section 4)
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| LMTU |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| EMTU_R |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Figure 8: Notification Data for PTB
with:
LMTU (4 bytes): The LMTU of the egress router
EMTU_R (4 bytes): The EMTU_R of the egress interface
9. IANA Considerations
IANA is requested to allocate two values in the "IKEv2 Notify Message
Types - Status Types" registry (available at
https://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/
ikev2-parameters.xhtml#ikev2-parameters-16) with the following
definition:
+=======+================================+
| Value | NOTIFY MESSAGES - STATUS TYPES |
+=======+================================+
| TBD1 | LMAP_AND_SUPPORTED |
| TBD2 | LMAP |
| TBD3 | PTB |
+-------+--------------------------------+
10. Security Considerations
This document defines an IKEv2 extension to enable an egress node to
notify an ingress node that fragmentation is happening as well as the
observed fragment length. In addition, the extension also enable to
an egress node to notify an ingress node that a packet too big has
been discarded, together with some complementary informations to
appropriately update the MTU.
These pieces of information are transferred over the authenticated
IKEv2 channel which ensures the origin of the message. Assuming the
egress node is trusted, the ingress node can trust what is being
reported effectively observed (like fragmentation is happening, the
observed fragment length, a packet too big has been received) by the
egress node and that some information are effectively accurate such
as the egress LMTU and EMTU_R. When fragmentation happens and a LMAP
notification is being sent, the egress node MUST send the
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notification once the reassembled packet has been decapsulated. This
ensure that fragmentation has been performed over a authenticated TLP
and ensure the TLP has not been forged by any attacker. With IPv6,
only outer fragmentation is permitted so, the ingress node can
validate the provided information. However, sending the notification
after the IPsec decapsulation enables the egress node to detect
potential injection attacks and prevent sending an unnecessary
notification, that may be part of a DDoS attack targeting the ingress
node itself. With IPv4 an attacker could set the DF=0 which would
allow any mid tunnel fragmentation. IPsec (ESP or AH) do not cover
the DF flag, so the egress cannot trust the fragment length observed
has not been forged, and the security considerations related to MTU
discovery [RFC0791], [RFC8900], [RFC4963], [RFC6864], [RFC1191] apply
here. Note that information carried by the LMAP notification are
never carried by ICMP, and all LMAP may share with ICMP is that this
information will be used to update the MTU.
The egress node may not be able to decrypt the encrypted TTP packet
if the full encrypted TTP cannot be built. One possibility is that
too many fragments are being sent over a too long period of time
(slowloris like attacks) (see [RFC8900], Section 3.7). Another
possibility is that one fragment exceeds the LMTU or that he
reassembled (unverified) encrypted TTP exceeds the EMTU_R. In both
cases, a PTB notification SHOULD be sent and if fragmentation is
observed a LMAP MUST be sent together with the PTB notification.
Information carried by the PTB (LMTU and EMTU_R) can be trusted.
Without this extension this information would have been carried by
ICMP. In many deployments, the ICMP channel may be unprotected and
ICMP packets maybe discarded by firewalls and never reach the egress
node. In addition, the description provided by
[I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels] tends to indicate that the ICMP channel
remains between the router components of the ingress and egress nodes
and as such are not provided to the interfaces component. Finally,
as detailed in Section 1.3 an ICMP PTB message contains a portion of
the encrypted ESP packet, which may not sufficient to deduce the SPI
and associated traffic selectors, and as such prevent the ingress
node to identify the traffic flow that generates the fragmentation.
In any cases, this results in the information not being available to
take the appropriate action. Sending the PTB notification over ICMP
solves these issues and ease the correlation with the LMAP
notification. In term of trust, when sufficient information may be
sent both on the IKEv2 channel and via a protected ICMP PTB message,
the use of the PTB notification achieves similar trust as the one
observed with an ICMP PTB message sent over a IPsec protected
channel. For that reason, the ICMP messages SHOULD be protected by
IPsec. The use of two different path may provide some additional
reliability as the same information is taking two different paths and
that IKEv2 windows ensures the the information is received - as
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opposed to the (encrypted) ICMP message that can be dropped.
However, information carried by the LMAP notification cannot be
trusted and similar security considerations related to MTU discovery
[RFC0791], [RFC8900], [RFC4963], [RFC6864], [RFC1191] apply here.
Fragmentation happens on a per LTP basis and packet size exceeding
EMTU_R happens on a TTP basis. During high packet rates, this
sending a notification for each of these packets is likely to be used
by an attacker to trigger a DDoS attack to both egress and ingress
nodes. As a result, the egress node SHOULD be able to configure the
maximum rate at which the notifications are sent. This includes the
ability to indicate that LMAP notifications (without PTB) are not
sent when the outer IP addresses are of version IPv6. The reasoning
is that with IPv6, the egress node observes outer fragmentation, in
which case the ingress node is already aware of it. In addition, an
egress node SHOULD be able to configure a threshold for number of
alert per SAs before a notification is sent, a rate limit per SA.
11. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Magnus Westerlund, Paul Wouters, Joe
Touch for his reviews and valuable comments and suggestions.
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[RFC0791] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, RFC 791,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0791, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc791>.
[RFC0792] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol", STD 5,
RFC 792, DOI 10.17487/RFC0792, September 1981,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc792>.
[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.
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[RFC4821] Mathis, M. and J. Heffner, "Packetization Layer Path MTU
Discovery", RFC 4821, DOI 10.17487/RFC4821, March 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4821>.
[RFC6864] Touch, J., "Updated Specification of the IPv4 ID Field",
RFC 6864, DOI 10.17487/RFC6864, February 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6864>.
[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>.
[RFC8900] Bonica, R., Baker, F., Huston, G., Hinden, R., Troan, O.,
and F. Gont, "IP Fragmentation Considered Fragile",
BCP 230, RFC 8900, DOI 10.17487/RFC8900, September 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8900>.
12.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-intarea-tunnels]
Touch, J. D. and M. Townsley, "IP Tunnels in the Internet
Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-intarea-tunnels-13, 26 March 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-intarea-
tunnels-13>.
[I-D.spiriyath-ipsecme-dynamic-ipsec-pmtu]
Piriyath, S., Mangla, U., Melam, N., and R. Bonica,
"Packetization Layer Path Maximum Transmission Unit
Discovery (PLPMTUD) For IPsec Tunnels", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-spiriyath-ipsecme-dynamic-ipsec-
pmtu-01, 1 March 2018,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-spiriyath-
ipsecme-dynamic-ipsec-pmtu-01>.
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[RFC4963] Heffner, J., Mathis, M., and B. Chandler, "IPv4 Reassembly
Errors at High Data Rates", RFC 4963,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4963, July 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4963>.
Authors' Addresses
Daiying Liu (editor)
Ericsson
Email: harold.liu@ericsson.com
Daniel Migault
Ericsson
Email: daniel.migault@ericsson.com
Renwang Liu
Ericsson
Email: renwang.liu@ericsson.com
Congjie Zhang
Ericsson
Email: congjie.zhang@ericsson.com
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