Internet DRAFT - draft-kuhn-quic-0rtt-bdp
draft-kuhn-quic-0rtt-bdp
Internet Engineering Task Force N. Kuhn
Internet-Draft CNES
Intended status: Informational E. Stephan
Expires: 26 April 2022 Orange
G. Fairhurst
T. Jones
University of Aberdeen
C. Huitema
Private Octopus Inc.
23 October 2021
Transport parameters for 0-RTT connections
draft-kuhn-quic-0rtt-bdp-11
Abstract
QUIC 0-RTT transport features currently focuses on egress traffic
optimization. This draft describes a QUIC extension that can be used
to improve the performance of ingress traffic.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 26 April 2022.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text
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provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Notations and terms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2. Safe jump start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1. Rationale behind the safety guidelines . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2. Rationale #1: Variable network conditions . . . . . . . . 6
2.3. Rationale #2: Malicious clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4. Trade-off between the different solutions . . . . . . . . 8
2.4.1. Security aspects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4.2. Interoperability and use-cases . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4.3. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3. Safety guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. Implementation considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.1. Rationale behind the different implementation options . . 12
4.2. Independent local storage of values . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3. Using NEW_TOKEN frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4. BDP Frame . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4.1. BDP Frame Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4.4.2. Extension activation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.1. BDP extension protected as much as initial_max_data . . . 15
5.2. Other use-cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2.1. Optimizing client's requests . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2.2. Sharing transport information across multiple
connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Introduction
QUIC 0-RTT transport features currently focus on egress traffic
optimization. This draft describes a QUIC extension that can be used
to improve the performance of ingress traffic.
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[RFC9000] mentions that "Generally, implementations are advised to be
cautious when using previous values on a new path." This draft
proposes a discussion on how using previous values can be achieved in
a interoperable manner and how it can be done safely.
When clients resume a session to download a large object, the
congestion control algorithms will require time to ramp-up the packet
rate as a sequence of Round-Trip Time (RTT)-based increases. This
document specifies a method that can improve traffic delivery by
allowing a QUIC connection to avoid a the slow process to discover
key path parameters including a way to more rapidly grow the
congestion window (cwnd):
1. During a previous session, current RTT (current_rtt), bottleneck
bandwidth (current_bb) and current client IP (current_client_ip)
are stored as saved_rtt, saved_bb and saved_client_ip;
2. When resuming a session to the same IP address, the server can
then utilize the current_rtt and the current_bb to the saved_rtt
and saved_bb of a previous connection.
This method applies to any resumed QUIC session: both saved_session
and recon_session can be a 0-RTT QUIC connection or a 1-RTT QUIC
connection.
The current version of this draft considers several possible
solutions: (1) the saved parameters are stored at the server; they
are not sent to the client; (2) the saved parameters are sent to the
client as an encrypted opaque blob; although the client is unable to
read the parameters can include this opaque blob in a subsequent
request to the server; (3) the saved parameters are sent to the
client and the client is notified of their value, but the parameters
also include a cryptographic integrity check; the client can include
both the parameters and the integrity check in a subsequent request
to the server.
None of these possible solutions allow q client to modify the
parameters that will be used by the server.
There are several cases where the parameters of a previous session
are not appropriate. These include:
(1) the network conditions have changed and the current capacity
is less than the previously estimated bottleneck bandwidth. Using
the saved congestion control state would increase congestion;
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(2) the network path has changed and the new path is different.
Using the saved congestion control state could increase
congestion. This case might be accompanied by a change in the RTT
or IP address.
(3) a client uses parameters that are no longer appropriate, e.g.,
to intentionally try to use a CWND larger than appropriate.
This document:
1. proposes guidelines for how to safely apply the previously
computed parameters to new sessions;
2. describes different implementation considerations for the
proposed method using QUIC;
3. discusses the trade-offs associated with the different
implementation solutions.
1.1. Notations and terms
* IW: Initial Window (e.g., from [RFC6928]);
* current_iw: Current Initial Window
* recom_iw: Recommended Initial Window
* BDP: defined below
* CWND: the congestion window used by server (maximum number of
bytes allowed in flight by the CC)
* current_bb : Current estimated bottleneck bandwidth
* saved_bb: Estimated bottleneck bandwidth preserved from a previous
connection
* RTT: Round-Trip Time
* current_rtt: Current RTT
* saved_rtt: RTT preserved from a previous connection
* client_ip : IP address of the client
* current_client_ip : Current IP address of the client
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* saved_client_ip : IP address of the client preserved from a
previous connection
* remembered BDP parameters: a combination of saved_rtt and saved_bb
* ITT : Interpacket Transmission Time
* MSS : Maximum Message Size
* AEAD : Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
* LRU : Least Recently Used
[RFC6349] defines the BDP as follows: "Derived from Round-Trip Time
(RTT) and network Bottleneck Bandwidth (BB), the Bandwidth-Delay
Product (BDP) determines the Send and Received Socket buffer sizes
required to achieve the maximum TCP Throughput." This draft
considers the BDP estimated by a server that includes all buffering
along the network path. In that sense, the BDP estimated is related
to the amount of bytes in flight.
A QUIC connection might not reproduce the procedure detailed in
[RFC6349] to measure the BDP. A server might be able to exploit an
internal evaluation of the Bottleneck Bandwidth to estimate the BDP.
This document refers to the saved_bb and current_bb for the
previously estimated bottleneck bandwidth. This value can be easilly
estimated when using a rate-based congestion controller, such as BBR.
Other congestion controllers, such as CUBIC or RENO, could estimate
the bottleneck bandwidth by utilizing a combinatioin of the cwnd and
the minimum RTT. This approach could result in over estimating the
bottleneck bandwidth and ought to be used with caution.
1.2. Requirements Language
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
2. Safe jump start
2.1. Rationale behind the safety guidelines
The previously measured saved_rtt and saved_bb SHOULD NOT be used as-
is, to avoid potential congestion collapse:
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* Rationale #1: Internet path capacity can change at any time. An
Internet method needs to be robust to network conditions that can
differ from one session to the next.
* Rationale #2: Information sent by a malicious client is not
relevant. A client could try to convince a server to use a CWND
higher than appropriate, to gain an unfair share of capacity for
itself or to induce congestion for other flows.
2.2. Rationale #1: Variable network conditions
The server MUST check the validity of the saved_rtt and saved_bb
parameters, whether these are sent by a client or are stored at the
server. The following events indicates cases where use of these
parameters is inappropriate:
* IP address changed: If the client changes its IP address (i.e.
the saved_client_ip is different from the current_client_ip), the
different address is to be takne as an indication of a different
network path. This new path does not necessarily exhibit the same
characteristics as the old one. If the server changes its IP
address after a migration, it would not be safe to exploit
previously estimated parameters.
* RTT changed: A significant change in RTT might be an indication
that the the network conditions changed. Since the CC information
is directly impacted by the RTT, a significant change in RTT is a
strong indication that the previously estimated BDP parameters are
likely to not be valid for the current path.
* Lifetime of the extension: The CC information is temporal.
Frequent connections to the same IP address are likely to track
changes, but long-term use of previous values are not appropriate.
* BB over estimation: There are cases where using the cwnd would
infralte the bottleneck bandwidth. However, at the end of a CC
slow start, the value of cwnd can be significantly larger than the
value, that the CC finally converges to (after a few more rounds).
Directly exploiting such value for the bottleneck bandwidth
estimation may be inappropriate. One mitigation could be to
restrict to only a fraction (e.g., 1/2) of the previously used
cwnd; another mitigation might be to calculate the bottleneck
bandwidth based on the flightsize.
There are different solutions for the variable network conditions:
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* Rationale #1 - Solution #1 : When resuming a session, restore the
current_bb and current_rtt from the saved_bb and saved_rtt
parameters estimated from a previous connection.
* Rationale #1 - Solution #2 : When resuming a session, implement a
safety check to measure avoid using the saved_bb and saved_rtt
parameters to cause congestion over the path. In this case, the
current_bb and current_rtt might not be set directly to the
saved_bb and saved_rtt: the server might wait for the completion
of the safety check before doing so.
Section 3 describes various approaches for Rationale #1 - Solution
#2.
2.3. Rationale #2: Malicious clients
The server MUST check the integrity of the saved_rtt and saved_bb
parameters received from a client.
There are several solutions to avoid attacks by malicious clients:
* Rationale #2 - Solution #1 : The server stores a local estimate of
the bottleneck bandwidth and RTT parameters as the saved_bb and
saved_rtt.
* Rationale #2 - Solution #2 : The server sends the estimate of the
bottleneck bandwidth and RTT parameters to the client as the
saved_bb and saved_rtt. This information is encrypted by the
server. The client resends the same encrypted information when
resuming a connection. The client can neither read nor modify the
saved_rtt and saved_bb parameters.
* Rationale #2 - Solution #3 : The server sends an estimate of the
saved_rtt and saved_bb parameters to the client. The information
includes an integrity protection check. The client can resend the
information when resuming a connection. This allows a client to
read, but not modify, the saved_rtt and saved_bb parameters. This
might enable a client to decide whether the new parameters are
appropriate, based on client-side information about the network
conidtions or connectivity.
Section 4 describes various implementation approaches for each of
these solutions using local storage ( Section 4.2 for Rationale #2 -
Solution #1), NEW_TOKEN Frame ( Section 4.3 for Rationale #2 -
Solution #2), BDP extension Frame ( Section 4.4 for Rationale #2 -
Solution #3).
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2.4. Trade-off between the different solutions
This section provides a description of different implementation
options and discusses their respective advantages and drawbacks.
While there are some discussions for the solutions regarding
Rationale #2, the server MUST consider Rationale #1 - Solution #2 and
avoid Rationale #1 - Solution #1: the server MUST implement a safety
check to measure whether the saved BDP parameters (i.e. saved_rtt and
saved_bb) are relevant or check that their usage would not cause
excessive congestion over the path.
2.4.1. Security aspects
The client can send information related to the saved_rtt and saved_bb
to the server with the BDP Frame extension using either Rationale #2
- Solution #2 or Rationale #2 - Solution #3. However, the server
SHOULD NOT trust the client. Indeed, even if 0-RTT packets
containing the BDP Frame are encrypted, a client could modify the
values within the extension and encrypt the 0-RTT packet.
Authentication mechanisms might not guarantee that the values are
safe. It is not an easy operation for a client to modify
authenticated or encrypted data without this being detected by a
server. Modification could be realized by malicious clients. One
way to avoid this is for a server to also store the saved_rtt and
saved_bb parameters.
A malicious client might modify the saved_bb parameter to convince
the server to use a larger CWND than appropriate. Using the
algorithms proposed in Section 3, the server may reduce any intended
harm and can check that part of the information provided by the
client are valid.
Storing the BDP parameters locally at the server reduces the
associated risks by allowing the client to transmit information
related to the BDP of the path in the case of a malicious client
trying to break the encryption mechanism that it had received.
2.4.2. Interoperability and use-cases
If the server stores a resumption ticket for each client to protect
against replay on a third party IP, it could also store the IP
address (i.e. saved_client_ip) and BDP parameters (i.e. saved_rtt
and saved_bb) of the previous session of the client.
In cases where the BDP Frame extension is exploited, the approach of
storing the BDP parameters locally at the server can provide a cross-
check of the BDP parameters sent by a client. The server can anyway
enable a safe jumpstart, but without the BDP Frame extension.
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However, the client does not have the choice of accepting to use this
or not, and is unable to utilize local knowledge of the network
conditions or conenctivity.
Storing local values related to the BDP would help in improving the
ingress for 0-RTT connections, however, not using a BDP Frame
extension could reduce the interest of the approach where (1) the
client knows the BDP estimations done at the server, (2) the client
decides to accept or reject ingress optimization, (3) the client
tunes application level requests.
2.4.3. Summary
As a summary, the approach of local storage of values can be secure
and the BDP Frame extension provides more information to the client
and more interoperability. The Figure 1 provides a summary of the
advantages and drawbacks of each approach.
+---------+-----------+----------------+---------------+-----------+
|Rationale| Solution | Advantage | Drawback | Comment |
+---------+-----------+----------------+---------------+-----------+
|#1 |#1 | | | |
|Variable |set |Ingress optim. |Risks of adding|MUST NOT |
|Network |current_* | | congestion |implement |
| |to saved_* | | | |
| +-----------+----------------+---------------+-----------+
| |#2 | | | |
| |Implement |Reduce risks of |Negative impact|MUST |
| |safety | adding | on ingress |implement |
| |check | congestion | optim. |Section 3 |
+---------+-----------+----------------+---------------+-----------+
|#2 |#1 | | | |
|Malicious|Local |Enforced |Client unable | |
|client |storage | security | to decide to | |
| | | | reject | |
| | | |Malicious | |
| | | | server could | |
| | | | fill client's | |
| | | | buffer | |
| | | |Limited | |
| | | | use-cases |Section 4.2|
| +-----------+----------------+---------------+-----------+
| |#2 | | | |
| |NEW_TOKEN |Save resource |Malicious | |
| | | at server | client could | |
| | |Opaque token | change token | |
| | | protected | even if | |
| | | | protected | |
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| | | |Malicious | |
| | | | server could | |
| | | | fill client's | |
| | | | buffer | |
| | | |Server may not | |
| | | | trust client |Section 4.3|
| +-----------+----------------+---------------+-----------+
| |#3 | | | |
| |BDP |Extended |Malicious | |
| |extension | use-cases | client could | |
| | |Save resource | change BDP | |
| | | at server | even if | |
| | |Client can | protected | |
| | | read and decide|Server may not | |
| | | to reject | trust client | |
| | |BDP extension | | |
| | | protected | | |
| | | | |Section 4.4|
+---------+-----------+----------------+---------------+-----------+
Figure 1: Comparing solutions
3. Safety guidelines
The safety guidelines are designed to avoid a server adding excessive
congestion to an already congested path. The following mechanisms
help in fulfilling this objective:
* The server SHOULD compare the measured transport parameters (in
particular current_rtt) of the 0-RTT connection with those of the
1-RTT connection (in particular saved_rtt);
* The server SHOULD NOT consider the saved_bb parameter when there
is any indicated congestion (e.g., loss of packet during the first
transmission of data or ECN-CE mark);
* The server MUST NOT send more than the recommended maximum IW
(recom_iw) in the first transmission of data. This value could be
based on a local understanding of the path characteristics.
Knowing the congestion status of the network in closed
environments may help in increasing the recommended maximum IW.
* The server SHOULD NOT store and/or send information related to the
previously estimated bottleneck bandwidth (saved_bb) (see
Section 1.1 for more details on bottleneck bandwidth definition),
if this estimation has not been computed after some rounds during
the 1-RTT connection. At least, the 1-RTT connection should have
reached the congestion avoidance phase.
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The proposed mechanisms SHOULD be limited by any rate-limitation
mechanisms of QUIC, such as flow control mechanisms or amplification
attack prevention. In particular, it may be necessary to issue
proactive MAX_DATA frames to increase the flow control limits of a
connection. In particular, the maximum number of packets that can be
sent without acknowledgment needs to be chosen to avoid the creation
and the increase of congestion for the path.
This extension should not provide an opportunity for the current
connection to be a vector of an amplification attack. The address
validation process, used to prevent amplification attacks, SHOULD be
performed [RFC9000].
The following mechanisms could be implemented:
* Exploit a standard IW:
1. The server sends the first data packet using the IW - this is
a safe starting point for any path where there is no path
information or where there is no congestion state. This
avoids adding excessive congestion to the path;
2. If the reception of IW exhibits characteristics that resemble
those of a recent previous session from the client (i.e.
current_rtt < 1.2*saved_rtt and all data was acknowledged
without reported congestion), the method permits the sender to
consider the saved_bb as an input to adapt current_bb to
rapidly determine a new safe rate;
3. The sender needs to avoid a burst of packets resulting from a
step-increase in the congestion window [RFC9000]. Pacing the
packets as a function of the current_rtt can provide this
additional safety during the period in which the CWND is
increased by the method.
* Identify a relevant pacing rhythm:
- The server estimates the pacing rhythm using saved_rtt and
saved_bb. The Interpacket Transmission Time (ITT) is
determined by the ratio between the current Maximum Message
Size (MSS) for packets and the ratio between the saved_bb and
saved_rtt. A tunable safety margin might be introduced to
avoid sending more than a recommended maximum IW (recom_iw):
o current_iw = min(recom_iw,saved_bb)
o ITT = MSS/(current_iw/saved_rtt)
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- When the IW is acknowledged, the server falls back to a
standard slow-start mechanism.
* Tune slow-start mechanisms: After transport parameters are set to
a previously estimated bottleneck bandwidth, if slow-start
mechanisms continue, the sender can overshoot the bottleneck
capacity. This can occur even if the safety check described in
this section is implemented.
- For NewReno and CUBIC, it is recommended to exit slow-start and
enter in congestion avoidance phase.
- For BBR, it is recommended to move to the "probe bandwidth"
state.
This follows the idea of [RFC4782],
[I-D.irtf-iccrg-sallantin-initial-spreading] and [CONEXT15].
4. Implementation considerations
4.1. Rationale behind the different implementation options
The NewSessionTickets messages of TLS offer a solution. The idea
would have been to add a 'bdp_metada' field in the NewSessionTickets
that the client could read. The sole extension currently defined in
TLS1.3 that can be seen by the client is max_early_data_size (see
section 4.6.1 of [RFC8446]). However, in the general design of QUIC,
TLS sessions are managed by the TLS stacks.
Three distinct approaches are presented: sending an opaque blob to
the client that it may return to the server for a future connection
(see Section 4.3), enable a local storage of BDP related values (see
Section 4.2) and a BDP Frame extension (see Section 4.4).
4.2. Independent local storage of values
This approach independently lets both a client and a server remember
their BDP parameters:
* During a 1-RTT session, the endpoint stores the RTT (as the
saved_rtt) and bottleneck bandwidth (as the saved_bb) together
with the session resume ticket. The client can also store the IP
address of the server.
* The server maintains a table of previously issued tickets, indexed
by the random ticket identifier that is used to guarantee
uniqueness of the Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
(AEAD) encryption. Old tokens are removed from the table using
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the Least Recently Used (LRU) logic. For each ticket identifier,
the table holds the RTT and bottleneck bandwidth (i.e. saved_rtt
and saved_bb), and also the IP address of the client (i.e.
saved_client_ip).
During the 0-RTT session, the endpoint waits for the first RTT
measurement from the peer's IP address. This is used to verify that
the current_rtt has not significantly changed from the saved_rtt, and
hence is an indication that the BDP information is appropriate to the
path that is currently being used.
If this RTT is confirmed (e.g. current_rtt < 1.2*saved_rtt, the
endpoint also verifies that an initial window of data has been
acknowledged without requiring retransmission. This second check
detects a path with significant incipient congestion (i.e. where it
would not be safe to update the CWND based on the saved_bb). In
practice, this could be realized by a proportional increase in the
CWND, where the increase is (saved_bb/IW)*proportion_of_IW_currently-
ACKed.
This solution does not allow the client to refuse the exploitation of
the BDP parameters. If the server does not want to store the metrics
from previous connections, an equivalent of the tcp_no_metrics_save
for QUIC may be necessary. This option could be negociated that
alows a client to choose whether to use the saved information.
4.3. Using NEW_TOKEN frames
Using NEW_TOKEN Frames, the server could send a token to the client
through a NEW_TOKEN Frame. The token is an opaque blob and the
client can not read its content (see section 19.7 of [RFC9000]). The
client sends the received token in the header of an Initial packet
for a later connection.
4.4. BDP Frame
This section describes the use of a new Frame, the BDP Frame. The
BDP Frame MUST be contained in 0-RTT packets, if sent by the client.
The BDP Frame MUST be contained in 1-RTT packets, if sent by the
server. The BDP Frame MUST be considered by congestion control and
its data is not be limited by flow control limits. The server MAY
send multiple BDP Frames in both 1-RTT and 0-RTT connections. The
client can send BDP Frames during 1-RTT and 0-RTT connections.
4.4.1. BDP Frame Format
A BDP Frame is formatted as shown in Figure 2.
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BDP Frame {
Type (i) = 0xXXX,
Lifetime (i),
Saved BB (i),
Saved RTT (i),
Saved IP length (i),
Saved IP (...)
}
Figure 2: BDP Frame Format
A BDP Frame contains the following fields:
* Lifetime (extension_lifetime): The extension_lifetime is a value
in milliseconds, encoded as a variable length integer. This
follows the idea of NewSessionTicket of TLS [RFC8446]. This
represents the validity in time of this extension.
* Saved BB (saved_bb): The saved_bb is a value in bytes, encoded as
a variable length integer. The bottleneck bandwidth estimated for
the previous connection by the server. Using the previous values
of bytes_in_flight defined in [RFC9002] can result in overshoot of
the bottleneck capacity and is not advised.
* Saved RTT (saved_rtt): The saved_rtt is a value in milliseconds,
encoded as a variable length integer. This could be set to the
minimum RTT (min_rtt). The saved_rtt can be set to min_rtt.
NOTE: The min_rtt defined in [RFC9002], does not track a
decreasing RTT: therefore min_rtt reported might be larger than
the actual minimum RTT measured during the 1-RTT connection.
* Saved IP length (saved_ip_length) : The length of the IP address
set to either 4 (IPv4) or 16 (IPv6).
* Saved IP (saved_client_ip) : The saved_client_ip could be set to
the IP address of the client.
4.4.2. Extension activation
The client can accept the transmission of BDP Frames from the server
by using the enable_bdp transport extension.
enable_bdp (0xTBD): in the 1-RTT connection, the client indicates to
the server that it wishes to receive BDP extension Frames for
improving ingress of 0-RTT connection. The default value is 0.
Values strictly above 3 are invalid, and receipt of these values MUST
be treated as a connection error of type TRANSPORT_PARAMETER_ERROR.
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* 0: Default value. If the client does not send this parameter, the
server considers that the client does not support or does not wish
to activate the BDP extension.
* 1: The client indicates to the server that it wishes to receive
BDP Frame and activates the ingress optimization for the 0-RTT
connection.
* 2: The client indicates that it does not wish to receive BDP
Frames but activates ingress optimization.
* 3: The client indicates that it wishes to receive BDP Frames but
does not activate ingress optimization.
This Transport Parameter is encoded as per Section 18 of [RFC9000].
5. Discussion
5.1. BDP extension protected as much as initial_max_data
The BDP metadata parameters are measured by the server during a
previous connection. The BDP extension is protected by the mechanism
that protects the exchange of the 0-RTT transport parameters. For
version 1 of QUIC, the BDP extension is protected using the mechanism
that already protects the "initial_max_data" parameter. This is
defined in sections 4.5 to 4.7 of [RFC9001]. This provides a way for
the server to verify that the parameters proposed by the client are
the same as those that the server sent to the client during the
previous connection.
5.2. Other use-cases
5.2.1. Optimizing client's requests
When using Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTPS (DASH), clients
might encounter issues in knowing the available path capacity or DASH
can encounter issues in reaching the best available video playback
quality. The client requests could then be adapted and specific
traffic could utilize information from the path characteristics (such
as encouraging the client to increase the quality of video chunks, to
fill the buffers and avoid video blocking or to send high quality
adds).
In other cases, applications could provide additional services if
clients can know the server estimation of the path characteristics.
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5.2.2. Sharing transport information across multiple connections
There can be benefit in sharing transport information across multiple
connections. [I-D.ietf-tcpm-2140bis] considers the sharing of
transport parameters between TCP connections originating from the
same host. The proposal in this document has the advantage of
storing server-generated information at the client and not requiring
the server to retain additional state for each client.
6. Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Gabriel Montenegro, Patrick McManus,
Ian Swett, Igor Lubashev, Robin Marx, Roland Bless and Franklin Simo
for their fruitful comments on earlier versions of this document.
7. IANA Considerations
TBD: Text is required to register the BDP Frame and the enable_bdp
transport parameter. Parameters are registered using the procedure
defined in [RFC9000].
8. Security Considerations
Security considerations are discussed in Section 5 and in Section 3.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-tcpm-2140bis]
Touch, J., Welzl, M., and S. Islam, "TCP Control Block
Interdependence", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tcpm-2140bis-11, 12 April 2021,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-tcpm-2140bis-
11.txt>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4782] Floyd, S., Allman, M., Jain, A., and P. Sarolahti, "Quick-
Start for TCP and IP", RFC 4782, DOI 10.17487/RFC4782,
January 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4782>.
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[RFC6349] Constantine, B., Forget, G., Geib, R., and R. Schrage,
"Framework for TCP Throughput Testing", RFC 6349,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6349, August 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6349>.
[RFC6928] Chu, J., Dukkipati, N., Cheng, Y., and M. Mathis,
"Increasing TCP's Initial Window", RFC 6928,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6928, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6928>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
[RFC9001] Thomson, M., Ed. and S. Turner, Ed., "Using TLS to Secure
QUIC", RFC 9001, DOI 10.17487/RFC9001, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9001>.
[RFC9002] Iyengar, J., Ed. and I. Swett, Ed., "QUIC Loss Detection
and Congestion Control", RFC 9002, DOI 10.17487/RFC9002,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9002>.
9.2. Informative References
[CONEXT15] Li, Q., Dong, M., and P B. Godfrey, "Halfback: Running
Short Flows Quickly and Safely", ACM CoNEXT , 2015.
[I-D.irtf-iccrg-sallantin-initial-spreading]
Sallantin, R., Baudoin, C., Arnal, F., Dubois, E., Chaput,
E., and A. Beylot, "Safe increase of the TCP's Initial
Window Using Initial Spreading", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-iccrg-sallantin-initial-
spreading-00, 15 January 2014,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-irtf-iccrg-
sallantin-initial-spreading-00.txt>.
Authors' Addresses
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Nicolas Kuhn
CNES
Email: nicolas.kuhn.ietf@gmail.com
Emile Stephan
Orange
Email: emile.stephan@orange.com
Godred Fairhurst
University of Aberdeen
Department of Engineering
Fraser Noble Building
Aberdeen
Email: gorry@erg.abdn.ac.uk
Tom Jones
University of Aberdeen
Department of Engineering
Fraser Noble Building
Aberdeen
Email: tom@erg.abdn.ac.uk
Christian Huitema
Private Octopus Inc.
Email: huitema@huitema.net
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