Internet DRAFT - draft-jpcert-ipv6vullnerability-check
draft-jpcert-ipv6vullnerability-check
INTERNET-DRAFT M.Nakatani
Intended Status: Informational JPCERT/CC
Expires: June 4, 2015 Y.Kitaguchi
Kanazawa University
K.Nagami
M.Kosugi
R.Hiromi
INTEC Inc.
December 1, 2014
Introducing IPv6 vulnerability test program in Japan
draft-jpcert-ipv6vullnerability-check-02
Abstract
Japan Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center, known
as JPCERT/CC have been researching about vulnerability in use of
IPv6. JPCERT/CC provided the information toward vendors in Japan.
They also verified the occurring those security incidents with
several products.
In 2013, JPCERT/CC called for vendors to participate their IPv6
security program. JPCERT/CC collects the results of equipments and
open to the public for an user reference of procurement.
In this document we describe about the program to share the
experiment of activity.
Status of this Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as
Internet-Drafts.
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html
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The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html
Copyright and License Notice
Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
(http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
publication of this document. Please review these documents
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1 Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3 IPv6 Vulnerability Test Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1 Test Concept and requirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2 Test Items and its Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3 Providing Test Tools and Manual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4 Handling results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5 Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6 IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.1 Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8.2 Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix A: IPv6 vulnerability reference RFCs and i-Ds . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
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1 Introduction
JPCERT/CC started "The IPv6 Security Test" in Japan in 2013. The
target equipments are routers and to verify their ability for the
protection of vulnerabilities which are pointed out in RFC or
Internet-Drafts. JPCERT/CC focuses exclusively on the possible
attacks coming from the Internet. Providing test materials(tool and
document), JPCERT/CC collects the results from vendors and published
IPv6 Security Test respondent product List. This list is keeping to
be up to date. In this document we describe about the program to
share this experimental activity.
1.1 Requirements Language
Take careful note: Unlike other IETF documents, the key words
"MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
"SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
are not used as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. This document
uses these keywords not strictly for the purpose of
interoperability, but rather for the purpose of establishing
industry-common baseline functionality. As such, the document
points to several other specifications (preferable in RFC or stable
form) to provide additional guidance to implementers regarding any
protocol implementation required to produce a successful CE router
that interoperates successfully with a particular subset of
currently deploying and planned common IPv6 access networks.
2 Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
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3 IPv6 Vulnerability Test Program
3.1 Test Concept and requirement
This test program is focused on exclusively on the inbound attacks
which possibly caused at WAN port(then through LAN port). JPCERT/CC
narrowed down 15 items out of 80[Appendix.A]. Fig.1 shows basic
network topology. In this test. Basically test packets sent to both
LAN and WAN then confirm the robustness.
Figure.1 Basic Network Topology
+---------------+
| IPv6 Attacker |
+---------------+
|
|
+--------------- IPv6 Internet ----------------------+
|
|
+----@--------+
| User Router |
+----@--------+
|
|
+---------------- /64 prefix segment ---------------+
| | | |
| | | |
+------+ +------+ +------+ +------+
|Client| |Client| |Client| |Client|
+------+ +------+ +------+ +------+
3.2 Test Items and its Criteria
Here is 15 test items.
[01] Disabling type 0 routing header processing
[02] Protection for a DoS attack on the router by hop-by-hop option
header
[03] Protection for unexpected jumbo packet by extra large payload
option
[04] Corresponding completely overwrite packet information by
unauthorized fragment header(overlap-first-zero fragmentation)
[05] Corresponding completely overwrite packet information by
unauthorized fragment header(overlap-last-zero fragmentation)
[06] Corresponding partially overwrite packet information by
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unauthorized fragment header(overlap-first-hop fragmentation)
[07] Corresponding partially overwrite packet information by
unauthorized fragment header(overlap-last-hop fragmentation)
[08] Detection of a DoS attack by tiny fragment header
[09] Protection for tiny fragment of a DoS attack with a large
amount of using the small fragment header
[10] Protection for a DoS attack by transmitting the first
fragmented packet only
[11] Protection for a DoS attack by single fragmented packet
using atomic fragment
[12] Protection for a DoS attack by single fragmented packet
with a large amount of atomic fragments
[13] Protection for an attack from the off-path attacker by fragment
ID prediction
[14] Protection for a DoS attack to the router using the neighbor
discovery service
[15] Protection for a DoS attack by sending a large number of
broken packets to the router
Table.1 Type of Attack and Criteria for the evaluation
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|No. |Type of Attack |Criteria |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|01 |DoS Attack |comply the DoS resistance policy(*) |
| |packet filtering evasion|discard packet or error reply |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|02 |DoS Attack |comply the DoS resistance policy(*) |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|03 |DoS Attack |comply the DoS resistance policy(*) |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|04 |packet filtering evasion|discard packet or error reply |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|05 |packet filtering evasion|discard packet or error reply |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|06 |packet filtering evasion|discard packet or error reply |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|07 |packet filtering evasion|discard packet or error reply |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|08 |DoS Attack |comply the DoS resistance policy(*) |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|09 |DoS Attack |comply the DoS resistance policy(*) |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|10 |DoS Attack |comply the DoS resistance policy(*) |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|11 |DoS Attack |comply the DoS resistance policy(*) |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
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|12 |DoS Attack |comply the DoS resistance policy(*) |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|13 |DoS Attack |comply the DoS resistance policy(*) |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|14 |DoS Attack |comply the DoS resistance policy(*) |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
|15 |DoS Attack |comply the DoS resistance policy(*) |
+----+------------------------+-------------------------------------+
(*) the DoS resistance policy
Router that "PASSED" this test has ability with all the result
in the below.
1. do not reboot
2. do not hung-up
(slow-down will be acceptable)
3. return to the original condition after DoS attack stopped
(to see the condition of the router, ping to the router
from a connected node)
3.3 Providing Test Tools and Manual
JPCERT/CC provides a testing tool to an applicant developer due to
execute these tests at same procedure and methodology. Prior to the
open up this test program JPCERT/CC examined test cases itself and
test tool with open source software then combined some software into
a distribution tool.
Current test tool includes these software ; - THC IPv6 Toolkit
2.3THC IPv6 Toolkit 2.3 - SI6 Networks IPv6 ToolKit v1.4.1 - nmap
6.40 - WireShark Version 1.2.15 - minicom
slight modification was made to the software to fix for the test
cases.
JPCERT/CC also provides a technical guide and an manual. The
technical guide is can be downloaded from their Web page[WEB] for the
general test guide to public.
3.4 Handling results
JPCERT/CC asks for the result of the test from associate
participants. Results are listed and released in the JPCERT/CC's web
site[WEB] under an agreement. JPCERT/CC updates the list continually
when they gets new information.
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4 Conclusion
IPv6 is in the way of universal deployment. In Japan, an
organization named JPCERT/CC started to provide a IPv6 related
security evaluation program. After one year of the activity,
JPCERT/CC also publish the result of test. End users of small and
mid-sized companies or SIers can refer the list for an procurement
even if they have lack of knowledge about IPv6 and its security
consideration. For the vendors, they can develop IPv6 secure
appraisal product that suited for targeted companies in base line.
The benefit of this activity is;
(1) developer and JPCERT/CC
JPCERT/CC is able to informed possible threats to vendors
proactively. Vendors are able to create more safer products
in advance. This scheme changes incident-first to
information-first approach.
(2) customer
Especially for a small and mid-sized companies, they are
going to start to adopt IPv6 easier if they don't have much
knowledge.
Currently JPCERT/CC defined 15 items for the test case. Beyond
controversy they will review and enhance the test program from time
to time.
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5 Security Considerations
Possible security threats are same as what pointed out in original
protocols and technologies referred in this document.
6 IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
7 Acknowledgements
Thanks for the following vendors/organizations with the contribution
of this activity.
IPv6 Promotion Council, Brocade Communications Systems Inc., NEC
Platforms, Ltd., Furukawa Electric Co., Ltd.,Hitachi Metals, Ltd,
CENTURY SYSTEMS Co.,Ltd and Codenomicon.
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8 References
8.1 Normative References
[RFC1858] G. Ziemba, D. Reed, and P. Traina, "Security Considerations
for IP Fragment Filtering", RFC 1858, October 1995.
[RFC1883] S. Deering, and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification (Obsoleted by RFC 2460)", RFC 1883,
December 1995.
[RFC2460] S. Deering, and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998.
[RFC2529] B. Carpenter and C. Jung, "Transmission of IPv6 over IPv4
Domains without Explicit Tunnels", RFC 2529, March 1999.
[RFC2661] W. Townsley, A. Valencia, A. Rubens, G. Pall, G. Zorn and
B. Palter, "Layer Two Tunneling Protocol "L2TP"", RFC
2661, August 1999.
[RFC2671] P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)", RFC 2661,
August 1999.
[RFC2675] D. Borman, S. Deering and R. Hinden "IPv6 Jumbograms", RFC
2675, August 1999.
[RFC2694] P. Srisuresh, G. Tsirtsis, P. Akkiraju and A. Heffernan,
"DNS extensions to Network Address Translators (DNS_ALG)",
RFC 2694, September 1999.
[RFC2710] S. Deering, W. Fenner and B. Haberman, "Multicast Listener
Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", RFC 2710, October 1999.
[RFC2766] G. Tsirtsis and P. Srisuresh, "Network Address Translation
- Protocol Translation (NAT-PT)", RFC 2766, February 2000.
[RFC3056] B. Carpenter and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains via
IPv4 Clouds", RFC 3056, February 2001.
[RFC3068] C. Huitema, "An Anycast Prefix for 6to4 Relay Routers", RFC
3068, June 2001.
[RFC3089] H. Kitamura, "A SOCKS-based IPv6/IPv4 Gateway Mechanism",
RFC 3089, April 2001.
[RFC3128] I. Miller, "Protection Against a Variant of the Tiny
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Fragment Attack", RFC 3128, June 2001.
[RFC3142] J. Hagino and K. Yamamoto, "An IPv6-to-IPv4 Transport Relay
Translator", RFC 3142, June 2001.
[RFC3493] R. Gilligan, S. Thomson, J. Bound, J. McCann and W.
Stevens, "Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6", RFC
3493, February 2003.
[RFC3756] P. Nikander, J. Kempf and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Neighbor
Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats", RFC 3756, May
2004.
[RFC3775] Johnson, D., Perkins, C. and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in
IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.
[RFC3810] R. Vida and L. Costa, "Multicast Listener Discovery Version
2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", RFC 3810, June 2004.
[RFC3879] C. Huitema and B. Carpenter, "Deprecating Site Local
Addresses", RFC 3879, September 2004.
[RFC3964] P. Savola and C. Patel, "Security Considerations for 6to4",
RFC 3964, December 2004.
[RFC3971] J. Arkko, J. Kempf, B. Zill and P. Nikander, "SEcure
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", RFC 3971, March 2005.
[RFC3972] T. Aura, "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", RFC
3972, March 2005.
[RFC3973] A. Adams, J. Nicholas and W. Siadak, "Protocol Independent
Multicast - Dense Mode (PIM-DM): Protocol Specification
(Revised)", RFC 3973, January 2005.
[RFC4191] R. Draves and D. Thaler, "Default Router Preferences and
More-Specific Routes", RFC 4191, November 2005.
[RFC4193] R. Hinden and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Addresses",
RFC 4193, October 2005.
[RFC4225] P. Nikander, J. Arkko, T. Aura, G. Montenegro and E.
Nordmark, "Mobile IP Version 6 Route Optimization Security
Design Background", RFC 4225, December 2005.
[RFC4291] R. Hinden and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
Architecture", RFC 4291, February 2006.
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[RFC4380] C. Huitema, "Teredo: Tunneling IPv6 over UDP through
Network Address Translations (NATs)", RFC 4380, February
2006.
[RFC4795] B. Aboba, D. Thaler and L. Esibov, "Link-Local Multicast
Name Resolution (LLMNR)", RFC 4795, January 2007.
[RFC4861] T. Narten, E. Nordmark, W. Simpson and H. Soliman,
"Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
September 2007.
[RFC4862] S. Thomson, T. Narten and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862, September 2007.
[RFC4941] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
Extensions `for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
IPv6", RFC 4941, September 2007.
[RFC4942] E. Davies, S. Krishnan and P. Savola, "IPv6 Transition/Co-
existence Security Considerations", RFC 4942, September
2007.
[RFC4943] S. Roy, A. Durand and J. Paugh, "IPv6 Neighbor Discovery
On-Link Assumption Considered Harmful", RFC 4943,
September 2007.
[RFC4966] C. Aoun and E. Davies, "Reasons to Move the Network Address
Translator - Protocol Translator (NAT-PT) to Historic
Status", RFC 4966, July 2007.
[RFC5095] C. Malamud, "Deprecation of Type 0 Routing Headers in
IPv6", RFC 5095, May 2005.
[RFC5110] P. Savola, "Overview of the Internet Multicast Routing
Architecture", RFC 5110, January 2008.
[RFC5157] T. Chown, "IPv6 Implication for Network Scanning", RFC
5157, March 2008.
[RFC5214] Templin, F., Gleeson T., and D. Thaler, "Intra-Site
Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol (ISATAP)", RFC 5214,
March 2008.
[RFC5227] S. Cheshire, "IPv4 Address Conflict Detection", RFC 5227,
July 2008.
[RFC5294] P. Savola and J. Lingard, "Host Threats to Protocol
Independent Multicast (PIM)", RFC 5294, August 2008.
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[RFC5572] M. Blanchet and F. Parent, "IPv6 Tunnel Broker with the
Tunnel Setup Protocol (TSP)", RFC 5572, February 2010.
[RFC5722] S. Krishnan, "Handling of Overlapping IPv6 Fragments", RFC
5722, December 2009.
[RFC5927] F. Gont, "ICMP Attacks against TCP", RFC 5927, July 2010.
[RFC5952] S. Kawamura and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for IPv6
Address Text Representation", RFC 5952, August 2010.
[RFC5969] W. Townsley and O. Troan, "IPv6 Rapid Deployment on IPv4
Infrastructures (6rd) -- Protocol Specification", RFC
5969, August 2010.
[RFC5991] D. Thaler, S. Krishnan and J. Hoagland, "Teredo Security
Updates", RFC 5991, September 2010.
[RFC6052] C. Bao, C. Huitema, M. Bagnulo, M. Boucadair and X. Li,
"IPv6 Addressing of IPv4/IPv6 Translators", RFC 6052,
October 2010.
[RFC6104] T. Chown and S. Venaas, "Rogue IPv6 Router Advertisement
Problem Statement", RFC 6104, February 2011.
[RFC6105] E. Levy-Abegnoli, G. Van de Velde, C. Popoviciu and J.
Mohacsi, "IPv6 Router Advertisement Guard", RFC 6105,
February 2011.
[RFC6106] J. Jeong, S. Park, L. Beloeil and S. Madanapalli, "IPv6
Router Advertisement Options for DNS Configuration", RFC
6106, November 2010.
[RFC6144] F. Baker, X. Li, C. Bao and K. Yin, "Framework for
IPv4/IPv6 Translation", RFC 6144, April 2011.
[RFC6145] X. Li, C. Bao and F. Baker, "IP/ICMP Translation
Algorithm", RFC 6145, April 2011.
[RFC6146] M. Bagnulo, P. Matthews and I. Beijnum, "Stateful NAT64:
Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6 Clients
to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6146, April 2011.
[RFC6147] M. Bagnulo, A. Sullivan, P. Matthews and I. Beijnum,
"DNS64: DNS Extensions for Network Address Translation
from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers", RFC 6147, April 2011.
[RFC6169] S. Krishnan, D. Thaler and J. Hoagland, "Security Concerns
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with IP Tunneling", RFC 6169, April 2011.
[RFC6275] C. Perkins, D. Johnson and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in
IPv6", RFC 6275, July 2011.
[RFC6296] M. Wasserman and F. Baker, "IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix
Translation", RFC 6296, June 2011.
[RFC6324] G. Nakibly and F. Templin, "Routing Loop Attack Using IPv6
Automatic Tunnels: Problem Statement and Proposed
Mitigations", RFC 6324, August 2011.
[RFC6437] S. Amante, B. Carpenter, S. Jiang and J. Rajahalme, "IPv6
Flow Label Specification", RFC 6437, November 2011.
[RFC6564] S. Krishnan, J. Woodyatt, E. Kline, J. Hoagland and M.
Bhatia, "A Uniform Format for IPv6 Extension Headers", RFC
6564, April 2012.
[RFC6583] I. Gashinsky, J. Jaeggli and W. Kumari, "Operational
Neighbor Discovery Problems", RFC 6583, March 2012.
[RFC6586] J. Arkko and A. Keranan, "Experiences from an IPv6-Only
Network", RFC 6586, April 2012.
[ID-dns-discovery] D. Thaler and J. Hagino, "IPv6 Stateless DNS
Discovery ", draft-ietf-ipngwg-dns-discovery-03, November
2001. (expired)
[ID-ipv6-hopbyhop] S. Krishnan, "The case against Hop-by-Hop
options", draft-krishnan-ipv6-hopbyhop-05, October 2010.
(expired)
[RFC6762] S. Cheshire and M. Krochmal, "Multicast DNS", RFC 6762,
February 2013.
[RFC6763] S. Cheshire and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service Discovery",
RFC 6763, February 2013.
[ID-ipv6-smurf-amplifier] F. Gont, "Security Implications of IPv6
options of Type 10xxxxxx", draft-gont-6man-ipv6-smurf-
amplifier-02, March 2013. (expired)
[ID-tiny-fragments-issues] V. Manral, "Tiny Fragments in IPv6",
draft-manral-6man-tiny-fragments-issues-00, February 2012.
(expired)
[ID-predictable-fragment-id] F. Gont, "Security Implications of
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Predictable Fragment Identification Values", draft-ietf-
6man-predictable-fragment-id-01, April 2014.
[ID-flowlabel-security] F. Gont, "Security Assessment of the IPv6
Flow Label", draft- gont-6man-flowlabel-security-03, March
2012. (expired)
[RFC6889] R. Renno, T. Saxena, M. Boucadair and S. Sivakumar,
"Analysis of Stateful 64 Translation", RFC 6889, April
2013.
[ID-dnsop-respsize] P. Vixie and A. Kato, "DNS Referral Response Size
Issues", draft-ietf-dnsop-respsize-15, February 2014.
[RFC7112] F. Gont and V. Manral, "Implications of Oversized IPv6
Header Chains", RFC 7112, January 2014.
[ID-slaac-dns-config-issues] F. Gont and P. Simerda, "Current issues
with DNS Configuration Options for SLAAC", draft-gont-
6man-slaac-dns-config-issues-00, June 2012. (expired)
[ID-dhcpv6-sheald] F. Gont, W. Liu and G. Van de Velde, "DHCPv6-
Shield: Protecting Against Rogue DHCPv6 Servers", draft-
ietf-opsec-dhcpv6-shield-04, July 2014.
[RFC7113] F. Gont, "Implementation Advice for IPv6 Router
Advertisement Guard (RA-Guard)", RFC 7113, February 2014.
[RFC6946] F. Gont, "Processing of IPv6 "atomic" fragments", RFC 6046,
May 2013.
[RFC6980] F. Gont, "Security Implications of IPv6 Fragmentation with
IPv6 Neighbor Discovery", RFC 6980, August 2013.
[RFC7123] F. Gont and W. Liu, "Security Implications of IPv6 on IPv4
Networks", RFC 7123, February 2014.
[ID-ipv6-host-scanning] F. Gont and T. Chown, "Network Reconnaissance
in IPv6 Networks", draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning-04,
June 2014.
8.2 Informative References
[WEB] JPCERT/CC, IPv6 Security Test Appraisal List, September 2014,
<https://www.jpcert.or.jp/research/ipv6product_list.html>.
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Appendix A: IPv6 vulnerability reference RFCs and i-Ds
Here is possible threats list and related RFC and internet-drafts.
1. Basic Header/Extension Header definition
1-1 Access filtering policy evasion using by Type 0 Routing Header,
RFC4942;RFC5095;RFC5871
1-2 DoS attack caused by Type 0 Routing Header,
RFC4942;RFC5095;RFC5871
1-3 DoS attack caused by Hop by Hop Option Header,
RFC4942
1-4 Handling problem and resource management problem of jumbogram,
RFC4942
1-5 Packet overwrite by unauthorized fragment header,
RFC4942;RFC5722
1-6 DoS attack caused by tiny fragmented packets,
RFC7112
1-7 Abuse by receiving a lot of first fragment packets
1-8 DoS attack caused by atomic fragment header,
RFC6946
1-9 DoS attack caused by prediction of fragment identification
values,
draft-ietf-6man-predictable-fragment-id-01
1-10 Distinctiveness on firewall implementation for packet
reassembly,
RFC4942;RFC7112;RFC5722
1-11 Implementation problems in processing extension
header chain;
RFC4942;RFC7112;RFC5722
1-12 Implementation problems in Unknown Headers/Destination Options,
RFC4942;RFC6564
1-13 Abuse using by Pad1 and PadN Options in Hop-by-Hop and
Destination option headers,
RFC4942
1-14 DoS attack using by old specification of Flow Label,
RFC3697;RFC6437
1-15 Covert Channel using by Flow Label,
RFC6437;draft-gont-6man-flowlabel-security-03
1-16 Information Leaking by Flow Label,
RFC6437;draft-gont-6man-flowlabel-security-03
2. NDP (link layer address resolution)
2-1 Neighbor Solicitation/Advertisement Spoofing,
RFC3756;RFC6980
2-2 Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) failure,
RFC3756;RFC6980
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2-3 Duplicate Address Detection DoS Attack,
RFC3756;RFC6980;draft-ietf-6man-enhanced-dad-06
2-4 Neighbor Discovery DoS Attack,
RFC3756;RFC4942
2-5 Abuse on Neighbor cache table,
RFC3756;RFC4942
3. NDP (address auto-configuration)
3-1 Juggled default route,
RFC3756;RFC6104;RFC6105;RFC7113
3-2 Juggled prefixes,
RFC3756;RFC6104;RFC6105;RFC7113
3-3 Juggled DNS server information,
RFC3756;RFC6104;RFC6105;RFC6106;draft-gont-6man-slaac-dns-
config-issues-00
3-4 Sniffing caused by following old specification of on-link
assumption,
RFC3756;RFC4943;RFC6104;RFC6105;RFC6583;RFC7113
3-5 Parameter Spoofing,
RFC3756;RFC6104;RFC6105;RFC7113
3-6 DoS attack caused by Router Advertisement,
RFC3756;RFC6104;RFC6105;RFC7113
3-7 Filtering Policy Evasion by fragment packets
RFC7113;RFC5722
4. ICMPv6
4-1 Spoofed Redirect Message,
RFC3756;draft-gont-opsec-ipv6-nd-shield-00;RFC6980
4-2 DoS attack to Upper-layer protocol by crafted ICMPv6 error
messages,
RFC4942;RFC5927
4-3 Covert conversation through the payload of ICMPv6 error
messages,
RFC4942
4-4 DoS attack by unprocessable packets to router,
RFC4942;RFC5927
5. IP Address definition
5-1 Anycast Traffic Identification,
RFC4942;RFC4291
5-2 Site Local Address as well-known DNS server addresses,
draft-ietf-ipngwg-dns-discovery-03;RFC6586
5-3 Malicious use of IPv6 addressing scheme,
RFC4942;RFC5157;draft-ietf-opsec-ipv6-host-scanning-04
5-4 Dynamic DNS and secure updates,
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RFC4942;RFC4472
5-5 Complexity on plural address operating by IPv4-mapped address,
RFC4942
5-6 Filtering policy evasion using by IPv4-mapped address
RFC4942
5-7 Firewalls cannot perform deep packet inspection and filtering
with IPSec,
RFC4942
5-8 IPv6 tunnels break IPv4 network security policy,
RFC4942
6. Multicast
6-1 DoS attack by hijacked multicast router,
RFC3810
6-2 DoS attack by forged Report message in MLD,
RFC3810;RFC2710
6-3 Extra processing on the network equipment by forged Done
messages in MLD,
RFC3810;RFC2710
6-4 DoS attack over multicast network with ICMPv6 error messages,
RFC4942
6-5 Abuse in multicast distribution tree on PIM-DM with
temporary addresses,
RFC3973
6-6 Denial-of-Service Attack on the Link,
RFC5294
7. Mobile IPv6
7-1 Attacks against Binding Update Protocols,
RFC4225
7-2 Filtering Policy evasion due to not support type 2 routing
header,
RFC4225;RFC6275
8. Tunneling
8-1 Filtering Policy evasion occurred in IPv6 transition/coexistence
technologies on "IPv4-only" networks,
RFC4942;RFC6169;RFC7123
8-2 Source Routing after the Tunnel Client combined with old
specification of Routing Header 0,
RFC6169;RFC5095;RFC7123
8-3 Attacks by malicious use of NDP may go to 6to4 Router/6to4
Relay Router/6rd Border Router,
RFC3964;RFC4942;RFC5969;RFC7123
8-4 Attack toward IPv6 clients from IPv4 network via
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6to4 Router/6to4 Relay Router,
RFC3964;RFC6169RFC5969;RFC7123
8-5 Attack toward 6to4 clients from IPv4 network via
6to4 Router/6to4 Relay Router,
RFC3964;RFC6169RFC5969;RFC7123
8-6 IPv4 broadcast attack via 6to4 Router/6to4 Relay Router,
RFC3964;RFC6169RFC5969;RFC7123
8-7 Sniffing at 6to4 Router/6to4 Relay Router,
RFC3964;RFC6169;RFC5969;RFC7123
8-8 Routing Loop Attack Using IPv6 Automatic Tunnels,
RFC6324
8-9 Filtering bypass by Teredo,
RFC6169;RFC7123
8-10 Port exposure with Teredo,
RFC6169;RFC5991;RFC7123
8-11 Teredo Tunnel Address Concerns,
RFC6119
8-12 Sniffing at Teredo Router/Teredo Relay Router,
RFC3964;RFC6169;RFC5969;RFC7123
9. Translation
9-1 Address Spoofing used by IPv4-embedded IPv6 address,
RFC6052;RFC6145;RFC6889
9-2 Concerns of using DNS64,
RFC6147;RFC6889
10. DNS
10-1 Dual stack operation bring overloading to name servers,
RFC4472;RFC4942;draft-ietf-dnsop-respsize-15
10-2 Operational difficulty of reverse zones and concerns,
RFC4472;RFC4942
10-3 Rogue DHCPv6 Servers,
draft-ietf-opsec-dhcpv6-shield-04
11. Other Operational concerns
11-1 Network segment violation by leakage of NDP in VLAN networks
11-2 RFC5952 text representation compliance for safer operation,
RFC5952
11-3 Dual stack nodes in IPv4 only network without supervision
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Authors' Addresses
Masayuki Nakatani
Japan Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center
3-17, Kanda Nishiki-cho, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo,
Japan
EMail: ww-info@jpcert.or.jp
Yoshiaki Kitaguchi
Kanazawa University
Kakuma-machi, Kanazawa, Ishikawa,
Japan
EMail: kitaguchi@imc.kanazawa-u.ac.jp
Kenichi Nagami
INTEC Inc.
1-3-3, Shinsuna, Koto-ku, Tokyo,
Japan
EMail: nagami@inetcore.com
Masataka Kosugi
INTEC Inc.
626-1, Kyoda, Takaoka-City, Toyama,
Japan
EMail: kosugi_masataka@intec.co.jp
Ruri Hiromi
INTEC Inc.
1-1-25, Shin Urashima-cho, Kanagawa-ku, Yokohama,
Japan
EMail: hiromi@inetcore.com
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