Internet DRAFT - draft-jfinkhaeuser-caps-for-distributed-auth
draft-jfinkhaeuser-caps-for-distributed-auth
Interpeer Project J. Finkhaeuser
Internet-Draft Interpeer
Intended status: Informational S. D. Penna
Expires: 8 June 2023 ISEP
5 December 2022
Capabilities for Distributed Authorization
draft-jfinkhaeuser-caps-for-distributed-auth-00
Abstract
Authorization is often the last remaining centralized function in a
distributed system. Advances in compute capabilities of miniaturized
CPUs make alternative cryptographic approaches feasible that did not
find such use when first envisioned. This document describes the
elements of such cryptographically backed distributed authorization
schemes as a reference for implementations.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
The latest revision of this draft can be found at
https://specs.interpeer.io/. Status information for this document
may be found at https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-jfinkhaeuser-
caps-for-distributed-auth/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the interpeer Working
Group mailing list (mailto:interpeer@lists.interpeer.io), which is
archived at https://lists.interpeer.io/pipermail/interpeer/.
Subscribe at https://lists.interpeer.io/mailman/listinfo/interpeer.
Working Group information can be found at https://interpeer.io/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://codeberg.org/interpeer/specs.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 1]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 8 June 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document.
This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not
be created, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to
translate it into languages other than English.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.1. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2. Problem Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1. Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.2. Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3. Previous Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.1. Object-Capabilities (OCAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.2. Identity-Capabilities (ICAP) . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.3. Pretty Good Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.4. JSON Web Tokens (JWT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.5. Power of Attorney . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.4. Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.1. IoT On-boarding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4.2. UAV Control Handover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2. Elements of a Distributed Authorization Scheme . . . . . . . 12
2.1. Grantor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.1. Grantor Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.2. Grantor Signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2. Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3. Verifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.4. Time-Delayed Transmission Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5. Grantee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.5.1. Grantee Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.6. Object . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 2]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
2.6.1. Object Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.7. Privilege . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.8. Validity Metadata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.9. Capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.9.1. Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.10. Authorization Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. Delegation of Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4. Related Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.1. Human Rights Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.1.1. In Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4.1.2. Out of Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2. Protocol Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.3.1. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3.2. Data Integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3.3. Peer Entity Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3.4. Non-Repudiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3.5. Unauthorized Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3.6. Inappropriate Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3.7. Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.3.8. Replay Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3.9. Message Insertion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3.10. Message Deletion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3.11. Message Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3.12. Man-In-The-Middle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3.13. Key Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.3.14. Revocation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4.4. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.4.1. Surveillance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.4.2. Stored Data Compromise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4.4.3. Intrusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4.4. Misattribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4.5. Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4.6. Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4.7. Secondary Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4.8. Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.4.9. Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 3]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
1. Introduction
In 1964, Paul Baran at the RAND Corporation described centralized,
decentralized and distributed communications networks and their
properties [RM3420]. Baran's argument was that because in
distributed systems, each node can reach many other nodes, failure of
a single node need not impact the ability of other nodes to
communicate.
This resilience is desirable in distributed systems today. Therefore
it seems an oversight that authentication and authorization in modern
system is often a centralized function.
This document explores previous attempts at distributed authorization
schemes, and outlines common elements of such solutions in order to
provide a reference for future work.
1.1. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
In order to respect inclusive language guidelines from [NIST.IR.8366]
and [I-D.draft-knodel-terminology-10], this document uses plural
pronouns.
1.2. Problem Space
Distributed authorization is not a goal in itself, but may be
desirable in distributed systems.
It's also worth exploring how the distribution of authorization
functions related to authentication. In many systems, these are
intrinsically linked. Logging in with a user name and password is
one such example. Providing the correct password proves that the
person at the keyboard is authorized to access a resource. But at
the same time, providing the correct password in combination with a
user name authenticates this user. Furthermore, any permissions
granted to the user are typically linked to the user name, as that
remains stable throughout password changes.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 4]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
1.2.1. Authentication
Password-based authentication mechanisms require that the tuple of
user name and password (or password hash) are sent to some central
repository where records of such tuples are kept; if the tuple is
found, the user name is authenticated.
This common scheme mixes different aspects to authentication,
however, which are worth disambiguating.
Endowment: The act of logging in establishes an association between
a user name and the person interacting with the device. More
broadly speaking, (parts of) a three-way endowment are performed:
an _identifier_ is endowed with _attributes_, which describe a
_person_ in sufficient detail to identify them.
Secret Proving: Logging in also proves that the person interacting
with the device is in possession of some secret, which should only
be known to the person which merits having the user name linked to
the secret associated with them.
The distinction becomes somewhat more relevant when we move towards
distributed authentication schemes, which rely on public key
cryptography.
1.2.1.1. Web of Trust
In Web of Trust based systems, starting with Philip R. Zimmermann's
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), public keys are exchanged with some
metadata attached. This performs some part of endowment in that it
provides the link between a public key and a user identifier (see
[RFC4880], Section 11.1).
Other parts of endowment are not specified. These often consist of
manual checks that the user identifier belongs to some person holding
the corresponding private key, and may involve verifying of
government issued identification documents. Once such a check is
passed, the verifier issues a digital signature over the tuple of
user identifier and public key to provide some proof that the
verification has occurred.
Endowment in Web of Trust occurs when a sufficient number of
sufficiently trustworthy signatures have been reached. Which number
of trust level is deemed sufficient is in the control of the
recipient of a transferable public key packets, however.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 5]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
1.2.1.2. TLS Certificates
A similar concept is applied in TLS [RFC8446], where [X.509]
certificates are used for endowment.
The major difference to Web of Trust based systems is how trust is
established. Instead of relying on a recipient defined method of
determining trust, certificates are issued by one of a set of well-
known trust sources. Information on these is stored in root
certificates, which are distributed to the machines participating in
the system.
While there are globally issued root certificates for entities that
perform endowment professionally, it is always possible for a system
designer to include other root certificates.
1.2.1.3. Secret Proving
Neither [X.509] certificates nor the transferable public key packets
in [RFC4880] provide any means for secret proving. This is left to
other parts of TLS or PGP.
In TLS, the handshake during connection establishment is used to send
challenges that only machines with the correct private key can
respond to. PGP, which aims to provide privacy at rest, simply
encrypts content with a secret key which is then encrypted with the
recipient's public key. Other parties cannot decrypt this, which
keeps content safe.
TLS and PGP are not the only public key cryptography based
authentication systems, but they can stand in for the two most common
classes of such systems: one aims to establish trust from
authoritative sources. The other aims to establish trust based on
the trust requirements of the recipient.
Both systems also strictly speaking separate endowment from secret
proving. While in TLS the certificates are transmitted as part of
the overall handshake, creating certificates nevertheless occurs
beforehand. This temporal decoupling is a key property that may also
be applied to authorization.
1.2.2. Authorization
Authorization occurs only after secret proving. Once an identity has
been established, it is then mapped to privileges associated with
said entity, which determine which object(s) it has access to.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 6]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
There exist a plethora of methods to establish this mapping. Access-
control lists (ACL) simply provide tuples of identities, privileges
and associated objects. Role-based access control (RBAC) is
effectively identical, if the identities specified are not those of
individuals, but of groups (as a group member, an individual inhabits
the associated role). A comparable approach is Organization-based
access control (OrBAC), which not only abstracts the identity to that
of a role, but performs a similar abstraction on the object and
privilege.
More complex systems such as context- or lattice-based access control
(CBAC and LBAC respectively) derive a mapping from properties of or
labels attached to the individuals and objects. Finally, graph-based
access control (GBAC) starts with a graph of an organization, and
derives privileges from the properties inherited by being part of a
larger organizational structure.
What these systems address is the problem of _managing_ the mapping
of an identity to access privileges for objects, where each system
has advantages and disadvantages for various use cases.
Subject: The subject is the identity (individual or group/role) that
intends to perform an action.
Action: The action the subject intends to perform may be as simple
as reading or writing a resource, but can be more complex.
Object: Actions are performed on objects , such as a file or network
resource.
Request Tuple: A request tuple consists of the subject, action and
(optional) object.
Privilege: A privilege encodes whether or not an action is
permitted.
Authorization Tuple: An authorization tuple encodes system state,
and is thus a tuple of a subject, a privilege and an (optional)
object.
The act of authorization translates from a request tuple to a Boolean
response determining whether a request is permitted. A centralized
authorization function provides this answer in real-time.
Distributed authorization instead deals in authorization tuples.
It may be of interest that and authorization tuple is semantically
equivalent to an RDF triple ([RDF]), in that it encodes a specific
relationship between a subject and an object. Authorization tuples
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 7]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
that consists solely of IRIs [RFC3987] is also syntactically an RDF
triple. This implies that authorization tuples can encode
arbitrarily complex authorization information by building the
knowledge graph resulting from resolving such an RDF triple.
1.2.2.1. Single Point of Failure
A centralized function is very useful for managing authorization.
The previous section on different access control methods should
illustrate sufficiently that authorization management is a complex
problem; complex enough for multiple competing management methods to
emerge.
Faced with such a complex problem, it is no surprise that solutions
tend to bring this function to a centralized location. Managing this
complexity in one place is of course simpler than managing it across
multiple locations.
The downside to this is that failure of this single location may mean
failure of the system as a whole. Particularly vulnerable to this
single point of failure are systems in which all access is controlled
by specific privileges. Systems with publicly available parts may
still provide those functions that do not rely on any privileges.
1.2.2.2. Temporal Coupling
The other class of problems with centralized authorization relate to
the temporal coupling of granting access and resolving authorization
queries . The abstract request introduced above of resolving an
request tuple to a Boolean response tightly couples both steps.
This requires disambiguating between participants in such a system
somewhat. From the perspective of the person operating the access
control management system, granting access occurs whenever they make
an entry into the database. The machine permitting an authorized
user to perform an action, however, grants or denies access in the
moment the action is requested. If this second form of access
granting is based on a real-time authorization query, it couples
granting access to such a query in time.
The key insight into distributing authorization effectively is that
it has little to do with managing access control databases. Rather,
it is related to temporally decoupling the authorization query from
granting access.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 8]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
1.3. Previous Work
Dividing the authentication problem into endowment and secret proving
helps illustrate how web of trust systems introduce temporal
decoupling between these functions, in a way that e.g. TLS does not.
In much the same way, dividing the authorization problem into
querying an authorization database and granting access to an object
suggests that authorization, too, can be temporally decoupled.
This section lists prior work where some temporal decoupling of this
kind has been performed in the past.
1.3.1. Object-Capabilities (OCAP)
Dennis and Van Horn described an approach for securing computations
in "multiprogrammed" systems in 1965/66 ([OCAP]). The context in
which they operated had little to do with modern distributed systems.
However, they recognized the trend of running computing systems
complex enough that multiple programmers would contribute to its
overall function. This raised a desire for access control to
individual sub-functions, which a security kernel within the
operating system was to provide.
The key differentiator to other systems was that in OCAP, a calling
process was to present a "capability", a serialized token to the
process being invoked. This capability was intended to encode all
relevant information the called process would need to determine
whether the caller was permitted to perform such an action.
These properties of being serializable and containing all relevant
authorization information imply that, conceptually, capabilities are
cached results of an authorization query . The called process can
then perform access granting without issuing such a query itself,
thereby temporally decoupling the two functions.
1.3.2. Identity-Capabilities (ICAP)
The OCAP system proved to have a particular weakness, namely that
"the right to exercise access carries with it the right to grant
access". This is the result the information encoded in an OCAP
capability: it contains a reference to the object and action to
perform, but does not tie this to any identity.
In 1988, Li Gong sought to address this with an Identity-Capability
model ([ICAP]). Including an identity in the capability token
arrives at the authorization tuple in Section 1.2.2. Furthermore,
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 9]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
ICAP introduces the notion of capability use in networked systems.
ICAP does this by temporally decoupling the authorization query from
access granting.
The main criticism levelled against the paper and capability-based
approaches in general in the following years was that some functions
were missing, such as a check for revocations. Proposals to address
this often added centralized functions again, which led to criticism
of the distributed approach in general.
1.3.3. Pretty Good Privacy
While we previously discussed PGP in terms of authentication in
Section 1.2.1.1, a key property of PGP is the introduction of trust
signatures ([RFC4880], Section 5.2.3.13).
Trust signatures do not merely authenticate a user, they introduce a
kind of authorization as well, as they carry specific notions for
what the provided public key may be trusted for. The trust signature
thus encodes specific kinds of privileges of an authorization tuple ,
while the public key encodes a subject . The only component missing
in the tuple is the object .
While the authorization tuple in PGP is incomplete, the system is
based on public key cryptography, and can thus be used to securely
verify a binding between the tuple elements.
1.3.4. JSON Web Tokens (JWT)
JSON Web Tokens ([RFC7519]) provide a standardized way for
serializing access tokens. Current uses are in systems with
centralized authorization functions such as OAuth ([RFC6749]).
However, the fundamental notion of capabilities, that a serializable
token carries authorization information, is provided also here.
Furthermore, JWT combines this with cryptographic signatures,
providing for - in theory - temporal decoupling as previously
discussed.
It's well worth pointing out that JWT is suitable as a portable,
modern capability format - all it requires is to encode all necessary
information within its fields.
1.3.5. Power of Attorney
The oldest kind of prior work in this field is the concept of Power
of Attorney, as exercised throughout much of human history.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 10]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
In a Power of Attorney system, an authority (a king, etc.) grants a
token (an official seal, ...) to a subordinate which makes this
subordinate recognizable as carrying some of the king's powers and
privileges.
Modern day Power of Attorney systems abound, and may be formalized as
notarized letters granting such and such rights to other people.
Capability-based authorization schemes are no different to this kind
of system in principle. In both kinds of systems, the token itself
encodes the privileges of the bearer.
1.4. Use Cases
Use cases relate to one or more of the issues explored in the problem
space.
1.4.1. IoT On-boarding
On-boarding IoT devices into an overall system requires
authentication and authorization; this may be mutual.
In such scenarios, new devices rarely have connectivity before
completing on-boarding. It follows that authentication and
authorization must work in a fully offline fashion, which in turn
requires that authorization tokens provided to the device contain all
information required for the authorization step. As described in
Section 1.3.1, this translates to a requirement of temporally
decoupling access granting from an authorization query.
1.4.2. UAV Control Handover
A similar argument applies to control handover of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV). The concept of Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS)
missions is to send drones into places that are harder or more costly
to reach for humans.
Control handover refers to transferring operational control for a
drone from one ground control station to (GCS) another. Control
handover bears similarities to IoT on-boarding in that the drone is
on-boarded to a new control system (and the previous system
relinquishes control).
In general, aviation authorities such as FAA, EASA, etc. expect
control handover to occur under ideal circumstances, in which
centralized authorization schemes suffice. There is, however, a
class of scenarios where connectivity to a central service cannot be
guaranteed.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 11]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
1.4.2.1. Remote Location
In order to guarantee BVLOS operations in very remote locations,
research projects such as [ADACORSA] assume use cases in which two
ground control stations between which handover occurs to not have
connectivity to each other.
In such cases, it is necessary for the UAV to act as a time-delayed
transmission channel for authorization information between the GCSes.
1.4.2.2. Emergency Response
Emergency response teams may require UAVs in the vicinity to
immediately clear the airspace and go to ground. This effectively
translates to the emergency response team operating a ground control
station that takes over control and issues a single command.
As emergency responses are, by definition, typically required in
situations where normal operations cannot be assumed, this includes
the assumption that connectivity cannot be assumed. Nevertheless,
such an emergency control handover must be possible.
1.4.2.3. Mobile Ground Control Stations
A comparable scenario to the above describes situations in which UAV
attach to a mobile ground control station. Specific scenarios may
range from cave exploration to investigating burning buildings.
The commonality here is that the UAV cannot establish connectivity to
a wider system, but can connect to the mobile GCS. This in turn may
act as a communications relay to the outside world, but may be too
limited in capacity to permit online, centralized authorization.
2. Elements of a Distributed Authorization Scheme
As explored in the previous sections, the most fundamental aspect of
a distributed authorization scheme is that it decouples access
granting from authorization queries by serializing the results in
such a way that they can be transmitted and evaluated at a later
date. This effectively shifts the focus of distributed authorization
systems away from request tuples towards authorization tuples.
This implies certain things about the contents of a capability token,
but it also introduces other elements and roles into the overall
scheme.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 12]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
2.1. Grantor
A grantor, sometimes called principal, has authority over an object,
and generates authorization tuples for use in the overall system.
As we describe cryptographic systems, a grantor is represented by an
asymmetric key pair. Endowment for a grantor is out of scope of this
document; for the purposes of distributed authorization, the grantor
key pair _is_ the grantor.
2.1.1. Grantor Identifier
A grantor identifier uniquely identifiers the public key of the key
pair; this may be identical to a serialized form of the public key
itself, or a cryptographic hash over it (fingerprint), or some
alternative scheme.
What is sufficient is that there MUST exit a mechanism for uniquely
mapping the grantor public key to the grantor identifier and vice
versa. This mapping permits verification.
2.1.2. Grantor Signature
The grantor undersigns a capability by adding a cryptographic
signature to it.
2.2. Agent
The agent is the element in a distributed system that executes a
requested action after verifying a capability. It typically manages
objects itself, or provides access to them.
2.3. Verifier
The verifier is a role in the system that verifies a capability.
While verifiers can exist in a variety of system nodes, it's a
mandatory part of the agent role.
Outside of the agent, verifiers may exist in intermediary nodes that
mediate access to agents. An example here might be an authorization
proxy that sits between the public internet and a closed system.
While it may not be an agent in and of itself, it can still decide to
reject invalid requests, and only forward those to agents that pass
verification and its own forwarding rules.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 13]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
2.4. Time-Delayed Transmission Channel
We introduce the concept of a time-delayed transmission channel to
illustrate that communications between grantor and verifier is not
possible in real-time.
In practice, of course the communications channel does not have to be
time- delayed. But treating it as such implies that granting access
must be temporally decoupled from the authorization query.
2.5. Grantee
The grantee is the entity to which a privilege is granted.
A grantee SHOULD also be represented by an asymmetric key pair in
order to perform distributed authentication.
2.5.1. Grantee Identifier
A grantee identifier is the identifier used as the subject in an
authorization tuple.
If the grantee is equivalent to an asymmetric key pair, it MUST also
be possible to map the grantee identifier to the grantee public key
and vice versa. Such a mapping SHOULD be feasible to perform without
connectivity in order to maintain the distributed authentication
mechanisms achieved through the use of asymmetric cryptography.
2.6. Object
An object is a resource the grantee wishes to access. This can be a
file, or a networked service, etc.
2.6.1. Object Identifier
The object identifier uniquely identifiers an object. This document
places no syntactic restrictions upon the object identifier, other
than that there exists a canonical encoding for it. For the purposes
of cryptographic signing and verification, the object identifier MUST
be treated as equivalent to its canonical encoding.
2.7. Privilege
A privilege encodes whether an action (on an object) is permitted
(for a subject); see {#sec:authorization} for an explanation.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
For the purposes of creating capabilities, a privilege must have a
canonical encoding. The semantics of each privilege are out of scope
of this document, and to be defined by the systems using distributed
authorization.
That being said, a typical set of privileges might include read and
write privileges for file-like resources.
2.8. Validity Metadata
In practical applications of distributed authorization scheme,
validity of a capability may be further scoped. We already discussed
the need to scope it to an authorization tuple, but further
restrictions are likely desirable.
For example, a set of not-before and not-after timestamps exist in
e.g. [X.509] certificates; similar temporal validity restrictions
are likely required in practical systems.
However necessary they may be in practice, however, such additional
validity metadata has no bearing on the fundamental concepts outlined
in this document, and is therefore considered out of scope here.
2.9. Capability
A capability provides a serialized encoding of previously listed
elements:
1. Fundamentally, a capability MUST encode an authorization tuple,
consisting of:
1. A subject identifier.
2. A privilege.
3. An object identifier.
2. A grantor identifier MAY be required in order to identify the
grantor key pair used in signing and verification.
3. Validity Metadata SHOULD be included in practical systems.
4. In order for a verifier to ensure the validity of a capability,
it MUST finally contain a grantor signature over all preceding
fields.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
The authorization tuple permits an agent to determine what kind of
access to grant or deny. The grantor identifier provides information
to the verifier about key pairs used in the authorization. While the
signature proves to the verifier that the grantor did indeed
authorize access, the validity metadata limits access to whichever
additional scope the grantor decided upon.
2.9.1. Extensions
Note that each of the fields in an authorization tuple may be treated
as a list of zero or more such elements. While a longer discussion
of this is out of scope for this document, two notes should be made:
1. Implementations must provide clarity what it means to provide a
list. Does the capability apply to each element in the list
individually, or to some combination? This is highly specific to
the semantics of each capability, so cannot be covered here.
2. A tuple consisting of a subject and privilege only (zero objects)
effectively turns into a statement about the subject, and no
longer relates to authorization concerns. However, other aspects
of a distributed trust system still apply. This is the approach
taken by Pretty Good Privacy.
2.10. Authorization Process
Having identified the elements, we can now describe an abstract
process in a distributed authorization system.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 16]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
.----------------------------------------------------.
| |
| +---------+ 2. serializes & signs .----------. |
| | Grantor +------------------------->| capability | |
| +---------+ '----------' |
| ^ |
| | 1. *authorization query* & response |
| v |
| .-------------. |
| | | |
| |'-------------'| |
| | authorization | |
| | tuple store | |
| '-------------' |
'-------------+--------------------------------------'
║
║ time-delayed communications channel
║ .----------.
║ | capability |
║ '----------'
v
.----------------------------------------------------.
| |
| +---------+ 1. access request +-------+ |
| | +--------------------->| | |
| | Grantee | | | |
| | |<---------------------+ Agent +---+ |
| +---------+ 4. *access grant* | | | |
| | | | |
| +--------->| | | |
| | +-------+ | |
| | | |
| 3. verification | 2. verification | |
| response | request | |
| | v |
| | +----------+ |
| +----------------+ Verifier | |
| +----------+ |
'-----------------------------------------------------'
The process is split into two phases.
In the first phase, the grantor issues an authorization query
(((authorization query))) to an authorization tuple store, which
stands in here for the specific process by which authorization is
managed, and produces tuples. Based on the response, it serializes a
capability and adds its signature over it.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 17]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
The capability then gets transmitted via the time-delayed
communications channel to the second phase, providing temporal
decoupling between the phases.
In the second phase, the grantee requests access to some object from
the agent. The agent must send a verification request to the
verifier (which may be a subroutine of the agent; no network
transmission is implied here). The verifier responds by either
permitting access or not. If access is permitted, the agent grants
access to the grantee. Because the capability encodes all required
information for the verifier to perform this step, it does not need
access to the authorization tuple store itself.
Note that the capability can be transmitted to any entity in the
second phase; all that is relevant is that it ends up at the
verifier. If it is transmitted to the grantee, it has to pass it on
to the agent as part of the access request. If the agent receives
it, it has to pass it on to the verifier as part of the verification
request.
3. Delegation of Authority
One of the more powerful applications of the power of attorney system
is that it is possible to further delegate authority. The constraint
is that no entity can provide more authority in a sub-grant than it
possessed in the first place.
The ability to generate sub-grants is easily provided in a
specialized privilege. Such a privilege must encode the specific
other privileges a grantee may in turn grant to other parties.
As this may include the ability to grant further sub-grants,
implementations MUST take care here. They MAY wish to include a
limit on the depth to which sub-grants may be further delegated.
4. Related Considerations
4.1. Human Rights Considerations
What follows is a list of objectives derived from [RFC8280], each
with a brief statement how this document addresses each concern, or
why it does not.
4.1.1. In Scope
Connectivity: Distributed authorization observes end-to-end
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 18]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
principle, by temporally decoupling distinct functions in the
authorization process, so that connectivity can be almost
arbitrarily unreliable.
Reliability: Capabilities provide reliability by removing the need
for real-time reliability.
Content agnosticism: The elements of authorization tuples are only
defined in the abstract; as noted in {#sec:authorization}, they
can encode arbitrarily complex relationships. Of course, the
semantics SHOULD be somewhat focused on authorization.
Integrity: The use of cryptographic signatures in capabilities also
provides integrity checking, but no explicit mechanism for
distinguishing between integrity failures and authenticity is
provided.
Authenticity: Proving authenticity is a core concept of
cryptographic capabilities.
Pseudonymity: This document deliberately distinguishes between
endowment and secret proving in {#sec:authentication}, precisely
because authorization does not need to make use of such
information.
Censorship resistance: Temporally decoupling authorization queries
from access granting provides one element in a censorship
resistant system, as it permits for capabilities to travel out-of-
band by means that circumvent potential censorship, such as e.g.
via a sneakernet, etc.
Outcome Transparency: This document's main focus is on illustrating
the outcomes of distributed authorization schemes.
Adaptability: As this document provides a generalized view on
distributed authorization schemes and capabilities, it is highly
adaptable in specific implementations.
Decentralization: Decentralization - rather, distribution - is the
goal of this document.
Open Standards: Care has been taken to define this specification in
reference to other open standards (see the references section).
Security: As this document describes an authorization scheme,
security is of great concern. However, guidelines in [BCP72] do
not fully apply to an abstract description. See {#sec:security-
considerations} for more detail.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 19]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
4.1.2. Out of Scope
Confidentiality: Confidentiality is out of scope of the general
concept of capabilities; capability content is almost by
definition public data. However, nothing prevents an
implementation from providing confidentiality for the capability
elements outside of the signature.
Heterogeneity Support: There is no specific heterogeneity support in
distributed authorization schemes.
Remedy: Remedy (new in [I-D.draft-irtf-hrpc-guidelines-16] often
stands in stark contrast to anonymity and pseudonymity, both of
which are out of scope. Implementations must take care to balance
these concerns.
Internationalization: This document focuses on abstract concepts;
internationalization is not in scope.
Localization See internationalization; this is not in scope.
Privacy: For privacy protections, implementations must themselves
ensure that any information encoded in a capability cannot be
abused to resolve otherwise private information.
Anonymity: Anonymity is out of scope for this document. While
pseudonymous use is feasible if sufficient care is taken,
authorization always ties to an identity, however transient.
Accessibility: Accessibility concerns are out of scope.
4.2. Protocol Considerations
There are no specific protocol considerations for this document.
However, protocols transmitting capabilities MAY provide some relief
to human rights concerns {#sec:human-rights-considerations}, e.g. by
providing confidentiality via encrypted transmission.
4.3. Security Considerations
This document does not specify a network protocol. In fact, it
deliberately requires no specific protocol for transmitting
capabilities. As such, much of [BCP72] does not apply.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 20]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
However, distributed authorization does not require the invention of
new cryptographic constructs; the document is deliberately phrased
such that the choice of such constructs remains implementation
defined.
4.3.1. Confidentiality
Confidentiality concerns are out of scope of this document.
4.3.2. Data Integrity
Data integrity is provided as a side effect of requiring a
cryptographic signature over capability payloads.
4.3.3. Peer Entity Authentication
Peer entity authentication is not, strictly speaking, a concern of
this document. However, it should be noted that an agent in the
process MUST obviously authenticate a grantee before proceeding to
verify capabilities.
As noted previously, distributed authorization does not require
endowment in this process, however.
4.3.4. Non-Repudiation
Non-repudiation is strictly speaking out of scope of this document
because key exchange is out of scope. However, key exchange is a
necessary precondition for verifying capabilities. Non-repudiation
is one of the guarantees that verification provides.
4.3.5. Unauthorized Usage
Preventing unauthorized usage is the core concern of this document.
4.3.6. Inappropriate Usage
Any scheme that prevents unauthorized use may also be extended to
prevent inappropriate use. However, such additions are out of scope.
4.3.7. Denial of Service
Denial of service mitigation is out of scope, because this document
does not describe a protocol.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 21]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
However, as avoiding a single point of failure (Section 1.2.2.1) is
one of the problems that distributed authorization schemes address,
it can easily be argued that preventing denial of service is a major
concern of this document, and consequently fully addressed here.
4.3.8. Replay Attacks
Capabilities can be "replayed" as much as an attacker wants. As they
encode a state, such state does not change when it is received
multiple times.
However, implementations MUST take care not to invite replay attacks
when designing their specific validity metadata (Section 2.8).
Furthermore, implementations MUST include such metadata in the
signature.
4.3.9. Message Insertion
Message insertion is of no concern to this document.
4.3.10. Message Deletion
Message deletion is of little concern to this document, except
insofar as if the transmission of capabilities is disrupted, access
granting cannot proceed. Implementations MUST take care to provide
safeguards against this as their threat model requires.
4.3.11. Message Modification
Message modification is prevented by the cryptographic signatures in
capabilities.
4.3.12. Man-In-The-Middle
As this document does not provide a protocol specification, this
consideration does not apply.
4.3.13. Key Usage
This document relies on secure key exchange.
4.3.14. Revocation
As ICAP was criticized for introducing a centralized solution for
revocatins, (see Section 1.3.2), a modern distributed authorization
system must adequately consider these.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 22]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
Fortunately, anything that can encode the granting of a privilege can
also encode the removal of said grant, by - essentially - encoding a
negative privilege. Doing so provides distributed revocations by the
same overall mechanism that distributed authorization is provided. A
sequence of grants and revocations for a particular request tuple
will map to a sequence of Boolean values, and can so be understood as
a bit stream.
This introduces a new requirement, namely that verifiers can
reconstruct the bit stream in order to understand the latest, most
up-to-date state. Unfortunately, this can be hard due to the time-
delayed nature of the communications channel.
Fortunately, research into conflict-free replicated data types has
yielded several methods for ordering also partially received streams,
which can be applied here by providing appropriate validity metadata.
This yields eventually consistent states in a distributed
authorization system, which in many cases may be sufficient.
It is not the purpose of this document to prescribe any particular
method for ordering grants and revocations into a consistent stream,
nor whether revocations are used at all. However, implemtations MUST
take care to consider this aspect.
4.4. Privacy Considerations
This section lists privacy considerations as covered by [RFC6973] and
distributed authorization's relationship to them.
4.4.1. Surveillance
The surveillance concerns outlined in [RFC6973] specifically relate
to network protocols; this document does not describe such a
protocol.
As noted previously, pseudonymous use is well supported by this kind
of scheme, while fully anonymous use is not. If appropriate
confidentiality is provided by implementations, distributed
authorization schemes can be considered fairly resistant to
surveillance.
That being said, systems SHOULD still use transport encryption in
order to further mitigate against surveillance.
4.4.2. Stored Data Compromise
Stored data concerns are largely identical to surveillance concerns
in the context of distributed authorization.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 23]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
4.4.3. Intrusion
Authorization schemes in general aim to protect against intrusion.
4.4.4. Misattribution
Misattribution in [RFC6973] refers to misattribution to individuals,
which relates to endowment. This document considers endowment out of
scope.
4.4.5. Correlation
Distributed authorization tokens cannot protect against correlation,
unless confidentiality concerns are addressed. This is, however, an
implementation concern.
4.4.6. Identification
Similar arguments can be made for identification concerns.
Distributed authorization is fundamentally concerned with identifying
elements in a system, but if confidentiality is provided,
identification is not possible.
4.4.7. Secondary Use
Secondary use concerns are not in scope of this document.
4.4.8. Disclosure
Disclosure concerns are effectively identical to confidentiality
concerns in that capabilities may leak identifiers, which may be
pseudonymous.
4.4.9. Exclusion
Exclusion is a network protocol consideration, and does not apply
here.
4.5. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
5. References
5.1. Normative References
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 24]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
[BCP72] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.
[NIST.IR.8366]
Miller, K., Alderman, D., Carnahan, L., Chen, L., Foti,
J., Goldstein, B., Hogan, M., Marshall, J., Reczek, K.,
Rioux, N., Theofanos, M., and D. Wollman, "Guidance for
NIST staff on using inclusive language in documentary
standards", National Institute of Standards and
Technology report, DOI 10.6028/nist.ir.8366, April 2021,
<https://doi.org/10.6028/nist.ir.8366>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8280] ten Oever, N. and C. Cath, "Research into Human Rights
Protocol Considerations", RFC 8280, DOI 10.17487/RFC8280,
October 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8280>.
[RM3420] Baran, P., "On Distributed Communications: I. Introduction
to Distributed Communications Networks", RAND
Corporation book, DOI 10.7249/rm3420, 1964,
<https://doi.org/10.7249/rm3420>.
5.2. Informative References
[ADACORSA] "Airborne data collection on resilient system
architectures", 1 May 2020,
<https://www.kdt-ju.europa.eu/projects/adacorsa>.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 25]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
[I-D.draft-irtf-hrpc-guidelines-16]
Grover, G. and N. ten Oever, "Guidelines for Human Rights
Protocol and Architecture Considerations", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-irtf-hrpc-guidelines-16,
10 November 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-
irtf-hrpc-guidelines-16.txt>.
[I-D.draft-knodel-terminology-10]
Knodel, M. and N. ten Oever, "Terminology, Power, and
Inclusive Language in Internet-Drafts and RFCs", Work in
Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-knodel-terminology-10, 11
July 2022, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-knodel-
terminology-10.txt>.
[ICAP] Gong, L., "A secure identity-based capability system",
Proceedings. 1989 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
DOI 10.1109/secpri.1989.36277, January 2003,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/secpri.1989.36277>.
[ISOC-FOUNDATION]
Internet Society Foundation, "Internet Society
Foundation", n.d., <https://www.isocfoundation.org/>.
[OCAP] Dennis, J. and E. Van Horn, "Programming semantics for
multiprogrammed computations", Communications of the
ACM vol. 9, no. 3, pp. 143-155, DOI 10.1145/365230.365252,
March 1966, <https://doi.org/10.1145/365230.365252>.
[RDF] RDF Working Group of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C),
"RDF 1.1 Concepts and Abstract Syntax", 25 February 2014,
<https://www.w3.org/TR/rdf11-concepts/>.
[RFC3987] Duerst, M. and M. Suignard, "Internationalized Resource
Identifiers (IRIs)", RFC 3987, DOI 10.17487/RFC3987,
January 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3987>.
[RFC4880] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Shaw, D., and R.
Thayer, "OpenPGP Message Format", RFC 4880,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4880, November 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4880>.
[RFC6749] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
RFC 6749, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 26]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[X.509] International Telecommunications Union, "Information
technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory:
Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks",
ITU-T Recommendation X.509, ISO Standard 9594-8, March
2000.
Acknowledgments
Jens Finkhaeuser's authorship of this document was performed as part
of work undertaken under a grant agreement with the Internet Society
Foundation [ISOC-FOUNDATION].
Index
A E O P R S T
A
access granting *_Section 1.2.2.2, Paragraph 1_*;
Section 1.3.1, Paragraph 4; Section 2, Paragraph 1
action *_Section 1.2.2, Paragraph 5.4.1_*
authorization query *_Section 1.2.2.2, Paragraph 1_*;
Section 1.3.1, Paragraph 4; Section 2, Paragraph 1
authorization tuple *_Section 1.2.2, Paragraph 5.12.1_*;
Section 1.3.2, Paragraph 2; Section 1.3.3, Paragraph 2;
Section 2, Paragraph 1; Section 2.1, Paragraph 1
E
endowment *_Section 1.2.1, Paragraph 3.2.1_*; Section 1.2.1.1,
Paragraph 1
O
object *_Section 1.2.2, Paragraph 5.6.1_*; Section 1.3.3,
Paragraph 2; Section 2.1, Paragraph 1; Section 2.9,
Paragraph 2, Item 1.2.3
P
privilege *_Section 1.2.2, Paragraph 5.10.1_*; Section 1.3.3,
Paragraph 2; Section 2.9, Paragraph 2, Item 1.2.2
R
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 27]
Internet-Draft Capabilities for Distributed Authorizati December 2022
request tuple *_Section 1.2.2, Paragraph 5.8.1_*;
Section 1.2.2.2, Paragraph 1; Section 2, Paragraph 1
S
secret proving *_Section 1.2.1, Paragraph 3.4.1_*
subject *_Section 1.2.2, Paragraph 5.2.1_*; Section 1.3.3,
Paragraph 2; Section 2.5.1, Paragraph 1; Section 2.9,
Paragraph 2, Item 1.2.1
T
temporal decoupling *_Section 1.2.1.3, Paragraph 4_*
Authors' Addresses
Jens Finkhäuser
Interpeer gUG (haftungsbeschraenkt)
Email: ietf@interpeer.io
URI: https://interpeer.io/
Sérgio Duarte Penna
Instituto Superior de Engenharia do Porto
Rua Dr. António Bernardino de Almeida, 431
4249-015 Porto
Portugal
Email: sdp@isep.ipp.pt
URI: https://isep.ipp.pt/
Finkhaeuser & Penna Expires 8 June 2023 [Page 28]
