Internet DRAFT - draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-properties
draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-properties
Network Working Group A.A. Bozhko, Ed.
Internet-Draft CryptoPro
Intended status: Informational 10 March 2023
Expires: 11 September 2023
Properties of AEAD algorithms
draft-irtf-cfrg-aead-properties-01
Abstract
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithms
provide confidentiality and integrity of data. The extensive use of
AEAD algorithms in various high-level applications has caused the
need for AEAD algorithms with additional properties and motivated
research in the area. This document gives definitions for the most
common of those properties intending to improve consistency in the
field.
Status of This Memo
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Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. AEAD algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
4. AEAD properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1. Classification of AEAD properties . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.2. Base properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.1. Confidentiality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2.2. Data integrity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3. Security properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3.1. Blockwise security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.3.2. Key Dependent Messages (KDM) security . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.3. Key commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.4. Leakage resistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.5. Multi-user security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.6. Nonce misuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.7. Nonce-hiding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.8. Reforgeability resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.9. Release of unverified plaintext (RUP) security . . . 8
4.4. Implementation properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4.1. Inverse-free . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4.2. Lightweight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4.3. Online . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4.4. Parallelizable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4.5. Single pass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4.6. Static Associated Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.4.7. ZK-friendly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.5. Additional functionality properties . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.5.1. Incremental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5.2. Remotely-keyed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.5.3. Robust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
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Appendix A. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1. Introduction
An Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm is
an extension of authenticated encryption, which provides
confidentiality for the plaintext to be encrypted and integrity for
the plaintext and some Associated Data (sometimes called Header).
AEAD algorithms are used in numerous applications and have become an
important field in cryptographic research.
1.1. Background
AEAD algorithms are formally defined in [RFC5116]. The main benefit
of AEAD algorithms is that they provide data confidentiality and
integrity and have a simple unified interface.
The importance of the AEAD algorithms is mainly explained by their
exploitation simplicity: they have a unified interface, easy-to-
understand security guarantees, and are much easier to implement
properly than MAC and encryption schemes separately. Therefore,
their embedding into high-level schemes and protocols is highly
transparent since, for example, there is no need for additional key
derivation procedures. Apart from that, when using the AEAD
algorithm, it is possible to reduce the key and state sizes and
improve the data processing speed. For instance, such algorithms are
mandatory for TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], IPsec ESP [RFC4303] [RFC8221], and
QUIC [RFC9000]. Hence, the research and standardization efforts in
the field are extremely active. Most AEAD algorithms usually come
with security guarantees, formal proofs, usage guidelines, and
reference implementations.
Even though providing core properties of AEAD algorithms is enough
for many applications, some environments require other unusual
cryptographic properties, which commonly require additional analysis
and research. With the growing number of such properties and
research papers, misunderstanding and confusion inevitably appear.
Some properties might be understood in different ways; for some, only
non-trivial formal security notions are provided, while others
require modification or extension of the standard AEAD interface to
support additional functionality. Therefore, the risk of misuse of
AEAD algorithms increases, which can lead to security issues.
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1.2. Scope
In the following document, we provide a short overview of the most
common properties of AEAD algorithms by giving high-level definitions
of these properties in Section 4. The document aims to improve
clarity and establish a common language in the field.
2. Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. AEAD algorithms
This section gives a general definition of an AEAD algorithm
following [RFC5116].
Definition. An AEAD algorithm is defined by two operations, which
are authenticated encryption and authenticated decryption:
* A deterministic operation of authenticated encryption has four
inputs, each a binary string: a secret key K of a fixed bit
length, a nonce N, associated data A, and a plaintext P. The
plaintext contains the data to be encrypted and authenticated, and
the associated data contains the data to be authenticated only.
Each nonce value must be unique in every distinct invocation of
the operation for any particular value of the key. The
authenticated encryption operation outputs a ciphertext C.
* A deterministic operation of authenticated decryption has four
inputs, each a binary string: a secret key K of a fixed bit
length, a nonce N, associated data A, and a ciphertext C. The
operation verifies the integrity of the ciphertext and associated
data and decrypts the ciphertext. It returns a special symbol
FAIL if the inputs are not authentic; otherwise, the operation
returns a plaintext P.
For more details on AEAD definition, please refer to [RFC5116].
Throughout this document, by default, we will consider nonce-based
AEAD algorithms, which have an interface from the definition above,
and give no other restrictions on their structure. However, some
properties defined in the document apply only to particular classes
of such algorithms, like block cipher-based AEAD algorithms (such
algorithms use block cipher as a building block). If that is the
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case, we explicitly point that out in the corresponding section.
Some other properties, on the contrary, are defined for algorithms
with extended or completely different interfaces. We address that
issue in Section 4.1.
We will call an AEAD algorithm secure if it provides such properties
as Confidentiality and Data integrity, defined in Section 4.2,
against any active nonce-respecting adversary. Even though we aim to
give high-level definitions, we sometimes use the advantage notion.
Specifically, we will use the Authenticated Encryption advantage
notion. We adopt the corresponding definition from
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits].
Definition. Authenticated Encryption advantage is the probability of
an active adversary succeeding in breaking the authenticated-
encryption properties of the AEAD algorithm. In this document, the
definition of authenticated encryption advantage roughly is the
probability that an attacker successfully distinguishes the
ciphertext outputs of the AEAD scheme from the outputs of a random
function or is able to forge a ciphertext that will be accepted as
valid.
4. AEAD properties
4.1. Classification of AEAD properties
In this document we use a high-level classification of additional
properties. The classification aims to give an intuition on how one
can benefit from the property. The additional properties fall into
one of these three categories:
* Security properties. We say that the property is a security
property if it considers new threats or adversarial capabilities,
in addition to those of the usual nonce-respecting adversary,
which aims to break confidentiality or data integrity.
* Implementation properties. We say that the property is an
implementation property if it allows for more efficient
implementations of the AEAD algorithm in special cases or
environments.
* Additional functionality properties. We say that the property is
an additional functionality property if it provides new features
in addition to the regular authenticated encryption with
associated data.
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We notice that the distinction between the security and additional
functionality properties might be vague. The convention in this
document is that additional functionality requires some extension of
the standard AEAD interface. In fact, each additional functionality
property defines a new class of algorithms, which is not a subclass
of regular AEAD. Hence, the basic threats and adversarial
capabilities must be redefined for each of these classes. As a
result, additional functionality properties consider the basic
threats and adversarial capabilities for their class of algorithms
and, in contrast to security properties, not the extended ones.
4.2. Base properties
4.2.1. Confidentiality
Definition. An AEAD algorithm guarantees that the plaintext is
available only to those authorized to obtain it, i.e., those
possessing the secret key. That property is required for the AEAD
algorithm to be called secure.
Synonyms. Privacy.
Further reading. [R2002], [BN2000]
4.2.2. Data integrity
Definition. An AEAD algorithm guarantees that the plaintext and the
associated data have not been changed or forged by those not
authorized to, i.e., those not possessing the secret key. That
property is required for the AEAD algorithm to be called secure.
Synonyms. Message authentication.
Further reading. [R2002], [BN2000]
4.3. Security properties
4.3.1. Blockwise security
Definition. An AEAD algorithm provides security even if an adversary
can adaptively choose the next block of the plaintext depending on
already computed ciphertext blocks during an encryption operation.
Note. The case when an adversary can adaptively choose the next
block of the ciphertext depending on already computed blocks of the
plaintext, which appear in the device memory before the integrity
verification during the decryption, can also be considered. This
case is strongly related to RUP security, defined in Section 4.3.9.
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Further reading. [JMV2002], [FJMV2004]
4.3.2. Key Dependent Messages (KDM) security
Definition. An AEAD algorithm provides security even when key-
dependent plaintexts are encrypted.
Notes. KDM security is achievable only if nonces are chosen randomly
and associated data is key-independent.
Further reading. [BK2011]
4.3.3. Key commitment
Definition. An AEAD algorithm guarantees that it is difficult to
find a tuple of the nonce, associated data, and ciphertext such that
it can be decrypted correctly with more than one key.
Synonyms. Key-robustness, key collision resistance.
Further reading. [FOR17], [LGR21], [GLR17]
4.3.4. Leakage resistance
Definition. An AEAD algorithm provides security even if some
additional information about computations of an encryption (and
possibly decryption) operation is obtained via side-channel leakages.
Further reading. [GPPS19], [B20]
4.3.5. Multi-user security
Definition. An AEAD algorithm Authenticated Encryption advantage
increases sublinearly in the number of users.
Further reading. [BT16]
4.3.6. Nonce misuse
Definition. An AEAD algorithm provides security (resilience or
resistance) even if an adversary can repeat nonces in its encryption
queries. Nonce misuse resilience and resistance are defined as
follows:
* Nonce misuse resilience. Security is provided only for messages
encrypted with unique nonces.
* Nonce misuse resistance. Security is provided for all messages.
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Further reading. [RS06], [ADL17]
4.3.7. Nonce-hiding
Definition. An AEAD algorithm decryption operation doesn't require
the nonce to perform decryption and provides privacy for the nonce
value used for encryption.
Note. In nonce-hiding AEAD algorithms, the ciphertext contains
information equivalent to an encrypted nonce. Hence, retrieving
information about nonce from the ciphertext has to be difficult.
Further reading. [BNT19]
4.3.8. Reforgeability resilience
Definition. An AEAD algorithm guarantees that once a successful
forgery for the algorithm has been found, it is still hard to find
any subsequent forgery.
Further reading. [BC09], [FLLW17]
4.3.9. Release of unverified plaintext (RUP) security
Definition. An AEAD algorithm provides security even if the
plaintext is released for every ciphertext, including those with
failed integrity verification.
Further reading. [A14]
4.4. Implementation properties
4.4.1. Inverse-free
Definition. A block cipher-based AEAD algorithm can be securely
implemented without evaluating the block cipher inverse.
4.4.2. Lightweight
Definition. An AEAD algorithm can be efficiently and securely
implemented on resource-constrained devices. In particular, it meets
the criteria required in the NIST Lightweight Cryptography
competition [MBTM17].
Further reading. [MBTM17]
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4.4.3. Online
Definition. An AEAD algorithm encryption (decryption) operation can
be implemented with a constant memory and a single one-direction pass
over the plaintext (ciphertext), writing out the result during that
pass.
Further reading. [HRRV15] [FJMV2004]
4.4.4. Parallelizable
Definition. An AEAD algorithm can fully exploit the parallel
computation infrastructure.
Synonyms. Pipelineable.
Further reading. [C20]
4.4.5. Single pass
Definition. An AEAD algorithm encryption (decryption) operation can
be implemented with a single pass over the plaintext (ciphertext).
4.4.6. Static Associated Data
Definition. An AEAD algorithm allows pre-computation for static (or
repeating) associated data so that static AD doesn't significantly
contribute to the computational cost of encryption.
4.4.7. ZK-friendly
Definition. An AEAD algorithm operates on binary and prime fields
with a low number of non-linear operations (often called
multiplicative complexity). Thus, it allows efficient implementation
using a domain-specific language (DSL) for writing zk-SNARKs
circuits.
Synonyms. ZK-focused, Arithmetization-oriented, Low Multiplicative
Complexity
Further reading. [DGGK21]
4.5. Additional functionality properties
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4.5.1. Incremental
Definition. An AEAD algorithm allows encrypting and authenticating a
message (associated data and a plaintext pair), which only partly
differs from some previous message, faster than processing it from
scratch.
Further reading. [SY16], [BKY02], [M05]
4.5.2. Remotely-keyed
Definition. An AEAD algorithm can be implemented with most of the
operations in encryption/decryption performed by an insecure (i.e.,
it leaks all intermediate values) device, which has no access to the
key, while another secure device performs operations involving the
key.
Further reading. [BFN98], [DA03]
4.5.3. Robust
Definition. An AEAD algorithm allows the user to choose an arbitrary
value l >= 0 for every plaintext and then encrypts it into a
ciphertext, which is l bits longer.
Further reading. [HKR2015]
5. Security Considerations
This document defines the properties of AEAD algorithms. However,
the document does not describe any concrete mechanisms providing
these properties, neither it describes how to achieve them. In fact,
one can claim that an AEAD algorithm provides any of the defined
properties only if its analysis in the relevant models was carried
out.
6. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC5116] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
Encryption", RFC 5116, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
7.2. Informative References
[A14] Forler, C., List, E., Forler, C., List, E., List, E., and
E. List, "How to Securely Release Unverified Plaintext in
Authenticated Encryption", Advances in Cryptology –
ASIACRYPT 2014. ASIACRYPT 2014. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol 8873. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-45611-8_6, 2014,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45611-8_6>.
[ADL17] Ashur, T., Dunkelman, O., and A. Luykx, "Boosting
Authenticated Encryption Robustness with Minimal
Modifications", Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2017.
CRYPTO 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 10403.
Springer, Cham, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_1, 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_1>.
[B20] Bellizia, D., Bronchain, O., Cassiers, G., Grosso, V.,
Guo, C., Momin, C., Pereira, O., Peters, T., and FX.
Standaert, "Mode-Level vs. Implementation-Level Physical
Security in Symmetric Cryptography: A Practical Guide
Through the Leakage-Resistance Jungle", Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2020. CRYPTO 2020. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol 12170. Springer, Cham,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-56784-2_13, 2020,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-56784-2_13>.
[BC09] Forler, C. and E. List, "MAC Reforgeability", Fast
Software Encryption. FSE 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol 5665. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-03317-9_21, 2009,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03317-9_21>.
[BFN98] Blaze, M., Feigenbaum, J., and M. Naor, "A formal
treatment of remotely keyed encryption", Advances in
Cryptology — EUROCRYPT'98. EUROCRYPT 1998. Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, vol 1403. Springer, Berlin,
Heidelberg, DOI 10.1007/BFb0054131, 1998,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/BFb0054131>.
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[BK2011] Bellare, M. and S. Keelveedhi, "Authenticated and Misuse-
Resistant Encryption of Key-Dependent Data", Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2011. CRYPTO 2011. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol 6841. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_35, 2011,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22792-9_35>.
[BKY02] Buonanno, E., Katz, J., and M. Yung, "Incremental
Unforgeable Encryption", Fast Software Encryption. FSE
2001. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 2355.
Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, DOI 10.1007/3-540-45473-X_9,
2002, <https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45473-X_9>.
[BN2000] Bellare, M. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated Encryption:
Relations among Notions and Analysis of the Generic
Composition Paradigm", Proceedings of ASIACRYPT 2000,
Springer-Verlag, LNCS 1976, pp. 531-545,
DOI 10.1007/s00145-008-9026-x, 2000,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-008-9026-x>.
[BNT19] Bellare, M., Ng, R., and B. Tackmann, "Nonces Are Noticed:
AEAD Revisited", Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2019.
CRYPTO 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 11692.
Springer, Cham, DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9, 2019,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-26948-7_9>.
[BT16] Bellare, M. and B. Tackmann, "The Multi-User Security of
Authenticated Encryption: AES-GCM in TLS 1.3", Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2016. CRYPTO 2016. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol 9814. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_10, 2016,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53018-4_10>.
[C20] Chakraborti, A., Datta, N., Jha, A., Mancillas-López, C.,
Nandi, M., and Y. Sasaki, "INT-RUP Secure Lightweight
Parallel AE Modes", IACR Transactions on Symmetric
Cryptology, 2019(4), 81–118,
DOI 10.13154/tosc.v2019.i4.81-118, 2020,
<https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2019.i4.81-118>.
[DA03] Dodis, Y. and JH. An, "Concealment and Its Applications to
Authenticated Encryption", Advances in Cryptology —
EUROCRYPT 2003. EUROCRYPT 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol 2656. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
DOI 10.1007/3-540-39200-9_19, 2003,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-39200-9_19>.
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[DGGK21] Dobraunig, C., Grassi, L., Guinet, G., and K. Kuijsters,
"CIMINION: Symmetric Encryption Based on Toffoli-Gates
over Large Finite Fields", Advances in Cryptology –
EUROCRYPT 2021. EUROCRYPT 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer
Science(), vol 12697. Springer, Cham,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-77886-6_1, 2021,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-77886-6_1>.
[FJMV2004] Valette, PA., Joux, A., Martinet, G., and F. Valette,
"Authenticated On-Line Encryption", Selected Areas in
Cryptography. SAC 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol 3006. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-24654-1_11, 2004,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-24654-1_11>.
[FLLW17] Forler, C., List, E., Lucks, S., and J. Wenzel,
"Reforgeability of Authenticated Encryption Schemes",
Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2017. Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol 10343. Springer, Cham,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-59870-3_2, 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59870-3_2>.
[FOR17] Farshim, P., Orlandi, C., and R. Rosie, "Authenticated and
Misuse-Resistant Encryption of Key-Dependent DataSecurity
of Symmetric Primitives under Incorrect Usage of Keys",
IACR Transactions on Symmetric Cryptology, 2017(1),
449–473., DOI 10.13154/tosc.v2017.i1.449-473, 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.13154/tosc.v2017.i1.449-473>.
[GLR17] Grubbs, P., Lu, J., and T. Ristenpart, "Message Franking
via Committing Authenticated Encryption.", Advances in
Cryptology – CRYPTO 2017. CRYPTO 2017. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol 10403. Springer, Cham,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_3, 2017,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-63697-9_3>.
[GPPS19] Guo, C., Pereira, O., Peters, T., and FX. Standaert,
"Authenticated Encryption with Nonce Misuse and Physical
Leakages: Definitions, Separation Results and Leveled
Constructions", Progress in Cryptology - LATINCRYPT 2019.
LATINCRYPT 2019. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol
11774. Springer, Cham, DOI 10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_8,
2019, <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_8>.
[HKR2015] Hoang, VT., Krovetz, T., and P. Rogaway, "Robust
Authenticated-Encryption AEZ and the Problem That It
Solves", Advances in Cryptology -- EUROCRYPT 2015.
EUROCRYPT 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol
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9056. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-46800-5_2, 2015,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-46800-5_2>.
[HRRV15] Hoang, VT., Reyhanitabar, R., Rogaway, P., and D. Vizár,
"Online Authenticated-Encryption and its Nonce-Reuse
Misuse-Resistance", Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO 2015.
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Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_24, 2015,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47989-6_24>.
[I-D.irtf-cfrg-aead-limits]
Günther, F., Thomson, M., and C. A. Wood, "Usage Limits on
AEAD Algorithms", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
irtf-cfrg-aead-limits-06, 30 January 2023,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-
aead-limits-06>.
[JMV2002] Joux, A., Martinet, G., and F. Valette, "Blockwise-
Adaptive Attackers Revisiting the (In)Security of Some
Provably Secure Encryption Modes: CBC, GEM, IACBC",
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Notes in Computer Science, vol 2442. Springer, Berlin,
Heidelberg, DOI 10.1007/3-540-45708-9_2, 2002,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-45708-9_2>.
[LGR21] Len, J., Grubbs, P., and T. Ristenpart, "Partitioning
Oracle Attacks", 30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX
Security 21), 195--212, 2021.
[M05] McGrew, D., "Efficient authentication of large, dynamic
data sets using Galois/counter mode (GCM)", Third IEEE
International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW'05), San
Francisco, CA, USA, DOI 10.1109/SISW.2005.3., 2005,
<https://doi.org/10.1109/SISW.2005.3.>.
[MBTM17] McKay, K., Bassham, L., Turan, MS., and N. Mouha, "Report
on Lightweight Cryptography", DOI 10.6028/NIST.IR.8114,
2017, <https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8114>.
[R2002] Rogaway, P., "Authenticated-encryption with associated-
data.", Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer
and communications security (CCS '02), Association for
Computing Machinery, New York, NY, USA, 98–107,
DOI 10.1145/586110.586125, 2002,
<https://doi.org/10.1145/586110.586125>.
Bozhko Expires 11 September 2023 [Page 14]
Internet-Draft Properties of AEAD algorithms March 2023
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4303>.
[RFC8221] Wouters, P., Migault, D., Mattsson, J., Nir, Y., and T.
Kivinen, "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)", RFC 8221,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8221, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8221>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
[RFC9000] Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.
[RS06] Rogaway, R. and T. Shrimpton, "A Provable-Security
Treatment of the Key-Wrap Problem", Advances in Cryptology
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Computer Science, vol 4004. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg,
DOI 10.1007/11761679_23, 2016,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/11761679_23>.
[SY16] Sasaki, Y. and K. Yasuda, "A New Mode of Operation for
Incremental Authenticated Encryption with Associated
Data", Selected Areas in Cryptography – SAC 2015. SAC
2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9566.
Springer, Cham, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_23, 2016,
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31301-6_23>.
Appendix A. Contributors
Author's Address
Andrey Bozhko (editor)
CryptoPro
Email: andbogc@gmail.com
Bozhko Expires 11 September 2023 [Page 15]
