Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-algs-rfc8208-bis

draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-algs-rfc8208-bis



 



Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)                         S. Turner
Internet-Draft                                                     sn3rd
Obsoletes: 8208 (if approved)                                O. Borchert
Intended status: Standards Track                                    NIST
Expires: October 17, 2019                                 April 15, 2019

         BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature Formats
             draft-ietf-sidrops-bgpsec-algs-rfc8208-bis-05

Abstract

   This document specifies the algorithms, algorithm parameters,
   asymmetric key formats, asymmetric key sizes, and signature formats
   used in BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security).  This document
   obsoletes RFC 8208 ("BGPsec Algorithms, Key Formats, and Signature
   Formats") by adding Documentation Algorithm IDs, Experimentation
   Algorithm IDs, correcting the range of unassigned algorithms IDs to
   fill the complete range, and restructured the document for better
   reading.

   This document also includes example BGPsec UPDATE messages as well as
   the private keys used to generate the messages and the certificates
   necessary to validate those signatures.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
   Task Force (IETF).  Note that other groups may also distribute
   working documents as Internet-Drafts.  The list of current Internet-
   Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.

   Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
   and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
   time.  It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
   material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 2, 2018








 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019                [Page 1]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.  Code Components extracted from this document must
   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License. 

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.1.  Terminology  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
     1.2.  Changes from RFC 8208  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   2.  Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.1. Algorithm ID Types  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
     2.2. Signature Algorithms  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       2.2.1. Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA-P256)  . . . . . . . . .  6
   3.  Asymmetric Key Pair Formats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
     3.1.  Asymmetric Key Pair for Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - 
           (ECDSA-P256) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.1.  Public Key Format  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
       3.1.2.  Private Key Format . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   4.  Signature Formats  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   5.  Additional Requirements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   7.  IANA Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
   8.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     8.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
     8.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   Appendix A.  Examples  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     A.1.  Topology and Experiment Description  . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     A.2.  Keys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     A.3.  BGPsec IPv4  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
     A.4.  BGPsec IPv6  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
   Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23





 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019                [Page 2]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


1.  Introduction

   This document specifies the following:

   o  the digital signature algorithm and parameters,

   o  the hash algorithm and parameters,

   o  the algorithm identifier assignment and classification, 

   o  the public and private key formats, and

   o  the signature formats

   used by Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Certification
   Authorities (CAs) and BGPsec (Border Gateway Protocol Security)
   speakers (i.e., routers).  CAs use these algorithms when processing
   requests for BGPsec Router Certificates [RFC8209].  Examples of when
   BGPsec routers use these algorithms include requesting BGPsec
   certificates [RFC8209], signing BGPsec UPDATE messages [RFC8205], and
   verifying signatures on BGPsec UPDATE messages [RFC8205].

   This document updates [RFC7935] to add support for a) a different
   algorithm for BGPsec certificate requests, which are issued only by
   BGPsec speakers; b) a different Subject Public Key Info format for
   BGPsec certificates, which is needed for the specified BGPsec
   signature algorithm; and c) different signature formats for BGPsec
   signatures, which are needed for the specified BGPsec signature
   algorithm.  The BGPsec certificates are differentiated from other
   RPKI certificates by the use of the BGPsec Extended Key Usage as
   defined in [RFC8209].  BGPsec uses a different algorithm [RFC6090]
   [DSS] as compared to the rest of the RPKI that provides similar
   security with smaller keys making the certificates smaller; these
   algorithms also result in smaller signatures, which makes the PDUs
   smaller.

   Appendix A (non-normative) contains example BGPsec UPDATE messages as
   well as the private keys used to generate the messages and the
   certificates necessary to validate the signatures.

1.1.  Terminology

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
   BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019                [Page 3]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


1.2.  Changes from RFC 8208

   This section describes the significant changes between [RFC8208] and
   this document.

   o  Added Section 2.1 of algorithm ID types. Also, the interpretation
      of these IDs is described.

   o  Restructured Sections 2 and 3 to align with the corresponding
      algorithm suite identifier value. 

   o  Correction of range for unassigned algorithm suite identifier
      values.

   o  Adding of Documentation algorithm suite identifier values. 

   o  Adding of Experimentation algorithm suite identifier values. 

   o  Changed Next-HOP IP in Appendix A's IPv6 Example to use private
      usage IPv6 address.

2.  Algorithms

   The algorithms used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec
   Router Certificates, and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) are as
   specified in Section 2 of [RFC7935].  This section addresses BGPsec
   algorithms used by BGPsec [RFC8205] [DSS]. For example, these
   algorithms are used by BGPsec routers to sign and verify BGPsec
   UPDATE messages. To identify which algorithm is used, the BGPsec
   UPDATE message contains the corresponding algorithm ID in each
   Signature_Block of the BGPsec UPDATE message.

2.1. Algorithm ID Types

   Algorithms in BGPsec UPDATE messages are identified by the Algorithm
   Suite Identifier field (Algorithm ID) within the Signature_Block (see
   Section 3.2 of [RFC8205]).

   This document specifies five types of algorithm IDs:

   o  Reserved Algorithm ID

      Reserved algorithm IDs are the values 0x00 (0) and 0xFF (255). 
      These IDs MUST NOT be used in a Signature_Block and if
      encountered, the router MUST treat BGPsec UPDATE messages as
      Malformed [RFC4271].


 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019                [Page 4]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


   o  Signature Algorithm ID

      Signature algorithms are defined in Section 2.2 of this document. 
      Processing of BGPsec UPDATE signing and validation using signature
      algorithms is described in length in Section 4.2 and Section 5.2
      of [RFC8205].

   o  Unassigned Algorithm ID

      This type of algorithm ID is free for future assignments and MUST
      NOT be used until an algorithm is officially assigned (see
      Section 7).  In case a router encounters an unassigned algorithm
      ID in one of the Signature_Blocks of a BGPsec UPDATE message, the
      router SHOULD process the Signature_Block as
      "unsupported algorithm" as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205].

   o  Experimentation Algorithm ID

      Experimentation algorithm IDs span from 0xF7 (247) to 0xFA (250). 
      To allow experimentation to accurately describe deployment
      examples, the use of publicly assigned algorithm IDs is
      inappropriate, and a reserved block of Experimentation algorithm
      IDs is required.  This ensures that experimentation does not clash
      with assigned algorithm IDs in deployed networks, and mitigates
      the risks to operational integrity of the network through
      inappropriate use of experimentation to perform literal
      configuration of routing elements on production systems.  A router
      that encounters an algorithm ID of this type outside of an
      experimental network, SHOULD treat it the same as
      "unsupported algorithm" as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205].

   o  Documentation Algorithm ID

      Documentation algorithm IDs span from 0xFB (251) to 0xFE (254). 
      To allow documentation to accurately describe deployment examples,
      the use of publicly assigned algorithm IDs is inappropriate, and a
      reserved block of Documentation algorithm IDs is required.  This
      ensures that documentation does not clash with assigned algorithm
      IDs in deployed networks, and mitigates the risks to operational
      integrity of the network through inappropriate use of
      documentation to perform literal configuration of routing elements
      on production systems.  A router that encounters an algorithm ID
      of this type SHOULD treat it the same as "unsupported algorithm"
      as specified in Section 5.2 of [RFC8205].




 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019                [Page 5]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


2.2. Signature Algorithms 

2.2.1. Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA-P256)

   o  The signature algorithm used MUST be the Elliptic Curve Digital
      Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with curve P-256 [RFC6090] [DSS].

   o  The hash algorithm used MUST be SHA-256 [SHS].

   Hash algorithms are not identified by themselves in certificates or
   BGPsec UPDATE messages.  They are represented by an OID that combines
   the hash algorithm with the digital signature algorithm as follows:

   o  The ecdsa-with-SHA256 OID [RFC5480] MUST appear in the Public-Key
      Cryptography Standards #10 (PKCS #10) signatureAlgorithm field
      [RFC2986] or in the Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)
      POPOSigningKey algorithm field [RFC4211]; where the OID is placed
      depends on the certificate request format generated.

   o  In BGPsec UPDATE messages, the ECDSA with SHA-256 algorithm suite
      identifier value 0x01 (1) (see Section 7) is included in the
      Signature_Block List's Algorithm Suite Identifier field.

3.  Asymmetric Key Pair Formats

   The key formats used to compute signatures on CA certificates, BGPsec
   Router Certificates, and CRLs are as specified in Section 3 of
   [RFC7935].  This section addresses key formats found in the BGPsec
   Router Certificate requests and in BGPsec Router Certificates.

3.1.  Asymmetric Key Pair for Algorithm ID 0x01 (1) - (ECDSA-P256)

   The ECDSA private keys used to compute signatures for certificate
   requests and BGPsec UPDATE messages MUST be associated with the P-256
   curve domain parameters [RFC5480].  The public key pair MUST use the
   uncompressed form.

3.1.1.  Public Key Format

   The Subject's public key is included in subjectPublicKeyInfo
   [RFC5280].  It has two sub-fields: algorithm and subjectPublicKey.
   The values for the structures and their sub-structures follow:

   o  algorithm (an AlgorithmIdentifier type): The id-ecPublicKey OID
      MUST be used in the algorithm field, as specified in Section 2.1.1
      of [RFC5480].  The value for the associated parameters MUST be
      secp256r1, as specified in Section 2.1.1.1 of [RFC5480].

 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019                [Page 6]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


   o  subjectPublicKey: ECPoint MUST be used to encode the certificate's
      subjectPublicKey field, as specified in Section 2.2 of [RFC5480].

3.1.2.  Private Key Format

   Local policy determines private key format.

4.  Signature Formats

   The structure for the certificate's and CRL's signature field MUST be
   as specified in Section 4 of [RFC7935]; this is the same format used
   by other RPKI certificates.  The structure for the certification
   request's and BGPsec UPDATE message's signature field MUST be as
   specified in Section 2.2.3 of [RFC3279].

5.  Additional Requirements

   It is anticipated that BGPsec will require the adoption of updated
   key sizes and a different set of signature and hash algorithms over
   time, in order to maintain an acceptable level of cryptographic
   security.  This profile should be updated to specify such future
   requirements, when appropriate.

   The recommended procedures to implement such a transition of key
   sizes and algorithms are specified in [RFC6916].

6.  Security Considerations 

   The security considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC5480], [RFC6090],
   [RFC7935], and [RFC8209] apply to certificates.  The security
   considerations of [RFC3279], [RFC6090], [RFC7935], and [RFC8209]
   apply to certification requests.  The security considerations of
   [RFC3279], [RFC6090], and [RFC8205] apply to BGPsec UPDATE messages.
   No new security considerations are introduced as a result of this
   specification.













 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019                [Page 7]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


7.  IANA Considerations

   The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has created the
   "BGPsec Algorithm Suite Registry" in the Resource Public Key
   Infrastructure (RPKI) group.  The one-octet "BGPsec Algorithm Suite
   Registry" identifiers assigned by IANA identify the digest algorithm
   and signature algorithm used in the BGPsec Signature_Block List's
   Algorithm Suite Identifier field.

   [RFC8208] directed IANA to register a single algorithm suite
   identifier for the digest algorithm SHA-256 [SHS] and for the
   signature algorithm ECDSA on the P-256 curve [RFC6090] [DSS].  This
   identifier is still valid, and IANA has updated registration to refer
   to this document.

   IANA is asked to modify the previously registered "Unassigned"
   address space.

     Algorithm   Digest          Signature       Specification
     Suite       Algorithm       Algorithm       Pointer
     Identifier 
   +------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+
   | 0x2-0xEF   | Unassigned    | Unassigned   |                       |
   +------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+

   To be modified to:

     Algorithm   Digest          Signature       Specification
     Suite       Algorithm       Algorithm       Pointer
     Identifier 
   +------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+
   | 0x02-0xF6  | Unassigned    | Unassigned   |                       |
   +------------+---------------+--------------+-----------------------+

   In addition IANA is asked to register the following address space for
   "Documentation" and "Experimentation":

     Algorithm   Digest            Signature         Specification
     Suite       Algorithm         Algorithm         Pointer
     Identifier 
   +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
   | 0xF7-0xFA  | Experimentation | Experimentation | This Document    |
   +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
   | 0xFB-0xFE  | Documentation   | Documentation   | This Document    |
   +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+



 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019                [Page 8]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


   After the requested modification, the "BGPsec Algorithm Suite
   Registry" in the RPKI group should contain the following values:

                    BGPsec Algorithm Suite Registry

     Algorithm   Digest            Signature         Specification
     Suite       Algorithm         Algorithm         Pointer
     Identifier 
   +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
   | 0x00       | Reserved        | Reserved        | This document    |
   +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
   | 0x01       | SHA-256         | ECDSA P-256     | [SHS] [DSS]      |
   |            |                 |                 | [RFC6090]        |
   |            |                 |                 | This document    |
   +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
   | 0x02-0xF6  | Unassigned      | Unassigned      |                  |
   +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
   | 0xF7-0xFA  | Experimentation | Experimentation | This Document    |
   +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
   | 0xFB-0xFE  | Documentation   | Documentation   | This Document    |
   +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+
   | 0xFF       | Reserved        | Reserved        | This document    |
   +------------+-----------------+-----------------+------------------+

   Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process
   defined in [RFC8126].  Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm
   suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and
   signature algorithm name.




















 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019                [Page 9]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


8.  References

8.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI
              10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2986]  Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
              Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, DOI
              10.17487/RFC2986, November 2000, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc2986>.

   [RFC3279]  Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
              Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 3279, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April
              2002, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279>.

   [RFC4211]  Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
              Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, DOI
              10.17487/RFC4211, September 2005, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc4211>.

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271, DOI
              10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

   [RFC5280]  Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
              Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
              Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
              (CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.

   [RFC5480]  Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
              "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
              Information", RFC 5480, DOI 10.17487/RFC5480, March 2009,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5480>.

   [RFC6090]  McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
              Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090, DOI
              10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc6090>.

   [RFC6916]  Gagliano, R., Kent, S., and S. Turner, "Algorithm Agility
              Procedure for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019               [Page 10]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


              (RPKI)", BCP 182, RFC 6916, DOI 10.17487/RFC6916, April
              2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6916>.

   [RFC7935]  Huston, G. and G. Michaelson, Ed., "The Profile for
              Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use in the Resource Public
              Key Infrastructure", RFC 7935, DOI 10.17487/RFC7935,
              August 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7935>.

   [RFC8126]  Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
              Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
              RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in
              RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI
              10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8205]  Lepinski, M., Ed., and K. Sriram, Ed., "BGPsec Protocol
              Specification", RFC 8205, DOI 10.17487/RFC8205, September
              2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8205>.

   [RFC8208]  Turner, S. and O. Borchert, "BGPsec Algorithms, Key
              Formats, and Signature Formats", RFC 8208, DOI
              10.17487/RFC8208, September 2017, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc8208>.

   [RFC8209]  Reynolds, M., Turner, S., and S. Kent, "A Profile for
              BGPsec Router Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists,
              and Certification Requests", RFC 8209, DOI
              10.17487/RFC8209, September 2017, <https://www.rfc-
              editor.org/info/rfc8209>.


   [DSS]      National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
              Signature Standard (DSS)", NIST FIPS Publication 186-4,
              DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, July 2013,
              <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
              NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>.

   [SHS]      National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
              Hash Standard (SHS)", NIST FIPS Publication 180-4,
              DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, August 2015,
              <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
              NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.

8.2.  Informative References

 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019               [Page 11]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


   [RFC5398]  Huston, G., "Autonomous System (AS) Number Reservation for
              Documentation Use", RFC 5398, DOI 10.17487/RFC5398,
              December 2008, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5398>.

   [RFC6979]  Pornin, T., "Deterministic Usage of the Digital Signature
              Algorithm (DSA) and Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
              Algorithm (ECDSA)", RFC 6979, DOI 10.17487/RFC6979, August
              2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6979>.








































 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019               [Page 12]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


Appendix A.  Examples

A.1.  Topology and Experiment Description

   Topology:

   AS(64496)----AS(65536)----AS(65537)

   Prefix Announcement: AS(64496), 192.0.2.0/24, 2001:db8::/32

   The signature algorithm used in this example is ECDSA P-256 using the
   algorithm suite identifier ID 0x01 (1) as specified in Section 7 of
   this document.

A.2.  Keys

   For this example, the ECDSA algorithm was provided with a static k to
   make the result deterministic.

   The k used for all signature operations was taken from [RFC6979],
   Appendix A.2.5, "Signatures With SHA-256, message = 'sample'".

   Note: Even though the certificates below are expired, the are still
   useful within the constraint of this document.

     k = A6E3C57DD01ABE90086538398355DD4C
         3B17AA873382B0F24D6129493D8AAD60


   Keys of AS64496:
   ================
   ski: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154

   private key:
     x = D8AA4DFBE2478F86E88A7451BF075565
         709C575AC1C136D081C540254CA440B9

   public key: 
     Ux = 7391BABB92A0CB3BE10E59B19EBFFB21
          4E04A91E0CBA1B139A7D38D90F77E55A
     Uy = A05B8E695678E0FA16904B55D9D4F5C0
          DFC58895EE50BC4F75D205A25BD36FF5






 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019               [Page 13]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


   Router Key Certificate example using OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013
   --------------------------------------------------------------------
   Certificate:
       Data:
           Version: 3 (0x2)
           Serial Number: 38655612 (0x24dd67c)
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
           Issuer: CN=ROUTER-0000FBF0
           Validity
               Not Before: Jan  1 05:00:00 2017 GMT
               Not After : Jul  1 05:00:00 2018 GMT
           Subject: CN=ROUTER-0000FBF0
           Subject Public Key Info:
               Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
                   Public-Key: (256 bit)
                   pub: 
                       04:73:91:ba:bb:92:a0:cb:3b:e1:0e:59:b1:9e:bf:
                       fb:21:4e:04:a9:1e:0c:ba:1b:13:9a:7d:38:d9:0f:
                       77:e5:5a:a0:5b:8e:69:56:78:e0:fa:16:90:4b:55:
                       d9:d4:f5:c0:df:c5:88:95:ee:50:bc:4f:75:d2:05:
                       a2:5b:d3:6f:f5
                   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
           X509v3 extensions:
               X509v3 Key Usage: 
                   Digital Signature
               X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 
                   AB:4D:91:0F:55:CA:E7:1A:21:5E:
                   F3:CA:FE:3A:CC:45:B5:EE:C1:54
               X509v3 Extended Key Usage: 
                   1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.30
               sbgp-autonomousSysNum: critical
                   Autonomous System Numbers:
                     64496
                   Routing Domain Identifiers:
                     inherit

       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
            30:44:02:20:07:b7:b4:6a:5f:a4:f1:cc:68:36:39:03:a4:83:
            ec:7c:80:02:d2:f6:08:9d:46:b2:ec:2a:7b:e6:92:b3:6f:b1:
            02:20:00:91:05:4a:a1:f5:b0:18:9d:27:24:e8:b4:22:fd:d1:
            1c:f0:3d:b1:38:24:5d:64:29:35:28:8d:ee:0c:38:29







 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019               [Page 14]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
   MIIBiDCCAS+gAwIBAgIEAk3WfDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAaMRgwFgYDVQQDDA9ST1VU
   RVItMDAwMEZCRjAwHhcNMTcwMTAxMDUwMDAwWhcNMTgwNzAxMDUwMDAwWjAaMRgw
   FgYDVQQDDA9ST1VURVItMDAwMEZCRjAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNC
   AARzkbq7kqDLO+EOWbGev/shTgSpHgy6GxOafTjZD3flWqBbjmlWeOD6FpBLVdnU
   9cDfxYiV7lC8T3XSBaJb02/1o2MwYTALBgNVHQ8EBAMCB4AwHQYDVR0OBBYEFKtN
   kQ9VyucaIV7zyv46zEW17sFUMBMGA1UdJQQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMeMB4GCCsGAQUF
   BwEIAQH/BA8wDaAHMAUCAwD78KECBQAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDRwAwRAIgB7e0al+k
   8cxoNjkDpIPsfIAC0vYInUay7Cp75pKzb7ECIACRBUqh9bAYnSck6LQi/dEc8D2x
   OCRdZCk1KI3uDDgp
   -----END CERTIFICATE-----


   Keys of AS(65536):
   ==================
   ski: 47F23BF1AB2F8A9D26864EBBD8DF2711C74406EC

   private key:
     x = 6CB2E931B112F24554BCDCAAFD9553A9
         519A9AF33C023B60846A21FC95583172

   public key: 
     Ux = 28FC5FE9AFCF5F4CAB3F5F85CB212FC1
          E9D0E0DBEAEE425BD2F0D3175AA0E989
     Uy = EA9B603E38F35FB329DF495641F2BA04
          0F1C3AC6138307F257CBA6B8B588F41F






















 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019               [Page 15]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


   Router Key Certificate example using OpenSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 Feb 2013
   --------------------------------------------------------------------
   Certificate:
       Data:
           Version: 3 (0x2)
           Serial Number: 3752143940 (0xdfa52c44)
       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
           Issuer: CN=ROUTER-00010000
           Validity
               Not Before: Jan  1 05:00:00 2017 GMT
               Not After : Jul  1 05:00:00 2018 GMT
           Subject: CN=ROUTER-00010000
           Subject Public Key Info:
               Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
                   Public-Key: (256 bit)
                   pub: 
                       04:28:fc:5f:e9:af:cf:5f:4c:ab:3f:5f:85:cb:21:
                       2f:c1:e9:d0:e0:db:ea:ee:42:5b:d2:f0:d3:17:5a:
                       a0:e9:89:ea:9b:60:3e:38:f3:5f:b3:29:df:49:56:
                       41:f2:ba:04:0f:1c:3a:c6:13:83:07:f2:57:cb:a6:
                       b8:b5:88:f4:1f
                   ASN1 OID: prime256v1
           X509v3 extensions:
               X509v3 Key Usage: 
                   Digital Signature
               X509v3 Subject Key Identifier: 
                   47:F2:3B:F1:AB:2F:8A:9D:26:86:
                   4E:BB:D8:DF:27:11:C7:44:06:EC
               X509v3 Extended Key Usage: 
                   1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.30
               sbgp-autonomousSysNum: critical
                   Autonomous System Numbers:
                     65536
                   Routing Domain Identifiers:
                     inherit

       Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
            30:45:02:21:00:8c:d9:f8:12:96:88:82:74:03:a1:82:82:18:
            c5:31:00:ee:35:38:e8:fa:ae:72:09:fe:98:67:01:78:69:77:
            8c:02:20:5f:ee:3a:bf:10:66:be:28:d3:b3:16:a1:6b:db:66:
            21:99:ed:a6:e4:ad:64:3c:ba:bf:44:fb:cb:b7:50:91:74







 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019               [Page 16]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
   MIIBijCCATCgAwIBAgIFAN+lLEQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwGjEYMBYGA1UEAwwPUk9V
   VEVSLTAwMDEwMDAwMB4XDTE3MDEwMTA1MDAwMFoXDTE4MDcwMTA1MDAwMFowGjEY
   MBYGA1UEAwwPUk9VVEVSLTAwMDEwMDAwMFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcD
   QgAEKPxf6a/PX0yrP1+FyyEvwenQ4Nvq7kJb0vDTF1qg6Ynqm2A+OPNfsynfSVZB
   8roEDxw6xhODB/JXy6a4tYj0H6NjMGEwCwYDVR0PBAQDAgeAMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRH
   8jvxqy+KnSaGTrvY3ycRx0QG7DATBgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDHjAeBggrBgEF
   BQcBCAEB/wQPMA2gBzAFAgMBAAChAgUAMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIQCM2fgS
   loiCdAOhgoIYxTEA7jU46Pqucgn+mGcBeGl3jAIgX+46vxBmvijTsxaha9tmIZnt
   puStZDy6v0T7y7dQkXQ=
   -----END CERTIFICATE-----


A.3.  BGPsec IPv4

   BGPsec IPv4 UPDATE from AS(65536) to AS(65537):
   ===============================================
   Binary Form of BGPsec UPDATE (TCP-DUMP):

   FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 
   01 03 02 00 00 00 EC 40  01 01 02 80 04 04 00 00 
   00 00 80 0E 0D 00 01 01  04 C6 33 64 64 00 18 C0 
   00 02 90 1E 00 CD 00 0E  01 00 00 01 00 00 01 00 
   00 00 FB F0 00 BF 01 47  F2 3B F1 AB 2F 8A 9D 26 
   86 4E BB D8 DF 27 11 C7  44 06 EC 00 48 30 46 02 
   21 00 EF D4 8B 2A AC B6  A8 FD 11 40 DD 9C D4 5E 
   81 D6 9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA  F9 91 C3 4D 0E A8 4E AF 
   37 16 02 21 00 90 F2 C1  29 AB B2 F3 9B 6A 07 96 
   3B D5 55 A8 7A B2 B7 33  3B 7B 91 F1 66 8F D8 61 
   8C 83 FA C3 F1 AB 4D 91  0F 55 CA E7 1A 21 5E F3 
   CA FE 3A CC 45 B5 EE C1  54 00 48 30 46 02 21 00 
   EF D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD  11 40 DD 9C D4 5E 81 D6 
   9D 2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91  C3 4D 0E A8 4E AF 37 16 
   02 21 00 8E 21 F6 0E 44  C6 06 6C 8B 8A 95 A3 C0 
   9D 3A D4 37 95 85 A2 D7  28 EE AD 07 A1 7E D7 AA 
   05 5E CA 

   Signature from AS(64496) to AS(65536):
   --------------------------------------
   Digest:    21 33 E5 CA A0 26 BE 07   3D 9C 1B 4E FE B9 B9 77 
              9F 20 F8 F5 DE 29 FA 98   40 00 9F 60 47 D0 81 54 
   Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B   2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD 
              9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87   7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E 
              A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00   8E 21 F6 0E 44 C6 06 6C 
              8B 8A 95 A3 C0 9D 3A D4   37 95 85 A2 D7 28 EE AD 
              07 A1 7E D7 AA 05 5E CA   


 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019               [Page 17]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


   Signature from AS(65536) to AS(65537):
   --------------------------------------
   Digest:    01 4F 24 DA E2 A5 21 90   B0 80 5C 60 5D B0 63 54 
              22 3E 93 BA 41 1D 3D 82   A3 EC 26 36 52 0C 5F 84 
   Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B   2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD 
              9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87   7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E 
              A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00   90 F2 C1 29 AB B2 F3 9B 
              6A 07 96 3B D5 55 A8 7A   B2 B7 33 3B 7B 91 F1 66 
              8F D8 61 8C 83 FA C3 F1

   The human-readable output is produced using bgpsec-io, a BGPsec
   traffic generator that uses a Wireshark-like printout.

   Send UPDATE Message
     +--marker: FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
     +--length: 259
     +--type: 2 (UPDATE)
     +--withdrawn_routes_length: 0
     +--total_path_attr_length: 236
        +--ORIGIN: INCOMPLETE (4 bytes)
        |  +--Flags: 0x40 (Well-Known, Transitive, Complete)
        |  +--Type Code: ORIGIN (1)
        |  +--Length: 1 byte
        |  +--Origin: INCOMPLETE (1)
        +--MULTI_EXIT_DISC (7 bytes)
        |  +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Non-transitive, Complete)
        |  +--Type Code: MULTI_EXIT_DISC (4)
        |  +--Length: 4 bytes
        |  +--data: 00 00 00 00 
        +--MP_REACH_NLRI (16 bytes)
        |  +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Non-transitive, Complete)
        |  +--Type Code: MP_REACH_NLRI (14)
        |  +--Length: 13 bytes
        |  +--Address family: IPv4 (1)
        |  +--Subsequent address family identifier: Unicast (1)
        |  +--Next hop network address: (4 bytes)
        |  |  +--Next hop: 198.51.100.100
        |  +--Subnetwork points of attachment: 0
        |  +--Network layer reachability information: (4 bytes)
        |     +--192.0.2.0/24
        |     +--MP Reach NLRI prefix length: 24
        |     +--MP Reach NLRI IPv4 prefix: 192.0.2.0






 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019               [Page 18]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


        +--BGPSEC Path Attribute (209 bytes)
           +--Flags: 0x90 (Optional, Complete, Extended Length)
           +--Type Code: BGPSEC Path Attribute (30)
           +--Length: 205 bytes
           +--Secure Path (14 bytes)
           |  +--Length: 14 bytes
           |  +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
           |  |  +--pCount: 1
           |  |  +--Flags: 0
           |  |  +--AS number: 65536 (1.0)
           |  +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
           |     +--pCount: 1
           |     +--Flags: 0
           |     +--AS number: 64496 (0.64496)
           +--Signature Block (191 bytes)
              +--Length: 191 bytes
              +--Algo ID: 1
              +--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
              |  +--SKI: 47F23BF1AB2F8A9D26864EBBD8DF2711C74406EC
              |  +--Length: 72 bytes
              |  +--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B   2AACB6A8FD1140DD 
              |                9CD45E81D69D2C87   7B56AAF991C34D0E 
              |                A84EAF3716022100   90F2C129ABB2F39B 
              |                6A07963BD555A87A   B2B7333B7B91F166 
              |                8FD8618C83FAC3F1   
              +--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
                 +--SKI: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154
                 +--Length: 72 bytes
                 +--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B   2AACB6A8FD1140DD 
                               9CD45E81D69D2C87   7B56AAF991C34D0E 
                               A84EAF3716022100   8E21F60E44C6066C 
                               8B8A95A3C09D3AD4   379585A2D728EEAD 
                               07A17ED7AA055ECA















 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019               [Page 19]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


A.4.  BGPsec IPv6

   BGPsec IPv6 UPDATE from AS(65536) to AS(65537):
   ===============================================
   Binary Form of BGP/BGPsec UPDATE (TCP-DUMP):

   FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF  FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 
   01 10 02 00 00 00 F9 40  01 01 02 80 04 04 00 00 
   00 00 80 0E 1A 00 02 01  10 FD 00 00 00 00 00 00 
   00 00 00 00 00 C6 33 64  64 00 20 20 01 0D B8 90 
   1E 00 CD 00 0E 01 00 00  01 00 00 01 00 00 00 FB 
   F0 00 BF 01 47 F2 3B F1  AB 2F 8A 9D 26 86 4E BB 
   D8 DF 27 11 C7 44 06 EC  00 48 30 46 02 21 00 EF 
   D4 8B 2A AC B6 A8 FD 11  40 DD 9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 
   2C 87 7B 56 AA F9 91 C3  4D 0E A8 4E AF 37 16 02 
   21 00 D1 B9 4F 62 51 04  6D 21 36 A1 05 B0 F4 72 
   7C C5 BC D6 74 D9 7D 28  E6 1B 8F 43 BD DE 91 C3 
   06 26 AB 4D 91 0F 55 CA  E7 1A 21 5E F3 CA FE 3A 
   CC 45 B5 EE C1 54 00 48  30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B 
   2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD  9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87 
   7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E  A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00 
   E2 A0 2C 68 FE 53 CB 96  93 4C 78 1F 5A 14 A2 97 
   19 79 20 0C 91 56 ED F8  55 05 8E 80 53 F4 AC D3 


   Signature from AS(64496) to AS(65536):
   --------------------------------------
   Digest:    8A 0C D3 E9 8E 55 10 45   82 1D 80 46 01 D6 55 FC 
              52 11 89 DF 4D B0 28 7D   84 AC FC 77 55 6D 06 C7 
   Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B   2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD 
              9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87   7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E 
              A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00   E2 A0 2C 68 FE 53 CB 96 
              93 4C 78 1F 5A 14 A2 97   19 79 20 0C 91 56 ED F8 
              55 05 8E 80 53 F4 AC D3   

   Signature from AS(65536) to AS(65537):
   --------------------------------------
   Digest:    44 49 EC 70 8D EC 5C 85   00 C2 17 8C 72 FE 4C 79 
              FF A9 3C 95 31 61 01 2D   EE 7E EE 05 46 AF 5F D0 
   Signature: 30 46 02 21 00 EF D4 8B   2A AC B6 A8 FD 11 40 DD 
              9C D4 5E 81 D6 9D 2C 87   7B 56 AA F9 91 C3 4D 0E 
              A8 4E AF 37 16 02 21 00   D1 B9 4F 62 51 04 6D 21 
              36 A1 05 B0 F4 72 7C C5   BC D6 74 D9 7D 28 E6 1B 
              8F 43 BD DE 91 C3 06 26




 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019               [Page 20]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


   The human-readable output is produced using bgpsec-io, a BGPsec
   traffic generator that uses a Wireshark-like printout.

   Send UPDATE Message
     +--marker: FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF
     +--length: 272
     +--type: 2 (UPDATE)
     +--withdrawn_routes_length: 0
     +--total_path_attr_length: 249
        +--ORIGIN: INCOMPLETE (4 bytes)
        |  +--Flags: 0x40 (Well-Known, Transitive, Complete)
        |  +--Type Code: ORIGIN (1)
        |  +--Length: 1 byte
        |  +--Origin: INCOMPLETE (1)
        +--MULTI_EXIT_DISC (7 bytes)
        |  +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Non-transitive, Complete)
        |  +--Type Code: MULTI_EXIT_DISC (4)
        |  +--Length: 4 bytes
        |  +--data: 00 00 00 00 
        +--MP_REACH_NLRI (29 bytes)
        |  +--Flags: 0x80 (Optional, Non-transitive, Complete)
        |  +--Type Code: MP_REACH_NLRI (14)
        |  +--Length: 26 bytes
        |  +--Address family: IPv6 (2)
        |  +--Subsequent address family identifier: Unicast (1)
        |  +--Next hop network address: (16 bytes)
        |  |  +--Next hop: fd00:0000:0000:0000:0000:0000:c633:6464
        |  +--Subnetwork points of attachment: 0
        |  +--Network layer reachability information: (5 bytes)
        |     +--2001:db8::/32
        |     +--MP Reach NLRI prefix length: 32
        |     +--MP Reach NLRI IPv6 prefix: 2001:db8::
















 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019               [Page 21]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


        +--BGPSEC Path Attribute (209 bytes)
           +--Flags: 0x90 (Optional, Complete, Extended Length)
           +--Type Code: BGPSEC Path Attribute (30)
           +--Length: 205 bytes
           +--Secure Path (14 bytes)
           |  +--Length: 14 bytes
           |  +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
           |  |  +--pCount: 1
           |  |  +--Flags: 0
           |  |  +--AS number: 65536 (1.0)
           |  +--Secure Path Segment: (6 bytes)
           |     +--pCount: 1
           |     +--Flags: 0
           |     +--AS number: 64496 (0.64496)
           +--Signature Block (191 bytes)
              +--Length: 191 bytes
              +--Algo ID: 1
              +--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
              |  +--SKI: 47F23BF1AB2F8A9D26864EBBD8DF2711C74406EC
              |  +--Length: 72 bytes
              |  +--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B   2AACB6A8FD1140DD 
              |                9CD45E81D69D2C87   7B56AAF991C34D0E 
              |                A84EAF3716022100   D1B94F6251046D21 
              |                36A105B0F4727CC5   BCD674D97D28E61B 
              |                8F43BDDE91C30626   
              +--Signature Segment: (94 bytes)
                 +--SKI: AB4D910F55CAE71A215EF3CAFE3ACC45B5EEC154
                 +--Length: 72 bytes
                 +--Signature: 3046022100EFD48B   2AACB6A8FD1140DD 
                               9CD45E81D69D2C87   7B56AAF991C34D0E 
                               A84EAF3716022100   E2A02C68FE53CB96
                               934C781F5A14A297   1979200C9156EDF8 
                               55058E8053F4ACD3















 


Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019               [Page 22]

Internet Draft    BGPsec Algs, Key & Signature Formats    April 15, 2019


Acknowledgements

   The authors wish to thank Geoff Huston and George Michaelson for
   producing [RFC7935], which this document is entirely based on.  The
   authors would also like to thank Roque Gagliano, David Mandelberg,
   Tom Petch, Sam Weiler, and Stephen Kent for their reviews and
   comments.  Mehmet Adalier, Kotikalapudi Sriram, and Doug Montgomery
   were instrumental in developing the test vectors found in Appendix A.
   Additionally we want to thank Geoff Huston, author of [RFC5398] from
   where we borrowed wording for Section 2.1 of this document.

Authors' Addresses

   Sean Turner
   sn3rd

   Email: sean@sn3rd.com


   Oliver Borchert
   NIST
   100 Bureau Drive
   Gaithersburg, MD  20899
   United States of America

   Email: oliver.borchert@nist.gov

























Turner & Borchert       Expires October 17, 2019               [Page 23]