Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-emu-bootstrapped-tls
draft-ietf-emu-bootstrapped-tls
Network Working Group O. Friel
Internet-Draft Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track D. Harkins
Expires: 14 August 2023 Hewlett-Packard Enterprise
10 February 2023
Bootstrapped TLS Authentication with Proof of Knowledge (TLS-POK)
draft-ietf-emu-bootstrapped-tls-02
Abstract
This document defines a mechanism that enables a bootstrapping device
to establish trust and mutually authenticate against a network.
Bootstrapping devices have a public private key pair, and this
mechanism enables a network server to prove to the device that it
knows the public key, and the device to prove to the server that it
knows the private key. The mechanism leverages existing DPP and TLS
standards and can be used in an EAP exchange.
Status of This Memo
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provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 August 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2. Bootstrapping Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. EAP Network Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. Bootstrap Key Pair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1. Alignment with Wi-Fi Alliance Device Provisioning
Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Bootstrapping in TLS 1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.1. External PSK Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.2. TLS 1.3 Handshake Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Using TLS Bootstrapping in EAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1. Introduction
On-boarding of devices with no, or limited, user interface can be
difficult. Typically, a credential is needed to access the network,
and network connectivity is needed to obtain a credential. This
poses a catch-22.
If a device has a public / private keypair, and trust in the
integrity of a device's public key can be obtained in an out-of-band
fashion, a device can be authenticated and provisioned with a usable
credential for network access. While this authentication can be
strong, the device's authentication of the network is somewhat
weaker. [duckling] presents a functional security model to address
this asymmetry.
Device on-boarding protocols such as the Device Provisioning Profile
[DPP], also referred to as Wi-Fi Easy Connect, address this use case
but they have drawbacks. [DPP] for instance does not support wired
network access, and does not specify how the device's DPP keypair can
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be used in a TLS handshake. This document describes an on-boarding
protocol that can be used for wired network access, which we refer to
as TLS Proof of Knowledge or TLS-POK.
This document does not address the problem of Wi-Fi network
discovery, where a bootstrapping device detects multiple different
Wi-Fi networks and needs a more robust and scalable mechanism than
simple round-robin to determine the correct network to attach to.
DPP addresses this issue. Thus, the intention is that DPP is the
recommended mechanism for bootstrapping against Wi-Fi networks, and
TLS-POK is the recommended mechanism for bootstrapping against wired
networks.
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The following terminology is used throughout this document.
* 802.1X: IEEE Port-Based Network Access Control
* BSK: Bootstrap Key which is an elliptic curve public private key
pair
* DPP: Device Provisioning Protocol [DPP]
* EAP: Extensible Authentication Protocol [RFC3748]
* EPSK: External Pre-Shared Key
* EST: Enrollment over Secure Transport [RFC7030]
* PSK: Pre-Shared Key
* TEAP: Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol [RFC7170]
1.2. Bootstrapping Overview
A bootstrapping device holds a public / private key pair which we
refer to as a Bootstrap Key (BSK). The private key of the BSK is
known only by the device. The public key of the BSK is known by the
device, is known by the owner or holder of the device, and is
provisioned on the network by the network operator. In order to
establish trust and mutually authenticate, the network proves to the
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device that it knows the public part of the BSK, and the device
proves to the network that it knows the private part of the BSK.
Once this trust has been established during bootstrapping, the
network can provision the device with a credential that it uses for
subsequent network access. More details on the BSK are given in
Section 2.
1.3. EAP Network Access
Enterprise deployments typically require an [IEEE802.1X]/EAP-based
authentication to obtain network access. Protocols like Enrollment
over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] can be used to enroll devices
into a Certification Authority to allow them to authenticate using
802.1X/EAP. This creates a Catch-22 where a certificate is needed
for network access and network access is needed to obtain
certificate.
Devices whose BSK public key can been obtained in an out-of-band
fashion and provisioned on the network can perform an EAP-TLS-based
exchange, for instance Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol
(TEAP) [RFC7170], and authenticate the TLS exchange using the
bootstrapping mechanisms defined in Section 3. This network
connectivity can then be used to perform an enrollment protocol (such
as provided by [RFC7170]) to obtain a credential for subsequent
network connectivity and certificate lifecycle maintenance.
2. Bootstrap Key Pair
The mechanism for on-boarding of devices defined in this document
relies on bootstrap key pairs. A client device has an associated
elliptic curve (EC) bootstrap key pair (BSK). The BSK may be static
and baked into device firmware at manufacturing time, or may be
dynamic and generated at on-boarding time by the device. If the BSK
public key, specifically the ASN.1 SEQUENCE SubjectPublicKeyInfo from
[RFC5280], can be shared in a trustworthy manner with a TLS server, a
form of "origin entity authentication" (the step from which all
subsequent authentication proceeds) can be obtained.
The exact mechanism by which the server gains knowledge of the BSK
public key is out of scope of this specification, but possible
mechanisms include scanning a QR code to obtain a base64 encoding of
the ASN.1-formatted public key or uploading of a Bill of Materials
(BOM) which includes the public key. If the QR code is physically
attached to the client device, or the BOM is associated with the
device, the assumption is that the public key obtained in this
bootstrapping method belongs to the client. In this model, physical
possession of the device implies legitimate ownership.
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The server may have knowledge of multiple BSK public keys
corresponding to multiple devices, and existing TLS mechanisms are
leveraged that enable the server to identity a specific bootstrap
public key corresponding to a specific device.
Using the process defined herein, the client proves to the server
that it has possession of the private key of its BSK. Provided that
the mechanism in which the server obtained the BSK public key is
trustworthy, a commensurate amount of authenticity of the resulting
connection can be obtained. The server also proves that it knows the
client's BSK public key which, if the client does not gratuitously
expose its public key, can be used to obtain a modicum of
correctness, that the client is connecting to the correct network
(see [duckling]).
2.1. Alignment with Wi-Fi Alliance Device Provisioning Profile
The definition of the BSK public key aligns with that given in [DPP].
This, for example, enables the QR code format as defined in [DPP] to
be reused for TLS-POK. Therefore, a device that supports both wired
LAN and Wi-Fi LAN connections can have a single QR code printed on
its label, or dynamically display a single QR code on a display, and
the bootstrap key can be used for DPP if the device bootstraps
against a Wi-Fi network, or TLS-POK if the device bootstraps against
a wired network. Similarly, a common bootstrap public key format
could be imported into a BOM into a server that handles devices
connecting over both wired and Wi-Fi networks.
Any bootstrapping method defined for, or used by, [DPP] is compatible
with TLS-POK.
3. Bootstrapping in TLS 1.3
Bootstrapping in TLS 1.3 leverages Certificate-Based Authentication
with an External Pre-Shared Key [RFC8773]. The External PSK (EPSK)
is derived from the BSK public key, and the EPSK is imported using
[RFC9258]. This BSK MUST be from a cryptosystem suitable for doing
ECDSA. As the BSK is an ASN.1 SEQUENCE SubjectPublicKeyInfo, the
client presents a raw public key certificate as specified in Using
Raw Public Keys in TLS and DTLS [RFC7250].
The TLS PSK handshake gives the client proof that the server knows
the BSK public key. Certificate based authentication of the client
by the server is carried out using the BSK, giving the server proof
that the client knows the BSK private key. This satisfies the proof
of ownership requirements outlined in Section 1.
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3.1. External PSK Derivation
An [RFC9258] EPSK is made up of the tuple of (Base Key, External
Identity, Hash). The EPSK is derived from the BSK public key using
[RFC5869] with the hash algorithm from the ciphersuite:
epsk = HKDF-Expand(HKDF-Extract(<>, bskey),
"tls13-imported-bsk", L)
epskid = HKDF-Expand(HKDF-Extract(<>, bskey),
"tls13-bspsk-identity", L)
where:
- epsk is the EPSK Base Key
- epskid is the EPSK External Identity
- <> is a NULL salt
- bskey is the DER-encoded ASN.1 subjectPublicKeyInfo
representation of the BSK public key
- L is the length of the digest of the underlying hash
algorithm
The [RFC9258] ImportedIdentity structure is defined as:
struct {
opaque external_identity<1...2^16-1>;
opaque context<0..2^16-1>;
uint16 target_protocol;
uint16 target_kdf;
} ImportedIdentity;
and is created using the following values:
external_identity = epskid
context = "tls13-bsk"
target_protocol = TLS1.3(0x0304)
target_kdf = HKDF_SHA256(0x0001)
The EPSK and ImportedIdentity are used in the TLS handshake as
specified in [RFC9258].
A performance versus storage tradeoff a server can choose is to
precompute the identity of every bootstrapped key with every hash
algorithm that it uses in TLS and use that to quickly lookup the
bootstrap key and generate the PSK. Servers that choose not to
employ this optimization will have to do a runtime check with every
bootstrap key it holds against the identity the client provides.
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3.2. TLS 1.3 Handshake Details
The client includes the "tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension in the
ClientHello, per [RFC8773]. The client identifies the BSK by
inserting the serialized content of ImportedIdentity into the
PskIdentity.identity in the PSK extension, per [RFC9258]. The client
MUST also include the [RFC7250] "client_certificate_type" extension
in the ClientHello and MUST specify type of RawPublicKey.
Upon receipt of the ClientHello, the server looks up the client's
EPSK key in its database using the mechanisms documented in
[RFC9258]. The ImportedIdentity context value of "tls13-bsk" informs
the server that the mechanisms specified in this document for
deriving the EPSK and executing the TLS handshake MUST be used. If
no match is found, the server MUST terminate the TLS handshake with
an alert. If the server found the matching BSK, it includes the
"tls_cert_with_extern_psk" extension in the ServerHello message, and
the corresponding EPSK identity in the "pre_shared_key" extension.
When these extensions have been successfully negotiated, the TLS 1.3
key schedule MUST include both the EPSK in the Early Secret
derivation and an (EC)DHE shared secret value in the Handshake Secret
derivation.
After successful negotiation of these extensions, the full TLS 1.3
handshake is performed with the additional caveat that the server
MUST send a CertificateRequest message and client MUST authenticate
with a raw public key (its BSK) per [RFC7250]. The BSK is always an
elliptic curve key pair, therefore the type of the client's
Certificate MUST be ECDSA and MUST contain the client's BSK public
key as a DER-encoded ASN.1 subjectPublicKeyInfo SEQUENCE.
Note that the client MUST NOT share its BSK public key with the
server until after the client has completed processing of the
ServerHello and verified the TLS key schedule. The PSK proof has
completed at this stage, and the server has proven to the client that
is knows the BSK public key, and it is therefore safe for the client
to send the BSK public key to the server in the Certificate message.
If the PSK verification step fails when processing the ServerHello,
the client terminates the TLS handshake and the BSK public key MUST
NOT be shared with the server.
When the server processes the client's Certificate it MUST ensure
that it is identical to the BSK public key that it used to generate
the EPSK and ImportedIdentity for this handshake.
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When clients use the [duckling] form of authentication, they MAY
forgo the checking of the server's certificate in the
CertificateVerify and rely on the integrity of the bootstrapping
method employed to distribute its key in order to validate trust in
the authenticated TLS connection.
The handshake is shown in Figure 1.
Client Server
-------- --------
ClientHello
+ cert_with_extern_psk
+ client_cert_type=RawPublicKey
+ key_share
+ pre_shared_key -------->
ServerHello
+ cert_with_extern_psk
+ client_cert_type=RawPublicKey
+ key_share
+ pre_shared_key
{EncryptedExtensions}
{CertificateRequest}
{Certificate}
{CertificateVerify}
<-------- {Finished}
{Certificate}
{CertificateVerify}
{Finished} -------->
[Application Data] <-------> [Application Data]
Figure 1: TLS 1.3 TLS-POK Handshake
4. Using TLS Bootstrapping in EAP
Upon "link up", an Authenticator on an 802.1X-protected port will
issue an EAP Identity request to the newly connected peer. For
unprovisioned devices that desire to take advantage of TLS-POK, there
is no initial realm in which to construct an NAI (see [RFC4282]) so
the initial EAP Identity response SHOULD contain simply the name
"tls-pok@eap-dpp.arpa" in order to indicate to the Authenticator that
an EAP method that supports TLS-POK SHOULD be started.
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Authenticating Peer Authenticator
------------------- -------------
<- EAP-Request/
Identity
EAP-Response/
Identity
(tls-pok@eap-dpp.arpa) ->
<- EAP-Request/
EAP-Type=TEAP
(TLS Start)
EAP-Response/
EAP-Type=TEAP
(TLS client_hello with
tls_cert_with_extern_psk
and pre_shared_key) ->
.
.
.
Both client and server have derived the EPSK and associated [RFC9258]
ImportedIdentity from the BSK as described in Section 3.1. When the
client starts the TLS exchange in the EAP transaction, it includes
the ImportedIdentity structure in the pre_shared_key extension in the
ClientHello. When the server received the ClientHello, it extracts
the ImportedIdentity and looks up the EPSK and BSK public key. As
previously mentioned in Section 2, the exact mechanism by which the
server has gained knowledge of or been provisioned with the BSK
public key is outside the scope of this document.
The server continues with the TLS handshake and uses the EPSK to
prove that it knows the BSK public key. When the client replies with
its Certificate, CertificateVerify and Finished messages, the server
MUST ensure that the public key in the Certificate message matches
the BSK public key.
Once the TLS handshake completes, the client and server have
established mutual trust. The server can then proceed to provision a
credential onto the client using, for example, the mechanisms
outlined in [RFC7170].
The client can then use this provisioned credential for subsequent
network authentication. The BSK is only used during bootstrap, and
it not used for any subsequent network access.
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5. IANA Considerations
This document registers the following arpa domain:
eap-dpp.arpa
6. Security Considerations
Bootstrap and trust establishment by the TLS server is based on proof
of knowledge of the client's bootstrap public key, a non-public
datum. The TLS server obtains proof that the client knows its
bootstrap public key and, in addition, also possesses its
corresponding private key.
Trust on the part of the client is based on successful completion of
the TLS 1.3 handshake using the EPSK derived from the BSK. This
proves to the client that the server knows its BSK public key. In
addition, the client assumes that knowledge of its BSK public key is
not widely disseminated and therefore any server that proves
knowledge of its BSK public key is the appropriate server from which
to receive provisioning, for instance via [RFC7170]. [duckling]
describes a security model for this type of "imprinting".
An attack on the bootstrapping method which substitutes the public
key of a corrupted device for the public key of an honest device can
result in the TLS sever on-boarding and trusting the corrupted
device.
If an adversary has knowledge of the bootstrap public key, the
adversary may be able to make the client bootstrap against the
adversary's network. For example, if an adversary intercepts and
scans QR labels on clients, and the adversary can force the client to
connect to its server, then the adversary can complete the TLS-POK
handshake with the client and the client will connect to the
adversary's server. Since physical possession implies ownership,
there is nothing to prevent a stolen device from being on-boarded.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280>.
[RFC5869] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", RFC 5869,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869>.
[RFC7250] Wouters, P., Ed., Tschofenig, H., Ed., Gilmore, J.,
Weiler, S., and T. Kivinen, "Using Raw Public Keys in
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport
Layer Security (DTLS)", RFC 7250, DOI 10.17487/RFC7250,
June 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7250>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8773] Housley, R., "TLS 1.3 Extension for Certificate-Based
Authentication with an External Pre-Shared Key", RFC 8773,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8773, March 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8773>.
[RFC9258] Benjamin, D. and C. A. Wood, "Importing External Pre-
Shared Keys (PSKs) for TLS 1.3", RFC 9258,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9258, July 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9258>.
7.2. Informative References
[DPP] Wi-Fi Alliance, "Device Provisioning Profile", 2020.
[duckling] Stajano, F. and E. Rescorla, "The Ressurecting Duckling:
Security Issues for Ad-Hoc Wireless Networks", 1999.
[IEEE802.1X]
IEEE, "Port-Based Network Access Control", 2010.
[RFC3748] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and H.
Levkowetz, Ed., "Extensible Authentication Protocol
(EAP)", RFC 3748, DOI 10.17487/RFC3748, June 2004,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3748>.
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[RFC4282] Aboba, B., Beadles, M., Arkko, J., and P. Eronen, "The
Network Access Identifier", RFC 4282,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4282, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4282>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
[RFC7170] Zhou, H., Cam-Winget, N., Salowey, J., and S. Hanna,
"Tunnel Extensible Authentication Protocol (TEAP) Version
1", RFC 7170, DOI 10.17487/RFC7170, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7170>.
Authors' Addresses
Owen Friel
Cisco
Email: ofriel@cisco.com
Dan Harkins
Hewlett-Packard Enterprise
Email: daniel.harkins@hpe.com
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