Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2


Internet-Draft                                                  D. Bider
Updates: 4252, 4253 (if approved)                        Bitvise Limited
Intended status: Standards Track                        October 12, 2017
Expires: April 12, 2018

      Use of RSA Keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 in Secure Shell (SSH)


  This memo updates RFC 4252 and RFC 4253 to define new public key
  algorithms for use of RSA keys with SHA-256 and SHA-512 for server and
  client authentication in SSH connections.


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Internet-Draft    RSA Keys with SHA-256, SHA-512 in SSH     October 2017

  This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
  Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10,
  2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material
  may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications
  of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining
  an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in
  such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF
  Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created
  outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for
  publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than

1.  Overview and Rationale

  Secure Shell (SSH) is a common protocol for secure communication on
  the Internet. In [RFC4253], SSH originally defined the public key
  algorithms "ssh-rsa" for server and client authentication using RSA
  with SHA-1, and "ssh-dss" using 1024-bit DSA and SHA-1. These
  algorithms are now considered deficient. For US government use, NIST
  has disallowed 1024-bit RSA and DSA, and use of SHA-1 for signing
  This memo updates RFC 4252 and RFC 4253 to define new public key
  algorithms allowing for interoperable use of existing and new RSA keys
  with SHA-256 and SHA-512.

1.1.  Requirements Terminology

  The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
  document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

1.2.  Wire Encoding Terminology

  The wire encoding types in this document - "boolean", "byte",
  "string", "mpint" - have meanings as described in [RFC4251].

2.  Public Key Format vs. Public Key Algorithm

  In [RFC4252], the concept "public key algorithm" is used to establish
  a relationship between one algorithm name, and:
  A. Procedures used to generate and validate a private/public keypair.
  B. A format used to encode a public key.
  C. Procedures used to calculate, encode, and verify a signature.
  This document uses the term "public key format" to identify only A and
  B in isolation. The term "public key algorithm" continues to identify
  all three aspects A, B, and C.

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3.  New RSA Public Key Algorithms

  This memo adopts the style and conventions of [RFC4253] in specifying
  how use of a public key algorithm is indicated in SSH.

  The following new public key algorithms are defined:
    rsa-sha2-256        RECOMMENDED    sign    Raw RSA key
    rsa-sha2-512        OPTIONAL       sign    Raw RSA key

  These algorithms are suitable for use both in the SSH transport layer
  [RFC4253] for server authentication, and in the authentication layer
  [RFC4252] for client authentication.

  Since RSA keys are not dependent on the choice of hash function, the
  new public key algorithms reuse the "ssh-rsa" public key format as
  defined in [RFC4253]:

    string    "ssh-rsa"
    mpint     e
    mpint     n
  All aspects of the "ssh-rsa" format are kept, including the encoded
  string "ssh-rsa". This allows existing RSA keys to be used with the
  new public key algorithms, without requiring re-encoding, or affecting
  already trusted key fingerprints.
  Signing and verifying using these algorithms is performed according to
  the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 scheme in [RFC8017] using SHA-2 [SHS] as hash.   

  For the algorithm "rsa-sha2-256", the hash used is SHA-256.
  For the algorithm "rsa-sha2-512", the hash used is SHA-512.

  The resulting signature is encoded as follows:

    string    "rsa-sha2-256" / "rsa-sha2-512"
    string    rsa_signature_blob

  The value for 'rsa_signature_blob' is encoded as a string containing
  S - an octet string which is the output of RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, of
  length equal to the length in octets of the RSA modulus.

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3.1.  Use for server authentication

  To express support and preference for one or both of these algorithms
  for server authentication, the SSH client or server includes one or
  both algorithm names, "rsa-sha2-256" and/or "rsa-sha2-512", in the
  name-list field "server_host_key_algorithms" in the SSH_MSG_KEXINIT
  packet [RFC4253]. If one of the two host key algorithms is negotiated,
  the server sends an "ssh-rsa" public key as part of the negotiated key
  exchange method (e.g. in SSH_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY), and encodes a signature
  with the appropriate signature algorithm name - either "rsa-sha2-256",
  or "rsa-sha2-512".
3.2.  Use for client authentication

  To use this algorithm for client authentication, the SSH client sends
  an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST message [RFC4252] encoding the "publickey"
  method, and encoding the string field "public key algorithm name" with
  the value "rsa-sha2-256" or "rsa-sha2-512". The "public key blob"
  field encodes the RSA public key using the "ssh-rsa" public key
  For example, as defined in [RFC4252] and [RFC4253], an SSH "publickey"
  authentication request using an "rsa-sha2-512" signature would be
  properly encoded as follows:

    string    user name
    string    service name
    string    "publickey"
    boolean   TRUE
    string    "rsa-sha2-512"
    string    public key blob:
        string    "ssh-rsa"
        mpint     e
        mpint     n
    string    signature:
        string    "rsa-sha2-512"
        string    rsa_signature_blob
  If the client includes the signature field, the client MUST encode the
  same algorithm name in the signature as in SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST -
  either "rsa-sha2-256", or "rsa-sha2-512". If a server receives a
  mismatching request, it MAY apply arbitrary authentication penalties,
  including but not limited to authentication failure or disconnect.

  OpenSSH 7.2 (but not 7.2p2) incorrectly encodes the algorithm in the
  signature as "ssh-rsa" when the algorithm in SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
  is "rsa-sha2-256" or "rsa-sha2-512". In this case, the signature does
  actually use either SHA-256 or SHA-512. A server MAY, but is not
  required to, accept this variant, or another variant that corresponds
  to a good-faith implementation, and is decided to be safe to accept.

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3.3.  Discovery of public key algorithms supported by servers

  Implementation experience has shown that there are servers which apply
  authentication penalties to clients attempting public key algorithms
  which the SSH server does not support.
  Servers that accept rsa-sha2-* signatures for client authentication
  SHOULD implement the extension negotiation mechanism defined in
  [EXT-INFO], including especially the "server-sig-algs" extension.
  When authenticating with an RSA key against a server that does not
  implement the "server-sig-algs" extension, clients MAY default to an
  "ssh-rsa" signature to avoid authentication penalties. When the new
  rsa-sha2-* algorithms have been sufficiently widely adopted to warrant
  disabling "ssh-rsa", clients MAY default to one of the new algorithms.

4.  IANA Considerations

  IANA is requested to update the "Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
  Parameters" registry established with [RFC4250], to extend the table
  Public Key Algorithm Names [IANA-PKA]:
  - To the immediate right of the column Public Key Algorithm Name,
    a new column is to be added, titled Public Key Format. For existing
    entries, the column Public Key Format should be assigned the same
    value found under Public Key Algorithm Name.

  - Immediately following the existing entry for "ssh-rsa", two sibling
    entries are to be added:

    P. K. Alg. Name    P. K. Format      Reference          Note
    rsa-sha2-256       ssh-rsa           [this document]    Section 3
    rsa-sha2-512       ssh-rsa           [this document]    Section 3

5.  Security Considerations

  The security considerations of [RFC4251] apply to this document.

5.1.  Key Size and Signature Hash
  The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special
  Publication 800-131A, Revision 1 [800-131A], disallows the use of RSA
  and DSA keys shorter than 2048 bits for US government use. The same
  document disallows the SHA-1 hash function for digital signature
  generation, except under NIST's protocol-specific guidance.
  It is prudent to follow this advice also outside of US government use.

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5.2.  Transition

  This document is based on the premise that RSA is used in environments
  where a gradual, compatible transition to improved algorithms will be
  better received than one that is abrupt and incompatible. It advises
  that SSH implementations add support for new RSA public key algorithms
  along with SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO and the "server-sig-algs" extension to
  allow coexistence of new deployments with older versions that support
  only "ssh-rsa". Nevertheless, implementations SHOULD start to disable
  "ssh-rsa" in their default configurations as soon as they have reason
  to believe that new RSA signature algorithms have been widely adopted.
5.3.  PKCS#1 v1.5 Padding and Signature Verification

  This document prescribes RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature padding because:
  (1) RSASSA-PSS is not universally available to all implementations;
  (2) PKCS#1 v1.5 is widely supported in existing SSH implementations;
  (3) PKCS#1 v1.5 is not known to be insecure for use in this scheme.
  Implementers are advised that a signature with PKCS#1 v1.5 padding
  MUST NOT be verified by applying the RSA key to the signature, and
  then parsing the output to extract the hash. This may give an attacker
  opportunities to exploit flaws in the parsing and vary the encoding.
  Verifiers MUST instead apply PKCS#1 v1.5 padding to the expected hash,
  then compare the encoded bytes with the output of the RSA operation.

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6.  References

6.1.  Normative References

  [SHS]       National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
              United States of America, "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)",
              FIPS Publication 180-4, August 2015,

  [RFC2119]   Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

  [RFC4251]   Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Architecture", RFC 4251, January 2006.

  [RFC4252]   Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Authentication Protocol", RFC 4252, January 2006.

  [RFC4253]   Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Transport Layer Protocol", RFC 4253, January 2006.

  [EXT-INFO]  Bider, D., "Extension Negotiation in Secure Shell (SSH)",
              draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ext-info-15.txt, September 2017,

6.2.  Informative References

  [800-131A]  National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
              "Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of
              Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths", NIST Special
              Publication 800-131A, Revision 1, November 2015,

  [RFC4250]   Lehtinen, S. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH)
              Protocol Assigned Numbers", RFC 4250, January 2006.

  [RFC8017]   Moriarty, K., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J. and Rusch, A.,
              "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
              RFC 8017, November 2016.
  [IANA-PKA]  "Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Parameters",

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Author's Address

  Denis Bider
  Bitvise Limited
  4105 Lombardy Court
  Colleyville, Texas  76034
  United States of America



  Thanks to Jon Bright, Niels Moeller, Stephen Farrell, Mark D. Baushke,
  Jeffrey Hutzelman, Hanno Boeck, Peter Gutmann, Damien Miller, Mat
  Berchtold, Roumen Petrov, Daniel Migault, Eric Rescorla, Russ Housley,
  Alissa Cooper, Adam Roach, and Ben Campbell for reviews, comments, and

Bider                                                           [Page 8]