Internet DRAFT - draft-ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy
draft-ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy
anima Working Group M. Richardson
Internet-Draft Sandelman Software Works
Intended status: Standards Track P. van der Stok
Expires: 27 April 2023 vanderstok consultancy
P. Kampanakis
Cisco Systems
24 October 2022
Constrained Join Proxy for Bootstrapping Protocols
draft-ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy-13
Abstract
This document extends the work of Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructures (BRSKI) by replacing the (stateful) TLS Circuit proxy
between Pledge and Registrar with a stateless or stateful Circuit
proxy using CoAP which is called the constrained Join Proxy. The
constrained Join Proxy is a mesh neighbor of the Pledge and can relay
a DTLS session originating from a Pledge with only link-local
addresses to a Registrar which is not a mesh neighbor of the Pledge.
Like the BRSKI Circuit proxy, this constrained Join Proxy eliminates
the need of Pledges to have routeable IP addresses before enrolment
by utilizing link-local addresses. Use of the constrained Join Proxy
also eliminates the need of the Pledge to authenticate to the network
or perform network-wide Registrar discover before enrolment.
About This Document
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Status information for this document may be found at
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-anima-constrained-join-
proxy/.
Discussion of this document takes place on the anima Working Group
mailing list (mailto:anima@ietf.org), which is archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/anima/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/anima-wg/constrained-join-proxy.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. constrained Join Proxy functionality . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. constrained Join Proxy specification . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Stateful Join Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Stateless Join Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3. Constraucting the extended token . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.3.1. Processing by Registrar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5. Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1. Discovery operations by Join-Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1.1. CoAP discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
5.1.2. GRASP discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.2. Pledge discovers Join-Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2.1. CoAP discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
5.2.2. GRASP discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5.2.3. 6tisch discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
6. Comparison of stateless and stateful modes . . . . . . . . . 18
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
8.1. Resource Type Attributes registry . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
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8.2. service name and port number registry . . . . . . . . . . 20
9. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
10. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11. Changelog . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11.1. 14 to 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11.2. 13 to 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11.3. 12 to 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
11.4. 11 to 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11.5. 10 to 09 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11.6. 09 to 07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11.7. 06 to 07 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11.8. 05 to 06 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11.9. 04 to 05 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11.10. 03 to 04 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11.11. 02 to 03 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11.12. 01 to 02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
11.13. 00 to 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
11.14. 00 to 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
12. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
12.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
12.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix A. Stateless CoAP payload examples . . . . . . . . . . 27
Appendix B. Stateless Proxy payload examples . . . . . . . . . . 27
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1. Introduction
The Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure (BRSKI) protocol
described in [RFC8995] provides a solution for a secure zero-touch
(automated) bootstrap of new (unconfigured) devices. In the context
of BRSKI, new devices, called "Pledges", are equipped with a factory-
installed Initial Device Identifier (IDevID) (see [ieee802-1AR]), and
are enrolled into a network. BRSKI makes use of Enrollment over
Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] with [RFC8366] vouchers to securely
enroll devices. A Registrar provides the security anchor of the
network to which a Pledge enrolls.
In this document, BRSKI is extended such that a Pledge connects to
"Registrars" via a constrained Join Proxy. In particular, this
solution is intended to support mesh networks as described in
[RFC4944].
The constrained Join Proxy as specified in this document is one of
the Join Proxy options referred to in [RFC8995] section 2.5.2 as
future work.
A complete specification of the terminology is pointed at in
Section 2.
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The specified solutions in [RFC8995] and [RFC7030] are based on POST
or GET requests to the EST resources (/cacerts, /simpleenroll,
/simplereenroll, /serverkeygen, and /csrattrs), and the brski
resources (/requestvoucher, /voucher_status, and /enrollstatus).
These requests use https and may be too large in terms of code space
or bandwidth required for constrained devices. Constrained devices
which may be part of constrained networks [RFC7228], typically
implement the IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless personal Area Networks
(6LoWPAN) [RFC4944] and Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)
[RFC7252].
CoAP can be run with the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
[RFC6347] as a security protocol for authenticity and confidentiality
of the messages. This is known as the "coaps" scheme. A constrained
version of EST, using CoAP and DTLS, is described in [RFC9148].
The [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher] extends [RFC9148] with BRSKI
artifacts such as voucher, request voucher, and the protocol
extensions for constrained Pledges that use CoAP.
However, in networks that require authentication, such as those using
[RFC4944], the Pledge will not be IP routable over the mesh network
until it is authenticated to the mesh network. A new Pledge can only
initially use a link-local IPv6 address to communicate with a mesh
neighbor [RFC6775] until it receives the necessary network
configuration parameters. The Pledge receives these configuration
parameters from the Registrar. When the Registrar is not a direct
neighbor of the Registrar but several hops away, the Pledge discovers
a neighbor that is operating the constrained Join Proxy, which
forwards DTLS protected messages between Pledge and Registrar. The
constrained Join Proxy must be enrolled previously such that the
message from constrained Join Proxy to Registrar can be routed over
one or more hops.
An enrolled Pledge can act as constrained Join Proxy between other
Pledges and the enrolling Registrar.
Two modes of the constrained Join Proxy are specified:
1 A stateful Join Proxy that locally stores UDP connection state:
IP addresses (link-local with interface and non-link-local and UDP port-numbers)
during the connection.
2 A stateless Join Proxy where the connection state
is replaced by a second layer of CoAP header in the
UDP messages between constrained Join Proxy and Registrar.
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This document is very much inspired by text published earlier in
[I-D.kumar-dice-dtls-relay].
[I-D.richardson-anima-state-for-joinrouter] outlined the various
options for building a constrained Join Proxy. [RFC8995] adopted
only the Circuit Proxy method (1), leaving the other methods as
future work.
Similar to the difference between storing and non-storing Modes of
Operations (MOP) in RPL [RFC6550], the stateful and stateless modes
differ in the way that they store the state required to forward the
return packet to the Pledge. In the stateful method, the return
forward state is stored in the Join Proxy. In the stateless method,
the return forward state is stored in the network using the CoAP
extended token in a way identical to that described in [RFC9031].
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
The following terms are defined in [RFC8366], and are used
identically as in that document: artifact, imprint, domain, Join
Registrar/Coordinator (JRC), Pledge, and Voucher.
In this document, the term "Registrar" is used throughout instead of
"Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC)".
The "Constrained Join Proxy" enables a Pledge that is multiple hops
away from the Registrar, to execute the BRSKI protocol [RFC8995]
using a secure channel.
The term "Join Proxy" is used interchangeably with the term
"constrained Join Proxy" throughout this document.
The [RFC8995] Circuit Proxy is referred to as a TCP circuit Join
Proxy.
3. constrained Join Proxy functionality
As depicted in the Figure 1, the Pledge (P), in a network such as a
Low-Power and Lossy Network (LLN) mesh [RFC7102] can be more than one
hop away from the Registrar (R) and not yet authenticated into the
network.
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In this situation, the Pledge can only communicate one-hop to its
nearest neighbor, the constrained Join Proxy (J) using link-local
IPv6 addresses. However, the Pledge needs to communicate using end-
to-end security with a Registrar in order to onboard, authenticate
and get the relevant system/network parameters. If the Pledge,
knowing the IP-address of the Registrar, initiates a DTLS connection
to the Registrar, then the packets are dropped at the constrained
Join Proxy since the Pledge is not yet admitted to the network or
there is no IP routability to the Pledge for any returned messages
from the Registrar.
multi-hop mesh
.---. IPv6
| R +---. +----+ +---+ subnet +--+
| | \ |6LR +----+ J |........|P |
'---' `--+ | | | clear | |
+----+ +---+ +--+
Registrar Join Proxy Pledge
Figure 1: multi-hop enrollment.
Without a routeable IPv6 address, the Pledge (P) cannot exchange
IPv6/UDP/DTLS traffic with the Registrar (R), over multiple hops in
the network.
Furthermore, the Pledge may not even be able to discover the IP
address of the Registrar over multiple hops to initiate a DTLS
connection and perform authentication.
To overcome the problems with non-routability of DTLS packets and the
discovery of the destination address of the Registrar, the
constrained Join Proxy is introduced. This constrained Join Proxy
functionality is also (auto) configured into all authenticated
devices in the network which may act as a constrained Join Proxy for
Pledges.
The constrained Join Proxy allows for routing of the packets from the
Pledge using IP routing to the intended Registrar. An authenticated
constrained Join Proxy can discover the routable IP address of the
Registrar over multiple hops. The following Section 4 specifies the
two constrained Join Proxy modes. A comparison is presented in
Section 6.
When a mesh network is set up, it consists of a Registrar and a set
of connected Pledges. No constrained Join Proxies are present. Only
some of these Pledges may be neighbors of the Registrar. Others
would need for their traffic to be routed across one or more enrolled
devices to reach the Registrar.
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The desired state of the installation is a network with a Registrar
and all Pledges becoming enrolled devices. Some of these enrolled
devices can act as constrained Join Proxies. Pledges can only employ
link-local communication until they are enrolled. A Pledge will
regularly try to discover a constrained Join Proxy or a Registrar
with link-local discovery requests. The Pledges which are neighbors
of the Registrar will discover the Registrar and be enrolled
following the constrained BRSKI protocol. An enrolled device can act
as constrained Join Proxy. The Pledges which are not a neighbor of
the Registrar will eventually discover a constrained Join Proxy and
follow the constrained BRSKI protocol to be enrolled. While this
goes on, more and more constrained Join Proxies with a larger hop
distance to the Registrar will emerge. The network should be
configured such that at the end of the enrollment process, all
Pledges have discovered a neighboring constrained Join Proxy or the
Registrar, and all Pledges are enrolled.
The constrained Join Proxy is as a packet-by-packet proxy for UDP
packets between Pledge and Registrar. The constrained BRSKI protocol
between Pledge and Registrar described in
[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher] which this Join Proxy supports
uses UDP messages with DTLS payload, but the Join Proxy as described
here is unaware of this payload. It can therefore potentially also
work for other UDP based protocols as long as they are agnostic to
(or can be made to work with) the change of IP header by the
constrained Join Proxy.
In both Stateless and Stateful mode, the Join Proxy needs to be
configured with or dynamically discover a Registrar to perform its
service. This specification does not discuss how a constrained Join
Proxy selects a Registrar when it discovers 2 or more.
4. constrained Join Proxy specification
A Join Proxy can operate in two modes:
* Stateful mode
* Stateless mode
The advantages and disadvantages of the two modes are presented in
Section 6.
A Registrar MUST implement both the stateful mode and the Stateless
mode, but an operator MAY configure it to announce only one. A Join
Proxy MUST implement the stateless mode, but SHOULD implement the
stateful mode if it has sufficient memory.
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For a Join Proxy to be operational, the node on which it is running
has to be able to talk to a Registrar (exchange UDP messages with
it). This can happen fully automatically by the Join Proxy node
first enrolling itself as a Pledge, and then learning the IP address,
the UDP port and the mode(s) (Stateful and/or Stateless) of the
Registrar, through a discovery mechanism such as those described in
Section 6.
In mesh LLN networks like those based upon RPL ([RFC6550]), it would
not be unusual for the 6LBR (the DODAG root) to have a wired network
interface on which the Registrar can be found. Or the Registrar may
in fact be co-located with the 6LBR. This 6LBR then becomes the
first Join Proxy, and additional nodes attach to it in a concentric
fashion.
Other methods, such as provisioning the Join Proxy are out of scope
of this document but equally feasible.
Once the Join Proxy is operational, its mode is determined by the
mode of the Registrar. If the Registrar offers both Stateful and
Stateless mode, the Join Proxy MUST use the stateless mode.
Independent of the mode of the Join Proxy, the Pledge first discovers
(see Section 6) and selects the most appropriate Join Proxy. From
the discovery, the Pledge learns the Join Proxies link-local scope IP
address and UDP (join) port. This discovery can also be based upon
[RFC8995] section 4.1. If the discovery method does not support
discovery of the join-port, then the Pledge assumes the default CoAP
over DTLS UDP port (5683).
4.1. Stateful Join Proxy
In stateful mode, the Join Proxy acts as a UDP "circuit" proxy that
does not change the UDP payload (data octets according to [RFC768])
but only rewrites the IP and UDP headers of each packet it receives
from Pledge and Registrar.
The stateful Join Proxy operates as a 'pseudo' UDP circuit proxy
creating and utilizing connection mapping state to rewrite the IP
address and UDP port number packet header fields of UDP packets that
it forwards between Pledge and Registrar. Figure 2 depiects how this
state is used.
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+------------+------------+-------------+--------------------------+
| Pledge | Join Proxy | Registrar | Message |
| (P) | (J) | (R) | Src_IP:port | Dst_IP:port|
+------------+------------+-------------+-------------+------------+
| --ClientHello--> | IP_P:p_P | IP_Jl:p_Jl |
| --ClientHello--> | IP_Jr:p_Jr| IP_R:5684 |
| | | |
| <--ServerHello-- | IP_R:5684 | IP_Jr:p_Jr |
| : | | |
| <--ServerHello-- : | IP_Jl:p_Jl| IP_P:p_P |
| : : | | |
| [DTLS messages] | : | : |
| : : | : | : |
| --Finished--> : | IP_P:p_P | IP_Jl:p_Jl |
| --Finished--> | IP_Jr:p_Jr| IP_R:5684 |
| | | |
| <--Finished-- | IP_R:5684 | IP_Jr:p_Jr |
| <--Finished-- | IP_Jl:p_Jl| IP_P:p_P |
| : : | : | : |
+---------------------------------------+-------------+------------+
IP_P:p_P = Link-local IP address and port of Pledge (DTLS Client)
IP_R:5684 = Routable IP address and coaps port of Registrar
IP_Jl:p_Jl = Link-local IP address and join-port of Join Proxy
IP_Jr:p_Jr = Routable IP address and client port of Join Proxy
Figure 2: constrained stateful joining message flow with
Registrar address known to Join Proxy.
Because UDP does not have the notion of a connection, this document
calls this a 'pseudo' connection, whose establishment is solely
triggered by receipt of a packet from a Pledge with an IP_p%IF:p_P
source for which no mapping state exists, and that is termined by a
connection expiry timer E.
If an untrusted Pledge that can only use link-local addressing wants
to contact a trusted Registrar, and the Registrar is more than one
hop away, it sends its DTLS messages to the Join Proxy.
When a proxy receives an ICMP error message from the Registrar or
Plege, for which mapping state exist, the proxy SHOULD map the ICMP
message as it would map a UDP message and forward the ICMP message to
the Registrar / Pledge. Processing of ICMP messages SHOULD NOT reset
the connection expiry timer.
To protect itself and the Registrar against malfunctioning Pledges
and or denial of service attacks, the join proxy SHOULD limit the
number of simultaneous mapping states on per ip address to 2 and the
number of simultaneous mapping states per interface to 10. When
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mapping state can not be built due to exhausted state, the proxy
SHOULD return an ICMP error (1), "Destination Port Unreachable"
message with code (1), "Communication with destination
administratively prohibited".
4.2. Stateless Join Proxy
Stateless Join Proxy operation eliminates the need and complexity to
maintain per UDP connection mapping state on the proxy and the state
machinery to build, maintain and remove this mapping state. It also
removes the need to protect this mapping state against DoS attacks
and may also reduce memory and CPU requirements on the proxy.
Stateless Join Proxy operations works by encapsulating the DTLS
messages into a new CoAP header [RFC7252]. This new CoAP header is
designed to be as minimalistic as possible. The use of CoAP here
costs a XXX bytes more than a custom encapsulation, but simplies much
of the operation, as well as permitting the result to pass through
CoAP proxies, CoAP to HTTP proxies, and other mechanisms that might
be introduced into a network. This also eliminates custom code that
is only rarely used, which may reduce bugs.
The CoAP payload is configured much as [RFC9031], Section 8.1.1
specifies:
* The request method is POST.
* The type is Confirmable (CON).
* The Proxy-Scheme option is set to "coap".
* No Uri_Host option is included, as none is technically required.
* No Uri-Path option is included.
* The payload is the DTLS payload as received from the Pledge.
* An extended token [RFC8974] is included to contain some encrypted
state that allows replies to be returned to the Pledge.
Appendix A shows an example CoAP header, assuming a 16-byte extended
token, with the resulting overhead of 28 bytes.
When the Join Proxy receives a UDP message from a Pledge, it encodes
the Pledges link-local IP address, interface and UDP (source) port of
the packet into the extended token. The result is sent to the
Registrar from a fixed source UDP port.
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As described in [RFC7252], Section 5.3.1, when the Registrar sends
packets for the Pledge, it MUST return the token field unchanged.
This allows the Join Proxy to decode the saved Pledge state, and
reconstruct the Pledges link-local IP address, interace and UDP
(destination) port for the return packet. Figure 3 shows this per-
packet mapping on the Join Proxy.
The Registrar transiently stores the extended token field information
in case it needs to generate additional messages as a result of DTLS
processing.
The Registrar uses the payload field to execute the Registrar
functionality.
The Registrar SHOULD NOT assume that it can decode the Header Field,
it should simply repeat it when responding. The Header contains the
original source link-local address and port of the Pledge from the
transient state stored earlier and the Contents field contains the
DTLS payload.
On receiving the CoAP message, the Join Proxy processes the CoAP
header. It uses the extended token field to route the payload as a
DTLS message to the Pledge.
In the stateless Join Proxy mode, both the Registrar and the Join
Proxy use discoverable UDP join-ports. For the Join Proxy this may
be a default CoAP port.
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+--------------+------------+---------------+-----------------------+
| Pledge | Join Proxy | Registrar | Message |
| (P) | (J) | (R) |Src_IP:port|Dst_IP:port|
+--------------+------------+---------------+-----------+-----------+
| --ClientHello--> | IP_P:p_P |IP_Jl:p_Jl |
| --JPY[H(IP_P:p_P),--> | IP_Jr:p_Jr|IP_R:p_Ra |
| C(ClientHello)] | | |
| <--JPY[H(IP_P:p_P),-- | IP_R:p_Ra |IP_Jr:p_Jr |
| C(ServerHello)] | | |
| <--ServerHello-- | IP_Jl:p_Jl|IP_P:p_P |
| : | | |
| [ DTLS messages ] | : | : |
| : | : | : |
| --Finished--> | IP_P:p_P |IP_Jr:p_Jr |
| --JPY[H(IP_P:p_P),--> | IP_Jl:p_Jl|IP_R:p_Ra |
| C(Finished)] | | |
| <--JPY[H(IP_P:p_P),-- | IP_R:p_Ra |IP_Jr:p_Jr |
| C(Finished)] | | |
| <--Finished-- | IP_Jl:p_Jl|IP_P:p_P |
| : | : | : |
+-------------------------------------------+-----------+-----------+
IP_P:p_P = Link-local IP address and port of the Pledge
IP_R:p_Ra = Routable IP address and join-port of Registrar
IP_Jl:p_Jl = Link-local IP address and join-port of Join Proxy
IP_Jr:p_Jr = Routable IP address and port of Join Proxy
JPY[H(),C()] = Join Proxy message with header H and content C
Figure 3: constrained stateless joining message flow.
4.3. Constraucting the extended token
The Join Proxy cannot decrypt the DTLS payload and has no knowledge
of the transported media type. The contents are DTLS encrypted.
The extended token payload is to be reflected by the Registrar when
sending reply packets to the Join Proxy. The extended token content
is not standardized, but this section provides an non-normative
example.
As explained in [RFC8974], Section 5.2, the Join Proxy SHOULD encrypt
the extended token with a symmetric key known only to the Join Proxy.
This key need not persist on a long term basis, and MAY be changed
periodically.
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This is intended to be identical to the mechanism described in
Section 7.1 of [RFC9031]. However, since the CoAP layer is inside of
the DTLS layer (which is between the Pledge and the Registrar), it is
not possible for the Join Proxy to act as an actual CoAP proxy.
The context that is stored into the extended token might be
constructed with the following CDDL grammar: (This is illustrative
only: the contents are not subject to standardization)
pledge_context_message = [
family: uint .bits 1,
ifindex: uint .bits 8,
srcport: uint .bits 16,
iid: bstr .bits 64,
]
This results in a total of 96 bits, or 12 bytes. The structure
stores the srcport, the originating IPv6 Link-Local address, the
IPv4/IPv6 family (as a single bit) and an ifindex to provide the
link-local scope. This fits nicely into a single AES128 CBC block
for instance, resulting in a 16 byte token. The Join Proxy MUST
maintain the same context block for all communications from the same
Pledge. This implies that any encryption key either does not change
during the communication, or that when it does, it is acceptable to
break any onboarding connections which have not yet completed. If
using a context parameter like defined above, it should be easy for
the Join Proxy to meet this requirement without maintaining any local
state about the Pledge.
Note: when IPv6 is used only the lower 64-bits of the origin IP need
to be recorded, because they are all IPv6 Link-Local addresses, so
the upper 64-bits are just "fe80::". For IPv4, a Link-Local IPv4
address [RFC3927] would be used, and it would fit into 64-bits. On
media where the IID is not 64-bits, a different arrangement will be
necessary.
For the join messages relayed to a particular Registrar, the Join
Proxy SHOULD use the same UDP source port for all messages related to
all Pledges. A Join Proxy MAY change the UDP source port, but doing
so creates more local state. But, a Join Proxy with multiple CPUs
(unlikely in a constrained system, but possible in some future)
could, for instance, use different source port numbers to demultiplex
connections across CPUs.
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4.3.1. Processing by Registrar
On reception of a CoAP encapsulated join message by the Registrar,
the Registrar processes the CoAP header and extracts the extended
token. The extended token will need to be provided as input to a
DTLS library [RFC9147], as the 5-tuple of the UDP connection alone
does not provide enough context for the Registrar to pick an
appropriate context. Note that the socket will need to be used for
multiple DTLS flows, which is atypical for how DTLS usually uses
sockets.
As an alternative, the Registrar could split out the state processing
from the DTLS processing, creating new sockets that it maintains, but
this just duplicates state across many places. It may still be an
advantage for some architectures.
Examples are shown in Appendix B.
At the CoAP level, within the Constrained BRSKI and the EST-COAP
[RFC9148] level, the block option [RFC7959] is often used. The
Registrar and the Pledge MUST select a block size that would allow
the addition of the additional CoAP header without violating MTU
sizes.
5. Discovery
5.1. Discovery operations by Join-Proxy
In order to accomodate automatic configuration of the Join-Proxy, it
must discover the location and a capabilities of the Registar.
Section 10.2 of [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher] explains the
basic mechanism, and this section explains the extensions required to
discover if stateless operation is supported.
5.1.1. CoAP discovery
Section 10.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher] describes how
to use CoAP Discovery. The stateless Join Proxy requires a different
end point that can accept the second CoAP header encapsulation and
extended token.
The stateless Join Proxy can discover the join-port of the Registrar
by sending a GET request to "/.well-known/core" including a resource
type (rt) parameter with the value "brski.rjp" [RFC6690]. Upon
success, the return payload will contain a port that contain process
the CoAP encalsulated DTLS messages.
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REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski.rjp
RES: 2.05 Content
<coap://[IP_address]:join-port>;rt=brski.rjp
In the [RFC6690] link format, and [RFC3986], Section 3.2, the
authority attribute can not include a port number unless it also
includes the IP address.
The returned join-port is expected to process the CoAP encapsulated
DTLS messages described in section Section 4.3. The scheme is now
CoAP, as the outside protocol is CoAP and could be subject to further
CoAP operations.
An EST/Registrar server running at address 2001:db8:0:abcd::52, with
the CoAP processing on port 7634, and the stateful Registrar on port
5683 could reply to a multicast query as follows:
REQ: GET /.well-known/core?rt=brski*
RES: 2.05 Content
<coap://[2001:db8:0:abcd::52]:7634>;rt=brski.rjp,
<coaps://[2001:db8:0:abcd::52]/.well-known/brski>;rt=brski,
<coaps://[2001:db8:0:abcd::52]/.well-known/brski/rv>;rt=brski.rv;ct=836,
<coaps://[2001:db8:0:abcd::52]/.well-known/brski/vs>;rt=brski.vs;ct="50 60",
<coaps://[2001:db8:0:abcd::52]/.well-known/brski/es>;rt=brski.es;ct="50 60",
5.1.2. GRASP discovery
Section 10.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher] describes how
to use GRASP [RFC8990] discovery within the ACP to locate the
stateful port of the Registrar.
A Join Proxy which supports a stateless mode of operation using the
mechanism described in Section 4.3 must know where to send the
encoded content from the Pledge. The Registrar announces its
willingness to use the stateless mechanism by including an additional
objective in it's M_FLOOD'ed AN_join_registrar announcements, but
with a different objective value.
The following changes are necessary with respect to figure 10 of
[RFC8995]:
* The transport-proto is IPPROTO_UDP
* the objective is AN_join_registrar, identical to [RFC8995].
* the objective name is "BRSKI_RJP".
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Here is an example M_FLOOD announcing the Registrar on example port
5685, which is a port number chosen by the Registrar.
[M_FLOOD, 51804231, h'fda379a6f6ee00000200000064000001', 180000,
[["AN_join_registrar", 4, 255, "BRSKI_RJP"],
[O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
h'fda379a6f6ee00000200000064000001', IPPROTO_UDP, 5685]]]
Figure 4: Example of Registrar announcement message
Most Registrars will announce both a CoAP-stateless and stateful
ports, and may also announce an HTTPS/TLS service:
[M_FLOOD, 51840231, h'fda379a6f6ee00000200000064000001', 180000,
[["AN_join_registrar", 4, 255, ""],
[O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
h'fda379a6f6ee00000200000064000001', IPPROTO_TCP, 8443],
["AN_join_registrar", 4, 255, "BRSKI_JP"],
[O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
h'fda379a6f6ee00000200000064000001', IPPROTO_UDP, 5684],
["AN_join_registrar", 4, 255, "BRSKI_RJP"],
[O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
h'fda379a6f6ee00000200000064000001', IPPROTO_UDP, 5685]]]
Figure 5: Example of Registrar announcing three services
5.2. Pledge discovers Join-Proxy
Regardless of whether the Join Proxy operates in stateful or
stateless mode, the Join Proxy is discovered by the Pledge
identically. When doing constrained onboarding with DTLS as
security, the Pledge will always see an IPv6 Link-Local destination,
with a single UDP port to which DTLS messages are to be sent.
5.2.1. CoAP discovery
In the context of a CoAP network without Autonomic Network support,
discovery follows the standard CoAP policy. The Pledge can discover
a Join Proxy by sending a link-local multicast message to ALL CoAP
Nodes with address FF02::FD. Multiple or no nodes may respond. The
handling of multiple responses and the absence of responses follow
section 4 of [RFC8995].
The join-port of the Join Proxy is discovered by sending a GET
request to "/.well-known/core" including a resource type (rt)
parameter with the value "brski.jp" [RFC6690]. Upon success, the
return payload will contain the join-port.
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The example below shows the discovery of the join-port of the Join
Proxy.
REQ: GET coap://[FF02::FD]/.well-known/core?rt=brski.jp
RES: 2.05 Content
<coaps://[IP_address]:join-port>; rt="brski.jp"
Port numbers are assumed to be the default numbers 5683 and 5684 for
coap and coaps respectively (sections 12.6 and 12.7 of [RFC7252])
when not shown in the response. Discoverable port numbers are
usually returned for Join Proxy resources in the <URI-Reference> of
the payload (see section 4.1 of [RFC9148]).
5.2.2. GRASP discovery
This section is normative for uses with an ANIMA ACP. In the context
of autonomic networks, the Join-Proxy uses the DULL GRASP M_FLOOD
mechanism to announce itself. Section 4.1.1 of [RFC8995] discusses
this in more detail.
The following changes are necessary with respect to figure 10 of
[RFC8995]:
* The transport-proto is IPPROTO_UDP
* the objective is AN_Proxy
The Registrar announces itself using ACP instance of GRASP using
M_FLOOD messages. Autonomic Network Join Proxies MUST support GRASP
discovery of Registrar as described in section 4.3 of [RFC8995] .
Here is an example M_FLOOD announcing the Join-Proxy at fe80::1, on
standard coaps port 5684.
[M_FLOOD, 12340815, h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', 180000,
[["AN_Proxy", 4, 1, ""],
[O_IPv6_LOCATOR,
h'fe800000000000000000000000000001', IPPROTO_UDP, 5684]]]
Figure 6: Example of Registrar announcement message
5.2.3. 6tisch discovery
The discovery of Join-Proxy by the Pledge uses the enhanced beacons
as discussed in [RFC9032]. 6tisch does not use DTLS and so this
specification does not apply to it.
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6. Comparison of stateless and stateful modes
The stateful and stateless mode of operation for the Join Proxy have
their advantages and disadvantages. This section should enable
operators to make a choice between the two modes based on the
available device resources and network bandwidth.
+===============+============================+=====================+
| Properties | Stateful mode | Stateless mode |
+===============+============================+=====================+
| State | The Join Proxy needs | No information is |
| Information | additional storage to | maintained by the |
| | maintain mapping between | Join Proxy. |
| | the address and port | Registrar needs to |
| | number of the Pledge and | store the packet |
| | those of the Registrar. | header. |
+---------------+----------------------------+---------------------+
| Packet size | The size of the forwarded | Size of the |
| | message is the same as the | forwarded message |
| | original message. | is bigger than the |
| | | original, it |
| | | includes additional |
| | | information |
+---------------+----------------------------+---------------------+
| Specification | The Join Proxy needs | CoAP message to |
| complexity | additional functionality | encapsulate DTLS |
| | to maintain state | payload. The |
| | information, and specify | Registrar and the |
| | the source and destination | Join Proxy have to |
| | addresses of the DTLS | understand the CoAP |
| | handshake messages | header in order to |
| | | process it. |
+---------------+----------------------------+---------------------+
| Ports | Join Proxy needs | Join Proxy and |
| | discoverable join-port | Registrar need |
| | | discoverable join- |
| | | ports |
+---------------+----------------------------+---------------------+
Table 1
7. Security Considerations
All the concerns in [RFC8995] section 4.1 apply. The Pledge can be
deceived by malicious Join Proxy announcements. The Pledge will only
join a network to which it receives a valid [RFC8366] voucher
[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher]. Once the Pledge joined, the
payload between Pledge and Registrar is protected by DTLS.
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A malicious constrained Join Proxy has a number of routing
possibilities:
* It sends the message on to a malicious Registrar. This is the
same case as the presence of a malicious Registrar discussed in
RFC 8995.
* It does not send on the request or does not return the response
from the Registrar. This is the case of the not responding or
crashing Registrar discussed in RFC 8995.
* It uses the returned response of the Registrar to enroll itself in
the network. With very low probability it can decrypt the
response because successful enrollment is deemed unlikely.
* It uses the request from the Pledge to appropriate the Pledge
certificate, but then it still needs to acquire the private key of
the Pledge. This, too, is assumed to be highly unlikely.
* A malicious node can construct an invalid Join Proxy message.
Suppose, the destination port is the coaps port. In that case, a
Join Proxy can accept the message and add the routing addresses
without checking the payload. The Join Proxy then routes it to
the Registrar. In all cases, the Registrar needs to receive the
message at the join-port, checks that the message consists of two
parts and uses the DTLS payload to start the BRSKI procedure. It
is highly unlikely that this malicious payload will lead to node
acceptance.
* A malicious node can sniff the messages routed by the constrained
Join Proxy. It is very unlikely that the malicious node can
decrypt the DTLS payload. A malicious node can read the header
field of the message sent by the stateless Join Proxy. This
ability does not yield much more information than the visible
addresses transported in the network packets.
It should be noted here that the contents of the CBOR array used to
convey return address information is not DTLS protected. When the
communication between Join Proxy and Registrar passes over an
unsecure network, an attacker can change the CBOR array, causing the
Registrar to deviate traffic from the intended Pledge. These
concerns are also expressed in [RFC8974]. It is also pointed out
that the encryption by the Join Proxy is a local matter. Similarly
to [RFC8974], the use of AES-CCM [RFC3610] with a 64-bit tag is
recommended, combined with a sequence number and a replay window.
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If such scenario needs to be avoided, the constrained Join Proxy MUST
encrypt the CBOR array using a locally generated symmetric key. The
Registrar is not able to examine the encrypted result, but does not
need to. The Registrar stores the encrypted header in the return
packet without modifications. The constrained Join Proxy can decrypt
the contents to route the message to the right destination.
8. IANA Considerations
8.1. Resource Type Attributes registry
This specification registers two new Resource Type (rt=) Link Target
Attributes in the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values"
subregistry under the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE)
Parameters" registry per the [RFC6690] procedure.
Attribute Value: brski.jp
Description: This BRSKI resource type is used to query and return
the supported BRSKI resources of the constrained
Join Proxy.
Reference: [this document]
Attribute Value: brski.rjp
Description: This BRSKI resource type is used for the constrained
Join Proxy to query and return Join Proxy specific
BRSKI resources of a Registrar.
Reference: [this document]
8.2. service name and port number registry
This specification registers two service names under the "Service
Name and Transport Protocol Port Number" registry.
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Service Name: brski-jp
Transport Protocol(s): udp
Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Contact: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Description: Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure
constrained Join Proxy
Reference: [this document]
Service Name: brski-rjp
Transport Protocol(s): udp
Assignee: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Contact: IESG <iesg@ietf.org>
Description: Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key Infrastructure
Registrar join-port used by stateless constrained
Join Proxy
Reference: [this document]
9. Acknowledgements
Many thanks for the comments by Carsten Bormann, Brian Carpenter,
Spencer Dawkins, Esko Dijk, Toerless Eckert, Russ Housley, Ines
Robles, Rich Salz, Jürgen Schönwälder, Mališa Vučinić, and Rob
Wilton.
10. Contributors
Sandeep Kumar, Sye loong Keoh, and Oscar Garcia-Morchon are the co-
authors of the draft-kumar-dice-dtls-relay-02. Their draft has
served as a basis for this document.
11. Changelog
11.1. 14 to 13
* incorporated review comments from TTE
* jpy message changed to CoAP header
11.2. 13 to 12
* jpy message encrypted and no longer standardized
11.3. 12 to 11
* many typos fixes and text re-organized
* core of GRASP and CoAP discovery moved to contrained-voucher document, only stateless extensions remain
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11.4. 11 to 10
* Join-Proxy and Registrar discovery merged
* GRASP discovery updated
* ARTART review
* TSVART review
11.5. 10 to 09
* OPSDIR review
* IANA review
* SECDIR review
* GENART review
11.6. 09 to 07
* typos
11.7. 06 to 07
* AD review changes
11.8. 05 to 06
* RT value change to brski.jp and brski.rjp
* new registry values for IANA
* improved handling of jpy header array
11.9. 04 to 05
* Join Proxy and join-port consistent spelling
* some nits removed
* restructured discovery
* section
* rephrased parts of security section
11.10. 03 to 04
* mail address and reference
11.11. 02 to 03
* Terminology updated
* Several clarifications on discovery and routability
* DTLS payload introduced
11.12. 01 to 02
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* Discovery of Join Proxy and Registrar ports
11.13. 00 to 01
* Registrar used throughout instead of EST server
* Emphasized additional Join Proxy port for Join Proxy and Registrar
* updated discovery accordingly
* updated stateless Join Proxy JPY header
* JPY header described with CDDL
* Example simplified and corrected
11.14. 00 to 00
* copied from vanderstok-anima-constrained-join-proxy-05
12. References
12.1. Normative References
[family] "Address Family Numbers", IANA, 19 October 2021,
<https://www.iana.org/assignments/address-family-numbers/
address-family-numbers.xhtml>.
[I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher]
Richardson, M., Van der Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., and E.
Dijk, "Constrained Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-anima-constrained-voucher-18, 11 July 2022,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-ietf-anima-
constrained-voucher-18.txt>.
[ieee802-1AR]
"IEEE 802.1AR Secure Device Identifier", IEEE Standard,
2009,
<https://standards.ieee.org/standard/802.1AR-2009.html>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
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[RFC6347] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
Security Version 1.2", RFC 6347, DOI 10.17487/RFC6347,
January 2012, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347>.
[RFC6690] Shelby, Z., "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link
Format", RFC 6690, DOI 10.17487/RFC6690, August 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690>.
[RFC7252] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., and C. Bormann, "The Constrained
Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7252,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7252, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252>.
[RFC768] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, RFC 768,
DOI 10.17487/RFC0768, August 1980,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc768>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
[RFC8366] Watsen, K., Richardson, M., Pritikin, M., and T. Eckert,
"A Voucher Artifact for Bootstrapping Protocols",
RFC 8366, DOI 10.17487/RFC8366, May 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8366>.
[RFC8949] Bormann, C. and P. Hoffman, "Concise Binary Object
Representation (CBOR)", STD 94, RFC 8949,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8949, December 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949>.
[RFC8990] Bormann, C., Carpenter, B., Ed., and B. Liu, Ed., "GeneRic
Autonomic Signaling Protocol (GRASP)", RFC 8990,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8990, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8990>.
[RFC8995] Pritikin, M., Richardson, M., Eckert, T., Behringer, M.,
and K. Watsen, "Bootstrapping Remote Secure Key
Infrastructure (BRSKI)", RFC 8995, DOI 10.17487/RFC8995,
May 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8995>.
[RFC9147] Rescorla, E., Tschofenig, H., and N. Modadugu, "The
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version
1.3", RFC 9147, DOI 10.17487/RFC9147, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147>.
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[RFC9148] van der Stok, P., Kampanakis, P., Richardson, M., and S.
Raza, "EST-coaps: Enrollment over Secure Transport with
the Secure Constrained Application Protocol", RFC 9148,
DOI 10.17487/RFC9148, April 2022,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9148>.
12.2. Informative References
[I-D.kumar-dice-dtls-relay]
Kumar, S. S., Keoh, S. L., and O. Garcia-Morchon, "DTLS
Relay for Constrained Environments", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-kumar-dice-dtls-relay-02, 20 October
2014, <https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-kumar-dice-
dtls-relay-02.txt>.
[I-D.richardson-anima-state-for-joinrouter]
Richardson, M., "Considerations for stateful vs stateless
join router in ANIMA bootstrap", Work in Progress,
Internet-Draft, draft-richardson-anima-state-for-
joinrouter-03, 22 September 2020,
<https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-richardson-anima-
state-for-joinrouter-03.txt>.
[RFC3610] Whiting, D., Housley, R., and N. Ferguson, "Counter with
CBC-MAC (CCM)", RFC 3610, DOI 10.17487/RFC3610, September
2003, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3610>.
[RFC3927] Cheshire, S., Aboba, B., and E. Guttman, "Dynamic
Configuration of IPv4 Link-Local Addresses", RFC 3927,
DOI 10.17487/RFC3927, May 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3927>.
[RFC3986] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
RFC 3986, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986>.
[RFC4944] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D. Culler,
"Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4
Networks", RFC 4944, DOI 10.17487/RFC4944, September 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4944>.
[RFC6550] Winter, T., Ed., Thubert, P., Ed., Brandt, A., Hui, J.,
Kelsey, R., Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik, R., Vasseur,
JP., and R. Alexander, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for
Low-Power and Lossy Networks", RFC 6550,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6550, March 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6550>.
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[RFC6775] Shelby, Z., Ed., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C.
Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over
Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)",
RFC 6775, DOI 10.17487/RFC6775, November 2012,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6775>.
[RFC7030] Pritikin, M., Ed., Yee, P., Ed., and D. Harkins, Ed.,
"Enrollment over Secure Transport", RFC 7030,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7030, October 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7030>.
[RFC7102] Vasseur, JP., "Terms Used in Routing for Low-Power and
Lossy Networks", RFC 7102, DOI 10.17487/RFC7102, January
2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7102>.
[RFC7228] Bormann, C., Ersue, M., and A. Keranen, "Terminology for
Constrained-Node Networks", RFC 7228,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7228, May 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228>.
[RFC7959] Bormann, C. and Z. Shelby, Ed., "Block-Wise Transfers in
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", RFC 7959,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7959, August 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959>.
[RFC8610] Birkholz, H., Vigano, C., and C. Bormann, "Concise Data
Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to
Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and
JSON Data Structures", RFC 8610, DOI 10.17487/RFC8610,
June 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610>.
[RFC8974] Hartke, K. and M. Richardson, "Extended Tokens and
Stateless Clients in the Constrained Application Protocol
(CoAP)", RFC 8974, DOI 10.17487/RFC8974, January 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8974>.
[RFC9031] Vučinić, M., Ed., Simon, J., Pister, K., and M.
Richardson, "Constrained Join Protocol (CoJP) for 6TiSCH",
RFC 9031, DOI 10.17487/RFC9031, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9031>.
[RFC9032] Dujovne, D., Ed. and M. Richardson, "Encapsulation of
6TiSCH Join and Enrollment Information Elements",
RFC 9032, DOI 10.17487/RFC9032, May 2021,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9032>.
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Appendix A. Stateless CoAP payload examples
This section shows how the CoAP header is arranged by the stateless
proxy.
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Ver|T=0|TKL=13 | Code=0.02 POST| Message ID |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1|
| 16-bytes of extended token |
| |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0|0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0| four bytes: "coap" |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1| Payload (DTLS contents)
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
The Option is Proxy-Scheme, with a value 39, and must be encoded as
an Option Delta of 13, followed by a single byte of (39-13=) 26.
The total size of the header is 4,1+16,6,1 is 28 bytes. A CBOR
header would have taken 4+16 bytes or 20 bytes, for a difference of 8
bytes.
Appendix B. Stateless Proxy payload examples
The examples show the request "GET coaps://192.168.1.200:5965/est/
crts" to a Registrar. The header generated between Join Proxy and
Registrar and from Registrar to Join Proxy are shown in detail. The
DTLS payload is not shown.
NOTE THESE ARE OLD.
The request from Join Proxy to Registrar looks like:
85 # array(5)
50 # bytes(16)
FE800000000000000000FFFFC0A801C8 #
19 BDA7 # unsigned(48551)
01 # unsigned(1) IP
00 # unsigned(0)
58 2D # bytes(45)
<cacrts DTLS encrypted request>
In CBOR Diagnostic:
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[h'FE800000000000000000FFFFC0A801C8', 48551, 1, 0,
h'<cacrts DTLS encrypted request>']
The response is:
85 # array(5)
50 # bytes(16)
FE800000000000000000FFFFC0A801C8 #
19 BDA7 # unsigned(48551)
01 # unsigned(1) IP
00 # unsigned(0)
59 026A # bytes(618)
<cacrts DTLS encrypted response>
In CBOR diagnostic:
[h'FE800000000000000000FFFFC0A801C8', 48551, 1, 0,
h'<cacrts DTLS encrypted response>']
Authors' Addresses
Michael Richardson
Sandelman Software Works
Email: mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca
Peter van der Stok
vanderstok consultancy
Email: stokcons@bbhmail.nl
Panos Kampanakis
Cisco Systems
Email: pkampana@cisco.com
Richardson, et al. Expires 27 April 2023 [Page 28]
