Internet DRAFT - draft-hardt-gnap-jose
draft-hardt-gnap-jose
Network Working Group D. Hardt, Ed.
Internet-Draft SignIn.Org
Intended status: Standards Track 15 August 2020
Expires: 16 February 2021
JOSE Authentication
draft-hardt-gnap-jose-02
Abstract
TBD
Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. JOSE Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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2.1. Grant Server Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.1. Authorization Header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1.2. Signed Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1.3. Public Key Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2. Resource Server Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1. JOSE header . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.2. "jose" Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.3. "jose+body" Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.2.4. Public Key Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3. Request Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4. Response Signing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.5. Response Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. Document History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.1. draft-hardt-gnap-jose-00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.2. draft-hardt-gnap-jose-01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A.3. draft-hardt-gnap-jose-02 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
TBD
*Terminology*
This document uses the following terms defined in [GNAP]:
* Grant Client (GC)
* Client Handle
* Registered Client
* Dynamic Client
* Grant
* Grant Server (GS)
* GS URI
* NumericDate
* Resource Server (RS)
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*Notational Conventions*
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
specification are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
Certain security-related terms are to be understood in the sense
defined in [RFC4949]. These terms include, but are not limited to,
"attack", "authentication", "authorization", "certificate",
"confidentiality", "credential", "encryption", "identity", "sign",
"signature", "trust", "validate", and "verify".
Unless otherwise noted, all the protocol parameter names and values
are case sensitive.
2. JOSE Authentication
How the GC authenticates to the GS and RS are independent of each
other. One mechanism can be used to authenticate to the GS, and a
different mechanism to authenticate to the RS.
Other documents that specify other GC authentication mechanisms will
replace this section.
In the JOSE Authentication Mechanism, the GC authenticates by using
its private key to sign a JSON document with JWS per [RFC7515] which
results in a token using JOSE compact serialization.
[Editor: are there advantages to using JSON serialization in the
body?]
Different instances of a Registered GC MAY have different private
keys, but each instance has a certificate to bind its private key to
to a public key the GS has for the Client ID. An instance of a GC
will use the same private key for all signing operations.
The GC and the GS MUST both use HTTP/2 ([RFC7540]) or later, and TLS
1.3 ([RFC8446]) or later, when communicating with each other.
[Editor: too aggressive to mandate HTTP/2 and TLS 1.3?]
The token may be included in an HTTP header, or as the HTTP message
body.
The following sections specify how the GC uses JOSE to authenticate
to the GS and RS.
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2.1. Grant Server Access
The GC authenticates to the GS by passing either a signed header
parameter, or a signed message body. The following table shows the
method, uri and token location for each GC request to the GS:
+===============+=============+===========+==========+
| request | http method | uri | token in |
+===============+=============+===========+==========+
| Create Grant | POST | GS URI | body |
+---------------+-------------+-----------+----------+
| Verify Grant | PATCH | Grant URI | body |
+---------------+-------------+-----------+----------+
| Read Grant | GET | Grant URI | header |
+---------------+-------------+-----------+----------+
| Update Grant | PUT | Grant URI | body |
+---------------+-------------+-----------+----------+
| Delete Grant | DELETE | Grant URI | header |
+---------------+-------------+-----------+----------+
| Read AuthZ | GET | AZ URI | header |
+---------------+-------------+-----------+----------+
| Update AuthZ | PUT | AZ URI | body |
+---------------+-------------+-----------+----------+
| Delete AuthZ | DELETE | AZ URI | header |
+---------------+-------------+-----------+----------+
| GS Options | OPTIONS | GS URI | header |
+---------------+-------------+-----------+----------+
| Grant Options | OPTIONS | Grant URI | header |
+---------------+-------------+-----------+----------+
| AuthZ Options | OPTIONS | AZ URI | header |
+---------------+-------------+-----------+----------+
Table 1
2.1.1. Authorization Header
For requests with the token in the header, the JWS payload MUST
contain the following attributes:
*iat* - the time the token was created as a NumericDate.
*jti* - a unique identifier for the token per [RFC7519] section
4.1.7.
*uri* - the value of the URI being called (GS URI, Grant URI, or AZ
URI).
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*method* - the HTTP method being used in the call ("GET", "DELETE",
"OPTIONS")
The HTTP authorization header is set to the "jose" parameter followed
by one or more white space characters, followed by the resulting
token.
A non-normative example of a JWS payload and the HTTP request
follows:
{
"iat" : 15790460234,
"jti" : "f6d72254-4f23-417f-b55e-14ad323b1dc1",
"uri" : "https://as.example/endpoint/grant/example6",
"method" : "GET"
}
GET /endpoint/example.grant HTTP/2
Host: as.example
Authorization: jose eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsIn ...
[Editor: make a real example token]
*GS Verification*
The GS MUST verify the token by:
* TBD
2.1.2. Signed Body
For requests with the token in the body, the GC uses the Request JSON
as the payload in a JWS. The resulting token is sent with the
content-type set to "application/jose".
A non-normative example (line breaks added to the body for
readability):
POST /endpoint HTTP/2
Host: as.example
Content-Type: application/jose
Content-Length: 155
eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyzdWIiOiIxMjM0NTY3ODkwIiwibmF
tZSI6IkpvaG4gRG9lIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyfQ.SflKxwRJSMeKKF2QT4fwpMe
Jf36POk6yJV_adQssw5c
[Editor: make a real example token]
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*GS Verification*
The GS MUST verify the token by:
* TBD
2.1.3. Public Key Resolution
* *Registered Clients* MAY use any of the JWS header values to
direct the GS to resolve the public key matching the private key
linked to the Client ID. The GS MAY restrict which JWS headers a
GC can use.
[Editor: would examples help here so that implementors understand the
full range of options, and how an instance can have its own asymetric
key pair]
A non-normative example of a JOSE header for a Registered Client with
a key identifier of "12":
{
"alg" : "ES256",
"typ" : "JOSE",
"kid" : "12"
}
* *Dynamic Clients* MUST include their public key in the "jwk" JWS
header in a GNAP Create Grant request, unless they have a Client
Handle and include it in the GNAP Request JSON "client" object.
A non-normative example of a JOSE header for a Dynamic Client:
{
"alg" : "ES256",
"typ" : "JOSE",
"jwk" : {
"kty" : "EC",
"crv" : "P-256",
"x" : "Kgl5DJSgLyV-G32osmLhFKxJ97FoMW0dZVEqDG-Cwo4",
"y" : "GsL4mOM4x2e6iON8BHvRDQ6AgXAPnw0m0SfdlREV7i4"
}
}
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2.2. Resource Server Access
In the "jose" mechanism Section 2.2.2, all GC requests to the RS
include a proof-of-possession token in the HTTP authorization header.
In the "jose+body" mechanism Section 2.2.3, the GC signs the JSON
document in the request if the POST or PUT methods are used,
otherwise it is the same as the "jose" mechanism.
2.2.1. JOSE header
The GS provides the GC one or more JWS header parameters and values
for a a certificate, or a reference to a certificate or certificate
chain, that the RS can use to resolve the public key matching the
private key being used by the GC.
A non-normative examples JOSE header:
{
"alg" : "ES256",
"typ" : "JOSE",
"x5u" : "https://as.example/cert/example2"
}
[Editor: this enables Dynamic Clients to make proof-of-possession API
calls the same as Registered Clients.]
2.2.2. "jose" Mechanism
The JWS payload MUST contain the following attributes:
*iat* - the time the token was created as a NumericDate.
*jti* - a unique identifier for the token per [RFC7519] section
4.1.7.
*uri* - the value of the RS URI being called.
*method* - the HTTP method being used in the call
*token* - the access token provided by the GS to the GC
The HTTP authorization header is set to the "jose" parameter followed
by one or more white space characters, followed by the resulting
token.
A non-normative example of a JWS payload and the HTTP request
follows:
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{
"iat" : 15790460234,
"jti" : "f6d72254-4f23-417f-b55e-14ad323b1dc1",
"uri" : "https://calendar.example/calendar",
"method" : "GET",
"token" : "eyJJ2D6.example.access.token.mZf9pTSpA"
}
GET /calendar HTTP/2
Host: calendar.example
Authorization: jose eyJhbG.example.jose.token.adks
[Editor: make a real example token]
*RS Verification*
The RS MUST verify the token by:
* verify access token is bound to the public key - include key
fingerprint in access token?
* TBD
2.2.3. "jose+body" Mechanism
The "jose+body" mechanism can only be used if the content being sent
to the RS is a JSON document.
Any requests not sending a message body will use the "jose" mechanism
Section 2.2.2.
Requests sending a message body MUST have the following JWS payload:
*iat* - the time the token was created as a NumericDate.
*jti* - a unique identifier for the token per [RFC7519] section
4.1.7.
*uri* - the value of the RS URI being called.
*method* - the HTTP method being used in the call
*token* - the access token provided by the GS to the GC
*body* - the message body being sent to the RS
A non-normative example of a JWS payload and the HTTP request
follows:
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{
"iat" : 15790460234,
"jti" : "f6d72254-4f23-417f-b55e-14ad323b1dc1",
"uri" : "https://calendar.example/calendar",
"method": "POST",
"token" : "eyJJ2D6.example.access.token.mZf9pTSpA",
"payload" : {
"event" : {
"title" : "meeting with joe",
"start_date_utc" : "2020-02-21 11:00:00",
"end_date_utc" : "2020-02-21 11:00:00"
}
}
}
POST /calendar HTTP/2
Host: calendar.example
Content-Type: application/jose
Content-Length: 155
eyJhbGciOi.example.jose+body.adasdQssw5c
[Editor: make a real example token]
*RS Verification*
The RS MUST verify the token by:
* TBD
2.2.4. Public Key Resolution
The RS has a public key for the GS that it uses to verify the
certificate or certificate chain the GC includes in the JWS header.
2.3. Request Encryption
[Editor: to be fleshed out]
The GC encrypts a request when ??? using the GS public key returned
as the ??? attribute in GS Options.
2.4. Response Signing
[Editor: to be fleshed out]
The GC verifies a signed response ??? using the GS public key
returned as the ??? attribute in GS Options.
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2.5. Response Encryption
[Editor: to be fleshed out]
The GC decrypts a response when ??? using the private key matching
the public key included in the request as the ??? attribute in [GNAP]
Grant Request JSON.
3. Acknowledgments
TBD
4. IANA Considerations
TBD
5. Security Considerations
TBD
6. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC4949] Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.
[RFC7515] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web
Signature (JWS)", RFC 7515, DOI 10.17487/RFC7515, May
2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7515>.
[RFC7519] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
(JWT)", RFC 7519, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519>.
[RFC7540] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", RFC 7540,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
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[GNAP] Hardt, D., "The Grant Negotiation and Authorization
Protocol", June 2020,
<https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-hardt-xauth-protocol>.
Appendix A. Document History
A.1. draft-hardt-gnap-jose-00
* Initial version
A.2. draft-hardt-gnap-jose-01
* renamed HTTP verb to method
A.3. draft-hardt-gnap-jose-02
* renamed Client to Grant Client (GC)
Author's Address
Dick Hardt (editor)
SignIn.Org
United States
Email: dick.hardt@gmail.com
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