Internet DRAFT - draft-haddad-mipshop-optisend

draft-haddad-mipshop-optisend






Mobility Optimizations                                         W. Haddad
Internet-Draft                                               S. Krishnan
Expires: January 10, 2008                              Ericsson Research
                                                                 J. Choi
                                                             Samsung AIT
                                                             J. Laganier
                                                        Docomo Euro-Labs
                                                            July 9, 2007


 Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND) Optimizations: The OptiSeND Protocol
                    draft-haddad-mipshop-optisend-03

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   This Internet-Draft will expire on January 10, 2008.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).










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Abstract

   This memo describes a new set of mechanisms, which aim to increase
   the Secure Neighbor Discovery protocol usability, provide additional
   deployment incentives and a better adaptation to mobile environment.


Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
   2.  Conventions used in this document  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
   3.  Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
   4.  Motivation and Goal  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
   5.  Overview of OptiSeND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
   6.  New Options and Messages Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
   7.  Security Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
   8.  Acknowledgments  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
   9.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     9.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
     9.2.  Informative Reference  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
   Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
   Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 15





























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1.  Introduction

   Securing Neighbor Discovery Protocol [SeND] has been designed to
   mitigate potential threats against IPv6 Neighbor Discovery Protocol
   [NDP].  SeND protocol is based uniquely on the Cryptographically
   Generated Address [CGA] technology.

   The reliance on RSA signature may severely hamper SeND protocol
   usability and deployment in the wireless world.  This is mainly due
   to the fact that the vast majority of mobile devices share a severe
   limitation in terms of processing power (and battery consumption).

   This memo describes a new protocol called OptiSeND, which aims to
   increase SeND protocol usability, provide additional deployment
   incentives and a better adaptation to mobile environment.

   We achieve our goals by reducing the reliance on RSA signature to
   validate the flow of periodic multicast router adverstisement
   (RtAdv), authenticating the NDP messages and removing the latency
   caused by running the duplicate address detection (DAD) procedure.
   Other features may also be provided.






























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2.  Conventions used in this document

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [TERM].














































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3.  Glossary

   Access Router (AR)

      The Access Router is the mobile node's default router.

   Attached Node (AN)

      An attached node (AN) is a node, which is already attached to the
      infrastructure via one or many Access Router(s).  An AN is able to
      validate a multicast RtAdv message(s) without checking its
      signature.  An AN can be static or mobile.

   Soliciting Node (SN)

      A soliciting node is a node, which has started the procedure to
      attach itself to the infrastructure by sending a router
      solicitation (RtSol) message signed with CGA technology to a
      selected AR.  After exchanging the first RtSol/RtAdv messages, the
      SN is supposed to become an AN.

   One-Way Chain

      A one-way chain (Vo...Vn) is a collection of values such that each
      value Vi (except the last value Vn) is a one-way function of the
      next value Vi+1.  In particular, we have Vi = H(Vi+1), for i
      belonging to [0,n[.  For clarity purpose and to avoid confusion,
      we'll use in the rest of this document the notation V[i] instead
      of Vi, which means V[i+1] points to Vi+1...

   Neighbors

      Nodes attached to the same link.

   For more details about the one-way chain, please refer to [OWHC].
















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4.  Motivation and Goal

   IPv6 NDP has been designed to enable nodes on the same link to
   discover each other's presence and link-layer addresses, to find
   routers, and to maintain reachability information about the paths to
   active neighbors.  NDP is used by both hosts and routers.  Its
   functions include Neighbor Discovery, Router Discovery, Address
   Autoconfiguration and Resolution, Neighbor Unreachability Detection,
   Duplicate Address Detection (DAD), and Redirection.

   [NDT] describes different threats, which may appear when NDP is
   applied without any protection (e.g., public WLAN network).  These
   threats can materialize on a particular link in a severe disruption
   of information exchange, e.g., due to launching DoS attacks against
   one or many nodes.  SeND protocol has been designed to counter
   threats described in the NDT.  For this purpose, SeND relies solely
   on CGA technology to provide IPv6 address proof of ownership, sign
   NDP messages and consequently, build a form of trust relationship
   between different nodes.  SeND protocol is highly recommended when
   attached nodes (ANs) are using NDP to communicate with the
   infrastructure and/or between themselves as neighbors.

   When SeND protocol is used between nodes and the infrastructure, an
   AR is expected to use CGA technology in all messages sent to any AN.
   As previously mentioned, CGA technology allows the AR to provide a
   proof of ownership of its claimed IP address(es) and enables the
   receiving node(s) to validate information carried in these messages.
   Note that the SN may or may not be SeND enabled and thus may not be
   able to secure the RtSol message sent to the AR(s).  Similarly,
   applying SeND protocol to secure NDP exchange enables each node to
   provide a proof of ownership of its newly configured IP address(es),
   thus eliminating certain malicious behavior, e.g., when checking its
   uniqueness via the DAD procedure.

   The main goal of this document is to provide an alternative solution
   to the RSA signature, which one one side, encourages all nodes to use
   SeND and increases the deployment scale, but on the other side,
   eliminates the reliance on CGA technology whenever possible.  Our
   current design is limited to the exchange of NDP messages between AN
   and the infrastructure and slightly cover the ND messages exchange
   between neighbors.  This part is left for future work.










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5.  Overview of OptiSeND

   The first goal behind designing OptiSeND protocol is to eliminate the
   need for ANs to validate RSA signatures whenever possible.  We
   achieve our goal by exploiting the fact that the content of the
   router advertisement message itself does not get modified frequently.
   It follows that prefixes advertised on one particular link together
   with their associated parameters are likely to appear unmodified in
   each subsequent RA message.  However, there are cases where prefixes
   do change when renumbering is needed.  Such scenario is also
   supported in our approach.

   In the following, we refer to such message (i.e., plain message) by
   RA message and we use the RtAdv notation to refer to an RA message
   with SeND protection, i.e., carrying RSA signature and associated
   parameters.

   Another goal is to enable each SN to share a secret with its AR when
   exchanging the first pair of RtSol/RtAdv messages.  The shared secret
   is then used to authenticate all NDP messages as they get exchanged
   via the AR instead of doing it on the link.  The NDP messages re-
   routing is needed in order to avoid sharing secrets between each and
   every neighbor.  In addition, ANs should skip the DAD procedure by
   delegating such task to the AR whenever possible, in order to reduce
   the handoff latency in a mobile environment.

   OptiSeND protocol removes the need to verify RSA signatures in an
   entire set of RtAdv messages carrying an identical multicast RA
   message, except for the first one, which MUST be sent to the SN in
   unicast mode.  Note that in our context, "identical" refers to
   prefixes and associated parameters.  We achieve this goal in two
   steps.  The first one consists on using a particular OWHC value as a
   "hook" to enable the SN to quickly validate the sequence of
   subsequent RtAdv messages.  Such requirement imposes on the AR to
   send to the SN the last disclosed value, i.e., to be used as the
   hook, of its OWHC.  For this purpose, the OWHC value is carried by
   the unicast (and first) RtAdv message.  The second step is achieved
   by inserting in the same (first) unicast RtAdv message sent to the SN
   the hash value, i.e., called "Z", of the next RtAdv message
   concatenated with the next, i.e., yet undisclosed, OWHC value and the
   next timestamp value.  This means that if OWHC[i] is the last
   disclosed OWHC value sent to the SN, then "Z" is computed in the
   following way:

   Z = First [ 64, Hash [ RA[i+1] | OWHC[i+1] | Timestamp[i+1] ] ]

   Where:




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   - "Z" is the hash value inserted in a new option in the RtAdv
   message.
   - First (size, input) indicates truncation of "input" data so that
   only the first "size" bits remain to be used.
   - RA[i+1] is the next multicast router advertisement sent after
   sending the unicast RtAdv to the SN.
   - OWHC[i+1] is the new and undisclosed value of the OWHC.
   - Timestamp[i+1] is the timestamp value which is sent in the next
   RtAdv message, i.e., RtAdv[i+1].

   It follows that the content of the unicast RtAdv message sent to the
   SN is as it follows:

   RtAdv[i] = { RA[i] | Z | OWHC[i] | Timestamp[i] | SIG(Kp, RtAdv[i] }

   Where SIG(K, M) is the signature computed over the entire message M
   with key K.

   Such procedure is then repeated in each subsequent multicast RtAdv
   messages sent on the link.  Doing so, enables ANs to easily validate
   all subsequent multicast RtAdv messages by checking first if the
   disclosed OWHC value carried in the newly received message is valid
   and then use it to compute "Z" and compare it to the one sent in the
   previous RtAdv message.  Note that the timestamp used in the RtAdv
   message will also be used to keep AN(s) synchronized to the OWHC.  In
   case, an AN misses one multicast RtAdv message, it should solicit a
   re-synchronization by sending an authenticated RtSol message.  In
   this case, the AR SHOULD send back an authenticated unicast RtAdv
   message similar to the first one sent to any SN in unicast mode.  The
   AR MAY also sign the unicast RtAdv message but the signature
   validation is not needed.

   In a mobile environment, the mobile node (MN) may miss the RtAdv
   message due to switching between ARs.  In this particular case, the
   new AR (nAR) and the MN should share a new secret to authenticate
   subsequent NDP messages.  It follows that the MN should send a new
   RtSol message signed with CGA in order to get an encrypted copy of
   the shared secret from the nAR.  An optimization to the handoff
   procedure would consist on enabling a closer collaboration between
   ARs, in order to avoid sharing a new secret each time the MN switches
   to a new AR.  Such optimization requires secure links and trust
   between ARs.

   As mentioned earlier, the proposed solution removes the need to
   verify the RSA signature in each RtAdv message.  This also means that
   the AR will always sign each RtAdv message sent in unicast or
   multicast mode.  However, the AN will first rely on the OWHC
   technique to validate its content.  In case, crucial data have been



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   modified in the latest multicast RtAdv message, then the signature
   MUST be checked.  Otherwise, the AN can skip such procedure and store
   the carried hash value (Z) whose components will be disclosed in the
   next RtAdv.  Finally, the AN SHOULD discard any multicast RtAdv
   message, which carries a non-valid timestamp unless it has been
   received after a layer 2 handoff.

   An AR should store in its cache the AN's CGA public key, its MAC
   address, the CGA-based interface identifier(s) (IID(s)) and the
   corresponding shared secret (called Ks).  Storing the IID(s) can also
   be used to remove the need for running DAD procedures, and additional
   IID(s) MAY be generated from combining Ks with additional parameters.
   Note that an AR can store the AN's corresponding parameters for a
   limited amount of time after which, it should check again its
   presence on the link.  Ks is computed by the AR and MUST be sent
   encrypted to SN.  For this purpose, the AR MUST use SN's CGA public
   key sent in the (first) RtSol message to encrypt Ks.  The shared
   secret should be refreshed when its lifetime expires.

   When a NDP messages exchange is needed between two neighboring ANs,
   NDP messages MUST be exchanged via the AR in order to avoid using CGA
   signature in each message while protecting their integrity.  For this
   purpose, and in order to avoid inflating each NDP message with an
   additional IPv6 header, a new option is defined to indicate to the AR
   the destination address to be querried.  If the received message is
   valid, the AR sends the NDP message to the destination and
   authenticates the message with the corresponding shared secret.
   After receiving a valid response from the destination, the AR sends
   back an authenticated ND message to the sender, which carries the
   response provided by the destination.





















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6.  New Options and Messages Formats

   TBD
















































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7.  Security Considerations

   This memo introduces a new mechanism which is built on top of SeND
   protocol.  The main goal behind OptiSeND design is to improve the
   usability, make a strong(er) case for potential deployment and widen
   its scope to include new features.  We believe that this goal can be
   achieved without introducing new threats nor amplifying existing
   ones.

   However, expanding OptiSeND protocol in order to enable additional
   features, e.g., fast mobility, signaling delegation, etc, requires
   secure links and trust between ARs and possibly between ARs and the
   access points.






































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8.  Acknowledgments

   Authors would like to thank Pekka Nikander for his valuable input at
   the early stage of this work.















































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9.  References

9.1.  Normative References

   [CGA]   Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
           RFC 3792, March 2005.

   [NDP]   Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
           "Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", Internet
           Draft, draft-ietf-ipv6-2461bis-11.txt, March 2007.

   [NDT]   Nikander, P., Kempf, J., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Neighbor
           Discovery (ND) Trust Model and Threats", RFC 3756, May 2004.

   [SeND]  Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Sommerfield, B., Zill, B., and P.
           Nikander, "Secure Neighbor Discovery (SeND)", RFC 3971,
           March 2005.

   [TERM]  Bradner, S., "Key Words for Use in RFCs to Indicate
           Requirement Levels", RFC 2119, BCP , March 1997.

9.2.  Informative Reference

   [OWHC]  Hu, Y., Jakobsson, M., and A. Perrig, "Efficient
           Constructions for One-Way Hash Chains", ACNS Conference,
           June 2005.

























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Authors' Addresses

   Wassim Haddad
   Ericsson Research
   Torshamnsgatan 23
   SE-164 80 Stockholm
   Sweden

   Phone: +46 8 4044079
   Email: Wassim.Haddad@ericsson.com


   Suresh Krishnan
   Ericsson Research
   8400 Decarie Blvd.
   Town of Mount Royal, QC
   Canada

   Phone: +1 514 345 7900
   Email: Suresh.Krishnan@ericsson.com


   JinHyeock Choi
   Samsung AIT
   Communication & N/W Lab
   Suwon 440-600
   P.O. Box 111
   KOREA

   Phone: +82 31 280 9233
   Email: jinchoe@samsung.com


   Julien Laganier
   Docomo Communications Laboratories Europe GmbH
   Landsberger Strasse 312
   Munich 80687
   Germany

   Phone: +49 89 56824 231
   Email: Julien.ietf@laposte.net
   URI:   http://www.docomolab-euro.com









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