Internet DRAFT - draft-gont-v6ops-ipv6-addressing-considerations

draft-gont-v6ops-ipv6-addressing-considerations







IPv6 Operations Working Group (v6ops)                            F. Gont
Internet-Draft                                                   G. Gont
Intended status: Informational                              SI6 Networks
Expires: August 25, 2021                               February 21, 2021


                     IPv6 Addressing Considerations
           draft-gont-v6ops-ipv6-addressing-considerations-01

Abstract

   IPv6 addresses can differ in a number of properties, such as scope,
   stability, and intended usage type.  This document analyzes the
   impact of these properties on aspects such as security, privacy,
   interoperability, and network operations.  Additionally, it
   identifies challenges and gaps that currently prevent systems and
   applications from leveraging the increased flexibility and
   availability of IPv6 addresses.

Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on August 25, 2021.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

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   include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of



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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

   This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not
   be created, and it may not be published except as an Internet-Draft.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
   3.  Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.1.  Legacy Specifications and Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . .   4
     3.2.  Address Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  IPv6 Address Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     4.1.  Address Scope Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     4.2.  Provider Dependency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7
     4.3.  Address Reachability  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   8
     4.4.  Address Stability Considerations  . . . . . . . . . . . .   9
   5.  IPv6 Address Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.1.  Default IPv6 Address Selection  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  11
     5.2.  Usage Type Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  12
       5.2.1.  Incoming communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  13
       5.2.2.  Outgoing communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14
   6.  Current Issues Associated with IPv6 Addressing  . . . . . . .  15
     6.1.  Sub-optimal Address Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       6.1.1.  Number of Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
       6.1.2.  SLAAC/DHCPv6 Interaction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  15
     6.2.  Sub-optimal IPv6 Address Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.2.1.  Correlation of Network Activity . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.2.2.  Host Tracking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  16
       6.2.3.  Unintended Service Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . .  17
       6.2.4.  Availability of Service Outside the Expected Domain .  17
     6.3.  Operational Problems  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  18
       6.3.1.  Implications of Employing Multiple Addresses  . . . .  18
       6.3.2.  Legitimate Network Activity Correlation . . . . . . .  18
       6.3.3.  Routing in Multi-Prefix/Multi-Router Networks . . . .  18
       6.3.4.  Renumbering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19
   7.  Current Gaps that Prevent Leveraging IPv6 Addressing  . . . .  20
     7.1.  Profile-based IPv6 Address Configuration  . . . . . . . .  20
     7.2.  Advice on IPv6 Address Usage  . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  21
     7.3.  Protocol Improvements to Deal with Many Addresses . . . .  21
     7.4.  Improved Address Selection APIs . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.5.  Universal Support of RFC 8028 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  22
     7.6.  Support for Firewall Traversal in CE Routers  . . . . . .  22
   8.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   9.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   10. Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
   11. References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23



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     11.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  23
     11.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  25
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  27

1.  Introduction

   IPv6 addresses can differ in a number of properties, such as address
   scope (e.g. link-local vs. global), stability (e.g. stable addresses
   vs. temporary addresses), and intended usage type (outgoing
   communications vs. incoming communications).  While often overlooked,
   these properties have direct impact on areas such as security,
   privacy, interoperability, and network operations.

   IPv6 hosts typically configure addresses based on local system
   policy, which tends to be static and irrespective of the specific
   network the host attaches to.  For example, most IPv6 host
   implementations configure one link-local address for each network
   interface, and one stable and one (or more) temporary addresses per
   each Stateless Address Auto-configuration (SLAAC) [RFC4862] prefix
   for each network interface.  However, this static policy for address
   configuration might be inappropriate.  For example, mobile nodes
   might benefit from employing only temporary addresses, which
   generally offer better privacy properties than stable addresses.  On
   the other hand, an enterprise network might prefer that local hosts
   employ only stable addresses, which might be more convenient when
   enforcing access control, performing network trouble-shooting, or
   identifying hosts that might have been infected by malware.

   On the other hand, Each application on a given host could have its
   own set of requirements or expectations for the underlying IPv6
   addresses.  For example, an application meaning to offer a public
   service might expect to employ addresses that are both globally-
   reachable [RFC8190] and stable [RFC7721] [RFC8064], while a privacy-
   sensible client application might prefer short-lived temporary
   addresses [I-D.ietf-6man-rfc4941bis], or might even expect to employ
   single-use ("ephemeral") IPv6 addresses when connecting to public
   servers.  However, the subtleties associated with IPv6 addresses are
   often ignored or overlooked by application programmers.  This means
   that applications could fail to signal their requirements and
   preferences to the underlying host, or that the addresses configured
   by the underlying host might be inappropriate to satisfy the
   requirements of the corresponding applications.

   Finally, a number of limitations in components that range from
   network devices to Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) could
   also prevent hosts and applications from leveraging the increased
   flexibility of IPv6 addressing.




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   This document identifies a set of properties that can be associated
   with IPv6 addresses (such as scope and stability), and analyzes the
   impact of these properties on areas ranging from security and privacy
   to network operations, with the goal of providing guidance about IPv6
   address usage.  Additionally, it identifies challenges and gaps that
   currently prevent systems and applications from leveraging the
   increased flexibility and availability of IPv6 addresses.

2.  Terminology

   This document employs the definitions of "public address", "stable
   address", and "temporary address" from Section 2 of [RFC7721].

   This document employs the definition of "globally reachable" from
   Section 2.1 of [RFC8190].

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
   "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
   14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
   capitals, as shown here.

3.  Conventions

3.1.  Legacy Specifications and Schemes

   IPv6 SLAAC has traditionally employed schemes for generating
   Interface Identifiers (IIDs) that have negatively affected the
   security and privacy properties of IPv6 addresses.  For example, IPv6
   SLAAC originally generated stable addresses by embedding the
   underlying link-layer address in the IPv6 Interface Identifier (IID),
   thus negatively affecting the security and privacy properties of IPv6
   addresses [RFC7721] [RFC7707].  Similarly, IPv6 temporary addresses
   [RFC4941] reused the same randomized IID for different auto-
   configuration prefixes [RFC4941], thus allowing for network activity
   correlation across different addresses of the same host.

   These schemes have become formally superseded by other schemes, such
   as [RFC7217] and [I-D.ietf-6man-rfc4941bis], that mitigate the
   aforementioned issues.  Therefore, this document does not discuss
   issues arising from legacy IID generation algorithms.

   NOTE:
      The security and privacy implications of such schemes are
      discussed in [RFC7721], [RFC7707], and [RFC7217].






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3.2.  Address Scope

   [RFC4007] defines the scope of an address as:

      "[the] topological span within which the address may be used as a
      unique identifier for an interface or set of interfaces"

   And defines the "global scope" to be used for:

      "uniquely identifying interfaces anywhere in the Internet"

   However, the term "scope" is employed in conflicting ways in
   different specifications (see [I-D.gont-6man-ipv6-ula-scope]).
   Throughout this document, we employ the notion of "scope" defined in
   [RFC4007].  As a result, addresses that do not uniquely identify
   interfaces Internet-wide are considered to have "non-global" or
   "limited" scope.  Grouping addresses in such a way is simply useful
   for the purpose of discussing address properties.

4.  IPv6 Address Properties

   There are, at least, four properties that can be associated with
   every IPv6 address:

   o  Scope

   o  Reachability

   o  Stability

   o  Provider Dependency

   The address scope essentially represents the topological span where
   an address can be expected to uniquely identify an interface; i.e.,
   the topological span where an given address is meaningful.  For
   example, link-local addresses are only meaningful within a given
   network link, and are expected to be unique only within such network
   link.

   Address reachability represents the topological span where an address
   can be expected to be used for receiving and transmitting packets.
   Reachability is implicitly constrained by the address scope, and may
   also be affected by network devices: for example, Customer Edge
   Routers (CE Routers) that enforce a filtering policy of "only
   allowing outgoing communications" can render otherwise globally
   reachable addresses as "unreachable from the public Internet, unless
   communication is initiated from the customer's network".




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   The stability of an address is associated with the invariance of an
   address over time.  For example, a manually-configured address will
   typically remain stable while the node remains attached to the same
   subnet, while a temporary address will, by definition, change over
   time.  While address stability does depend on the inherent properties
   of a given address (e.g. stable vs. temporary), it also depends on
   other factors, such as provider dependency: if a network employs a
   prefix that is assigned/leased by an upstream provider, then the
   overall stability an address will also depend on the stability
   corresponding network prefix.

   Provider-dependency is typically discussed in the context of Global
   Unicast Addresses, where the address space may be allocated by an
   Internet Service Provider (ISP) (and hence "provider aggregatable")
   or by a Regional Internet Registry (RIR) (and hence "provider
   independent").  However, this document considers "provider
   dependency" in a more general way: "provider aggregatable" address
   space is assigned or leased by an upstream provider and carved out
   from the provider's address space, and thus is topologically-related
   to the upstream provider's address space; on the other hand,
   "provider independent" address space is "owned" by the network in
   question and thus is not necessarily topologically-related to the
   upstream provider.

4.1.  Address Scope Considerations

   The IPv6 address scope [RFC4007] has a direct implication on address
   reachability: the address scope essentially constrains address
   reachability.  For example, addresses that have a non-global/limited
   scope are not, in principle, globally reachable.

   NOTE:
      This assumption becomes invalid if technologies such as Network
      Prefix Translation (NPT) [RFC6296] are employed, though.  However,
      strictly speaking, in these scenarios the non-global addresses are
      still not globally reachable, but rather the middle-box acts as an
      interface with the "external realm" via globally-reachable
      addresses (i.e., the middle-box provides an interface between two
      topological spans).

   The IPv6 address scope can, in some scenarios, limit the attack
   exposure of a node as a result of the implicit isolation provided by
   a non-global/limited address scopes.  For example, a node that only
   employs link-local addresses will, in principle, only be exposed to
   attacks from other nodes on the same local link.

   The potential protection provided by a non-global-scope addresses
   should not be regarded as a complete security strategy, but rather as



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   a form of "prophylactic" security (see
   [I-D.gont-opsawg-firewalls-analysis]).

   We note that non-global scope addresses are normally only of use for
   a limited number of applications/protocols that operate on a limited
   scope (e.g., mDNS), or deployments where the intended participants
   are known to operate in a limited domain [RFC8799] (e.g., OpenSSH
   client and server attached to the same link and employing link-local
   addresses, or mDNS hosts employing link-local addresses).

   The address scope can at times be somewhat related with the provider
   dependency property.  For example, link-local addresses are, by
   definition, provider independent.  In the same light, a locally-
   generated ULA prefix will be, by definition, provider independent.
   However, a router might also employ a ULA prefix leased by an
   upstream router, in which case this prefix would be "provider
   dependent".  The possible implications of the address scope on
   "provider dependency" may also affect address stability: for example,
   a locally-generated ULA prefix is "provider independent", and will
   not be subject to renumbering events triggered by the upstream
   provider.  However, a router (e.g.  CE Router) might, in some
   circumstances, be unable to guarantee prefix stability -- as in the
   case where the locally-generated ULA prefix is not recorded on stable
   storage, and thus cannot be guaranteed to remain stable across power
   outages.

4.2.  Provider Dependency

   Provider-dependency is typically discussed in the context of Global
   Unicast Addresses, where the address space may be allocated by an
   Internet Service Provider (ISP) (and hence "provider agreggatable")
   or by a Regional Internet Registry (RIR) (and hence "provider
   independent").  However, this document considers "provider
   dependency" in a more general way: "provider aggregatable" address
   space is assigned or leased by an upstream provider and carved out
   from the provider's address space, and thus is topologically-related
   to the upstream provider's address space; on the other hand,
   "provider independent" address space is "owned" by the network in
   question and thus is not necessarily topologically-related to the
   upstream provider.

   An implicit consequence of PA address space is that its use is tied
   to the specific provider/upstream provider that provides the address
   space.  This has a number of consequences, including:

   o  Multi-homing (employing local address space with multiple upstream
      providers) is not possible.




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   o  A renumbering event at the upstream provider will typically cause
      the local network to be renumbered.

   Since PA space has a topological relationship with the upstream
   provider, it will prevent multi-homing.  This has led some
   organizations to employ NPT [RFC6296] such that:

   o  The local network is isolated of renumbering events caused by the
      upstream provider.

   o  The local network employs the same address space regardless of the
      upstream provider employed to communicate with the external realm.

   While PA space may impact address stability, PI address space
   generally has better stability properties.  For example, a home
   network could internally employ both ULAs and GUAs, where a ULA
   prefix is locally generated by the CE Router (and hence resulting in
   PI space), and a global prefix is leased by the ISP via DHCPv6 Prefix
   Delegation [RFC8415] (hence PA space).  If for some reason there was
   an outage involving the connection with the upstream ISP, the lease
   time for the GUA prefix would eventually expire, and therefore
   addresses configured for such prefix would need to be invalidated.
   Similarly, if upon prefix lease expiration the ISP were to lease a
   new GUA prefix (rather than renew the current prefix), the network
   would need to be renumbered.  On the other hand, locally-generated
   ULA prefixes can be employed independently from the upstream ISP.

   Similarly, an organizational network that employs PI global address
   space obtained from a RIR would be able to employ the same address
   space irrespective of renumbering events or outages involving the
   upstream provider.

4.3.  Address Reachability

   Address reachability represents the area of the network (and the
   associated conditions), where an address can be used for receiving
   and transmitting packets.  As noted in Section 4.1, the address scope
   has a direct implication on address reachability, since it constrains
   the network span where the address is reachable.

   In addition to the reachability semantics of each address type,
   network filtering policies may also affect address reachability.  For
   example, there is widespread deployment of Customer Edge Routers that
   implement a (stateful) filtering policy of "only allowing outgoing
   communications" -- mimicking the filtering policy enforced (as a
   side-effect) by IPv4 NATs.  In such scenarios, even otherwise
   globally-reachable addresses become unreachable, unless:




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   o  communication is initiated from the internal network, or,

   o  the CE Router is manually configured override the default
      filtering policy, or,

   o  a technology to dynamically override the filtering policy (such as
      UPnP [UPnP] or PCP [RFC6887]) is employed.

   Address reachability is what ultimately determines the application
   architecture that may be successfully employed by an IPv6 node.

   NOTE:
      Ironically, an IPv6-only host (with global-scope addresses)
      attached to a home network where the CE Router "only allows
      outgoing communications" and does not implement protocols such as
      UPnP [UPnP] or PCP [RFC6887], will normally have a harder time
      using peer-to-peer (P2P) applications than an IPv4-only host (with
      a private address) attached to a home network where the CE Router
      employs NAT but implements a protocols such as UPnP or PCP.

   Address reachability has a direct impact on security, since the
   ability to attack a system normally relies on the ability of the
   attacker to reach the system in the first place.  Firewalls
   [I-D.gont-opsawg-firewalls-analysis] are, indeed, devices that are
   specifically devoted to administer address reachability.

4.4.  Address Stability Considerations

   Address stability typically depends on two factors:

   o  Stability of the network prefix

   o  Inherent stability of address type

   Depending on whether the local prefix is PI or PA (see Section 4.2)
   and whether the prefix is stable or dynamic (see
   [I-D.ietf-v6ops-slaac-renum]), the resulting addresses will have
   different stability properties.  Additionally, even in the presence
   of stable prefixes, a host may configure stable addresses [RFC8064]
   and/or temporary addresses [RFC4941].

   The stability of an address has two associated security/privacy
   implications:

   o  Ability of an attacker to correlate network activity

   o  Exposure to attack




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   For obvious reasons, an address that is employed for multiple
   communication instances allows the aforementioned network activities
   to be correlated.  The longer an address is employed (i.e., the more
   stable it is), the longer such correlation will be possible.  In the
   worst-case scenario, a stable address that is employed for multiple
   communication instances over time will allow all such activities to
   be correlated.  On the other hand, if a host were to generate (and
   eventually remove) one new address for each communication instance
   (e.g., TCP connection), network activity correlation would be
   mitigated.

   NOTE:
      The security and privacy implications of predictable addresses are
      discussed in [RFC7721] and [RFC7707].

   Typically, the longer an address is employed the longer the window of
   exposure of a host as being accessible via an address that becomes
   revealed as a result of active communication.  While such exposure is
   traditionally associated with the stability of the address, the usage
   type of the address may also have an impact on attack exposure (see
   Section 5.2).

   A popular approach to mitigate network activity correlation is the
   use of "temporary addresses" [RFC4941].  Temporary addresses are
   typically auto-configured and employed along with stable addresses,
   with the temporary addresses employed for outgoing communications,
   and the stable addresses employed for incoming communications.

   NOTE:
      Ongoing work [I-D.ietf-6man-rfc4941bis] aims at updating [RFC4941]
      such that temporary addresses can be employed without the need to
      configure stable addresses.

   We note that the extent to which temporary addresses provide improved
   mitigation of network activity correlation and/or reduced attack
   exposure may be questionable and/or limited in some scenarios.  For
   example, a temporary address that is reachable for, say, a few hours
   has a questionable "reduced exposure" (particularly when automated
   attack tools do not typically require such a long period of time to
   complete their task).  Similarly, if network activity can be
   correlated for the life of such address (e.g., on the order of
   several hours), such period of time might be long enough for the
   attacker to correlate all the network activity of interest.  However,
   they temporary addresses do limit the attack window and the amount of
   time during which address-based network activity correlation can be
   performed.





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   In order to better mitigate network activity correlation and/or
   possibly reduce host exposure, an implementation might want to either
   reduce the preferred lifetime of temporary addresses or, even better,
   generate one new IPv6 address for each application or new transport
   protocol instance (sometimes referred to as "ephemeral addresses").
   However, reduced address lifetimes and the use of multiple IPv6
   addresses may have a negative impact on the network (please see
   Section 6.3).

   Additionally, enforcing a maximum lifetime on IPv6 addresses may
   cause long-lived TCP connections to fail.  For example, an address
   becoming "Invalid" (after transitioning through the "Preferred" and
   "Deprecated" states) would cause the TCP connections employing them
   to break, which would in turn cause e.g. long-lived SSH sessions to
   break/fail.  Traditionally, many application protocols have assumed
   or expected address stability.  However, in the light of mobile
   roaming nodes that may frequently switch among different connections
   (e.g.  Wi-Fi, 4G, etc.) or that may be subject to renumbering events
   (see [I-D.ietf-v6ops-slaac-renum]), robust applications should assume
   and expect "ephemeral" IPv6 addresses (i.e., gracefully handle the
   case where the underlying IPv6 addresses change over short periods of
   time).

   In some scenarios, attack exposure may be further mitigated by
   limiting the usage of temporary addresses to outgoing connections,
   and prevent such addresses from being used for incoming connections
   (please see Section 5.2).

   Finally, we note that on different single-use (i.e., "ephemeral")
   IPv6 address is employed for each transport protocol instance, the
   possibility of an attacker successfully performing off-path attacks
   (such as the TCP reset attacks discussed in [RFC4953]) is reduced,
   since the ephemeral IPv6 address will typically be unknown and
   unpredictable to the off-path attacker.

5.  IPv6 Address Usage

5.1.  Default IPv6 Address Selection

   Applications use system API's to implicitly or explicitly select the
   IPv6 addresses that will be used for incoming and outgoing
   connections.  These choices have consequences in terms of privacy,
   security, stability and performance.

   Default Address Selection for IPv6 is specified in [RFC6724].  The
   selection starts with a set of potential destination addresses, such
   as returned by getaddrinfo(3), and the set of potential source
   addresses currently configured for the selected interfaces.  For each



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   potential destination address, the algorithm will select the source
   address that provides the best route to the destination, while
   choosing the appropriate scope and preferring temporary addresses.
   The algorithm will then select the destination address, while giving
   a preference to reachable addresses with the smallest scope.  The
   selection may be affected by system settings.  We note that [RFC6724]
   only applies for outgoing connections, such as those made by clients
   trying to use services offered by other hosts.

   We note that [RFC6724] selects IPv6 addresses from all the currently
   available addresses on the host, and there is currently no way for an
   application to indicate expected or desirable properties for the IPv6
   source addresses employed for such outgoing communications.  For
   example, a privacy-sensitive application might want that each
   outgoing communication instance employs a new, single-use IPv6
   address, or to employ a new reusable address that is not employed or
   reusable by any other application on the host.  Reuse of an IPv6
   address by an application would allow the correlation of all network
   activities corresponding to such application as being performed by
   the same host, while reuse of an IPv6 address by multiple different
   applications would allow the correlation of all such network
   activities as being performed by the host with such IPv6 address (see
   Section 4.4 for further details).

   When a host provides a service, the common pattern is to just wait
   for incoming connections over all configured addresses.  For example,
   applications using the BSD Sockets API will commonly bind(2) the
   listening socket to the undefined address.  This long-established
   behavior is appropriate for hosts providing public services, but can
   have unexpected results for hosts providing semi-private services,
   such as various forms of peer-to-peer or local-only applications
   (e.g. mDNS).

   This behavior leads to three problems: host tracking, discussed in
   Section 6.2.2; unexpected address discovery, discussed in
   Section 6.2.3; and availability outside the expected scope, discussed
   in Section 6.2.4.  These problems are caused in part by the
   limitations of available address selection API, discussed in
   Section 7.4.

5.2.  Usage Type Considerations

   IPv6 hosts may configure stable [RFC8064] and/or temporary [RFC4941]
   addresses, where stable addresses are typically employed for incoming
   (server-like) communications, and temporary addresses are employed
   for outgoing (client-like) communications.  That is, the stability
   properties of an address have an implicitly associated usage type.




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   A host that employs one of its addresses to communicate with a remote
   server (i.e., that performs an "outgoing connection") will expose
   that address to the target server (and to on-path nodes).  Once the
   remote server receives an incoming connection, it could readily
   launch an attack against the host via the exposed address.  A real-
   world instance of this type of scenario has been documented in
   [Hein].

   However, we note that employing an IPv6 address for outgoing
   communications need not increase the exposure of local services to
   other parties.  For example, nodes could employ temporary addresses
   only for outgoing communications, and disallow their use for incoming
   communications.  Thus, nodes that learn about a client's addresses
   could not really leverage such addresses for actively contacting
   clients.  Unfortunately, current APIs represent a challenge when
   trying to leverage IPv6 addresses in this way (please see
   Section 5.2.1 and Section 7.4 for further details).

   The following subsections possible techniques that could be employed
   by applications to better leverage IPv6 addresses for both incoming
   and outgoing communications

5.2.1.  Incoming communications

   There are a number of ways in which a system or network may affect
   which addresses (and how) may be employed for different services and
   cases.  Namely,

   o  TCP/IP stack address filtering

   o  Application-based address filtering

   o  Firewall-based address filtering

   Clearly, the most elegant approach for address selection would be for
   applications to be able to specify the properties of the addresses
   they are willing to employ by means of an API, such the TCP/IP stack
   itself could "filter" which addresses are allowed for the given
   service/application.  For example, an application could specify the
   stability and scope properties of the addresses on which incoming
   communications should be accepted, such that the application can be
   relieved from dealing with low-level networking details, portability
   is improved, and duplicate code in applications is avoided.  However,
   constraints in the current APIs (see Section 7.4) prevent application
   programmers from leveraging this technique.  Alternatively, services
   could be bound to specific (explicit) addresses, rather than to all
   locally-configured addresses.  However, there are a number of short-
   comings associated with this approach.  Firstly, an application would



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   need to be able to learn all of its addresses and associated
   properties, something that tends to be non-trivial and non-portable,
   and that also makes applications protocol-dependent, unnecessarily.
   Secondly, the BSD Sockets API does not allow a socket to be bound to
   a subset of the node's addresses.  That is, sockets can be bound to a
   single address or to all available addresses (wildcard), but not to a
   subset of all the configured addresses.

   Another possible approach would be for applications to e.g. bind
   services to all available addresses, and perform the associated
   selection/filtering at the application level.  While possible, this
   would have a number of drawbacks.  Firstly, it would require
   applications to deal with low-level networking details, lead to
   duplicated code in all applications, and also negatively affect
   portability.  Secondly, performing address/selection filtering at the
   application level may not mitigate some possible attacks.  For
   example, port scanning would still be possible, since the
   aforementioned filtering would be performed once UDP packets have
   been received or TCP connections have been established.

   A client could simply run a host-based firewall that only allows
   incoming connections on the stable addresses.  This would be more of
   an operational approach for achieving the desired functionality, and
   would require good firewall/host integration (e.g., the firewall
   should be able to tell stable vs. temporary addresses), would require
   the client to run additional firewall software for this specific
   purpose, etc.  In other scenarios, a network-based firewall could be
   configured to allow outgoing communications from all internal
   addresses, but only allow incoming communications to stable addresses
   (either via manual configuration or via a helper protocol such as
   [UPnP] or PCP [RFC6887]).  For obvious reasons, this is generally
   only applicable to networks where incoming communications are allowed
   to a limited number of hosts/servers.

5.2.2.  Outgoing communications

   An application might be able to obtain the list of currently-
   configured addresses, and subsequently select an address with desired
   properties, and explicitly "bind" the address to the socket, to
   override the default source address selection.

   However, this approach is problematic for a number of reasons.
   Firstly, there is no portable way of obtaining the list of currently-
   configured addresses on the local node, and even less to check for
   address properties such "valid lifetime".  Secondly, as discussed in
   Section 5.2.1, it would require application programmers to understand
   all the subtleties associated with IPv6 addressing, and would also
   lead to duplicate code on all applications.  Finally, applications



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   would be limited to use already-configured addresses and unable to
   trigger the generation of new addresses where desirable (e.g. the
   generation of a new single-use address for this application instance
   or communication instance).

6.  Current Issues Associated with IPv6 Addressing

   The following subsections discuss current problems associated with
   IPv6 addresses, namely:

   o  Sub-optimal Address Configuration (Section 6.1)

   o  Sub-optimal IPv6 Address Usage (Section 6.2)

   o  Operational Problems (Section 6.3)

6.1.  Sub-optimal Address Configuration

6.1.1.  Number of Addresses

   Two mechanisms exist for automatic network configuration: SLAAC
   [RFC4862] and DHCPv6 [RFC8415].  DHCPv6 centralizes network
   configuration and address assignment, and may thus prevent hosts from
   leveraging the increased flexibility and availability of IPv6
   addresses.  On the other hand, SLAAC may result in network
   configuration anarchy, where hosts may e.g. configure and use
   addresses in a way that may negatively affect the network (please see
   Section 6.3.1).

   Most of the challenges associated with the use of multiple addresses
   can be addressed by allocating one /64 per host via mechanisms such
   as DHCPv6-PD [RFC8415].  However, support for such mechanisms in host
   implementations and e.g. the LAN-side of CE Routers is rather
   uncommon.  On the other hand, SLAAC lacks the means for conveying
   information about e.g., the number of addresses per host that the
   network is able or willing to support.

   NOTE:
      Use of a /64 prefix per host could also render techniques such as
      temporary addresses [RFC4941] ineffective, since hosts would
      become identified by corresponding /64 prefix.

6.1.2.  SLAAC/DHCPv6 Interaction

   Many CE Routers offer address configuration via both SLAAC and
   DHCPv6, by including Prefix Information Options (PIOs) with the "A"
   flag set in Router Advertisement messages, and also setting the "M"
   flag in such RA messages.  This has a number of implications:



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   o  The outcome of the configuration process is non-deterministic,
      difficulting network troubleshooting (see
      [I-D.ietf-v6ops-dhcpv6-slaac-problem]).

   o  Nodes end up configuring more addresses than needed (or even
      used), normally configuring multiple stable addresses for each
      autoconfiguration prefix, with at least one address for each
      configuration mechanism (SLAAC and DHCPv6).

   o  A host may end up employing predictable addresses resulting from
      DHCPv6, thus thwarting the security and privacy improvements of
      SLAAC-configured addresses (i.e., [RFC7217] and [RFC4941]).

6.2.  Sub-optimal IPv6 Address Usage

6.2.1.  Correlation of Network Activity

   As discussed in [RFC7721], a node that reuses an IPv6 address for
   multiple communication instances will enable the correlation of such
   network activities.  This could be the case when the same IPv6
   address is employed by several instances of the same application
   (e.g., a browser in "privacy" mode and a browser in "normal" mode),
   or when the same IPv6 address is employed by two different
   applications on the same node (e.g., a browser in "privacy" mode, and
   an email client).

   Particularly in the case of privacy-sensitive applications, an
   application or system might want to limit the usage of a given IPv6
   address to a single communication instance, a single application, a
   single user on the system, etc.  However, as discussed in Section 5,
   given current APIs, this is practically impossible.

6.2.2.  Host Tracking

   The stable addresses recommended in [RFC8064] use stable IIDs defined
   in [RFC7217].  One key part of that algorithm is that if a device
   connects to a given network at different times, it will always
   configure the same IPv6 addresses on that network.  If the device
   hosts a service ready to accept connections on that stable address,
   adversaries can test the presence of the device on the network by
   attempting connections to that stable address.  Stable addresses will
   thus enable testing whether a specific device is returning to a
   particular network, which in a number of cases might be considered a
   privacy issue.







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6.2.3.  Unintended Service Disclosure

   Systems like DNS-Based Service Discovery [RFC6763] allow clients to
   discover services within a limited domain (e.g. a local link).  These
   services are not advertised outside of that domain, and thus do not
   expect to be discovered by random parties on the Internet.  However,
   such services may be easily discoverable if they allow incoming
   connections on IPv6 addresses that client processes also use when
   connecting to remote servers.

   NOTE:
      An example of such service disclosure is described in [Hein].  A
      network manager observed port scanning traffic directed at the
      temporary addresses of local host.  The analysis in [Hein] shows
      that the scanners learned the addresses by observing the device
      contact an NTP service ([RFC5905]).  The remote scanning was
      possible because the local services were accepting connections on
      all configured addresses, including temporary addresses.

   It is obvious from this example that local services are disclosed
   because they are bond to the same IPv6 addresses that are also used
   by clients for outgoing communications with remote systems.  But the
   overlap between "client" and "server" addresses is only one part of
   the problem.  Suppose that a host operates both a video game server
   and a home automation application server.  The video game users will
   be able to discover the IPv6 address of the game server; if the home
   automation server listens to the same IPv6 addresses, its address
   will be revealed to all these users, thus increasing the exposure of
   the home automation server.

   We note that a host or network that wants to limit access to local
   services should filter incoming connection attempts by affecting
   address reachability (see Section 4.3) via firewalls
   [I-D.gont-opsawg-firewalls-analysis] and/or the use of IPv6 addresses
   of appropriate scope (see Section 4.1).  However, it is also prudent
   to avoid unintended service disclosure by avoiding the scenarios
   discussed in this section.

6.2.4.  Availability of Service Outside the Expected Domain

   IPv6 defines [RFC4291] [RFC4007] multiple address scopes, with hosts
   typically configuring Global Unicast Addresses (GUAs), link local
   addresses, and Unique Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses (ULAs) [RFC4193].
   Availability of a service outside the expected scope happens when a
   service is expected to be available only in some limited domain, but
   inadvertently becomes available from outside of that domain.  This
   could happen, for example, if a service is meant to be accessible
   only within a given link, but becomes reachable from outside that



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   link via ULAs or GUAs, or if a service is meant to be accessible only
   within some organization's perimeter but becomes accessible from the
   public Internet via GUAs.  This will commonly happen if a service
   intended for a limited domain is implemented by bind()ing the
   listening socket to the "unspecified" addresses (please see
   Section 7.4).

6.3.  Operational Problems

6.3.1.  Implications of Employing Multiple Addresses

   Network deployments are currently recommended to provide multiple
   IPv6 addresses to general-purpose hosts [RFC7934].  However, in some
   scenarios, use of a large number of IPv6 addresses may have negative
   implications on network devices that need to maintain entries for
   each IPv6 address in network data structures (e.g., [RFC7039]).
   Additionally, concurrent active use of multiple IPv6 addresses will
   normally increase neighbour discovery traffic if Neighbour Caches in
   network devices are not large enough to store all addresses on the
   link.  This can impact performance and energy efficiency on networks
   on which multicast is expensive (e.g.
   [I-D.ietf-mboned-ieee802-mcast-problems]).  Finally, network devices
   may interpret the use of a number of addresses above a certain
   threshold as a security event, and block the offending device from
   using the network.

6.3.2.  Legitimate Network Activity Correlation

   The desires of protecting individual privacy versus the desire to
   effectively maintain and debug a network can conflict with each
   other.  For example, having clients use addresses that change over
   time will make it more difficult to track down and isolate
   operational problems.  When looking at packet traces, it could become
   more difficult to determine whether one is seeing behavior caused by
   a single errant machine, or by a number of them.

6.3.3.  Routing in Multi-Prefix/Multi-Router Networks

   If the network is provided with multiple upstream connections via
   different providers and different local routers, each of them will
   typically provide its own PA address space (see Section 4.2) and thus
   local hosts will typically configure addresses for each of PA address
   spaces.  In this scenario, packets sourced from a given PA space
   should only employ the local router of the corresponding upstream
   provider, since otherwise packets might be dropped as a result of
   ingress/egress filtering [RFC2827].  Unfortunately, traditional
   Neighbor Discovery [RFC4861] can advertise routes only with a per-
   destination granularity, irrespective of the source address/prefix.



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   [RFC8028] addresses the most important challenges associated with
   these scenarios.  However, [RFC8028] is not yet widely implemented.
   As a result, operating a multi-prefix/multi-router IPv6 network
   represents a major challenge -- if at all possible.

6.3.4.  Renumbering

   The challenges posed by network renumbering have been known for a
   very long time [RFC5887], with network renumbering typically being
   assumed to be performed in a planned manner.

   However, in scenarios where a host is moved to a different network
   without the host detecting the network re-attachment event, or where
   the network a host attaches to is moved to a different point of the
   network topology (i.e., the network itself is migrated/"moved"), the
   aforementioned host will also experience a renumbering event.  In an
   era in which migrating virtual machines, containers, and networks
   around a network topology is commonplace, and where mobile systems
   changing network connectivity to and from e.g.  WiFi and 4G is also
   commonplace, renumbering events are anything but rare.

   One of the challenges represented by network renumbering is how hosts
   can infer that an existing network prefix and associated address(es)
   have become stale (such that stale prefixes and addresses can be
   removed and replaced by new prefixes and addresses).  In scenarios
   where the network topology does not change and the network is
   renumbered, network elements may be aware of the renumbering event
   and signal this condition to attached systems (i.e., signal that
   existing network configuration information should be removed and
   replaced).  However, in scenarios where it is the host, virtual
   machine, container or network that move around the network topology,
   the network might not be able to signal the "renumbering event", and
   these events might be harder to infer and react to.

   Unfortunately, both SLAAC and DHCPv6 assume that network
   configuration information is somewhat stable.  SLAAC has
   traditionally employed long lifetimes for network configuration
   information, meaning that stale information could be employed for an
   unacceptably long period of time.  DCHPv6 operates on the same
   premise, and lacks widespread support for RECONFIGURE messages -- so
   even if the network were in a position to signal a renumbering event,
   hosts will normally rely on expiration of lease times for stale
   information to be cleared up.

   Some of these problems have been discussed in detail in
   [I-D.ietf-v6ops-slaac-renum], and there is ongoing work
   [I-D.ietf-6man-slaac-renum] [I-D.ietf-v6ops-cpe-slaac-renum] to
   mitigate this issue.



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7.  Current Gaps that Prevent Leveraging IPv6 Addressing

   The following subsections identify and discuss areas where further
   work is needed.  Namely,

   o  Profile-based IPv6 Address Configuration (see Section 7.1)

   o  Advice on IPv6 Address Usage (see Section 7.2)

   o  Protocol Improvements to Deal with Many Addresses (see
      Section 7.3)

   o  Improved Address Selection APIs (see Section 7.4)

   o  Universal Support of RFC 8028 (see Section 7.5)

   o  Support for Firewall Traversal in CE Routers (see Section 7.6)

7.1.  Profile-based IPv6 Address Configuration

   Most operating systems configure the same type of addresses
   regardless of the current "operating mode" or "profile" of the device
   (e.g., device connected to an enterprise network vs. roaming across
   untrusted networks).  For example, many operating systems configure
   both stable [RFC8064] and temporary [RFC4941] addresses for all
   network types.  However, this "one size fits all" approach tends to
   be sub-optimal or even inappropriate for some scenarios.  For
   example, enterprise networks typically prefer the use of only stable
   addresses, thus requiring the network administrator to configure each
   host to disable the use of temporary addresses.  On the other hand,
   mobile devices typically configure both stable and temporary
   addresses, even when their operating mode (client-like operation)
   would allow for the more privacy-sensible option of configuring only
   temporary addresses.

   The lack of fine-grained address configuration policies forces nodes
   to rely on a "one size fits all" approach that, as noted, usually
   leads to suboptimal results.  Advice in this area might help achieve
   profile-based address configuration policies such that IPv6
   addressing capabilities are fully leveraged.

   NOTE:
      One might envision a document that provides advice regarding IPv6
      address generation for different typical scenarios (e.g., when to
      configure stable-only, temporary-only, or stable+temporary).  In
      the most simple analysis, one might expect nodes in a typical
      enterprise network to employ only stable addresses.  General-
      purpose nodes in a home or "trusted" network might want to employ



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      both stable and temporary addresses.  Finally, mobile nodes (e.g.
      when roaming across non-trusted networks) might want to employ
      only temporary addresses).

7.2.  Advice on IPv6 Address Usage

   An application programmers typically rely to the Default Source IPv6
   Address Selection for IPv6 (see Section 5.1) for outgoing
   communications, and to accepting incoming communications on all
   configured addresses.  As discussed throughout this document, this
   leads to sub-optimal or undesirable results.  Applications on a node
   share the same pool of configured addresses, and currently available
   APIs prevent applications from requesting the generation of new
   addresses (e.g. to be employed for a particular application or
   communication instance).

   Guidance in this area is warranted such that applications and systems
   can fully leverage IPv6 addressing.

   NOTE:
      Such guidance would elaborate, among other things, both on the
      usage of IPv6 addresses when offering network services and when
      performing client-like communications.  For example, for incoming
      communications, hosts might want to employ only the smallest-scope
      applicable addresses (if available) and, if stable addresses are
      available only accept incoming connections on such addresses.  For
      client-like communications, hosts might prefer temporary
      addresses, unless the corresponding communication instances are
      expected to be long-lived (e.g., SSH sessions).

7.3.  Protocol Improvements to Deal with Many Addresses

   Possible improvements to IPv6 SLAAC should be evaluated, including:

   o  Enabling IPv6 routers to convey information about network
      constraints such as maximum number of addressees per node.

   o  Enabling hosts to register/de-register configured addresses, such
      that e.g. routers need not tie resources to addresses that are no
      longer used.

   On the other hand, in order for DHCPv6-PD (or some alternative
   protocol) to be employed to support the "one /64 per node" paradigm,
   widespread support for DHCPv6-PD (or an alternative protocol) would
   be necessary.






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7.4.  Improved Address Selection APIs

   Application developers using the BSD Sockets API can "bind()" a
   listening socket to a specific address, and ensure that the
   application is only reachable through that address.  In theory,
   careful selection of the binding address could mitigate the problems
   described in Section 6.2.  Binding services to temporary addresses
   could mitigate the ability of an attacker from testing for the
   presence of the node in the network.  Binding different services to
   different addresses could mitigate unexpected discovery.  Binding
   services to non-globally-reachable addresses (e.g. link-local
   addresses or ULAs) could mitigate availability outside the expected
   domain.  However, explicitly managing addresses adds significant
   complexity to application development.  It requires that application
   developers master IPv6 addressing architecture subtleties, and
   implement logic that reacts adequately to connectivity events and
   address changes.  Experience shows that application developers would
   probably prefer some much simpler solution.

   In addition, we note that many application developers use high level
   APIs that listen to TLS, HTTP, or some other application protocol.
   These high level APIs seldomly provide detailed access to specific
   IPv6 addresses, and typically default to listening to all available
   addresses.

   A more advanced API could allow application programmers to select
   desired properties in an address (scope, stability, etc.), such that
   the best-suitable addresses are selected, while relieving the
   application from low-level IPv6 addressing details.  Such API could
   also trigger the generation of new IPv6 addresses if/when the
   specified properties require so.

7.5.  Universal Support of RFC 8028

   To put it bluntly, multi-prefix/multi-router networks cannot possibly
   work properly without implementation of [RFC8028].  Unfortunately,
   [RFC8028] is not widely implemented yet.  On the protocol
   standardization side, the IETF should consider elevating the
   requirement to support RFC8028 in the IPv6 Node Requirements RFC
   [RFC8504] from "SHOULD" to "MUST".

7.6.  Support for Firewall Traversal in CE Routers

   Customer Edge Routers that implement a default filtering policy of
   "only allowing outgoing communications" need to support helper
   protocols such as [UPnP] or PCP [RFC6887], so that applications can
   open holes in the CE Router firewall to be able to receive incoming




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   communications.  Otherwise, P2P applications that currently work in
   IPv4 networks might not function in IPv6-only networks.

   Support for these protocols is particularly important for IPv6
   deployments since, as hosts will normally employ "provider
   aggregatable" addresses (see Section 4.2), renumbering events will
   result in host address changes, and thus static firewall rules will
   be harder to implement than for the IPv4 networks.  Similarly, use of
   temporary addresses [RFC4941] will also lead to changing IPv6
   addresses, which will require that the associated firewall rules be
   updated.

8.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

9.  Security Considerations

   The security and privacy implications associated with the
   predictability and lifetime of IPv6 addresses has been analyzed in
   [RFC7217] [RFC7721], and [RFC7707].  This document complements and
   extends the aforementioned analysis by also considering other IPv6
   properties such as address scope and address reachability, and the
   associated trade-offs.

10.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank (in alphabetical order) Mikael
   Abrahamsson, Fred Baker, Brian Carpenter, Owen DeLong, Francis
   Dupont, Tatuya Jinmei, Ted Lemon, and Dave Thaler for providing
   valuable comments on earlier versions of this document.

11.  References

11.1.  Normative References

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC2827]  Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
              Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
              Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, DOI 10.17487/RFC2827,
              May 2000, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2827>.






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   [RFC4007]  Deering, S., Haberman, B., Jinmei, T., Nordmark, E., and
              B. Zill, "IPv6 Scoped Address Architecture", RFC 4007,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4007, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4007>.

   [RFC4193]  Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast
              Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>.

   [RFC4291]  Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
              Architecture", RFC 4291, DOI 10.17487/RFC4291, February
              2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4291>.

   [RFC4861]  Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
              "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", RFC 4861,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4861, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4861>.

   [RFC4862]  Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
              Address Autoconfiguration", RFC 4862,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4862, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4862>.

   [RFC4941]  Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
              Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in
              IPv6", RFC 4941, DOI 10.17487/RFC4941, September 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4941>.

   [RFC5905]  Mills, D., Martin, J., Ed., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
              "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms
              Specification", RFC 5905, DOI 10.17487/RFC5905, June 2010,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5905>.

   [RFC6724]  Thaler, D., Ed., Draves, R., Matsumoto, A., and T. Chown,
              "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol Version 6
              (IPv6)", RFC 6724, DOI 10.17487/RFC6724, September 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6724>.

   [RFC6763]  Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
              Discovery", RFC 6763, DOI 10.17487/RFC6763, February 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6763>.

   [RFC6887]  Wing, D., Ed., Cheshire, S., Boucadair, M., Penno, R., and
              P. Selkirk, "Port Control Protocol (PCP)", RFC 6887,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6887, April 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6887>.





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   [RFC7217]  Gont, F., "A Method for Generating Semantically Opaque
              Interface Identifiers with IPv6 Stateless Address
              Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)", RFC 7217,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7217, April 2014,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7217>.

   [RFC7934]  Colitti, L., Cerf, V., Cheshire, S., and D. Schinazi,
              "Host Address Availability Recommendations", BCP 204,
              RFC 7934, DOI 10.17487/RFC7934, July 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7934>.

   [RFC8028]  Baker, F. and B. Carpenter, "First-Hop Router Selection by
              Hosts in a Multi-Prefix Network", RFC 8028,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8028, November 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8028>.

   [RFC8064]  Gont, F., Cooper, A., Thaler, D., and W. Liu,
              "Recommendation on Stable IPv6 Interface Identifiers",
              RFC 8064, DOI 10.17487/RFC8064, February 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8064>.

   [RFC8174]  Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
              2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
              May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

   [RFC8415]  Mrugalski, T., Siodelski, M., Volz, B., Yourtchenko, A.,
              Richardson, M., Jiang, S., Lemon, T., and T. Winters,
              "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)",
              RFC 8415, DOI 10.17487/RFC8415, November 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8415>.

   [RFC8504]  Chown, T., Loughney, J., and T. Winters, "IPv6 Node
              Requirements", BCP 220, RFC 8504, DOI 10.17487/RFC8504,
              January 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8504>.

11.2.  Informative References

   [Hein]     Hein, B., "The Rising Sophistication of Network
              Scanning",  January 2016,
              <http://netpatterns.blogspot.be/2016/01/the-rising-
              sophistication-of-network.html>.

   [I-D.gont-6man-ipv6-ula-scope]
              Gont, F., "Scope of Unique Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses",
              draft-gont-6man-ipv6-ula-scope-00 (work in progress),
              January 2021.





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   [I-D.gont-opsawg-firewalls-analysis]
              Gont, F. and F. Baker, "On Firewalls in Network Security",
              draft-gont-opsawg-firewalls-analysis-02 (work in
              progress), February 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-6man-rfc4941bis]
              Gont, F., Krishnan, S., Narten, T., and R. Draves,
              "Temporary Address Extensions for Stateless Address
              Autoconfiguration in IPv6", draft-ietf-6man-rfc4941bis-12
              (work in progress), November 2020.

   [I-D.ietf-6man-slaac-renum]
              Gont, F., Zorz, J., and R. Patterson, "Improving the
              Robustness of Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC)
              to Flash Renumbering Events", draft-ietf-6man-slaac-
              renum-02 (work in progress), January 2021.

   [I-D.ietf-mboned-ieee802-mcast-problems]
              Perkins, C., McBride, M., Stanley, D., Kumari, W., and J.
              Zuniga, "Multicast Considerations over IEEE 802 Wireless
              Media", draft-ietf-mboned-ieee802-mcast-problems-12 (work
              in progress), October 2020.

   [I-D.ietf-v6ops-cpe-slaac-renum]
              Gont, F., Zorz, J., Patterson, R., and B. Volz, "Improving
              the Reaction of Customer Edge Routers to Renumbering
              Events", draft-ietf-v6ops-cpe-slaac-renum-06 (work in
              progress), December 2020.

   [I-D.ietf-v6ops-dhcpv6-slaac-problem]
              Liu, B., Jiang, S., Gong, X., Wang, W., and E. Rey,
              "DHCPv6/SLAAC Interaction Problems on Address and DNS
              Configuration", draft-ietf-v6ops-dhcpv6-slaac-problem-07
              (work in progress), August 2016.

   [I-D.ietf-v6ops-slaac-renum]
              Gont, F., Zorz, J., and R. Patterson, "Reaction of
              Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) to Flash-
              Renumbering Events", draft-ietf-v6ops-slaac-renum-05 (work
              in progress), November 2020.

   [RFC4953]  Touch, J., "Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks",
              RFC 4953, DOI 10.17487/RFC4953, July 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4953>.

   [RFC5887]  Carpenter, B., Atkinson, R., and H. Flinck, "Renumbering
              Still Needs Work", RFC 5887, DOI 10.17487/RFC5887, May
              2010, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5887>.



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   [RFC6296]  Wasserman, M. and F. Baker, "IPv6-to-IPv6 Network Prefix
              Translation", RFC 6296, DOI 10.17487/RFC6296, June 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6296>.

   [RFC7039]  Wu, J., Bi, J., Bagnulo, M., Baker, F., and C. Vogt, Ed.,
              "Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Framework",
              RFC 7039, DOI 10.17487/RFC7039, October 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7039>.

   [RFC7707]  Gont, F. and T. Chown, "Network Reconnaissance in IPv6
              Networks", RFC 7707, DOI 10.17487/RFC7707, March 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7707>.

   [RFC7721]  Cooper, A., Gont, F., and D. Thaler, "Security and Privacy
              Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms",
              RFC 7721, DOI 10.17487/RFC7721, March 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721>.

   [RFC8190]  Bonica, R., Cotton, M., Haberman, B., and L. Vegoda,
              "Updates to the Special-Purpose IP Address Registries",
              BCP 153, RFC 8190, DOI 10.17487/RFC8190, June 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8190>.

   [RFC8799]  Carpenter, B. and B. Liu, "Limited Domains and Internet
              Protocols", RFC 8799, DOI 10.17487/RFC8799, July 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8799>.

   [UPnP]     UPnP, "UPnP Device Architecture 2.0",  April 17, 2020,
              <https://openconnectivity.org/upnp-specs/UPnP-arch-
              DeviceArchitecture-v2.0-20200417.pdf>.

Authors' Addresses

   Fernando Gont
   SI6 Networks
   Evaristo Carriego 2644
   Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires  1706
   Argentina

   Email: fgont@si6networks.com
   URI:   https://www.si6networks.com










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   Guillermo Gont
   SI6 Networks
   Evaristo Carriego 2644
   Haedo, Provincia de Buenos Aires  1706
   Argentina

   Email: ggont@si6networks.com
   URI:   https://www.si6networks.com











































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