Internet DRAFT - draft-garcia-radext-radius-lorawan
draft-garcia-radext-radius-lorawan
Network Working Group D. Garcia
Internet-Draft R. Marin
Intended status: Experimental University of Murcia
Expires: November 3, 2017 A. Kandasamy
A. Pelov
Acklio
May 2, 2017
LoRaWAN Authentication in RADIUS
draft-garcia-radext-radius-lorawan-03
Abstract
This document describes a proposal for adding LoRaWAN support in
RADIUS. The purpose is to integrate the LoRaWAN network join
procedure with an Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA)
infrastructure based on RADIUS.
Status of This Memo
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. LoRaWAN support in RADIUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. LoRaWAN Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. LoRaWAN join procedure Key Material . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. LoRaWAN joining procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. LoRaWAN Key Derivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Integration Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Mapping LoRaWAN Entities to AAA Infrastructure . . . . . 7
4.2. Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Protocol Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3.1. Join-Request Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.3.2. Join-Answer Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
4.3.3. AppSKey Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3.4. NwkSKey Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.3.5. Table of Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5. Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7. Proof of concept implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
Low Power Wide Area Network (LP-WAN) groups several radio
technologies that allow communications with nodes far from the
central communication endpoint (base station) in the range of
kilometers depending on the specifics of the technology and the
scenario. They are fairly recent and the protocols to manage those
infrastructures are in continuous development. In some cases they
may not consider aspects such as key management or directly tackle
scalability issue in terms of authentication and authorization. The
nodes to be authenticated and authorized is expected to be
considerably high in number. One of the protocols that provide a
complete solution is LoRaWAN [LoRaWAN]. LoRaWAN is a MAC layer
protocol that use LoRa as its physical medium to cover long range
(up-to 20 km depending on the environment) devices. LoRaWAN is
designed for large scale networks and currently has a central entity
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called Network Server which maintains a pre-configured key named
AppKey for each of the devices on the network. Furthermore, session
keys such as NwkSKey and AppSKey used for encryption of data
messages, are derived with the help of this AppKey. Since each
service provider would operate their Network Server individually,
authenticating the devices becomes a tedious process because of
inter-interoperability or the roaming challenges between the
operators. An illustration of the LoRaWAN architecture can be seen
in figure Figure 1. As we know the AAA infrastructure provides a
flexible, scalable solution. They offer an opportunity to manage all
these processes in a centralized manner as happens in other type of
networks (e.g. cellular, WiFi, etc...) making it an interesting asset
when integrated into the LoRaWAN architecture.
+-------+ +-------+ +--------+
+------+ | | | | | |
| +--(LoRa)--+ +--(IP)--+ +-----(IP)-----+ |
+------+ | | | | | |
+-------+ +-------+ +--------+
End-Device Gateway Network Join
Server Server
Figure 1: LoRAWAN Architecture
The End-Device communicates with the Gateway by using the LoRa
modulation. The Gateway acts as a simple transceiver, which forwards
all data do the Network Server, which performs the processing of the
frames, network frame authentication (MIC verification), and which
serves as Network Access Port. This document describes a way to use
standard RADIUS servers as a Join Server, and to use the RADIUS
protocol for the interaction between the Network Server and the
Application Server. This integration is illustrated in figure
Figure 2
+-------+ +-------+ +--------+
+------+ | | | | | |
|AppKey+--(LoRa)--+ +--(IP)--+ +---(RADIUS)---+ AppKey |
+------+ | | | | | |
+-------+ +-------+ +--------+
End-Device Gateway Network Join
Server Server
(+ RADIUS client) (+ RADIUS server)
Figure 2: LoRAWAN Architecture with AAA and RADIUS authentication.
End-Device and RADIUS server have a shared secret - the AppKey, which
is used to derive the session keys (NwkSKey and AppSKey).
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The document describes how LoRaWAN join procedure is integrated with
AAA infrastructure using RADIUS [RFC2865] by defining the new
attributes needed to support the LoRaWAN exchange.
1.1. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
2. LoRaWAN support in RADIUS
Regarding the overall functionality, the RADIUS LoRaWAN support
defines the new Attributes needed for the management of the join
procedure. The Network Server will implement a RADIUS client
supporting this specification and therefore, it MUST implement the
RADIUS attributes for this service. The NAS-Port-Type specifying the
type of port on which the Network Server is authenticating the End-
Device in this case MAY be 18 ( Wireless - Other ) or a new one
specifically assigned for LoRaWAN (TBD.).
3. LoRaWAN Overview
3.1. Introduction
The LoRAWAN specification defines how the MAC and PHY layer will be
used with the LoRa radio technologies. It defines a process by which
the smart objects can securely join the network in an authenticated
way and exchange application information ciphered and integrity
protected. The focus of this document is to extend how the process
of joining is performed by the specification including a AAA
infrastructure (RADIUS) to accomplish this. Next we review how the
keys, and each message is used in the joining procedure. Then we
elaborate some assumptions to design the integration of AAA in the
joining procedure possible.
3.2. LoRaWAN join procedure Key Material
The LoRaWAN specification describes 3 keys involved in the joining
procedure. One as a root key that will be used to generate the other
two, which will be used to secure the message exchanges after the
joining procedure success. The AppKey key used to derive the other
two keys, NwkSKey and AppSKey:
o The AppKey is an AES-128 application specific key assigned by the
owner of the application. This key is derived from an
application-specific root key that is only known to the
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application owner and is stored in each device and in the Join
Server that will perform the authentication.
o The NwkSKey is a network session key that is specific to each End-
Device. It is shared between the Network Server and the End-
Device and used to calculate and verify the Message Integrity Code
(MIC) for each data message, between both entities. Furthermore,
it is used to cipher and decipher the payload of MAC-only data
message.
o The AppSKey is an application session key specific to each End-
Device. It is in charge of ciphering and deciphering the payload
of application-specific data messages and is also used to
calculate and verify the MIC that may be added to the payload of
application-specific data messages.
3.3. LoRaWAN joining procedure
The LoRaWAN joining procedure, as described in the LoRaWAN
Specification 1.0 [LoRaWAN], consists on one exchange. The first
message of this exchange is called join-request (JR) message and is
sent from the End-Device to the Network Server containing the AppEUI
and DevEUI of the End-Device with a nonce of 2 octets called
DevNonce. Figure 3 summarizes the format.
+-------------+-------------+-------------+
Size (bytes) | 8 | 8 | 2 |
+---------------------------+-------------+-------------+
Join Request | AppEUI | DevEUI | DevNonce |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+
Figure 3: Join Request Message
In response to the join-request, the other endpoint will answer with
the join-accept (JA) (Figure 4) if the End-Device is successfully
authenticated and authorized to join the network. The join-accept
contains a nonce (AppNonce), a network identifier (NetID), an End-
Device address (DevAddr), a delay between the TX and RX (RxDelay)
and, optionally, the CFList (see LoRaWAN specification [LoRaWAN]
section 7).
+--------+-----+-------+----------+-------+-------------+
Size (bytes)| 3 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 |16 (Optional)|
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
Join Accept |AppNonce|NetID|DevAddr|DLSettings|RxDelay| CFList |
+--------+-----+-------+----------+-------+-------------+
Figure 4: Join Accept Message
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Next, we enumerate and describe each field involved in the join
procedure message exchange.
o AppEUI: Global application ID in IEEE EUI64 to uniquely identify
the application provider.
o DevEUI: Global End-Device ID in IEEE EUI64 to uniquely identify
the End-Device
o DevNonce: A random value.
o AppNonce: A random value or some kind of unique ID provided by the
Network Server. This value can be also generated by the AAA
server, in case the network server wants to rely on the AAA server
pseudo random number generation. For this, the AppNonce would be
empty (set to zero), signaling the AAA server it has to generate
the AppNonce.
o NetID: A network identifier
o DevAddr: A 32 bit identifier of the End-Device in the current
network. It is composed of the Network ID and the Network
Address.
o DLSettings: 8 bits containing the down-link configuration.
o RxDelay: 8 bits containing the delay between TX and RX.
o CFList (Optional): Channel frequency list.
3.4. LoRaWAN Key Derivation
The keys NwkSKey and AppSKey are derived from the AppKey in both the
Join Server and the End-Device according to the LoRaWAN specification
[LoRaWAN] as follows:
Derivation of the NwkSkey:
NwkSKey = aes128_encrypt(AppKey, 0x01 | AppNonce | NetID | DevNonce |
pad16)
Derivation of the AppSkey:
AppSKey = aes128_encrypt(AppKey, 0x02 | AppNonce | NetID | DevNonce |
pad16)
Note: The pad16 function appends octets of containing "zero" so that
the length of the data is a multiple of 16.
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4. Integration Overview
4.1. Mapping LoRaWAN Entities to AAA Infrastructure
In the current specification of LoRaWAN [LoRaWAN], there is no
explicit reference to an external entity to which the Network Server
can go to authenticate the End-Device. However, ongoing work related
to LoRaWAN, such as the work in the LoRa Alliance
[LoRaAllianceSecurity] sketches the use of a new entity, the Join
Server, that will be in charge of performing the authentication.
This separation of responsibilities is also the aim of our work,
where the Join Server acts as an external AAA server in a AAA
infrastructure using RADIUS as the protocol to communicate the
Network Server and the Join Server. Further, it is under
consideration the distribution of the AppSKey to a target application
server instead of the Network Server. Therefore, the Join Server
would need another protocol to deliver the AppSKey. Another RADIUS
interface could be used for this purpose, though this I-D focuses on
the joining procedure so far.
4.2. Assumptions
For the integration of LoRaWAN joining procedure with RADIUS next we
describe some assumptions regarding the LoRaWAN specification. The
first is that the AppKey is only shared between the AAA server (Join
Server) and the End-Device. The outcome of the successful join
procedure (i.e. NwkSKey and AppSKey) are sent from the AAA server to
the network-server. This allows for the End-Device to exchange
message with the network-server, once the join procedure is finished,
as specified in LoRaWAN [LoRaWAN].
4.3. Protocol Exchange
The join procedure between the End-Device and the network-server
entails one exchange consisting on a join-request message and a join-
response message. In RADIUS the network-server implements a RADIUS
client to communicate with the Join Server, which act as AAA Server.
The protocol exchange is done in the following steps:
1. The End-Device sends the join-request message to to the Network
Server.
2. Upon reception of the LoRaWAN join-request message, the Network
Server creates a RADIUS Access-Request message, with the Join-
Request attribute containing the original message from the End-
Device, and the Join-Answer Attribute with all the fields of a
join-answer message except for the MIC, which will be calculated
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by the AAA Server (Join Server), since is the one that holds the
AppKey.
3. Once the AAA Server authenticates and authorizes the End-Device,
sends back the Join-Answer with the MIC generated as specified by
the LoRaWAN specification. Furthermore, as a consequence of a
successful join procedure, the AppSKey (optional) and NwkSKey are
generated and sent along in AppSKey and NwkSKey Attributes
respectively.
4. The Network Server receives the Access-Accept (if successful),
obtains the content of the Join-Request attribute and sends it to
the End-Device, storing in association with that End-Device the
NwkSKey and the AppSKey.
AAA
End-Device Network Server Server (Join Server)
----------- --------- -------
| | |
1) | JR[MIC] | Access-Request |
|------------------------>| Join-Request Att |
| | Join-Answer Att* |
2) | |----------------------------------->|
| | |
| gen | | gen
| | | | |
| | | Access-Accept | |
| v | Join-Answer Att | v
| AppSKey | AppSKey Att* | AppSKey
3) | NwkSKey | NwkSKey Att | NwkSKey
| |<-----------------------------------|
| JA[MIC] | |
4) |<------------------------| |
| | |
Figure 5: Protocol
4.3.1. Join-Request Attribute
Description
This Attribute contains the original Join-Request message. This
attribute will only appear in the Access-Request message. A summary
of the Join-Request attribute format is shown below. The fields are
transmitted from left to right.
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0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
TBD. for Join-Request
Length
18
String
The String field contains an octet string with the Join-Request
message as received over the network, such as defined in [LoRaWAN].
4.3.2. Join-Answer Attribute
Description
This Attribute is used in both RADIUS Access-Request and RADIUS
Access-Accept messages. In the first case, it contains the Join
Answer message with all the needed values filled by the network-
server except the MIC (this fact is marked with an *). With these
values, the Join Server (AAA server) that holds the AppKey is able to
create the MIC and compose the final Join Answer message. In the
second case, it contains the Join Answer with the MIC generated by
the Join Server (AAA server). A summary of the Join-Answer attribute
format is shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to
right.
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0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
TBD. for Join-Answer
Length
28
String
The String field contains an octet string with the Join-Answer as
received over the network , as defined in [LoRaWAN].
4.3.3. AppSKey Attribute
Description
This Attribute contains the AppSKey, an application session key
specific for the End-Device. This attribute is optional, and will
only appear in the RADIUS Access-Accept message. A summary of the
AppSKey attribute format is shown below. The fields are transmitted
from left to right.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
TBD. for AppSKey
Length
16+
String
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The String field contains an octet string containing the Application
Session Key, as defined in [LoRaWAN].
4.3.4. NwkSKey Attribute
Description
This Attribute contains the NwkSKey, an network session key specific
for the End-Device. This attribute will only appear in the Access-
Accept message. A summary of the NwkSKey attribute format is shown
below. The fields are transmitted from left to right.
0 1 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Type | Length | String...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Type
TBD. for NwkSKey
Length
16+
String
The String field contains the octet string of the Network Session Key
, as defined in [LoRaWAN].
4.3.5. Table of Attribute
Request Accept Reject Challenge # Attribute
1 0 0 0 TBD. Join-Request
1 1 0 0 TBD. Join-Answer
0 0-1 0 0 TBD. AppSKey
0 1 0 0 TBD. NwkSKey
Request Accept Reject Challenge # Attribute
Figure 6: Attributes Table
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5. Open Issues
With the purpose of extending the authentication process via AAA
infrastructures, and concretely, RADIUS, we have faced a question
regarding the relationship between the AppEUI associated to the
organization operating the Join Server and the realm used by RADIUS
to route the AAA information to the AAA Server (Join Server) of that
organization.
In particular, the Network Server knows the AppEUI included in the
Join Request, but it needs to discover the realm (Fully Qualified
Domain Name) that corresponds to that organizations ID to be able to
communicate with the concrete RADIUS server.
NOTE: One option MAY be to use the DNS system to provide the FQDN
associated to an AppEUI (which is an EUI64 address). The mapping
using DNS to find out the domain name associated to an EUI64 address
has been described in [RFC7043]. However, we would need the inverse
process. Nevertheless, this needs further discussion.
6. Security Considerations
In the LoRaWAN 1.0 specification, the AppSKey and NwkSKey are not
sent over the network, they are derived in each of the endpoints that
communicate, namely the End-Device and the Network Server. In this
document we propose relegating the responsibility of deriving the
Network Session Key and Application Session Key to the RADIUS server
(the Join Server). These session keys need to be sent to the Network
Server and if necessary to the application server.
To send the messages over the network between the RADIUS server and
the RADIUS client (in this case the Network Server). How to provide
confidentiality to the key distributed is outside the scope of this
document, nevertheless RadSec (RFC6614) or extensions such as those
defined in RFC 6218 may be considered to protect the distribution.
The AAA framework and its key management features become increasingly
important as the use case of LoRaWAN adds functionality and
complexity. This is the case for having the Application Server and
Network Server as separate entities and each receive its keys.
Although the utility is apparent in that specific case, it has to be
considered in any other future use-case that may require key
management and key distribution. Another point in favor of using AAA
can be also appreciated since the modifications required by this
proposal does not imply the modification of the protocols of the
constrained link, but the unrestricted network that is used to manage
LP-WAN.
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7. Proof of concept implementation
The proof of concept is implemented using the Go programming
language, that is well suited for the development of web servers or a
network servers as in this case.
The implementation of the network server is from [LoRaSERVER] which
is tailored with the features of a RADIUS Client and the RADIUS
server implementation from [RADIUSGo] that is modified to handle
LoRaWAN attributes.
The LoRa end-device, pre-configured with AppKey, from Nemeus [MK002]
is a USB key that can be controlled by UART (AT command) through USB
interface. A JAVA application installed on a Linux machine is used
to send control and data messages from the End-Device.
The LoRa Gateway is from EXPEMB [EXPEMB] which uses the packet
forwarder to forward the LoRa packets to the LoRa Network Server.
The Network Server is run in a docker container on a Linux machine
transfers the LoRa packets into the RADIUS attributes to be sent to
the RADIUS server. For now, the packets are sent to the default
RADIUS server but in the future this would be changed as per the
discussion in Section 5 in order to redirect the RADIUS request to
appropriate RADIUS server.
The RADIUS server is run in a docker container on a Linux machine
which contains the mapping between the DevEUI of the End-Device and
the AppKey. This AppKey from the map along with the received LoRa
attributes is used to derive the session keys, NwkSKey and AppSKey,
in the RADIUS server. These keys are transported as RADIUS
attributes back to the network server.
+----------+ +---------+ +-------------+ +---------+
| | | LoRa | | Nwk server/ | | Radius |
|End-device+---------+ Gateway +----------+ RADIUS +--------+ Server |
| | LoRa | | IP | client | IP | |
+----------+ +---------+ +-------------+ +---------+
A successful authentication would result in the session keys, NwkSKey
and AppSKey, being visible on the network server that can be viewed
using a web interface and the DevAddr being acquired by the End-
Device from the Join Accept Lora message. Running Wireshark on the
interface between RADIUS server and the Network Server shows the
RADIUS packets with the LoRa attributes.
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To simplify the design and implementation, we opted for creating one
RADIUS Attribute per message, instead of per each field within the
message since only the authenticating module responsible for the Join
Procedure in the current network server is delegated to the AAA
server and the AAA server would be able to obtain the required fields
from this single attribute, i.e either JoinRequest or JoinAccept
message. This design choice would follow the RADIUS guidelines given
in [RFC6158] identifying it as string for being an opaque
encapsulation of data structures defined outside RADIUS. Creating an
attribute per field, would be useful in case the AAA infrastructure
would change its behavior depending on the specific content of one or
more of the fields contained in the message. This could be the case
when the LoRaWAN use case becomes more complex and add more
functionality.
As future work, we intend to implement the proof of concept in
FreeRADIUS
8. Acknowledgments
This work has been possible partially by the SMARTIE project
(FP7-SMARTIE-609062 EU Project) and the Spanish National Project
CICYT EDISON (TIN2014-52099-R) granted by the Ministry of Economy and
Competitiveness of Spain (including ERDF support).
We also wanted to thank for the comments received about this document
by Sri Gundavelli, Yeoh Chun-Yeow, Alan DeKok, Stephen Farrell and
Mark Grayson.
9. IANA Considerations
In this document we define 4 new RADIUS Attributes that would need
actions from IANA to assign the corresponding numbers.
+--------+--------------+----------------------------+
| Number | Name | Reference |
+----------------------------------------------------+
| TBD | Join-Request | Section 4 of this document |
| TBD | Join-Answer | Section 4 of this document |
| TBD | AppSKey | Section 4 of this document |
| TBD | NwkSKey | Section 4 of this document |
+--------+--------------+----------------------------+
10. References
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10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
RFC 2865, DOI 10.17487/RFC2865, June 2000,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2865>.
[RFC6158] DeKok, A., Ed. and G. Weber, "RADIUS Design Guidelines",
BCP 158, RFC 6158, DOI 10.17487/RFC6158, March 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6158>.
[RFC7043] Abley, J., "Resource Records for EUI-48 and EUI-64
Addresses in the DNS", RFC 7043, DOI 10.17487/RFC7043,
October 2013, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7043>.
10.2. Informative References
[EXPEMB] EXPEMB, E., "LoRa MultiConnectivity Service Gateway - Last
Accessed:", July 2016, <www.expemb.com/en/product/
multi%E2%80%90connectivity-service-gateway-
sgwmc%E2%80%90x86lr%E2%80%9012132/>.
[LoRaAllianceSecurity]
Girard, P., "LoRaWAN - SECURITY a comprehensive insight -
Online Resource: Last Accessed", July 2016,
<http://portal.lora-
alliance.org/DesktopModules/Inventures_Document/
FileDownload.aspx?ContentID=1085>.
[LoRaSERVER]
Acklio, A., "LoRa Server", July 2016,
<http://www.ackl.io>.
[LoRaWAN] Sornin, N., Luis, M., Eirich, T., and T. Kramp, "LoRa
Specification V1.0", January 2015, <https://www.lora-
alliance.org/portals/0/specs/
LoRaWAN%20Specification%201R0.pdf>.
[MK002] Nemesus, N., "MK002-xx-EU - Last Accessed:", July 2016,
<http://www.nemeus.fr/en/mk002-usb-key>.
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Internet-Draft LoRaWAN-RADIUS May 2017
[RADIUSGo]
bronze1man, B., "Radius: A golang radius library - Last
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radius>.
Authors' Addresses
Dan Garcia-Carrillo (Ed.)
University of Murcia
Campus de Espinardo S/N, Faculty of Computer Science
Murcia 30100
Spain
Phone: +34 868 88 78 82
Email: dan.garcia@um.es
Rafa Marin-Lopez
University of Murcia
Campus de Espinardo S/N, Faculty of Computer Science
Murcia 30100
Spain
Phone: +34 868 88 85 01
Email: rafa@um.es
Arunprabhu Kandasamy
Acklio
2bis rue de la Chataigneraie
35510 Cesson-Sevigne Cedex
France
Email: arun@ackl.io
Alexander Pelov
Acklio
2bis rue de la Chataigneraie
35510 Cesson-Sevigne Cedex
France
Email: a@ackl.io
Garcia, et al. Expires November 3, 2017 [Page 16]
