Internet DRAFT - draft-fujiwara-dnsop-fragment-attack
draft-fujiwara-dnsop-fragment-attack
Network Working Group K. Fujiwara
Internet-Draft JPRS
Intended status: Informational March 01, 2019
Expires: September 2, 2019
Measures against cache poisoning attacks using IP fragmentation in DNS
draft-fujiwara-dnsop-fragment-attack-01
Abstract
Researchers proposed practical DNS cache poisoning attacks using IP
fragmentation. This document shows feasible and adequate measures at
full-service resolvers and authoritative servers against these
attacks. To protect resolvers from these attacks, avoid
fragmentation (limit requestor's UDP payload size to 1220/1232), drop
fragmented UDP DNS responses and use TCP at resolver side. To make a
domain name robust against these attacks, limit EDNS0 Responder's
maximum payload size to 1220, set DONTFRAG option to DNS response
packets and use good random fragmentation ID at authoritative server
side.
Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Methodology of the attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Current status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Possible measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. Use DNSSEC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. Limit requestor's UDP payload size to 1220/1232 on IPv6 . 6
4.3. Limit requestor's UDP payload size to 512 . . . . . . . . 6
4.4. Set IP_DONTFRAG / IPv6 DONTFRAG at authoritative servers 7
4.5. Drop path MTU discovery or filter ICMP related to path
MTU discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.6. Drop all fragmented packets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.7. Drop fragmented UDP DNS responses at full-service
resolvers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.8. Use TCP only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.9. Use good randomness for Fragmentation Identification
field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5. Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Example firewall configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10. Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.1. 00 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
10.2. 01 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
11. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
11.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A. How to know path MTU size . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Appendix B. How to generate crafted ICMP packets . . . . . . . . 11
B.1. Example of crafted ICMP Need Fragmentation and DF set
packet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
B.2. Example of crafted ICMPv6 Packet Too Big . . . . . . . . 12
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1. Introduction
"Fragmentation Considered Poisonous" [Herzberg2013] proposed
effective off-path DNS cache poisoning attacks using IP
fragmentation. The attacks mainly depend on the use of UDP to
retrieve long DNS responses, resulting in packet fragmentation.
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Recent full-service resolvers use good randomness for query source
port numbers and ID field in DNS header to prevent cache poisoning
attacks by off-path attackers. However, IP fragmentation is
performed by OS kernel or routers that operators of DNS servers
cannot control, and the query source port number and ID field in DNS
header exist only in first fragment. The attack depends on poor
randomness of "Identification" field generated by IP fragmentation
and some bugs in IP reassembly code. Attackers can know path MTU
size between authoritative servers and victim full-service resolvers,
and responses from the authoritative servers. If attackers know
generation algorithm of the "Identification" field, they can generate
crafted second fragment packets that will be accepted by victim full-
service resolvers.
[Hlavacek2013] also discussed the attacks and pointed that attackers
can control path MTU size between some authoritative servers and
victim full-service resolvers by sending crafted ICMP packets
(Fragmentation needed and DF set, or ICMPv6 Packet Too Big).
[Hlavacek2013] proposed a defense and two workarounds. The defence
is DNSSEC and workarounds are ignoring ICMP type=3 code=4
(fragmentation needed and DF set), and limiting response size / EDNS0
buffer size fit to MTU size.
And more, "Domain Validation++ For MitM-Resilient PKI" [Brandt2018]
proved that off-path attackers can intervene in path MTU discovery
[RFC1191] to perform intentionally fragment responses from
authoritative servers. They also proved that they poisoned
Certificate Authorities (CAs)' full-service resolvers and
successfully issued some fraudulent certificates.
As a result, we cannot trust all fragmented UDP packets and path MTU
discovery.
By the way, TCP is considered strong against fragmentation attacks
because TCP has sequence number and acknowledgement number in each
sequence.
This document describes possible measures of cache poisoning attacks
using IP fragmentation.
2. Methodology of the attack
DNS cache poisoning attacks using IP fragmentation are performed by
combining the path MTU attack and cache poisoning attack. Path MTU
attack targets are authoritative DNS servers. Cache poisoning attack
targets are full-service resolvers.
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Cache poisoning attacks using IP fragmentation are performed as
follows steps. Path MTU attack is performed by step 3. Cache
poisoning attack is performed by step 4 to 6.
1. Choose victim full-service resolver and target domain name.
2. Get the correct response from authoritative servers of the target
domain name.
3. Send crafted ICMP/ICMPv6 packet to authoritative servers of the
target domain name. The crafted ICMP packet indicates small path
MTU size from the authoritative server to the victim full-
resolver. If control of the path MTU succeed, proceed to the
next step.
4. Generate second fragments from the correct response retrieved at
step 2 with specified path MTU size, and calculate partial
checksum value of the second fragment. Generate crafted second
fragment that has the same partial checksum value. (If the
partial checksum value of the correct second fragment and the
partial checksum value of the crafted second fragment are the
same, the UDP checksum value are the same.)
5. Send trigger query (target domain name / type) to the victim
full-service resolver.
6. Send the crafted second fragment to victim full-service resolver
with assumed fragment ID (or all possible IDs, at most 65536 on
IPv4).
7. If victim full-service resolver accepts the crafted second
fragment, the attack is successful.
The keys of the attack are:
o The attacker can control the fragmentation.
o The attacker can generate second fragment that generates the same
UDP checksum value as the original response.
o The query source port and DNS ID field exist in the first
fragment.
o the reassembly process holds received second fragment until
arrival of the first fragment (timing is not strict),
o IPv4 fragmentation ID field has only 16 bits.
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o Some IPv6 implementations use predictable fragment Identification
values [RFC7739].
The probability of spoofing a resolver is described in Section 7.2 of
[RFC5452]. The DNS cache poisoning attack using IP fragmentation
changes to P=1 and I=1 (source port and ID are in the first fragment
and need not predict), and adds number of fragment IDs as a
denominator.
On IPv6, the attack does not change the probability because IPv6
fragment ID field has 32 bits. On IPv4, the attack changes the
probability from 1/2^32 to 1/2^16 because IPv4 fragment ID field has
only 16 bits.
3. Current status
[Brandt2018] showed that Linux version 3.13 and older versions are
vulnerable to crafted ICMP fragmentation needed and DF set packet and
off-path attackers can set some of authoritative servers' path MTU
size to 296.
The author tested Linux version 2.6.32, 4.18.20 and FreeBSD 12.0.
Linux 2.6.32 accepts crafted "ICMP Need Fragmentation and DF set"
packet and path MTU decreased to 552. Linux 2.6.32, Linux 4.18.20
and FreeBSD 12.0 accept crafted "ICMPv6 Packet Too Big" packet and
path MTU decreased to 1280.
Linux version 4.18.20 may ignore crafted ICMP packet.
FreeBSD and NetBSD accept "ICMP Need Fragmentation and DF set" packet
related to established TCP and ignore "ICMP Need Fragmentation and DF
set" packet related to UDP.
Then, off-path attackers can decrease path MTU size from some IPv4
authoritative servers to 552 (or 296), and can decrease path MTU size
from IPv6 authoritative servers to 1280 (minimal IPv6 MTU size).
As described before, some old operating systems use predictable
(incremental) fragmentation ID.
Furthermore, off-path attackers can know path MTU size related to
authoritative servers and they can generate crafted fragmented DNS
responses to victim full-service resolvers.
Then, measures against these attacks at full-service resolvers is
important.
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+---------------+---------+----------+---------+----------+
| OS / | crafted | minimal | crafted | minimal |
| source | ICMPv4 | IPv4 MTU | ICMPv6 | IPv6 MTU |
+---------------+---------+----------+---------+----------+
| [Brandt2018] | accept | 552/296 | unknown | unknown |
+---------------+---------+----------+---------+----------+
| Linux 2.6.32 | accept | 552 | accept | 1280 |
| Linux 4.18.20 | ignore? | | accept | 1280 |
| FreeBSD 12 | ignore | | accept | 1280 |
+---------------+---------+----------+---------+----------+
4. Possible measures
4.1. Use DNSSEC
DNSSEC is a measure against cache poisoning attacks. However, there
are many unsigned zones and full-service resolver operator need to
consider these zones.
"Use DNSSEC" requires both authoritative side and resolver side
support.
4.2. Limit requestor's UDP payload size to 1220/1232 on IPv6
Limiting EDNS0 requestor's UDP payload size [RFC6891] to 1220/1232 on
IPv6 is a measure of path MTU attacks on IPv6 because minimal MTU
size of IPv6 is 1280 and most of implementations ignore ICMPv6 packet
too big packets whose MTU size is smaller than 1280.
4.3. Limit requestor's UDP payload size to 512
Limiting EDNS0 requestor's UDP payload size [RFC6891] to 512 may be a
measure of path MTU attacks.
However, since most of DNSSEC responses exceed 512 octets, limiting
EDNS0 requestor's UDP payload size to 512 results truncated responses
and resolvers need to retry queries by TCP. It always decreases name
resolution performance.
And more, [Brandt2018] showed that off-path attackers can set some of
authoritative servers' path MTU cache to 296. In this case, limiting
EDNS0 payload size is not a measure.
Section 3 of [RFC4035] defines that A security-aware name server MUST
support a message size of at least 1220 octets.
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4.4. Set IP_DONTFRAG / IPv6 DONTFRAG at authoritative servers
It is a measure of authoritative server side.
4.5. Drop path MTU discovery or filter ICMP related to path MTU
discovery
It is not a measure of resolver side. All authoritative servers need
to be changed. Changing all authoritative servers is impossible.
TCP requires path MTU discovery.
4.6. Drop all fragmented packets
To avoid the fragmentation attacks, "drop all fragmented packets" is
one of the ideas. However, under path MTU discovery attacks, TCP
packets may be fragmented and dropped. Then, "drop all fragmented
UDP packets related to DNS" is the solution.
4.7. Drop fragmented UDP DNS responses at full-service resolvers
Drop fragmented UDP DNS responses at full-service resolvers may be a
measure of cache poisoning attacks using IP fragmentation.
To avoid fragmentation in normal condition, use EDNS0 requestor's and
responder's UDP payload size as 1220 to avoid fragmentation. 1220 is
the minimal value defined by [RFC4035].
Under path MTU discovery attacks and cache poisoning attacks using IP
fragmentation, UDP DNS response packets are fragmented and dropped
and name resolution fails.
If resolver software retries by TCP, TCP is strong for fragmentation
attacks and name resolution by TCP will success.
4.8. Use TCP only
It is believed that TCP is not vulnerable to fragmentation attacks.
Unbound has "tcp-upstream" option that changes the upstream queries
use TCP only for transport.
Some operators that support [RFC8078] said that they use TCP only for
transport to avoid cache poisoning attacks.
The full-service resolvers of multiple CAs issuing domain validation
(DV) certificates are required to withstand cache poisoning attacks,
it is better to implement their full-service resolvers use TCP
upstream queries only. Section 11.2 "DNS security" of
[I-D.ietf-acme-acme] recommends that servers SHOULD perform DNS
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queries over TCP, which provides better resistance to some forgery
attacks than DNS over UDP.
4.9. Use good randomness for Fragmentation Identification field
See [RFC7739].
5. Proposal
To avoid cache poisoning attacks using IP fragmentation by full-
service resolvers,
o Full-service resolvers set EDNS0 requestor's UDP payload size to
1220. (minimal size defined by [RFC4035])
o Full-service resolvers drop fragmented UDP responses related to
DNS.
o Full-service resolvers may retry name resolution by TCP.
o (Full-service resolvers support DNSSEC validation.)
To make a domain name robust for cache poisoning attacks using IP
fragmentation,
o Authoritative servers choose EDNS0 responder's maximum payload
size limit to 1220 (to avoid IP fragmentation).
o Authoritative servers send DNS responses with IP_DONTFRAG /
IPV6_DONTFRAG options.
o (Authoritative servers support DNSSEC and sign the domain name.)
o Authoritative servers and network devices use good randomness for
fragmentation Identification field.
Exception: If authoritative servers and full-service resolvers are
located beyond the link with the MTU value less than 1280, choose
EDNS0 requestor's and responder's maximum payload size limit to the
smallest link MTU value.
6. Example firewall configuration
Linux iptables support dropping first fragment with UDP source port
53 by using m32 module. Other first fragments that is not UDP, not
source port 53 are not dropped. Second and following fragments
should not be dropped because they may relate to other protocols.
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Second fragments related to DNS will be dropped because their first
fragments dropped.
iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -m u32 --u32 \\
"6&0xFFFF00FF=0x20000011&&18&0xffff=53" -j DROP
or iptables -t raw -A PREROUTING -p udp -f -j DROP
ip6tables -A INPUT -p udp -m frag --fragfirst -m udp --sport 53 -j DROP
Other OSs may not handle first fragments. Then, drop all fragmented
UDP packets.
On FreeBSD, 'ipfw' can drop all fragmented UDP packets (second
fragments).
ipfw deny log udp from any to me in frag
7. IANA Considerations
This document has no IANA actions.
8. Security Considerations
Under path MTU discovery and fragmentation attacks, most full-service
resolver software do not retry name resolution by TCP, name
resolution related to attacks fails.
9. Acknowledgments
The author would like to specifically thank Mark Andrews and Daisuke
HIGASHI.
10. Change History
10.1. 00
Initial version
10.2. 01
o Added Attack methodology
o Added measures at authoritative servers
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11. References
11.1. Normative References
[RFC1191] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", RFC 1191,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1191, November 1990,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1191>.
[RFC4035] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security
Extensions", RFC 4035, DOI 10.17487/RFC4035, March 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4035>.
[RFC5452] Hubert, A. and R. van Mook, "Measures for Making DNS More
Resilient against Forged Answers", RFC 5452,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5452, January 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5452>.
[RFC6891] Damas, J., Graff, M., and P. Vixie, "Extension Mechanisms
for DNS (EDNS(0))", STD 75, RFC 6891,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6891, April 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6891>.
[RFC7739] Gont, F., "Security Implications of Predictable Fragment
Identification Values", RFC 7739, DOI 10.17487/RFC7739,
February 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7739>.
11.2. Informative References
[Brandt2018]
Brandt, M., Dai, T., Klein, A., Shulman, H., and M.
Waidner, "Domain Validation++ For MitM-Resilient PKI",
Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security , 2018.
[Herzberg2013]
Herzberg, A. and H. Shulman, "Fragmentation Considered
Poisonous", IEEE Conference on Communications and Network
Security , 2013.
[Hlavacek2013]
Hlavacek, T., "IP fragmentation attack on DNS", RIPE 67
Meeting , 2013, <https://ripe67.ripe.net/
presentations/240-ipfragattack.pdf>.
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[I-D.ietf-acme-acme]
Barnes, R., Hoffman-Andrews, J., McCarney, D., and J.
Kasten, "Automatic Certificate Management Environment
(ACME)", draft-ietf-acme-acme-18 (work in progress),
December 2018.
[RFC8078] Gudmundsson, O. and P. Wouters, "Managing DS Records from
the Parent via CDS/CDNSKEY", RFC 8078,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8078, March 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8078>.
Appendix A. How to know path MTU size
o Linux: ip route get <IPv4/IPv6 address>
o FreeBSD: sysctl -o net.inet.tcp.hostcache.list
Appendix B. How to generate crafted ICMP packets
Let the crafted path MTU size be cMTU.
B.1. Example of crafted ICMP Need Fragmentation and DF set packet
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IP header:
+-----------------------------------------------+
| V/HL 0x45 / TOS any / Total Length 20+8+20+8 |
| Identification any / Flags/Offset 0 |
| TTL any / Protocol 1 / Header checksum: calc |
| Source Address: attack tool address or any |
| Destination: target auth server address |
+-----------------------------------------------+
ICMP header:
+-----------------------------------------------+
| Type 3 / Code 4 / Checksum: calculate |
| unused 0 / Next-Hop MTU: cMTU |
+-----------------------------------------------+
Internet Header + 64 bits of Original Datagram:
IP header: +-----------------------------------------------+
| V/HL 0x45 / TOS any / Total Length 1420 |
| Identification any / Flags/Offset 0x4000(DF)|
| TTL any / Protocol 17/ Header checksum: calc |
| Source Address: target auth server address |
| Destination: victim full-resolver address |
+-----------------------------------------------+
UDP header:
+-----------------------------------------------+
| Source Port 53 / Destination Port: any |
| Length 1400 / Checksum: any |
+-----------------------------------------------+
B.2. Example of crafted ICMPv6 Packet Too Big
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IPv6 header:
+----------------------------------------------------+
| Version/Traffic Class/Flow Label: 0x60000000 |
|Payload Len: cMTU-40 / NextHeader 58 / HopLimit any |
| Source Address: attack tool address or any |
| Destination Address: target auth server address |
+----------------------------------------------------+
ICMPv6 header:
+----------------------------------------------------+
| Type 2 / Code 0 / Checksum: calculate |
| MTU: (64bit) cMTU |
+----------------------------------------------------+
Fake invoking packet
IPv6 header:
+----------------------------------------------------+
| Version/Traffic Class/Flow Label: 0x60000000 |
|Payload Len: 1400 / NextHeader 17 / HopLimit any |
| Source Address: target auth server address |
| Destination Address: victim full-resolver address |
+----------------------------------------------------+
UDP header:
+----------------------------------------------------+
| Source Port 53 / Destination Port: any |
| Length 1400 / Checksum: any |
+----------------------------------------------------+
Rest: Fill zero to end of packet
Author's Address
Kazunori Fujiwara
Japan Registry Services Co., Ltd.
Chiyoda First Bldg. East 13F, 3-8-1 Nishi-Kanda
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 101-0065
Japan
Phone: +81 3 5215 8451
Email: fujiwara@jprs.co.jp
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