Internet DRAFT - draft-dhody-pce-pceps-tls13
draft-dhody-pce-pceps-tls13
PCE D. Dhody
Internet-Draft Huawei Technologies
Updates: 8253 (if approved) S. Turner
Intended status: Standards Track sn3rd
Expires: 14 September 2023 R. Housley
Vigil Security
13 March 2023
Updates for PCEPS
draft-dhody-pce-pceps-tls13-02
Abstract
RFC 8253 defines how to protect PCEP messages with TLS 1.2. This
document updates RFC 8253 to address support requirements for TLS 1.2
and TLS 1.3 and the use of TLS 1.3's early data.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Discussion of this document takes place on the Path Computation
Element Working Group mailing list (pce@ietf.org), which is archived
at https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/pce/.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/dhruvdhody/draft-dhody-pce-pceps-tls13.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
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material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."
This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 September 2023.
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Early Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction
[RFC8253] defines how to protect PCEP messages [RFC5440] with TLS 1.2
[RFC5246]. This document updates [RFC8253] to address support
requirements for TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and TLS 1.3
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] and the use of TLS 1.3's early data, which
is also known as 0-RTT data. All other provisions set forth in
[RFC8253] are unchanged, including connection initiation, message
framing, connection closure, certificate validation, peer identity,
and failure handling.
| Editor's Note: The reference to [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] could
| be changed to RFC 8446 incase the progress of the bis draft is
| slower than the progression of this document.
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2. Conventions and Definitions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. Early Data
Early data (aka 0-RTT data) is a mechanism defined in TLS 1.3
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] that allows a client to send data ("early
data") as part of the first flight of messages to a server. Note
that TLS 1.3 can be used without early data as per Appendix F.5 of
[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]. In fact, early data is permitted by TLS
1.3 only when the client and server share a Pre-Shared Key (PSK),
either obtained externally or via a previous handshake. The client
uses the PSK to authenticate the server and to encrypt the early
data.
As noted in Section 2.3 of [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis], the security
properties for early data are weaker than those for subsequent TLS-
protected data. In particular, early data is not forward secret, and
there is no protection against the replay of early data between
connections. Appendix E.5 of [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] requires
applications not use early data without a profile that defines its
use. This document specifies that PCEPS implementations that support
TLS 1.3 MUST NOT use early data.
4. Cipher Suites
Implementations MUST support TLS 1.2 [RFC5246] and are REQUIRED to
support the TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher suite
[RFC9325].
Implementations MAY implement additional TLS 1.2 cipher suites that
provide mutual authentication and confidentiality as required by
PCEP.
Implementations SHOULD support TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] and,
if implemented, MUST prefer to negotiate TLS 1.3 over earlier
versions of TLS.
Implementations that support TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis] are
REQUIRED to support the mandatory-to-implement cipher suites listed
in Section 9.1 of [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis].
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Implementations that support TLS 1.3 MAY implement additional TLS 1.3
cipher suites that provide mutual authentication and confidentiality
as required by PCEP.
PCEPS Implementations SHOULD follow the recommendations given in
[RFC9325].
5. Security Considerations
The Security Considerations of PCEP [RFC5440], [RFC8231], [RFC8281],
and [RFC8283]; TLS 1.2 [RFC5246]; TLS 1.3 [I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis],
and; [RFC9325] apply here as well.
The Path Computation Element (PCE) defined in [RFC4655] is an entity
that is capable of computing a network path or route based on a
network graph, and applying computational constraints. A Path
Computation Client (PCC) may make requests to a PCE for paths to be
computed. PCEP is the communication protocol between a PCC and PCE
and is defined in [RFC5440]. Stateful PCE [RFC8231] specifies a set
of extensions to PCEP to enable control of TE-LSPs by a PCE that
retains the state of the LSPs provisioned in the network (a stateful
PCE). [RFC8281] describes the setup, maintenance, and teardown of
LSPs initiated by a stateful PCE without the need for local
configuration on the PCC, thus allowing for a dynamic network that is
centrally controlled. [RFC8283] introduces the architecture for PCE
as a central controller
TLS mutual authentication is used to ensure that only authorized
users and systems are able to send and receive PCEP messages. To
this end, neither the PCC nor the PCE should establish a PCEPS with
TLS connection with an unknown, unexpected, or incorrectly identified
peer; see Section 3.5 of [RFC5440]. If deployments make use of a
trusted list of Certification Authority (CA) certificates [RFC5280],
then the listed CAs should only issue certificates to parties that
are authorized to access the PCE. Doing otherwise will allow
certificates that were issued for other purposes to be
inappropriately accepted by a PCE.
6. IANA Considerations
There are no IANA considerations.
7. References
7.1. Normative References
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[I-D.ietf-tls-rfc8446bis]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-05, 24 October 2022,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
rfc8446bis-05>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5246] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5246>.
[RFC5280] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
(CRL) Profile", RFC 5280, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5280>.
[RFC5440] Vasseur, JP., Ed. and JL. Le Roux, Ed., "Path Computation
Element (PCE) Communication Protocol (PCEP)", RFC 5440,
DOI 10.17487/RFC5440, March 2009,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5440>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8253] Lopez, D., Gonzalez de Dios, O., Wu, Q., and D. Dhody,
"PCEPS: Usage of TLS to Provide a Secure Transport for the
Path Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)",
RFC 8253, DOI 10.17487/RFC8253, October 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8253>.
[RFC9325] Sheffer, Y., Saint-Andre, P., and T. Fossati,
"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer
Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security
(DTLS)", BCP 195, RFC 9325, DOI 10.17487/RFC9325, November
2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9325>.
7.2. Informative References
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[RFC4655] Farrel, A., Vasseur, J.-P., and J. Ash, "A Path
Computation Element (PCE)-Based Architecture", RFC 4655,
DOI 10.17487/RFC4655, August 2006,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4655>.
[RFC8231] Crabbe, E., Minei, I., Medved, J., and R. Varga, "Path
Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)
Extensions for Stateful PCE", RFC 8231,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8231, September 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8231>.
[RFC8281] Crabbe, E., Minei, I., Sivabalan, S., and R. Varga, "Path
Computation Element Communication Protocol (PCEP)
Extensions for PCE-Initiated LSP Setup in a Stateful PCE
Model", RFC 8281, DOI 10.17487/RFC8281, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8281>.
[RFC8283] Farrel, A., Ed., Zhao, Q., Ed., Li, Z., and C. Zhou, "An
Architecture for Use of PCE and the PCE Communication
Protocol (PCEP) in a Network with Central Control",
RFC 8283, DOI 10.17487/RFC8283, December 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8283>.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Adrian Farrel for their review.
Authors' Addresses
Dhruv Dhody
Huawei Technologies
Email: dhruv.ietf@gmail.com
Sean Turner
sn3rd
Email: sean@sn3rd.com
Russ Housley
Vigil Security, LLC
516 Dranesville Road
Herndon, VA, 20170
United States of America
Email: housley@vigilsec.com
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