Internet DRAFT - draft-celi-irtf-hrpc-ipvc
draft-celi-irtf-hrpc-ipvc
None S. Celi
Internet-Draft Brave
Intended status: Informational J. Guerra
Expires: 14 September 2023 Derechos Digitales
M. Knodel
CDT
13 March 2023
Intimate Partner Violence Digital Considerations
draft-celi-irtf-hrpc-ipvc-00
Abstract
This document aims to inform how Internet protocols and their
implementations might better mitigate technical attacks at the user
endpoint by describing technology-based practices to perpetrate
intimate partner violence (IPV). IPV is a pervasive reality that is
not limited to, but can be exacerbated with, the usage of technology.
The IPV context enables the attacker to access one, some or all of:
devices, local networks, authentication mechanisms, identity
information, and accounts. These kinds of technical compromise exist
in addition to on-path attacks, both active and passive [RFC7624].
In this document we describe the tactics the IPV attacker uses and
what kind of counter-measures can be designed in IETF protocols.
Discussion Venues
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
https://github.com/claucece/draft-celi-irtf-hrpc-ipvc.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 14 September 2023.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/
license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document.
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components
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provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Definition of technology-based IPV . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Technology-based IPV attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3.1. The intimate attacker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.2. Tech-based IPV tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.3. Kinds of tech-enabled IPV attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.4. Means of attacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4. Specific abused technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. Introduction
Intimate partner violence (IPV) refers to physical, emotional,
verbal, sexual, or economic abuse of a person by a current or former
intimate partner. It is understood that in IPV cases there is an
unequal power relationship that enables the abuser to cause harm in
romantic or sexual relationships, as well as child or elder abuse, or
abuse by any member of a household.
Digital technologies are central in modern lives and can be used as a
way to enable and enhance IPV. At the same time, IPV is not
considered enough when designing digital technologies, networks, or
Internet protocols against threats. This lack of consideration has
put pressure on health professionals and social workers to mitigate
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technology-enabled abuse and its effects. In turn, survivors and
targets develop ad hoc strategies for digital privacy and safety for
themselves alone and only in rare cases are protocol design or
cybersecurity best practice available tactics. This type of abuser,
"the attacker you know", is neither on- nor off-path, they have
complete access to-- perhaps even share-- devices and local networks.
They can even coerce their targets.
This document describes the tactics used in technology-based IPV. It
provides recommendations for the design of protocols and
implementations to mitigate those tactics. In what follows, we first
describe IPV and related terminology, the kind of tactics attackers
use, and we end with the recommendations.
2. Definition of technology-based IPV
Technology enables and enhances IPV attacks with pervasive
surveillance, overt monitoring, and coercive access. IPV refers to
physical, emotional, verbal, sexual, or economic abuse of a person by
a current or former intimate partner. By "partner" we mean anyone
with a close relationship with the victim that can exercise abuse in
a romantic or sexual relationship, as well as child or elder abuse,
or abuse by any member of a household. In cases of IPV there is an
unequal power relationship that enables the attacker to cause harm.
[Dragiewicz2018] calls this "digital coercive control" whereby
Internet-enabled technology-- through access to local networks,
devices and accounts-- becomes a mechanism to exert control, to
conduct surveillance, or to aggravate and harass.
2.1. Terminology
In the rest of this draft, we will use this terminology:
* Attacker: By "attacker" we mean an abuser in an IPV situation that
is using digital tools to enable and enhance abuse. An attacker
can also be referred as "perpetrator".
* Victim: By "victim" we mean the subject of a attack. Notice that
we are using this term only in the context of an attack scenario:
we prefer the term "survivor" otherwise.
3. Technology-based IPV attacks
In order to describe IPV attacks that are enabled or exacerbated by
Internet technology, we first describe our assumptions about the
attacker and common tactics that can be used. Then the types of
technology-enabled IPV attacks are described.
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3.1. The intimate attacker
The attacker we present in this document is one that either has
forceful control of accounts, devices, and/or authentication
information for accessing systems, or uses public information to
exercise control. The kind of attacker can be technologically savvy
or not. We define this attacker as one of the strongest ones as it
can have unlimited access to systems and devices.
The attacker has some kind of physical access to the victim (or has
had it in the past), and often shares a common social network with
them. In some cases, it can be the legal owner of the devices/
accounts a victim uses.
3.2. Tech-based IPV tactics
There are many ways in which digital and networked technology can
facilitate an attacker perpetrating IPV. Here we informally list
their main groups:
* Ready-made tools: Attackers can use applications or devices that
are solely built to facilitate IPV. These apps are sometimes
called "stalkerware" or "spouseware".
* Dual-use tools: Attackers can use applications, control settings
or devices built for beneficial or innocuous purposes and
repurpose them for harm. This is the case, for example, of anti-
theft devices that can be repurposed for stalking.
* Impersonation attacks: Knowing personal information coupled with
access to authentication mechanisms gives an attacker the ability
to fully authenticate to services and accounts of the victim,
effectively impersonating them. This can be executed to the
degree that the victim can no longer successfully authenticate
themselves.
* UI-bound impersonation attacks: Attackers can abuse technology to
enhance IPV by abusing the UI of a specific tool. In this case,
attackers become authenticated but adversarial users of a system.
They cannot, however, escalate to root privileges or access other
underlying functionalities of the system. They are bound to
whatever system they managed to authenticate to. We will explore
later the ways attackers use to forcibly gain authentication to a
system.
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* Social media and forums: Attackers can learn and share information
on how to use technology to enhance IPV through the usage of these
tools. They can also receive narrative justification to condone
their behaviour. They can also perform cyberstalking,
cyberbullying, doxxing with the usage of these tools.
* Perception of threat: The mere presence of a pervasive threat is a
form of control. The perception that technology can be used to
enhance IPV is a tactic of attackers to control victims, take away
agency and abuse them. This can lead to lack of trust in
technology and further isolates the victim from seeking and
receiving support.
3.3. Kinds of tech-enabled IPV attacks
* Monitoring: One of the most prevalent methods to enhance IPV is
the usage of active monitoring of any online account that the
victim has or of any action that the victim does in the digital
world. This includes a variety of behaviors that feel unwelcomed
and intrusive, and can involve threats. The monitoring is
"active" in that is a permanent action that the victim can be
aware of or not, and that the abuser might want to make them aware
or not. It can include:
- Monitoring e-mail, chat-based or social media communication, or
browsing history either directly on the victim's computer or
through specialised applications.
- Monitoring location and whereabouts by looking at the metadata
of communication, by using location-help applications, or by
using specialized applications.
- Monitoring any data sent over the network by mounting DNS
attacks or other specialised attacks.
- Monitoring any information found on the UI by looking at
laptops screens, or other device's screens while the victim is
using them.
- Using the Internet to seek public or private information to
compile a victim's personal information for use in harassment.
In this type of attack, we see these dimensions:
- Monitoring of the content of communications either at the
application layer or other layers.
- Monitoring of the UI content of application tools.
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- Monitoring of location information.
* Compromise of accounts: Research suggests that in IPV, an attacker
may demand access to a victim's accounts for continuous monitoring
and/or restricting their communication with others. This is
different from the previous point in that the perpetrator demands
access (or uses invasive tools) to tools and contents, rather than
using "publicly available" tools or by monitoring without
coercion. This type of attack is mounted in order to reduce the
"life space" or "space for action" that the victim-survivor may
have to perform activities that do not involve their attacker.
Once an attacker has access to an online account, they can use
that to:
- Delete data, which can be communication data, documents and
more.
- Have access to friends, family and contacts.
- Have access to communication, audio-video content, and any
associated metadata.
- Lock out or change the authentication mechanisms that grant
access to the account.
- Impersonate by using the victim's online identity to send
false/forged messages to others or to purchase goods and
services.
- Impersonate by using the victim's online identity to publicly
post information that can be private or fake.
* Compromise of devices: This attack is similar to the above, but
the attacker demands access to the victim's devices. The goal is
the same as the above but the result is more impactful as it
restricts access to accounts that are accessed through the device.
It can also prevent any connection to the Internet. Once an
attacker has access to the device, they can use it to:
- Phisical prevention of use of the device (the device can be
used, for example, to call police services, which is restricted
with this attack).
- Access contacts and data (media or messages) stored in it.
- Access to accounts and authentication mechanisms for other
accounts (saved passwords or authenticator apps -2-factor
authentication-, for example).
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- Perform impersonation.
- Perform denial of access to the device, networks or the
Internet in general.
- Destroy the device itself and any information stored in it.
- Impersonate by using the victim's online identity as accessed
through the device. to publicly post information that can be
private or fake.
* Exposing of private information or media: This attack builds on
top of other attacks. Once an attacker has access to an account
or device, they can use this access to gather private information
or private media stored in it. This can later be used for
threatening, extortion, doxing (posting private information), and
more. It can also be used to gather information regarding bank
accounts, tax information and more.
* Denial of access: This attack can be built on top of other
attacks. It can consist of denying access to a device, but also
denying access to the Internet in general by destroying routers
(or network devices), changing Wi-Fi passwords or network
settings. The goal is to disallow access to services, or contact
with family and friends. It can also take the form of disrupting
digital communications by flooding a victim's communication tool
with unwanted messages or by sending a virus program.
* Threats: This attack can be considered as a dimension of the
previous attack as it can result on a denial of access attack. It
consists on sending e-mail, chat-based messages or social media
messages that threatens, insults, or harasses a victim.
* Harrassing: This type of attack seems to appear in different
dimensions:
- On-going harassment with the goal of intimidation, humiliation
and monitoring.
- Harrassment that appears after a victim has "disconnected" to
continue coercion: "[Disconnecting] often makes it worse.
Clients are much more at risk when they actually separate from
their abusers because he suddenly no longer has any control
over that victim. So often the only thing left is through the
phone, so he's going to start harassing you, calling, texting.
If you change your number, now he's most likely going to go
crazy. So that's when he's going to start stalking you any way
he can."
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Harrassment can be anonymous, but a victim often knows from whom
harrassment messages/actions come from; but, due to its anonymity,
it is unable to hold atackers accountable. The systems we have in
place often need that harrassment content is permanently available
so that an investigation takes place. This enhances the abuse a
victim is suffering.
3.4. Means of attacking
The above attacks can be carried out in different ways. We list
there the most common ones:
* Installation of spyware or spoofing: This form of attack consists
of installing unwanted tools into a device in order to gain access
to accounts or for active monitoring. It can also take the form
of remote access by remotely "hacking" security questions,
passwords or any authentication mechanism. Most of the time,
these tools are installed without the victim's knowledge.
* Coercion and control: This form of attack consists of using
coercion and control (which can be physical, emotional or
psychological) to gain access to devices, network devices,
accounts or digital information. It often takes the form of
forcing victims to reveal passwords or account/devices
authentication mechanisms.
* Shared network plans between family/relationship members: Often
times, an attacker is the legal "owner" of a device (owning
children's devices, for example) or accounts (a bank account, for
example), or they have access to accounts/devices as they are part
of a shared family plan. This enables an attacker to carry out
the previously mentioned attacks without the knowledge of the
victim and without the need for installation of tools.
* Monitoring: This means of attack consists of the abuse of social
media and any public information found on digital tools from the
victim that has been shared through them. It also involves
installing tools for active monitoring on devices or using
"bening" applications in a dual-use manner (applications, such as
the "track my phone" one).
* Exposure: This means of attack consists of the abuse of social
media to enhance harassment. It consists of using social media to
post harmful content to humiliate, to harass family or friends,
for doxxing or to non-consensually share intimate/private media.
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4. Specific abused technology
In the research of the ways attackers use technology to enhance IPV,
we see this specific technology being abused:
* Passwords and authentication mechanisms: all authentication
mechanisms can be used to enhance IPV as they are the single point
of failure used by attackers to get access to the account and/or
devices (and, once they have access to those, they can get further
access to other accounts or devices). Attackers can use
specialised tools (to be installed in devices) to record
authentication mechanisms, they can coerce victims in order to get
access to devices, and more. They can also mount these attacks
against fingerprints and biometric authentication mechanisms,
2-factor authentication devices/applications and more.
* Media and private information: attackers can use the access to
accounts/devices to gain access to media and private information.
This media can later be used to bribe a victim, to humiliate them
(by publicly posting it), to enhance harassment and more.
* Recovery of account mechanisms: as with authentication mechanisms,
attackers can use 2-factor authentication devices, accounts and/or
applications to get access to other accounts or profiles
* Lack of blocking mechanisms and abuse of anonymous mechanisms:
Often times attackers carry out abuse by:
- Contacting through fake numbers
- Contacting through fake accounts
- Sending messages to applications that have a "open" chanel for
receiving any message.
- Abusing of read-recipes to enhance control.
- Abusing the lack of blocking mechanisms.
5. Recommendations
We list here some recommendations to protocol designers to mitigate
technology-enabled IPV:
* Build proper authentication systems: authentication mechanisms
should provide:
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- A non-deletable and non-modifiable list of who has access to
accounts/devices.
- A way to recover access to an account and to change
authentication mechanisms.
- Provide mechanisms to revoke access.
* Storage and sharing of media: media should be stored/posted in
such a way that:
- It can be taken down at the request of a victim if it consists
of private media posted without consent.
- Provide good and private mechanisms for reporting the posting
of non-consented media.
- Provide a way to destroy media once a device is in the hands of
an attacker.
* Social media: social media can be a way for attackers to enhance
monitoring. They should:
- Provide proper blocking systems that are not limited to an
individual account.
- Provide mechanisms by which only "accepted" people are able to
send messages to an account.
* Browser history or searching information/metadata should be
deleted by default.
* End-to-end encryption must be the default in order to prevent
network monitoring.
* Considering local attackers when designing sensitive applications.
* Plausible deniability for sensitive applications.
6. Security Considerations
7. IANA Considerations
This document has no actions for IANA.
8. Informative References
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[Dragiewicz2018]
Dragiewicz, M., Burgess, J., Matamoros-Fernández, A.,
Salter, M., Suzor, N. P., Woodlock, D., and B. Harris,
"Technology facilitated coercive control: domestic
violence and the competing roles of digital media
platforms", 6 September 2022,
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/14680777.2018.1447341>.
[NCAV] Abuse, N. C. A. D. V., "National Statistics Domestic
Violence", 6 September 2022,
<https://ncadv.org/learn-more/statistics>.
[RFC7624] Barnes, R., Schneier, B., Jennings, C., Hardie, T.,
Trammell, B., Huitema, C., and D. Borkmann,
"Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A
Threat Model and Problem Statement", RFC 7624,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7624, August 2015,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7624>.
[WHO] Organization, W. H., "Understanding and Addressing
Violence Against Women: Intimate Partner Violence", 2012,
<https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/77432/
WHO_RHR_12.36_eng.pdf>.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to:
* Lana Ramjit and Thomas Ristenpart for their insipiring work on
this area, and guidance for this draft.
* Shivan Kaul and Pete Snyder for discussions, guidance and support.
Authors' Addresses
Sofia Celi
Brave
Email: cherenkov@riseup.net
Juliana Guerra
Derechos Digitales
Email: juliana@derechosdigitales.org
Mallory Knodel
CDT
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Email: mknodel@cdt.org
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