Internet DRAFT - draft-cel-nfsv4-rpc-tls-pseudoflavors
draft-cel-nfsv4-rpc-tls-pseudoflavors
Network File System Version 4 C. Lever
Internet-Draft Oracle
Intended status: Standards Track 27 December 2021
Expires: 30 June 2022
Pseudo-flavors for Remote Procedure Calls with Transport Layer Security
draft-cel-nfsv4-rpc-tls-pseudoflavors-02
Abstract
Recent innovations in Remote Procedure Call (RPC) transport layer
security enable broad deployment of encryption and mutual peer
authentication when exchanging RPC messages. These security
mechanisms can protect peers who continue to use the AUTH_SYS RPC
auth flavor, which is not cryptographically secure, on open networks.
This document introduces RPC auth pseudo-flavors that an RPC service
can use to indicate transport layer security requirements for
accessing that service, and a mechanism the service can use to
enforce those requirements.
Note
This note is to be removed before publishing as an RFC.
Discussion of this draft occurs on the NFSv4 working group mailing
list (nfsv4@ietf.org), archived at
https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/nfsv4/. Working Group
information is available at https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/nfsv4/
about/.
Submit suggestions and changes as pull requests at
https://github.com/chucklever/i-d-rpc-tls-pseudoflavors.
Instructions are on that page.
Status of This Memo
This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.
Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute
working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet-
Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/.
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Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
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This Internet-Draft will expire on 30 June 2022.
Copyright Notice
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Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. RPC Auth Pseudo-flavors for Transport Layer Security . . . . 4
3.1. Definitions of New Pseudo-flavors . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.1. TLS Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4.2. SSHv2 Channel Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Channel Binding for RDMA Transports . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5. NFS Examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.1. Network File System Versions 2 and 3 . . . . . . . . . . 7
5.2. Network File System Version 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
5.2.1. NFSv4 State Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
6. Implementation Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.1. New RPC Auth Flavors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.2. Pseudo-flavors for Secure AUTH_NONE . . . . . . . . . . . 11
8.3. Pseudo-flavors for Secure AUTH_SYS . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
9.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
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1. Introduction
Each RPC transaction may be associated with a user and a set of
groups. That transaction's RPC auth flavor determines how the user
and groups are identified and whether they are authenticated. Peers
that host applications and RPC services may also be identified and
authenicated in each RPC transaction, again depending on that
transaction's RPC auth flavor [RFC5531].
Not all flavors provide peer and user identification and
authentication. For example, the traditional RPC auth flavor
AUTH_NONE identifies no user or group and provides no authentication
of users or peers. The traditional RPC auth flavor AUTH_SYS provides
identification of peers, users, and groups, but does not provide
authentication of any of these.
Moreover, unlike some GSS security services, these RPC auth flavors
provide no confidentiality or integrity checking services. Therefore
AUTH_NONE and AUTH_SYS are considered insecure.
Mutual peer authentication and encryption provided at the transport
layer can make the use of AUTH_NONE and AUTH_SYS more secure. An RPC
service might want to indicate to its clients that it will not allow
access via AUTH_NONE or AUTH_SYS unless transport layer security
services are in place. To do that, this document specifies several
pseudo-flavors that upper layers such as NFS [RFC8881] can use to
enforce stronger security when unauthenticated RPC auth flavors are
in use.
The author expects that, in addition to RPC-with-TLS
[I-D.ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls], other novel RPC transports will eventually
appear that provide similar security features. These transports can
benefit from the pseudo-flavors defined in this document, or this
approach can be extended if new transport security features require
it.
1.1. Terminology
This document adopts the terminology introduced in Section 3 of
[RFC6973] and assumes a working knowledge of the Remote Procedure
Call (RPC) version 2 protocol [RFC5531] and the Transport Layer
Security (TLS) protocol [RFC8446].
This document adheres to the convention that a "client" is a network
host that actively initiates an association, and a "server" is a
network host that passively accepts an association request.
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For the purposes of this document, an Upper-Layer Protocol is an RPC
Program and Version tuple comprised of a set of procedure calls
defining a single API. One example of a ULP is the Network File
System Version 4.0 [RFC7530].
An "RPC auth flavor" is a set of protocol elements that can identify
a network peer and a user and possibly authenticate either or both.
Section 13.4.2 of [RFC5531] explains the differences between RPC auth
flavors and pseudo-flavors.
RPC documentation historically refers to the authentication of a host
as "machine authentication" or "host authentication". TLS
documentation refers to the same as "peer authentication". The
current document uses only "peer authentication".
The term "user authentication" in the current document refers
specifically to the RPC caller's credential provided in the "cred"
and "verf" fields in each RPC Call.
This document uses the term "insecure RPC auth flavor" (or "insecure
flavor" for short) to refer to a class of RPC auth flavors which
provide no user or peer authentication. Two prime examples of an
insecure RPC auth flavor are AUTH_NONE and AUTH_SYS.
2. Requirements Language
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all
capitals, as shown here.
3. RPC Auth Pseudo-flavors for Transport Layer Security
Section 4 of [I-D.ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls] introduces a special RPC auth
flavor known as AUTH_TLS. This RPC auth flavor is used only in a
NULL procedure that probes the presence of support for RPC-with-TLS,
and acts as a STARTTLS barrier.
This auth flavor does not carry the identity of the peer or a user.
RPC clients do not use this RPC auth flavor to authenticate users in
RPC Calls for non-NULL RPC procedures.
Once transport layer security has been established between two RPC
peers, an RPC client can use insecure flavors when forming RPC Calls
with knowledge that the RPC server is known and trusted, and without
concern that the communication can be altered or monitored.
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In some cases an RPC service might want to restrict access to only
clients that have authenticated, or perhaps only when encryption
protects communication. The pseudo-flavors defined below enable RPC-
based services to indicate and enforce access restrictions of this
type.
3.1. Definitions of New Pseudo-flavors
This document specifies several pseudo-flavors that servers may
advertise to clients via mechanisms not defined here. Using the RPC
auth flavor registry instantiated in [RFC5531] gives us leeway to
introduce a narrow basic set of pseudoflavors in this document and
then expand them, via additional documents, as needs arise.
RPC clients continue to use AUTH_NONE (0) or AUTH_SYS (1) in
individual transactions while the network transport service provides
cryptographically secure authentication or encryption, as follows:
* The new pseudo-flavor AUTH_NONE_MPA indicates that the client may
use the AUTH_NONE RPC auth flavor only if both peers have mutually
authenticated. Encryption of traffic between these peers is not
required.
* The new pseudo-flavor AUTH_NONE_ENC indicates that the client may
use the AUTH_NONE RPC auth flavor only if traffic between these
peers is encrypted. Mutual peer authentication is not required.
* The new pseudo-flavor AUTH_NONE_MPA_ENC indicates that the client
may use the AUTH_NONE RPC auth flavor only if both peers have
mutually authenticated and traffic between these peers is
encrypted.
* The new pseudo-flavor AUTH_SYS_MPA indicates that the client may
use the AUTH_SYS RPC auth flavor only if both peers have mutually
authenticated. Encryption of traffic between these peers is not
required.
* The new pseudo-flavor AUTH_SYS_ENC indicates that the client may
use the AUTH_SYS RPC auth flavor only if traffic between these
peers is encrypted. Mutual peer authentication is not required.
* The new pseudo-flavor AUTH_SYS_MPA_ENC indicates that the client
may use the AUTH_SYS RPC auth flavor only if both peers have
mutually authenticated and traffic between these peers is
encrypted.
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Because the RPC layer is not aware of pseudo-flavors, the Upper-Layer
Protocol is responsible for ensuring that appropriate transport layer
security is in place when clients use AUTH_SYS or AUTH_NONE. The
next section explains how server implementations enforce the use of
transport layer security.
4. Channel Binding
Certain aspects of transport layer security are not new. A
deployment might choose to run NFS on a virtual private network
established via an ssh tunnel or over IPsec, for example. The
Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API)
specification [RFC2743] recognized the use of security provided by
transport services underlying GSS with the introduction of channel
binding. [RFC5056] further describes channel binding as a concept
that...
...allows applications to establish that the two end-points of a
secure channel at one network layer are the same as at a higher
layer by binding authentication at the higher layer to the channel
at the lower layer. This allows applications to delegate session
protection to lower layers, which has various performance
benefits.
We are particularly interested in ensuring that the mutual
authentication done during a TLS handshake (most recently specified
in [RFC8446]) on a transport service that handles RPC traffic can be
recognized and used by Upper-Layer Protocols for securely
authenticating the communicating RPC peers.
Section 7 of [RFC5929] identifies a set of API characteristics that
RPC and its underlying transport provide to such protocols.
4.1. TLS Channel Binding
[RFC5929] defines several TLS channel binding types that Upper-Layer
Protocol implementations can use to determine whether appropriate
security is in place to protect RPC transactions that continue to use
insecure RPC auth flavors such as AUTH_SYS.
When used with a Certificate handshake message, the 'tls-server-end-
point' channel binding type as defined in Section 4 of [RFC5929]
serves as authentication for securing pseudo-flavors that require
mutual peer authentication.
RPC-with-TLS requires the use of TLS session encryption
[I-D.ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls]. The presence of TLS under an RPC transport
is enough to secure pseudo-flavors that require encryption. A peer
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can use channel binding to determine whether peer authentication has
also occurred and whether that authentication was mutual or server-
only.
Moreover, in the particular case of TLS, when a handshake fails, both
peers are made aware of the failure reason via the Finished message.
The failure reason can then be reported to the Upper-Layer Protocol
so the local administrator can take specific corrective action.
For instance, an RPC server's local security policy might require
that the RPC client's IP address or hostname match its certificates
Subject Alt Name (SAN). This is not always possible if the client's
IP address and hostname are assigned dynamically. When such a server
causes a handshake failure, administrators can be made aware that the
server's SAN policy restricted a client's access, and corrective
action can then be taken.
4.2. SSHv2 Channel Binding
When RPC traverses an SSHv2 tunnel established between an RPC server
and an RPC client, the 'tls-unique' channel binding type as defined
in Section 3 of [RFC5929] can be used to authenticate peer endpoints
and provide appropriate confidentiality.
4.3. Channel Binding for RDMA Transports
As of this writing, RPC-over-RDMA [RFC8166] does not provide a
transport layer security service. However, Section 5 of [RFC5056]
suggests a mechanism by which channel binding can protect RDDP
[RFC5040], the protocol that handles remote direct data placement for
the iWARP family of protocols. The transport layer underlying RDDP
might use IPsec [RFC6071], TLS [RFC8446], or Encapsulating Security
Payload (ESP) [RFC4303].
5. NFS Examples
This section presents examples of how a commonly-used Upper-Layer
Protocol (NFS) can make use of these pseudo-flavors.
5.1. Network File System Versions 2 and 3
NFSv3 clients use the MNT procedure, defined in Appendix I of
[RFC1813], to discover which RPC auth flavors may be used to access a
particular shared NFSv3 filesystem.
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To require NFSv3 clients to employ underlying transport security when
using AUTH_NONE or AUTH_SYS, the NFS server includes one or more of
the new pseudo-flavors defined in Section 8 in the auth_flavors list
that is part of a MNT response.
When determining whether a filehandle-bearing operation is
authorized, an NFSv3 server uses channel binding to ensure that
appropriate transport layer security is in place before processing an
incoming NFS request that uses an insecure RPC auth flavor. If that
request is not authorized, the NFSv3 server can respond with an
nfs_stat of NFS3ERR_STALE.
The usage of the MNT procedure as described in [RFC1094] is the same
with the exception that an NFSv2 server responds with NFSERR_STALE
instead of NFS3ERR_STALE.
5.2. Network File System Version 4
NFSv4 clients use the SECINFO or SECINFO_NO_NAME procedures, as
defined in [RFC8881], to discover which RPC auth flavors may be used
to access a particular shared NFSv4 filesystem.
To require NFSv4 clients to employ underlying transport security when
using AUTH_NONE or AUTH_SYS, the NFS server includes one or more of
the new pseudo-flavors defined in Section 8 in the SECINFO4resok list
that is part of a SECINFO or SECINFO_NO_NAME response.
When determining whether a filehandle-bearing operation is
authorized, an NFSv4 server uses channel binding to ensure that
appropriate transport layer security is in place before processing an
incoming NFSv4 COMPOUND that uses an insecure RPC auth flavor. If
that request is not authorized, the NFSv4 server terminates the
COMPOUND with a status code of NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC.
5.2.1. NFSv4 State Protection
Note: This section updates RFC 8881.
| An alternate approach might place the updates described in this
| section in rfc5661bis.
Section 2.4.3 of [RFC8881] explains how an NFSv4 server determines
when an NFSv4 client is authorized to create a new lease or replace a
previous one. This mechanism prevents clients from maliciously or
unintentionally wiping open and lock state for another client.
Section 2.10.8.3 of that document further specifies how the server
responds to unauthorized state changes.
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When used with a Certificate handshake message, the 'tls-server-end-
point' channel binding type as defined in Section 4 of [RFC5929] can
provide protection similar to SP4_MACH_CRED.
This document modifies the text of the first bullet in Section 2.4.3
of [RFC8881] to include the use of transport layer security as
follows:
* The principal that created the client ID for the client owner is
the same as the principal that is sending the EXCHANGE_ID
operation. Note that if the client ID was created with
SP4_MACH_CRED state protection (Section 18.35), either:
- The principal MUST be based on RPCSEC_GSS authentication, the
RPCSEC_GSS service used MUST be integrity or privacy, and the
same GSS mechanism and principal MUST be used as that used when
the client ID was created. Or,
- The principal MUST be based on AUTH_SYS, and the server MUST
use channel binding to verify the identity of the client peer
when performing any of the operations specified in the
spa_mach_ops bitmaps. Or,
- The principal MUST be based on AUTH_NONE, and the server MUST
use channel binding to verify the identity of the client peer
when performing any of the operations specified in the
spa_mach_ops bitmaps.
Subsequent discussion of SP4_MACH_CRED in [RFC8881] in Sections
2.10.5.1, 2.10.8.3, and 2.10.11.3 would need similar adjustments.
Further, NFSv4 server implementations may implement a security policy
that restricts the set of clients or security flavors that can
establish a lease via SETCLIENTID or EXCHANGE_ID. However, [RFC8881]
does not allow EXCHANGE_ID or CREATE_SESSION to return
NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC, and [RFC7530] does not allow SETCLIENTID to return
NFS4ERR_WRONGSEC.
NFSv4.1-based protocols might be updated to allow EXCHANGE_ID or
CREATE_SESSION to return NFS4ERR_WRONG_CRED. However, that solution
would be challenging for NFSv4.0, which does not have a definition
for NFS4ERR_WRONG_CRED.
| More discussion is necessary to determine the exact mechanism
| to handle this case in both protocols and to determine which
| documents need to specify that mechanism.
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6. Implementation Status
| This section is to be removed before publishing this document
| as an RFC.
This section records the status of known implementations of the
protocol defined by this specification at the time of posting of this
Internet-Draft, and is based on a proposal described in [RFC7942].
The description of implementations in this section is intended to
assist the IETF in its decision processes in progressing drafts to
RFCs.
Please note that the listing of any individual implementation here
does not imply endorsement by the IETF. Furthermore, no effort has
been spent to verify the information presented here that was supplied
by IETF contributors. This is not intended as, and must not be
construed to be, a catalog of available implementations or their
features. Readers are advised to note that other implementations may
exist.
There are currently no known implementations of the new RPC pseudo-
flavors requested by this document.
7. Security Considerations
Discussion of shortcomings peculiar to the AUTH_SYS RPC auth flavor
appears in the final paragraph of Appendix A of [RFC5531] and in
Appendix A of [I-D.ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls].
When implementing or deploying transport layer security to protect an
upper-level RPC protocol:
* RPC clients that support transport layer security SHOULD use it
whenever possible. Typically the only reason not to is when
performance is important and reasonable security can be provided
in some other way.
* RPC clients that support transport layer security and have the
ability to authenticate SHOULD do so. The only reason not to
authenticate is when authentication and encryption can only be
enabled together, performance is paramount, and there are other
available mechanisms that can provide peer authentication
securely.
The pseudo-flavors defined in this document enable RPC servers to
indicate required levels of security so that RPC clients can make
informed and autonomous decisions that balance performance and
scalability against security needs.
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Important security considerations specific to the use of channel
binding are discussed throughout [RFC5056] and in Section 10 of
[RFC5929].
8. IANA Considerations
| RFC Editor: In the following subsections, please replace RFC-
| TBD with the RFC number assigned to this document.
| Furthermore, please remove this Editor's Note before this
| document is published.
8.1. New RPC Auth Flavors
Following Appendix B of [RFC5531], this document requests several new
entries in the RPC Authentication Flavor Numbers
(https://www.iana.org/assignments/rpc-authentication-numbers/rpc-
authentication-numbers.xhtml) registry. The purpose of these new
flavors is to indicate the use of transport layer encryption or
mutual peer authentication with insecure RPC auth flavors. All new
flavors described in the sections below are pseudo-flavors.
8.2. Pseudo-flavors for Secure AUTH_NONE
The fields in the new entries are assigned as follows:
+===================+==============+=====+================+=========+
| Identifier String | Flavor Name |Value| Description |Reference|
+===================+==============+=====+================+=========+
| AUTH_NONE_MPA | NONE_MPA | TBD | AUTH_NONE with | RFC_TBD|
| | | | mutual peer | |
| | | | authentication | |
+-------------------+--------------+-----+----------------+---------+
| AUTH_NONE_ENC | NONE_ENC | TBD | AUTH_NONE with | RFC_TBD|
| | | |transport layer | |
| | | | encryption | |
+-------------------+--------------+-----+----------------+---------+
| AUTH_NONE_MPA_ENC | NONE_MPA_ENC | TBD | AUTH_NONE with | RFC_TBD|
| | | | peer | |
| | | | authentication | |
| | | | and encryption | |
+-------------------+--------------+-----+----------------+---------+
Table 1
Please allocate the numeric values from the range 400000-409999.
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8.3. Pseudo-flavors for Secure AUTH_SYS
The fields in the new entries are assigned as follows:
+==================+=============+=====+================+===========+
|Identifier String | Flavor Name |Value| Description | Reference |
+==================+=============+=====+================+===========+
|AUTH_SYS_MPA | SYS_MPA | TBD | AUTH_SYS with | RFC_TBD |
| | | | mutual peer | |
| | | | authentication | |
+------------------+-------------+-----+----------------+-----------+
|AUTH_SYS_ENC | SYS_ENC | TBD | AUTH_SYS with | RFC_TBD |
| | | |transport layer | |
| | | | encryption | |
+------------------+-------------+-----+----------------+-----------+
|AUTH_SYS_MPA_ENC | SYS_MPA_ENC | TBD | AUTH_SYS with | RFC_TBD |
| | | | peer | |
| | | | authentication | |
| | | | and encryption | |
+------------------+-------------+-----+----------------+-----------+
Table 2
Please allocate the numeric values from the range 410000-419999.
9. References
9.1. Normative References
[I-D.ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls]
Myklebust, T. and C. Lever, "Towards Remote Procedure Call
Encryption By Default", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-11, 23 November 2020,
<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-nfsv4-
rpc-tls-11>.
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2119>.
[RFC5531] Thurlow, R., "RPC: Remote Procedure Call Protocol
Specification Version 2", RFC 5531, DOI 10.17487/RFC5531,
May 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5531>.
[RFC5929] Altman, J., Williams, N., and L. Zhu, "Channel Bindings
for TLS", RFC 5929, DOI 10.17487/RFC5929, July 2010,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5929>.
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[RFC7942] Sheffer, Y. and A. Farrel, "Improving Awareness of Running
Code: The Implementation Status Section", BCP 205,
RFC 7942, DOI 10.17487/RFC7942, July 2016,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7942>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8174>.
[RFC8881] Noveck, D., Ed. and C. Lever, "Network File System (NFS)
Version 4 Minor Version 1 Protocol", RFC 8881,
DOI 10.17487/RFC8881, August 2020,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8881>.
9.2. Informative References
[RFC1094] Nowicki, B., "NFS: Network File System Protocol
specification", RFC 1094, DOI 10.17487/RFC1094, March
1989, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1094>.
[RFC1813] Callaghan, B., Pawlowski, B., and P. Staubach, "NFS
Version 3 Protocol Specification", RFC 1813,
DOI 10.17487/RFC1813, June 1995,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1813>.
[RFC2743] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application Program
Interface Version 2, Update 1", RFC 2743,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2743, January 2000,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2743>.
[RFC4303] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
RFC 4303, DOI 10.17487/RFC4303, December 2005,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4303>.
[RFC5040] Recio, R., Metzler, B., Culley, P., Hilland, J., and D.
Garcia, "A Remote Direct Memory Access Protocol
Specification", RFC 5040, DOI 10.17487/RFC5040, October
2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5040>.
[RFC5056] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure
Channels", RFC 5056, DOI 10.17487/RFC5056, November 2007,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5056>.
[RFC6071] Frankel, S. and S. Krishnan, "IP Security (IPsec) and
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) Document Roadmap", RFC 6071,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6071, February 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6071>.
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Internet-Draft RPC TLS Pseudo-flavors December 2021
[RFC6973] Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6973>.
[RFC7530] Haynes, T., Ed. and D. Noveck, Ed., "Network File System
(NFS) Version 4 Protocol", RFC 7530, DOI 10.17487/RFC7530,
March 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7530>.
[RFC8166] Lever, C., Ed., Simpson, W., and T. Talpey, "Remote Direct
Memory Access Transport for Remote Procedure Call Version
1", RFC 8166, DOI 10.17487/RFC8166, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8166>.
[RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8446>.
Acknowledgments
David Noveck is responsible for the basic architecture of this
proposal. The author is also grateful to Bill Baker, Rick Macklem,
Greg Marsden, and Martin Thomson for their input and support.
Special thanks to Transport Area Directors Martin Duke and
Zaheduzzaman Sarker, NFSV4 Working Group Chairs David Noveck and
Brian Pawlowski, and NFSV4 Working Group Secretary Thomas Haynes for
their guidance and oversight.
Author's Address
Charles Lever
Oracle Corporation
United States of America
Email: chuck.lever@oracle.com
Lever Expires 30 June 2022 [Page 14]
