Internet DRAFT - draft-brockners-ippm-ioam-data-integrity
draft-brockners-ippm-ioam-data-integrity
ippm F. Brockners
Internet-Draft Cisco
Intended status: Standards Track S. Bhandari
Expires: February 1, 2022 Thoughtspot
T. Mizrahi
Huawei
July 31, 2021
Integrity of In-situ OAM Data Fields
draft-brockners-ippm-ioam-data-integrity-03
Abstract
In-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) records
operational and telemetry information in the packet while the packet
traverses a path between two points in the network. IOAM deployments
could require ensuring the integrity of IOAM data fields. This
document specifies methods to ensure the integrity of IOAM data
fields.
Status of This Memo
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3.1. Modification: IOAM Data Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2. Modification: IOAM Option-Type Headers . . . . . . . . . 5
3.3. Injection: IOAM Data Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4. Injection: IOAM Option-Type Headers . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.5. Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.6. Management and Exporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.7. Delay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.8. Threat Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4. Methods of providing integrity to IOAM data fields . . . . . 8
4.1. Integrity Protected IOAM Option-Types . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2. Subheader for Integrity Protected IOAM Option-Types . . . 9
4.3. Space optimized symmetric key based signing of IOAM data 11
4.3.1. Overhead consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4. Space optimized asymmetric key based signing of trace
data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
4.4.1. Overhead consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5.1. IOAM Option-Type Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2. IOAM Integrity Protection Algorithm Suite Registry . . . 13
6. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1. Introduction
"In-situ" Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (IOAM) records
OAM information within the packet while the packet traverses a
particular network domain. The term "in-situ" refers to the fact
that the OAM data is added to the data packets rather than is being
sent within packets specifically dedicated to OAM. IOAM is to
complement mechanisms such as Ping, Traceroute, or other active
probing mechanisms. In terms of "active" or "passive" OAM, "in-situ"
OAM can be considered a hybrid OAM type. "In-situ" mechanisms do not
require extra packets to be sent. IOAM adds information to the
already available data packets and therefore cannot be considered
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passive. In terms of the classification given in [RFC7799] IOAM
could be portrayed as Hybrid Type I. IOAM mechanisms can be
leveraged where mechanisms using e.g., ICMP do not apply or do not
offer the desired results, such as proving that a certain traffic
flow takes a pre-defined path, SLA verification for the live data
traffic, detailed statistics on traffic distribution paths in
networks that distribute traffic across multiple paths, or scenarios
in which probe traffic is potentially handled differently from
regular data traffic by the network devices.
The current [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data] assumes that IOAM is deployed
in limited domains, where an operator has means to select, monitor,
and control the access to all the networking devices, making the
domain a trusted network. As such, IOAM tracing data is carried in
the packets in clear and there are no protections against any node or
middlebox tampering with the data. As a consequence, IOAM tracing
data collected in an untrusted or semi-trusted environments cannot be
trusted for critical operational decisions. Any rogue or
unauthorized change to IOAM data fields in a user packet cannot be
detected.
Recent discussions following the IETF last call on
[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data] revealed that there might be uses of IOAM
where integrity protection of IOAM data fields is at least desirable,
knowing that IOAM data fields integrity protection would incur extra
effort in the data path of a device processing IOAM data fields. As
such, the following additional considerations and requirements are to
be taken into account in addition to addressing the problem of
detectability of any integrity breach of the IOAM trace data
collected:
1. IOAM trace data is processed by the data plane, hence viability
of any method to prove integrity of the IOAM trace data must be
feasible at data plane processing/forwarding rates (IOAM data
might be applied to all traffic a router forwards).
2. IOAM trace data is carried within data packets. Additional space
required to prove integrity of the data needs to be optimal, i.e.
should not exceed the MTU or have adverse affect on packet
processing.
3. Replay protection of older IOAM trace data should be possible.
Without replay protection a rogue node can present the old IOAM
trace data masking any ongoing network issues/activity making the
IOAM trace data collection useless.
This document is to assist the IPPM working group in designing and
specifying a solution for those deployments where the integrity of
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IOAM data fields is a concern. This document proposes several
methods to achieve integrity protection for IOAM data fields.
The discussion of the different methods to protect the integrity of
IOAM data fields focuses mostly on protecting the integrity of IOAM
Option-Types specified in [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data], though the
specified methods are not limited to these IOAM Option-Types. The
methods could be applied to other IOAM Option-Types such as the DEX
[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-direct-export] Option-Type.
2. Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174]
Abbreviations used in this document:
IOAM: In-situ Operations, Administration, and Maintenance
MTU: Maximum Transmit Unit
OAM: Operations, Administration, and Maintenance
POT: Proof of Transit
SFC: Service Function Chain
3. Threat Analysis
This section presents a threat analysis of integrity-related threats
in the context of IOAM. The threats that are discussed are assumed
to be independent of the lower layer protocols; it is assumed that
threats at other layers are handled by security mechanisms that are
deployed at these layers.
This document is focused on integrity protection for IOAM data
fields. Thus the threat analysis includes threats that are related
to or result from compromising the integrity of IOAM data fields.
Other security aspects such as confidentiality are not within the
scope of this document.
Throughout the analysis there is a distinction between on-path and
off-path attackers. As discussed in [I-D.ietf-detnet-security], on-
path attackers are located in a position that allows interception and
modification of in-flight protocol packets, whereas off-path
attackers can only attack by generating protocol packets.
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The analysis also includes the impact of each of the threats.
Generally speaking, the impact of a successful attack on an OAM
protocol [RFC7276] is a false illusion of nonexistent failures or
preventing the detection of actual ones; in both cases, the attack
may result in denial of service (DoS). Furthermore, creating the
false illusion of a nonexistent issue may trigger unnecessary
processing in some of the IOAM nodes along the path, and may cause
more IOAM-related data to be exported to the management plane than is
conventionally necessary. Beyond these general impacts, threat-
specific impacts are discussed in each of the subsections below.
3.1. Modification: IOAM Data Fields
Threat
An attacker can maliciously modify the IOAM data fields of in-
transit packets. The modification can either be applied to all
packets or selectively applied to a subset of the en route
packets. This threat is applicable to on-path attackers.
Impact
By systematically modifying the IOAM data fields of some or all of
the in-transit packets an attacker can create a false picture of
the paths in the network, the existence of faulty nodes and their
location, and the network performance.
3.2. Modification: IOAM Option-Type Headers
Threat
An on-path attacker can modify IOAM data fields in one or more of
the IOAM Option-Type headers in order to change or disrupt the
behavior of nodes processing IOAM data fields along the path.
Impact
Changing the header of IOAM Option-Types may have several
implications. An attacker can maliciously increase the processing
overhead in nodes that process IOAM data fields and increase the
on-the-wire overhead of IOAM data fields, for example by modifying
the IOAM-Trace-Type field in the IOAM Trace-option header. An
attacker can also prevent some of the nodes that process IOAM data
fields from incorporating IOAM data fields by modifying the
RemainingLen field.
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3.3. Injection: IOAM Data Fields
Threat
An attacker can inject packets with IOAM Option-Types and IOAM
data fields. This threat is applicable to both on-path and off-
path attackers.
Impact
This attack and it impacts are similar to Section 3.1.
3.4. Injection: IOAM Option-Type Headers
Threat
An attacker can inject packets with IOAM Option-Type headers, thus
manipulating other nodes that process IOAM data fields in the
network. This threat is applicable to both on-path and off-path
attackers.
Impact
This attack and it impacts are similar to Section 3.2.
3.5. Replay
Threat
An attacker can replay packets with IOAM data fields.
Specifically, an attacker may replay a previously transmitted IOAM
Option-Type with a new data packet, thus attaching old IOAM data
fields to a fresh user packet. This threat is applicable to both
on-path and off-path attackers.
Impact
As with previous threats, this threat may create a false image of
a nonexistent failure, or may overload nodes which process IOAM
data fields with unnecessary processing.
3.6. Management and Exporting
Threat
Attacks that compromise the integrity of IOAM data fields can be
applied at the management plane, e.g., by manipulating network
management packets. Furthermore, the integrity of IOAM data
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fields that are exported to a receiving entity can also be
compromised. Management plane attacks are not within the scope of
this document; the network management protocol is expected to
include inherent security capabilities. The integrity of exported
data is also not within the scope of this document. It is
expected that the specification of the export format will discuss
the relevant security aspects.
Impact
Malicious manipulation of the management protocol can cause nodes
that process IOAM data fields to malfunction, to be overloaded, or
to incorporate unnecessary IOAM data fields into user packets.
The impact of compromising the integrity of exported IOAM data
fields is similar to the impacts of previous threats that were
described in this section.
3.7. Delay
Threat
An on-path attacker may delay some or all of the in-transit
packets that include IOAM data fields in order to create the false
illusion of congestion. Delay attacks are well known in the
context of deterministic networks [I-D.ietf-detnet-security] and
synchronization [RFC7384], and may be somewhat mitigated in these
environments by using redundant paths in a way that is resilient
to an attack along one of the paths. This approach does not
address the threat in the context of IOAM, as it does not meet the
requirement to measure a specific path or to detect a problem
along the path. It is noted that this threat is not within the
scope of the threats that are mitigated in the scope of this
document.
Impact
Since IOAM can be applied to a fraction of the traffic, an
attacker can detect and delay only the packets that include IOAM
data fields, thus preventing the authenticity of delay and load
measurements.
3.8. Threat Summary
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+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
| Threat |In scope|Out of scope|
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
|Modification: IOAM Data Fields | + | |
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
|Modification: IOAM Option-Type Headers | + | |
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
|Injection: IOAM Data Fields | + | |
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
|Injection: IOAM Option-Type Headers | + | |
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
|Replay | + | |
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
|Management and Exporting | | + |
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
|Delay | | + |
+-------------------------------------------+--------+------------+
Figure 1: Threat Analysis Summary
4. Methods of providing integrity to IOAM data fields
This section specifies additional IOAM Option-Types to carry data
fields to provide for integrity protection. Methods for integrity
protection can leverage symmetric or asymmetric key based signatures
as described in the sub-sections below.
4.1. Integrity Protected IOAM Option-Types
Each of the IOAM Options defined in [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data] are
extended to include Integrity Protected (IP) IOAM Option-Types by
allocating the following IOAM Option-Types in the IOAM Option-Type
registry.
64 IOAM Pre-allocated Trace Integrity Protected Option-Type
corresponds to IOAM Pre-allocated Trace Option-Type with integrity
protection.
65 IOAM Incremental Trace Integrity Protected Option-Type corresponds
to IOAM Incremental Trace Option-Type with integrity protection.
66 IOAM POT Integrity Protected Option-Type corresponds to IOAM POT
Option-Type with integrity protection.
67 IOAM E2E Integrity Protected Option-Type corresponds to IOAM E2E
Option-Type with integrity protection.
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4.2. Subheader for Integrity Protected IOAM Option-Types
An integrity data sub-header is used in IOAM Integrity Protected
Options. It is defined as follows:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Signature-suite| Nonce length | Reserved. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Nonce ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Signature-suite: 8-bit unsigned integer. This field defines the
algorithms used to compute the digest and the signature over the
Option-Type header and data fields excluding the Signature field.
Nonce length: 8-bit unsigned integer. This field specifies the
length of the Nonce field in octets.
Reserved: 16-bit Reserved field. MUST be set to zero upon
transmission and ignored upon receipt.
Nonce: Nonce is a variable length field with length specified in
Nonce length.
Signature: Signature is the digital signature value generated by the
method and algorithm specified by Signature-suite.
The Integrity sub-header follows the IOAM Option-Type header when the
IOAM Option-Type is Integrity Protected Option. Pre-allocated and
incremental Trace option headers are as defined in
[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data]. When the IOAM Option-Type is set to the
IOAM Pre-allocated Trace Integrity Protected Option-Type or IOAM
Incremental Trace Integrity Protected Option-Type then the Integrity
Protection subheader follows the original IOAM Option Type header: :
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0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Namespace-ID |NodeLen | Flags | RemainingLen|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| IOAM-Trace-Type | Reserved |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Signature-suite| Nonce length | Reserved. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Nonce ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
IOAM POT option header as defined in [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data] is
followed by Integrity Protection subheader when IOAM Option Type is
set to IOAM POT Integrity Protected Option-Type:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Namespace-ID |IOAM POT Type | IOAM POT flags|
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Signature-suite| Nonce length | Reserved. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Nonce ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
IOAM E2E option header as defined in [I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data] is
followed by Integrity Protection subheader when IOAM Option Type is
set to IOAM E2E Integrity Protected Option-Type:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Namespace-ID | IOAM-E2E-Type |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|Signature-suite| Nonce length | Reserved. |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Nonce ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| Signature ~
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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4.3. Space optimized symmetric key based signing of IOAM data
This method assumes that symmetric keys have been distributed to the
respective nodes as well as the Validator (the Validator receives all
the keys). The details of the mechanisms of how keys are distributed
are outside the scope of this document. The "Signature" field is
populated as follows:
1. The first node creates a nonce and signature over the hash of
IOAM Option excluding the Signature field, the nonce and its
symmetric key. The nonce is included as a field in Integrity
Protection sub-header of the corresponding IOAM Option. The
resulting signature is included in the corresponding Signature
field.
2. Transit nodes will update the Signature field by creating a
signature of data where the data is [Signature ||
hash(node_data_list[x])] with its symmetric key in case of IOAM
Trace Integrity Protected Options. Transit nodes updating IOAM
POT Option will update the Signature field by creating a
signature of data where the data is [Signature || hash(IOAM POT
OPTION excluding Signature field)] with its symmetric key in case
of IOAM POT Integrity Protected Option.
3. The Validator will iteratively recreate the Signature over the
IOAM Option fields collected and matches the Signature field to
validate the data integrity.
This method uses the following algorithms:
1. The algorithm to calculate the signature using symmetric key MUST
be Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) AES-256. [AES]
[NIST.800-38D].
2. The digest/hash algorithm used MUST be SHA-256 [SHS].
4.3.1. Overhead consideration
The Signature would consume 32 bytes with AES-256. With this method
the Signature is carried only once for the entire packet. As there
are dedicated options for carrying IOAM data with integrity
protection, in case of performance concerns in calculating signature
and validating it, these options can be used for a subset of the
packets by using sampling of data to enable IOAM with integrity
protection.
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4.4. Space optimized asymmetric key based signing of trace data
This method assumes that asymmetric keys have been generated per IOAM
node and the respective nodes can access their keys. The Validator
receives all the public keys. The details of the mechanisms of how
keys are generated and shared are outside the scope of this document.
The " Signature" field is populated as follows:
1. The first node creates a nonce and signs over the hash of IOAM
Option it populates excluding the Signature field in the option,
the nonce and its private key. The resulting signature is
included in the Signature field.
2. Transit nodes will update the Signature field by creating a
signature of data where the data is [Signature ||
hash(node_data_list[x])] with its private key in case of IOAM
Trace Integrity Protected Options. Transit nodes updating IOAM
POT Option will update the Signature field by creating a
signature of data where the data is [Signature || hash(IOAM POT
OPTION excluding Signature field)] with its private key in case
of IOAM POT Integrity Protected Option.
3. The Validator will iteratively recreate the Signature over the
IOAM Option fields collected and matches the Signature field to
validate the data integrity using public keys of the IOAM nodes.
This method uses the following algorithms:
1. The signature algorithm used MUST be the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with curve P-256 [RFC6090] [DSS].
2. The digest/hash algorithm used MUST be SHA-256 [SHS].
4.4.1. Overhead consideration
The Signature consumes 32 bytes based on the SHA-256 ECDSA P-256
algorithm employed. With this method the Signature is only carried
once for the entire packet. As there are dedicated options for
carrying IOAM data with integrity protection, in case of performance
concerns in calculating signature and validating it, these options
can be used for a subset of the packets by using sampling of data to
enable IOAM with integrity protection.
5. IANA Considerations
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5.1. IOAM Option-Type Registry
The following code points are defined in this draft in "IOAM Option-
Type Registry" :
64 IOAM Pre-allocated Trace Integrity Protected Option-Type
65 IOAM Incremental Trace Integrity Protected Option-Type
66 IOAM POT Integrity Protected Option-Type
67 IOAM E2E Integrity Protected Option-Type
5.2. IOAM Integrity Protection Algorithm Suite Registry
"IOAM Integrity Protection Algorithm Suite Registry" in the "In-Situ
OAM (IOAM) Protocol Parameters" group. The one-octet "IOAM Integrity
Protection Algorithm Suite Registry" identifiers assigned by IANA
identify the digest algorithm and signature algorithm used in the
Signature Suite Identifier field. IANA has registered the following
algorithm suite identifiers for the digest algorithm and for the
signature algorithm.
IOAM Integrity Protection Algorithm Suite Registry
Algorithm Digest Signature Specification
Suite Algorithm Algorithm Pointer
Identifier
+------------+------------+-------------+-----------------------+
| 0x0 | Reserved | Reserved | This document |
+------------+------------+-------------+-----------------------+
| 0x1 | SHA-256 | ECDSA P-256 | [SHS] [DSS] [RFC6090] |
| | | | This document |
+------------+------------+-------------+-----------------------+
| 0x2 | SHA-256 | AES-256 | [AES] [NIST.800-38D] |
| | | | This document |
+------------+------------+-------------+-----------------------+
| 0xEF-0xFF | Unassigned | Unassigned | |
+------------+------------+-------------+-----------------------+
Future assignments are to be made using the Standards Action process
defined in [RFC8126]. Assignments consist of the one-octet algorithm
suite identifier value and the associated digest algorithm name and
signature algorithm name.
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6. Security Considerations
This section will be completed in a future revision of this document.
7. Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Santhosh N, Rakesh Kandula, Saiprasad
Muchala, Greg Mirsky, Benjamin Kaduk and Martin Duke for their
comments and advice.
8. References
8.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.
[RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26,
RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>.
[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.
8.2. Informative References
[AES] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, 2001,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-
197.pdf>.
[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
Signature Standard (DSS)", NIST FIPS Publication 186-4,
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, 2013,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf>.
[I-D.ietf-detnet-security]
Grossman, E., Mizrahi, T., and A. J. Hacker,
"Deterministic Networking (DetNet) Security
Considerations", draft-ietf-detnet-security-16 (work in
progress), March 2021.
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[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-data]
Brockners, F., Bhandari, S., and T. Mizrahi, "Data Fields
for In-situ OAM", draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-data-14 (work in
progress), June 2021.
[I-D.ietf-ippm-ioam-direct-export]
Song, H., Gafni, B., Zhou, T., Li, Z., Brockners, F.,
Bhandari, S., Sivakolundu, R., and T. Mizrahi, "In-situ
OAM Direct Exporting", draft-ietf-ippm-ioam-direct-
export-05 (work in progress), July 2021.
[NIST.800-38D]
National Institute of Standards and Technology,
"Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation:
Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and GMAC", NIST Special
Publication 800-38D, 2001,
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-38D/SP-
800-38D.pdf>.
[RFC6090] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
Curve Cryptography Algorithms", RFC 6090,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090>.
[RFC7276] Mizrahi, T., Sprecher, N., Bellagamba, E., and Y.
Weingarten, "An Overview of Operations, Administration,
and Maintenance (OAM) Tools", RFC 7276,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7276, June 2014,
<https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7276>.
[RFC7384] Mizrahi, T., "Security Requirements of Time Protocols in
Packet Switched Networks", RFC 7384, DOI 10.17487/RFC7384,
October 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7384>.
[RFC7799] Morton, A., "Active and Passive Metrics and Methods (with
Hybrid Types In-Between)", RFC 7799, DOI 10.17487/RFC7799,
May 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7799>.
[SHS] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
Hash Standard (SHS)", NIST FIPS Publication 180-4, DOI
10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, 2015,
<http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/
NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf>.
Brockners, et al. Expires February 1, 2022 [Page 15]
Internet-Draft IOAM Data Fields Integrity July 2021
Authors' Addresses
Frank Brockners
Cisco Systems, Inc.
Hansaallee 249, 3rd Floor
DUESSELDORF, NORDRHEIN-WESTFALEN 40549
Germany
Email: fbrockne@cisco.com
Shwetha Bhandari
Thoughtspot
3rd Floor, Indiqube Orion, 24th Main Rd, Garden Layout, HSR Layout
Bangalore, KARNATAKA 560 102
India
Email: shwetha.bhandari@thoughtspot.com
Tal Mizrahi
Huawei
8-2 Matam
Haifa 3190501
Israel
Email: tal.mizrahi.phd@gmail.com
Brockners, et al. Expires February 1, 2022 [Page 16]
