Internet DRAFT - draft-agrewal-idr-accept-own-nexthop

draft-agrewal-idr-accept-own-nexthop







IDR                                                            A. Grewal
Internet-Draft                                                  N. Sheth
Intended status: Standards Track                        K. Vairavakkalai
Expires: April 22, 2018                                 Juniper Networks
                                                        October 19, 2017


               BGP accept-own-nexthop community attribute
                draft-agrewal-idr-accept-own-nexthop-00

Abstract

   Various Service chain techniques utilize a Controller to inject
   Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) Virtual Private Network (VPN) routes to
   help steer traffic through a given path.  The Controller does so by
   controlling how these VPN routes are imported into various Virtual
   Routing and Forwarding (VRF) tables at routers along the desired
   path.  A couple of such approaches are specified in
   [I-D.ietf-bess-service-chaining].  These approaches rely on the
   Controller modifying the Route Target (RT) list and next-hop of a VPN
   route received from a downstream router and redistributing these
   modified routes to upstream routers.  This is done such that -

   o  routes originated by an ingress VRF at the downstream router are
      imported into the egress VRF at the immediately preceding upstream
      router and

   o  next-hop advertised to the upstream router is the address of the
      immediately succeeding downstream router.

   This forces the traffic to flow through a sequence of network
   functions creating a service chain.

   This works fine as long as the VRF importing the route received from
   the Controller is on a different router than the VRF that originally
   exported the route to the Controller.  This is because BGP protocol
   [RFC4271] specifies that a router reject routes received with its own
   next-hop.  This document proposes a new community the reception of
   which relaxes this particular rule in the BGP protocol standard and
   describes at least one way of how next-hops of such routes could be
   resolved.

Requirements Language

   The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
   "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
   document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].




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Status of This Memo

   This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
   provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

   Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
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   This Internet-Draft will expire on April 22, 2018.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
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   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
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   the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
   described in the Simplified BSD License.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   2.  Use Case  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   3
   3.  accept-own-nexthop community  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.1.  New BGP behavior  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
     3.2.  Configuration Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   4.  IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   5.  Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   5
   6.  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   7.  References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.1.  Normative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
     7.2.  Informative References  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   6
   Authors' Addresses  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   7





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1.  Introduction

   The BGP ACCEPT_OWN Community Attribute standard [RFC7611] defined a
   technique to let the route reflector modify the RT list of a VPN
   route and redistribute it back to the originating Provider Edge (PE).
   This enables the route reflector to control how a route originated
   within one VRF at the PE is imported into other VRFs at the
   originating PE.  However, the ACCEPT_OWN standard does not specify
   how the forwarding next-hop for such an accepted route is derived.
   It is understood that once the source VRF is located, the original
   route for this prefix in this source VRF is located and the next-hop
   information of the original route is used as the forwarding state for
   the received route.  The standard also mandates that the route
   received from the route reflector be originated by a source VRF on
   the receiving router.

   This document proposes a new community - BGP accept-own-nexthop -
   whose usage means - 'accept a route with one's own next-hop'
   (regardless of whether the route was originated by the PE).  Doing
   so, enables some new useful use cases.  The scope of this community
   does not mandate the route be originated by a source VRF on the
   receiving router as was the case in BGP ACCEPT_OWN community
   attribute.  Also, the usage of this community does not specify how
   the forwarding next-hop of such a route is derived.  One different
   approach, than the implicit approach used in BGP ACCEPT_OWN standard,
   to obtain the forwarding information of the received route is
   described below.

2.  Use Case

   Let us walk through an example of how a router could redirect
   traffic, that it is receiving in the Ingress VRF, towards a Layer 2
   Physical Network Function (PNF) before the traffic exits this router.
   A gateway in the form of a router is necessary to have Layer 2 PNFs
   become part of a service chain.
















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                +--------------------------------------+
                | Layer 2 Physical network function    |
                +-------------^------------|-----------+
                              |            |
                              |            |
                              |            |
              +---------------|------------|---------------+
              |               |            |               |
              |          +----|----+  +----v----+          |
              |          | Service |  | Service |          |
              |       +-->  in-VRF |  | out-VRF ---+       |
              |       |  |         |  |         |  |       |
              |       |  +---------+  +---------+  |       |
              |       |                            |       |
              |  +----|----+                  +----v----+  |
              |  | Ingress |                  | Egress  |  |
        --------->  VRF    |                  |   VRF   --------->
              |  |         |                  |         |  |
              |  +---------+                  +---------+  |
              |                                            |
              |                   Router                   |
              +--------------------------------------------+

              Figure 1: A Layer 2 PNF as part of service chain

   In the service chaining scenario involving a Layer 2 PNF - a PE (Fig.
   1) advertises a static route - configured inside a VRF (service in-
   VRF) - whose next-hop is the interface that a (transparent layer-2)
   service instance (viz., firewall, anti-virus system etc.) is
   connected to.  The prefix for this route is an address that also
   belongs to the same subnet as this interface's address.  The
   destination address will be in a different vrf (Service out-VRF) at
   the PE itself where the serviced traffic coming from the service will
   be received to be sent to it's destination.

   PE will advertise this route with next-hop as itself and a label that
   identifies the interface on the PE that the service is connected to.

   A Controller acting as an extended route reflector could now steer
   the traffic for a particular destination - for which the controller
   wants the traffic to be serviced - by sending a VPN route for that
   destination, with PE's own address as the next-hop and the above
   label.  The RT that Controller attaches to such a route would allow
   it to be imported to the Ingress VRF.  Such a route will be resolved
   using the received VPN label - that the PE itself advertised - to
   point to whatever next-hop information that is associated with this
   label locally.  A controller may create multiple such service VRFs on
   the PE and follow the above procedure for each service to construct a



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   service chain by advertising routes with different RTs for the same
   destination prefix with different labels, where each label identifies
   the interface towards that particular service.

3.  accept-own-nexthop community

   A new well-known BGP community in the First Come First Served
   [RFC5226] range called accept-own-nexthop has been assigned value of
   0XFFF008 by IANA.

3.1.  New BGP behavior

   A change to default BGP behavior is proposed such that a router that
   receives a route, whose NEXT_HOP value matches one of the addresses
   configured on itself, MAY accept the route if and only if the
   following are true:

   o  The received route is carrying the accept-own-nexthop community.

   o  Processing of the accept-own-nexthop community is enabled by
      configuration on the receiving router.

3.2.  Configuration Control

   The processing - as defined above - of accept-own-nexthop community
   is disabled by default.  An implementation SHOULD provide a
   configuration statement to enable a router to activate the behavior
   specified in this document.

4.  IANA Considerations

   IANA has assigned the value 0xFFFF0008 in the "BGP Well-known
   Communities" registry for the accept-own-nexthop community.

5.  Security Considerations

   accept-own-nexthop community allows a router to accept a route with
   it's own next-hop.  If the originator of that route is that router
   itself and if the router accepts the received route to the same VRF
   from where it was originated route oscillations would happen if this
   new route is more preferable than the original route.  That is so
   because the receiving router preferring the received route would lead
   to it withdrawing its advertisement for the original route.  This
   will prompt the Controller to withdraw the re-originated route.  This
   in turn will prompt the PE to re-advertise the original route and the
   cycle would continue.





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   Since these routes are like any other BGP VPN route, all the
   vulnerabilities applicable to any other BGP VPN route are also
   applicable to these routes.  Such vulnerabilities for BGP VPN routes
   have been described in [RFC4364].

6.  Acknowledgements

   The authors would like to thank John Scudder, Jeff Haas and Minto
   Jeyanath for their valuable comments and suggestions.

7.  References

7.1.  Normative References

   [RFC4271]  Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
              Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", RFC 4271,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4271, January 2006,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4271>.

   [RFC4364]  Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private
              Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4364, DOI 10.17487/RFC4364, February
              2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4364>.

7.2.  Informative References

   [I-D.ietf-bess-service-chaining]
              Fernando, R., Mackie, S., Rao, D., Rijsman, B., Napierala,
              M., and T. Morin, "Service Chaining using Virtual Networks
              with BGP VPNs", draft-ietf-bess-service-chaining-03 (work
              in progress), July 2017.

   [RFC2119]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
              Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

   [RFC5226]  Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an
              IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", RFC 5226,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5226, May 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5226>.

   [RFC7611]  Uttaro, J., Mohapatra, P., Smith, D., Raszuk, R., and J.
              Scudder, "BGP ACCEPT_OWN Community Attribute", RFC 7611,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7611, August 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7611>.






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Authors' Addresses

   Ashutosh Grewal
   Juniper Networks
   1133 Innovation Way
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089
   USA

   EMail: agrewal@juniper.net


   Nischal Sheth
   Juniper Networks
   1133 Innovation Way
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089
   USA

   EMail: nsheth@juniper.net


   Kaliraj Vairavakkalai
   Juniper Networks
   1133 Innovation Way
   Sunnyvale, CA  94089
   USA

   EMail: kaliraj@juniper.net
























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