Constrained Join Proxy for Bootstrapping Protocols
draft-ietf-anima-constrained-join-proxy-04

Abstract

This document defines a protocol to securely assign a Pledge to a domain, represented by a Registrar, using an intermediary node between Pledge and Registrar. This intermediary node is known as a "constrained Join Proxy".

This document extends the work of [RFC8995] by replacing the Circuit-proxy between Pledge and Registrar by a stateless/stateful constrained (CoAP) Join Proxy. It relays join traffic from the Pledge to the Registrar.

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1. Introduction

Enrolment of new nodes into networks with enrolled nodes present is described in [RFC8995] ("BRSKI") and makes use of Enrolment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] with [RFC8366] vouchers to securely enroll devices. BRSKI connects a new joining device (called Pledge) to "Registrars" via a Join Proxy.

The specified solutions use https and may be too large in terms of code space or bandwidth required for constrained devices. Constrained devices possibly part of constrained networks [RFC7228] typically implement the IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) [RFC4944] and Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252].

CoAP can be run with the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6347] as a security protocol for authenticity and confidentiality of the messages. This is known as the "coaps" scheme. A constrained version of EST, using Coap and DTLS, is described in [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher]. The [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher] extends [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-est] with BRSKI artefacts such as voucher, request voucher, and the protocol extensions for constrained Pledges.

DTLS is a client-server protocol relying on the underlying IP layer to perform the routing between the DTLS Client and the DTLS Server. However, the new Pledge will not be IP routable until it is authenticated to the network. A new Pledge can only initially use a link-local IPv6 address to communicate with a neighbour on the same link [RFC6775] until it receives the necessary network configuration parameters. However, before the Pledge can receive these configuration parameters, it needs to authenticate itself to the network to which it connects.

During enrollment, a DTLS connection is required between Pledge and Registrar.

This document specifies a new form of Join Proxy and protocol to act as intermediary between Pledge and Registrar to relay DTLS messages between Pledge and Registrar. Two versions of the Join Proxy are specified:

1. A stateful Join Proxy that locally stores IP addresses during the connection.
2. A stateless Join Proxy that where the connection state is stored in the messages.

This document is very much inspired by text published earlier in [I-D.kumar-dice-dtls-relay].
[I-D.richardson-anima-state-for-joinrouter] outlined the various options for building a join proxy. [RFC8995] adopted only the Circuit Proxy method (1), leaving the other methods as future work. This document standardizes the CoAP/DTLS (method 4).

2. Terminology

The following terms are defined in [RFC8366], and are used identically as in that document: artifact, imprint, domain, Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC), Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA), Pledge, Trust of First Use (TOFU), and Voucher.

The term "installation network" refers to all devices in the installation and the network connections between them. The term "installation IP_address" refers to the set of addresses which are routable over the whole installation network.

3. Requirements Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

4. Join Proxy functionality

As depicted in the Figure 1, the Pledge (P), in an LLN mesh can be more than one hop away from the Registrar (R) and not yet authenticated into the network.

In this situation, the Pledge can only communicate one-hop to its nearest neighbour, the Join Proxy (J) using their link-local IPv6 addresses. However, the Pledge (P) needs to communicate with end-to-end security with a Registrar to authenticate and get the relevant system/network parameters. If the Pledge (P), knowing the IP-address of the Registrar, initiates a DTLS connection to the Registrar, then the packets are dropped at the Join Proxy (J) since the Pledge (P) is not yet admitted to the network or there is no IP routability to Pledge (P) for any returned messages from the Registrar.
Without routing the Pledge (P) cannot establish a secure connection to the Registrar (R) over multiple hops in the network.

Furthermore, the Pledge (P) cannot discover the IP address of the Registrar (R) over multiple hops to initiate a DTLS connection and perform authentication.

To overcome the problems with non-routability of DTLS packets and/or discovery of the destination address of the Registrar, the Join Proxy is introduced. This Join Proxy functionality is configured into all authenticated devices in the network which may act as a Join Proxy for Pledges. The Join Proxy allows for routing of the packets from the Pledge using IP routing to the intended Registrar. An authenticated Join Proxy can discover the routable IP address of the Registrar over multiple hops. The following Section 5 specifies the two Join Proxy modes. A comparison is presented in Section 6.

5. Join Proxy specification

A Join Proxy can operate in two modes:

- Statefull mode
- Stateless mode

A Join Proxy MUST implement one of the two modes. A Join Proxy MAY implement both, with an unspecified mechanism to switch between the two modes.

5.1. Statefull Join Proxy

In statefull mode, the Join Proxy forwards the DTLS messages to the Registrar.

Assume that the Pledge does not know the IP address of the Registrar it needs to contact. The Join Proxy has been enrolled via the Registrar and learns the IP address and port of the Registrar, for
example by using the discovery mechanism described in Section 7. The Pledge first discovers (see Section 7) and selects the most appropriate Join Proxy. (Discovery can also be based upon [RFC8995] section 4.1, or via DNS-SD service discovery [RFC6763]). The Pledge initiates its request as if the Join Proxy is the intended Registrar. The Join Proxy receives the message at a discoverable "Join" port. The Join Proxy constructs an IP packet by copying the DTLS payload from the message received from the Pledge, and provides source and destination addresses to forward the message to the intended Registrar. The Join Proxy maintains a 4-tuple array to translate the DTLS messages received from the Registrar and forward it back to the Pledge.

In Figure 2 the various steps of the message flow are shown, with 5684 being the standard coaps port:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pledge</td>
<td>Join Proxy</td>
<td>Registrar</td>
<td>Message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(P)</td>
<td>(J)</td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td>Src_IP:port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--ClientHello--&gt;</td>
<td>IP_P:p_P</td>
<td>IP_Ja:p_J</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--ClientHello--&gt;</td>
<td>IP_Jb:p_Jb</td>
<td>IP_R:5684</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;--ServerHello--</td>
<td>IP_R:5684</td>
<td>IP_Jb:p_Jb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IP_Ja:p_J</td>
<td>IP_P:p_P</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[DTLS messages]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Finished--</td>
<td>IP_P:p_P</td>
<td>IP_Ja:p_J</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--Finished--</td>
<td>IP_Jb:p_Jb</td>
<td>IP_R:5684</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;--Finished--</td>
<td>IP_R:5684</td>
<td>IP_Jb:p_Jb</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IP_Ja:p_J</td>
<td>IP_P:p_P</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IP_P:p_P = Link-local IP address and port of Pledge (DTLS Client)
IP_R:5684 = Routable IP address and coaps port of Registrar
IP_Ja:p_J = Link-local IP address and join port of Join Proxy
IP_Jb:p_Jb = Routable IP address and client port of Join proxy

Figure 2: constrained statefull joining message flow with Registrar address known to Join Proxy.
5.2. Stateless Join Proxy

The stateless Join Proxy aims to minimize the requirements on the constrained Join Proxy device. Stateless operation requires no memory in the Join Proxy device, but may also reduce the CPU impact as the device does not need to search through a state table.

If an untrusted Pledge that can only use link-local addressing wants to contact a trusted Registrar, and the Registrar is more than one hop away, it sends its DTLS messages to the Join Proxy.

When a Pledge attempts a DTLS connection to the Join Proxy, it uses its link-local IP address as its IP source address. This message is transmitted one-hop to a neighbouring (Join Proxy) node. Under normal circumstances, this message would be dropped at the neighbour node since the Pledge is not yet IP routable or is not yet authenticated to send messages through the network. However, if the neighbour device has the Join Proxy functionality enabled, it routes the DTLS message to its Registrar of choice.

The Join Proxy sends a "new" JPY message which includes the DTLS data as payload.

The JPY message payload consists of two parts:

- Header (H) field: consisting of the source link-local address and port of the Pledge (P), and
- Contents (C) field: containing the original DTLS payload.

On receiving the JPY message, the Registrar (or proxy) retrieves the two parts.

The Registrar transiently stores the Header field information. The Registrar uses the Contents field to execute the Registrar functionality. However, when the Registrar replies, it also extends its DTLS message with the header field in a JPY message and sends it back to the Join Proxy. The Registrar SHOULD NOT assume that it can decode the Header Field, it should simply repeat it when responding. The Header contains the original source link-local address and port of the Pledge from the transient state stored earlier and the Contents field contains the DTLS payload.

On receiving the JPY message, the Join Proxy retrieves the two parts. It uses the Header field to route the DTLS message containing the DTLS payload retrieved from the Contents field to the Pledge.
In this scenario, both the Registrar and the Join Proxy use discoverable "Join" ports, which may be the default ports.

The Figure 3 depicts the message flow diagram:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pledge</th>
<th>Join Proxy</th>
<th>Registrar</th>
<th>Message</th>
<th>Src_IP:port</th>
<th>Dst_IP:port</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(P)</td>
<td>(J)</td>
<td>(R)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

--ClientHello---> IP_P:p_P | IP_Ja:p_Ja |
--JPY[H(IP_P:p_P), C(ClientHello)] | IP_Jb:p_Jb | IP_R:p_Ra |
<--JPY[H(IP_P:p_P), C(ServerHello)] | IP_R:p_Ra | IP_Jb:p_Jb |

<--ServerHello-->
[ DTLS messages ] : : :

--Finished---> IP_P:p_P | IP_Ja:p_Ja |
--JPY[H(IP_P:p_P), C(Finished)] | IP_Jb:p_Jb | IP_R:p_Ra |
<--JPY[H(IP_P:p_P), C(Finished)] | IP_R:p_Ra | IP_Jb:p_Jb |
<--Finished-->

IP_P:p_P = Link-local IP address and port of the Pledge
IP_R:p_Ra = Routable IP address and join port of Registrar
IP_Ja:p_Ja = Link-local IP address and join port of Join Proxy
IP_Jb:p_Jb = Routable IP address and port of Join Proxy

JPY[H(),C()] = Join Proxy message with header H and content C

Figure 3: constrained stateless joining message flow.

5.3. Stateless Message structure

The JPY message is constructed as a payload with media-type application/cbor

Header and Contents fields together are one cbor array of 5 elements:

1. header field: containing a CBOR array [RFC7049] with the Pledge IPv6 Link Local address as a cbor byte string, the Pledge’s UDP port number as a CBOR integer, the IP address family (IPv4/IPv6) as a cbor integer, and the proxy’s ifindex or other identifier
for the physical port as cbor integer. The header field is not DTLS encrypted.

2. Content field: containing the DTLS payload as a CBOR byte string.

The join_proxy cannot decrypt the DTLS payload and has no knowledge of the transported media type.

```cddl
JPY_message =
[
  ip      : bstr,
  port    : int,
  family  : int,
  index   : int,
  payload : bstr
]
```

Figure 4: CDDL representation of JPY message

The content fields are DTLS encrypted. In CBOR diagnostic notation the payload JPY[H(IP_P:p_P)], will look like:

```cddl
[h'IP_p', p_P, family, ident, h'DTLS-payload']
```

Examples are shown in Appendix A.

6. Comparison of stateless and statefull modes

The stateful and stateless mode of operation for the Join Proxy have their advantages and disadvantages. This section should enable to make a choice between the two modes based on the available device resources and network bandwidth.
## Properties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Stateful mode</th>
<th>Stateless mode</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>State Information</td>
<td>The Join Proxy needs additional storage to maintain mapping between the address and port number of the Pledge and those of the Registrar.</td>
<td>No information is maintained by the Join Proxy. Registrar needs to store the packet header.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packet size</td>
<td>The size of the forwarded message is the same as the original message.</td>
<td>Size of the forwarded message is bigger than the original, it includes additional IP-addresses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specification</td>
<td>The Join Proxy needs additional functionality to maintain state information, and specify the source and destination addresses of the DTLS handshake messages.</td>
<td>New JPY message to encapsulate DTLS payload.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ports</td>
<td>Join Proxy needs discoverable &quot;Join&quot; port.</td>
<td>Join Proxy and Registrar need discoverable &quot;Join&quot; ports.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 5: Comparison between stateful and stateless mode

7. **Discovery**

It is assumed that Join Proxy seamlessly provides a coaps connection between Pledge and Registrar. In particular this section replaces section 4.1 of [RFC8995].

The discovery follows two steps with two alternatives for step 1:

1. Two alternatives:

   a. The Pledge is one hop away from the Registrar. The Pledge discovers the link-local address of the Registrar as described in [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]. From then on, it follows the BR SKI process as described in [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] and [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher], using link-local addresses.
b. The Pledge is more than one hop away from a relevant Registrar, and discovers the link-local address and join port of a Join Proxy. The Pledge then follows the BRSKI procedure using the link-local address of the Join Proxy.

1. Once enrolled, the Join Proxy discovers the join port of the Registrar.

Once a Pledge is enrolled, it may function as Join Proxy. The Join Proxy functions are advertised as described below. In principle, the Join Proxy functions are offered via a "join" port, and not the standard coaps port. Also the Registrar offers a "join" port to which the stateless join proxy sends the JPY message. The Join Proxy and Registrar show the extra join port number when replying to a /.well-known/core discovery request addressed to the standard coap/coaps port.

Three discovery cases are discussed: Join_proxy discovers Registrar, Pledge discovers Registrar, and Pledge discovers Join-proxy. Each discovery case considers three alternatives: coap discovery, 6tisch discovery and GRASP discovery.

7.1. Join-Proxy discovers Registrar

In this section, the Pledge and Join Proxy are assumed to communicate via Link-Local addresses. This section describes the discovery of the Registrar by the Join-Proxy.

7.1.1. CoAP discovery

The discovery of the coaps Registrar, using coap discovery, by the Join Proxy follows section 6 of [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est].

7.1.2. Autonomous Network

In the context of autonomous networks, the Join Proxy uses the DULL GRASP M_FLOOD mechanism to announce itself. Section 4.1.1 of [RFC8995] discusses this in more detail. The Registrar announces itself using ACP instance of GRASP using M_FLOOD messages. Autonomous Network Join Proxies MUST support GRASP discovery of Registrar as described in section 4.3 of [RFC8995].

7.1.3. 6tisch discovery

The discovery of Registrar by the Join-Proxy uses the enhanced beacons as discussed in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-enrollment-enhanced-beacon].
7.2. Pledge discovers Join Proxy

7.2.1. Autonomous Network

The Pledge MUST listen for GRASP M_FLOOD [RFC8990] announcements of the objective: "AN_Proxy". See section Section 4.1.1 [RFC8995] for the details of the objective.

7.2.2. CoAP discovery

In the context of a coap network without Autonomous Network support, discovery follows the standard coap policy. The Pledge can discover a Join Proxy by sending a link-local multicast message to ALL CoAP Nodes with address FF02::FD. Multiple or no nodes may respond. The handling of multiple responses and the absence of responses follow section 4 of [RFC8995].

The join port of the Join Proxy is discovered by sending a GET request to "/.well-known/core" including a resource type (rt) parameter with the value "brski-proxy" [RFC6690]. Upon success, the return payload will contain the join port.

The example below shows the discovery of the join port of the Join Proxy.

REQ: GET coap://[FF02::FD]/.well-known/core?rt=brski-proxy

RES: 2.05 Content
<coaps://[IP_address]:join-port>; rt="brski-proxy"

Port numbers are assumed to be the default numbers 5683 and 5684 for coap and coaps respectively (sections 12.6 and 12.7 of [RFC7252] when not shown in the response. Discoverable port numbers are usually returned for Join Proxy resources in the <href> of the payload (see section 5.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]).

7.2.3. 6tisch discovery

Not applicable.

7.3. Join Proxy discovers Registrar join port

7.3.1. CoAP discovery

The stateless Join Proxy can discover the join port of the Registrar by sending a GET request to "/.well-known/core" including a resource type (rt) parameter with the value "join-proxy" [RFC6690]. Upon
success, the return payload will contain the join Port of the Registrar.

REQ: GET coap://[IP_address]/.well-known/core?rt=join-proxy

RES: 2.05 Content
<coaps://[IP_address]:join-port>; rt="join-proxy"

The discoverable port numbers are usually returned for Join Proxy resources in the <href> of the payload (see section 5.1 of [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]).

8. Security Considerations

It should be noted here that the contents of the CBOR map used to convey return address information is not protected. However, the communication is between the Proxy and a known registrar are over the already secured portion of the network, so are not visible to eavesdropping systems.

All of the concerns in [RFC8995] section 4.1 apply. The Pledge can be deceived by malicious Join Proxy announcements. The Pledge will only join a network to which it receives a valid [RFC8366] voucher [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher].

If the communication between Join-Proxy and Registrar passed over an unsecure network, then an attacker could change the cbor array, causing the Pledge to send traffic to another node. If the such scenario needed to be supported, then it would be reasonable for the Proxy to encrypt the CBOR array using a locally generated symmetric key. The Registrar would not be able to examine the result, but it does not need to do so. This is a topic for future work.

9. IANA Considerations

This document needs to create a registry for key indices in the CBOR map. It should be given a name, and the amending formula should be IETF Specification.

9.1. Resource Type registry

This specification registers a new Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attributes in the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values" subregistry under the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters" registry.
rt="brski-proxy". This BRSKI resource is used to query and return the supported BRSKI port of the Join Proxy.

rt="join-proxy". This BRSKI resource is used to query and return the supported BRSKI port of the Registrar.

10. Acknowledgements

Many thanks for the comments by Brian Carpenter and Esko Dijk.

11. Contributors

Sandeep Kumar, Sye loong Keoh, and Oscar Garcia-Morchon are the co-authors of the draft-kumar-dice-dtls-relay-02. Their draft has served as a basis for this document. Much text from their draft is copied over to this draft.

12. Changelog

12.1. 03 to 04

* mail address and reference

12.2. 02 to 03

* Terminology updated
* Several clarifications on discovery and routability
* DTLS payload introduced

12.3. 01 to 02

o Discovery of Join Proxy and Registrar ports

12.4. 00 to 01

o Registrar used throughout instead of EST server
o Emphasized additional Join Proxy port for Join Proxy and Registrar
o updated discovery accordingly
o updated stateless Join Proxy JPY header
o JPY header described with CDDL
o Example simplified and corrected
12.5. 00 to 00

- copied from vanderstok-anima-constrained-join-proxy-05

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Appendix A. Stateless Proxy payload examples

The examples show the request "GET coaps://192.168.1.200:5965/est/crts" to a Registrar. The header generated between Join-Proxy and Registrar and from Registrar to Join-Proxy are shown in detail. The DTLS payload is not shown.

The request from Join Proxy to Registrar looks like:

```
85                                   # array(5)
50                                   # bytes(16)
FE800000000000000000FFFFC0A801C8 #
19 BDA7                          # unsigned(48551)
0A                                # unsigned(10)
00                                # unsigned(0)
58 2D                             # bytes(45)
<cacrts DTLS encrypted request>
```

In CBOR Diagnostic:

```
[  h'FE800000000000000000FFFFC0A801C8', 48551, 10, 0, h'<cacrts DTLS encrypted request>']
```

The response is:

```
85                                   # array(5)
50                                   # bytes(16)
FE800000000000000000FFFFC0A801C8 #
19 BDA7                          # unsigned(48551)
0A                                # unsigned(10)
00                                # unsigned(0)
59 026A                             # bytes(618)
<cacrts DTLS encrypted response>
```

In CBOR diagnostic:

```
[  h'FE800000000000000000FFFFC0A801C8', 48551, 10, 0, h'<cacrts DTLS encrypted response>']
```
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