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| | Application of the Alternate Marking Method to the Segment Routing Header |
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| | draft-fz-spring-srv6-alt-mark-17.txt |
| | Date: |
27/08/2025 |
| | Authors: |
Giuseppe Fioccola, Tianran Zhou, Gyan Mishra, xuewei wang, Geng Zhang, Mauro Cociglio |
| | Working Group: |
Individual Submissions (none) |
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This document describes an alternative experimental approach for the application of the Alternate-Marking Method to SRv6. It uses an experimental TLV in the Segment Routing Header, and thus participation in this experiment should be between coordinating parties in a controlled domain. This approach has potential scaling and simplification benefits over the technique described in RFC 9343 and the scope of the experiment is to determine whether those are significant and attractive to the community. This protocol extension has been developed outside the IETF as an alternative to the IETF's standards track specification RFC 9343 and it does not have IETF consensus. It is published here to guide experimental implementation, ensure interoperability among implementations to better determine the value of this approach. Researchers are invited to submit their evaluations of this work to the RFC Editor for consideration as independent submissions or to the IETF SPRING working group as Internet-Drafts. |
| | Mutually Authenticating TLS in the context of Federations |
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| | draft-halen-fedae-03.txt |
| | Date: |
27/08/2025 |
| | Authors: |
Stefan Halen, Jakob Schlyter |
| | Working Group: |
Individual Submissions (none) |
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This informational independent submission to the RFC series describes a means to use TLS 1.3 to perform machine-to-machine mutual authentication within federations. This memo is not a standard. It does not modify the TLS protocol in any way, nor does it require changes to common TLS libraries. TLS is specified and standardized by the IETF's TLS working group. The framework enables interoperable trust management for federated machine-to-machine communication. It introduces a centrally managed trust anchor and a controlled metadata publication process, ensuring that only authorized members are identifiable within the federation. These mechanisms support unambiguous entity identification and reduce the risk of impersonation, promoting secure and policy-aligned interaction across organizational boundaries. |
| | Reverse Change-of-Authorization (CoA) in RADIUS/(D)TLS |
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This document defines a "reverse Change-of-Authorization (CoA)" path for RADIUS packets. A TLS connection is normally used to forward request packets from a client to a server and to send responses from the server to the client. This specification allows a server to send CoA request packets to the client in "reverse" down that connection, and for the client to send responses to the server. Without this capability, it is in general impossible for a server to send CoA packets to a Network Access Server (NAS) that is located behind a firewall or NAT. This reverse CoA functionality extends the available transport methods for CoA packets, but it does not change anything else about how CoA packets are handled. This document updates RFC8559. |
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| | Post-Quantum Cryptography for Engineers |
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| | draft-ietf-pquip-pqc-engineers-14.txt |
| | Date: |
25/08/2025 |
| | Authors: |
Aritra Banerjee, Tirumaleswar Reddy.K, Dimitrios Schoinianakis, Tim Hollebeek, Mike Ounsworth |
| | Working Group: |
Post-Quantum Use In Protocols (pquip) |
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The advent of a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) would render state-of-the-art, traditional public key algorithms deployed today obsolete, as the mathematical assumptions underpinning their security would no longer hold. To address this, protocols and infrastructure must transition to post-quantum algorithms, which are designed to resist both traditional and quantum attacks. This document explains why engineers need to be aware of and understand post-quantum cryptography (PQC), detailing the impact of CRQCs on existing systems and the challenges involved in transitioning to post-quantum algorithms. Unlike previous cryptographic updates, this shift may require significant protocol redesign due to the unique properties of post-quantum algorithms. |
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| | Prioritizing known-local IPv6 ULAs through address selection policy |
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This document updates the default address selection algorithm for Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6), originally specified in RFC 6724, based on accumulated operational experience. It introduces the concept of "known-local" Unique Local Address (ULA) prefixes within the fd00::/8 block and specifies that ULA-to-ULA communications using such prefixes should be preferred over both IPv4-to-IPv4 and GUA-to- GUA (Global Unicast Address) communications in local use scenarios. The document defines mechanisms for nodes to identify and incorporate known-local prefixes into their address selection policy tables. It introduces a requirement to implement Rule 5.5 of RFC 6724 and reduces the default precedence for 6to4 addresses. These updates enhance the supportability of typical deployment environments, including automatic and unmanaged configurations, and promote consistent IPv6-over-IPv4 precedence behavior for both ULA and GUA within local networks. The document acknowledges that certain atypical deployment models may require explicit configuration to achieve intended operational outcomes. |
| | ALPN ID Specification for CoAP over DTLS |
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| | draft-ietf-core-coap-dtls-alpn-05.txt |
| | Date: |
11/08/2025 |
| | Authors: |
Martine Lenders, Christian Amsuess, Thomas Schmidt, Matthias Waehlisch |
| | Working Group: |
Constrained RESTful Environments (core) |
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This document specifies an Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation (ALPN) ID for transport-layer-secured Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) services. |