Network Working Group G. Zorn Internet-Draft H. Zhou Intended status: Informational J. Salowey Expires: February 28, 2007 Cisco Systems August 27, 2006 Transmitting Confidential Data in RADIUS draft-zorn-radius-encattr-03.txt Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on February 28, 2007. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). Abstract This document defines a pair of RADIUS Attributes designed to allow the secure transmission of sensitive or confidential data between RADIUS clients and servers. Zorn, et al. Expires February 28, 2007 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Encrypted Attributes August 2006 Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Specification of Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.1. Crypto-Params . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3.2. Encrypted-Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 4. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.1. Attribute Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 4.2. Attribute Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 10 Zorn, et al. Expires February 28, 2007 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Encrypted Attributes August 2006 1. Introduction Certain applications of the RADIUS protocol [RFC2865] require the content (at least, if not the type and length) of one or more Attributes in a message to be encrypted. For example, an application enabling the interception of certain packets by law enforcement agencies might require that it be impossible for an observer to distinguish between sessions which are under surveillance and those that are not. If packet interception is enabled and disabled using RADIUS (via the Access-Accept [RFC2865] or CoA-Request [RFC3576] messages, for example) then the Attributes used to signal this must be encrypted; however, it might be acceptable for the remainder of the Attributes to be sent in cleartext. Currently, this type of transfer is usually accomplished using either the Tunnel-Password Attribute [RFC2868] or vendor-specific RADIUS attributes. However, there are several issues with these techniques: o The Tunnel-Password Attribute was not designed to carry entire RADIUS Attributes and it is not large enough to hold an Attribute of the maximum size o The security properties and strength of the encryption method used to hide the contents of the Tunnel-Password Attribute are unknown o Due to its dependency upon the random Request Authenticator in the Access-Request message [RFC2865], the Tunnel-Password Attribute cannot be used in messages other than Access-Accept o Although vendor-specific Attributes may not share the problems outlined above, a profusion of different attributes used for the same purpose entails considerable multiplication of effort and makes interoperability difficult to achieve This document defines RADIUS Attributes that can be used to encapsulate and confidentially transfer one or more RADIUS Attributes using non-proprietary techniques with well understood security properties. Discussion of this draft may be directed to the authors. 2. Specification of Requirements The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. Zorn, et al. Expires February 28, 2007 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Encrypted Attributes August 2006 3. Attributes The following subsections describe the Attributes defined by this document. This specification concerns the following values: [TBD1] Crypto-Params [TBD2] Encrypted-Attribute 3.1. Crypto-Params Description This Attribute is used to carry data used during the encryption and decryption of the Attribute(s) encapsulated in the Encrypted- Attribute Attribute, specifically the initialization vector and algorithm identifier. Any packet that contains an Crypto-Params Attribute MUST also contain a Message-Authentication-Code Attribute [KEYWRAP] and SHOULD contain one or more instances of the Encrypted-Attribute Attribute. A summary of the Crypto-Params attribute format is shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | Enc Type | Key ID +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Key ID (cont'd) +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Key ID (cont'd) +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Key ID (cont'd) +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Key ID (cont'd) | IV... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Type [TBD2] for Crypto-Params Zorn, et al. Expires February 28, 2007 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Encrypted Attributes August 2006 Length >=19 Enc Type The Enc Type field is 1 octet in length and serves to identify the encryption algorithm in use. This document defines the following decimal values for this field: 0 NULL 1 AES-CBC-128 [FIPS-197-2001] 2 AES-CBC-192 [FIPS-197-2001] 3 AES-CBC-256 [FIPS-197-2001] Implementations MUST support Enc Types 0 and 1 (NULL and AES- CBC-12). Other values are to be assigned by IANA. Key ID The Key ID field is 16 octets in length and contains an identifier for the key used to encrypt and decrypt the String field of the Encrypted-Attribute Attribute (section 3.2). Further specification of the content of this field is outside the scope of this document. IV The IV field is variable length and contains the initialization vector. The length of the IV field depends upon the algorithm specified in the Enc Type field (above); for the algorithms defined in this document, the length of the IV field is 16 octets. If no initialization vector is required by the algorithm specified by the Enc Type field, this field MAY be omitted. 3.2. Encrypted-Attribute Description This Attribute MAY be used to carry one or more encrypted Attributes in a RADIUS message. Any packet that contains an Encrypted-Attribute Attribute MUST also include both a Crypto-Params Attribute (section 3.1) and a Zorn, et al. Expires February 28, 2007 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Encrypted Attributes August 2006 Message-Authentication-Code Attribute [KEYWRAP]. The encryption of the Attribute(s) MUST be performed by the sender according to the following algorithm: Concatenate the Attributes to be encrypted. If the algorithm specified by the Enc Type field of the Crypto-Params Attribute is a block cipher and the length in octets of the result is not an even multiple of the algorithm's block size , pad the result of the concatenation on the right with enough zero-value octets to make the resulting string an even multiple of the block size in length. Encrypt the result using the algorithm specified by the Enc Type field and the initialization vector contained in the IV field of the Crypto-Params Attribute (section 3.1). Split the resulting ciphertext into one or more chunks, each <= 253 octets in length. Encapsulate each chunk in a separate instance of the Encrypted-Attribute Attribute. The receiver MUST recover the plaintext Attribute(s) using the following algorithm: Concatenate the String fields of the received Encrypted- Attribute Attributes in order of reception. Decrypt the result using the algorithm specified in the Enc Type field and the initialization vector contained in the IV field of the Crypto- Params Attribute (section 3.1). Split the resulting cleartext in to Attributes, discarding the padding (if any). A subset of the attributes in a message can be authenticated and integrity-protected by setting the Enc Type field in the Crypto- Params Attribute (section 3.1) to NULL and concatenating an instance of the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute [KEYWRAP] to the set of attributes to be protected. When used in this way, only the attributes to be protected are to be used as input in the creation of the Message-Authentication-Code Attribute. The Encrypted-Attribute Attribute MUST NOT be used to transfer keys between RADIUS servers and clients. A summary of the Encrypted-Attribute attribute format is shown below. The fields are transmitted from left to right. 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Type | Length | String... +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ Zorn, et al. Expires February 28, 2007 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Encrypted Attributes August 2006 Type [TBD2] for Encrypted-Attribute Length >3 String The String field is variable length and contains the actual encrypted Attributes (see above). 4. IANA Considerations This section explains the criteria to be used by the IANA for assignment of numbers within namespaces defined within this document. The "Specification Required" policy is used here with the meaning defined in BCP 26 [RFC2434]. 4.1. Attribute Types Upon publication of this document as an RFC, IANA must assign numbers to the Crypto-Params and Encrypted-Attribute Attributes. 4.2. Attribute Values As defined in Section 3.1, numbers may need to be assigned for future values of the Enc Type field of the Crypto-Params attribute. These numbers may be assigned by applying the "Specification Required" policy. 5. Security Considerations Although the encryption algorithms specified in this document are believed to be strong, ultimately the confidentiality of the encrypted attributes depends upon the strength of the keys used to encrypt them. For this reason, implementations SHOULD use keys with entropy equal to or greater than the strength of the algorithm used (e.g., 128 bits of entropy for AES-CBC-128, etc.). Given that the secret shared between RADIUS clients and servers typically has relatively weak entropy, it is NOT RECOMMENDED that implementations use the shared secret (or a derivative thereof) as a Zorn, et al. Expires February 28, 2007 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Encrypted Attributes August 2006 key for attribute encryption. 6. References 6.1. Normative References [FIPS-197-2001] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, November 2001, < http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/ fips-197.pdf>. [KEYWRAP] Zorn, G., Zhang, T., Walker, J., and J. Salowey, "RADIUS Attributes for Key Delivery", draft-zorn-radius-keywrap-08.txt (work in progress), September 2005. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC2434] Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998. [RFC2865] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 2865, June 2000. 6.2. Informative References [RFC2868] Zorn, G., Leifer, D., Rubens, A., Shriver, J., Holdrege, M., and I. Goyret, "RADIUS Attributes for Tunnel Protocol Support", RFC 2868, June 2000. [RFC3576] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B. Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC 3576, July 2003. Zorn, et al. Expires February 28, 2007 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Encrypted Attributes August 2006 Authors' Addresses Glen Zorn Cisco Systems 2901 Third Avenue, Suite 600 SEA1/5/ Seattle, WA 98121 US Phone: +1 (425) 344 8113 Email: gwz@cisco.com Hao Zhou Cisco Systems 4125 Highlander Parkway REQ01/3/ Richfield, OH 44286 US Phone: +1 (330) 523-2132 Email: hzhou@cisco.com Joseph Salowey Cisco Systems 2901 Third Avenue SEA1/6/ Seattle, WA 98121 US Phone: +1 (206) 256-3380 Email: jsalowey@cisco.com Zorn, et al. Expires February 28, 2007 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Encrypted Attributes August 2006 Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006). 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The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. Acknowledgment Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF Administrative Support Activity (IASA). Zorn, et al. Expires February 28, 2007 [Page 10]