Individual Submission Bill Manning draft-ymbk-opcode-discover-01.txt ISI 03 Jun 2001 The DISCOVER opcode This document is an Internet-Draft and is NOT offered in accordance with Section 10 of RFC2026, and the author does not provide the IETF with any rights other than to publish as an Internet-Draft. This document is a submission to the domain name system extentions (DNSEXT) working group of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Comments may be submitted to the working group mailing list at "namedroppers@ops.ietf.org" or the author. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This work was funded under DARPA grant: F30602-99-1-0523 0. Abstract The QUERY opcode in the DNS is designed for unicast. With the development of multicast capabilities in the DNS, it is desireable to have a more robust opcode for server interactions. 1. DISCOVER works like QUERY except: 1. it can be sent to a broadcast or multicast destination (QUERY isn't defined for non-unicast, and arguably shouldn't be.) 2. the Question section, if present, has tuples. Future work could augment this structure as follows: 3. if QDCOUNT==0 then only servers willing to do recursion should answer. Other servers must silently discard the DISCOVER request. 4. if QDCOUNT!=0 then only servers who are authoritative for the zones named by some QNAME should answer. 5. responses may echo the request's Question section or leave it blank. 6. responses have "normal" Answer, Authority, and Additional sections. e.g. the response is the same as that to a QUERY. Usage for gethostby{name,addr}-style requestors: Compute the zone name of the enclosing in-addr.arpa or ip6.int domain. DISCOVER whether anyone in-scope is authoritative for this zone. If so, query these authoritative servers for local in-addr/ip6 names. If not, DISCOVER whether there are recursive servers available. If so, query these recursive servers for local in-addr/ip6 names. So, a node will issue a multicast request with the DISCOVER opcode at some particular multicast scope. Then determine, from the replies, whether there are any DNS servers which are authoritative (or support recursion) for the zone. Once one learns a host's FQDN by the above means, repeat the process for discovering the closest enclosing authoritative server of such local name. Cache all NS and A data learned in this process, respecting TTL's. Usage for SRV requestors: Do the gethostbyaddr() and gethostbyname() on one's own LAN-local address, using the above process. Assume that the closest enclosing zone for which an authority server answers an in-scope DISCOVER packet is "this host's parent domain". Compute the SRV name as _service._transport.*.parentdomain. This is a change to the definition as defined in RFC 1034. A wildcard label ("*") in the QNAME used in a DNS message with opcode DISCOVER SHOULD be evaluated with special rules. The wildcard matches any label for which the DNS server data is authoritative. For example 'x.*.example.com.' would match 'x.y.example.com.' and 'x.yy.example.com.' provided that the server was authoritative for 'example.com.' In this particular case, we suggest the follwing considerations be made: getservbyname() can be satisfied by issuing a request with this computed SRV name. The servent structure can be populated by values returned from a request as follows: s_name The name of the service, "_service" without the preceding underscore. s_aliases The names returned in the SRV RRs in replies to the query. s_port The port number in the SRV RRs replies to the query. If these port numbers disagree - one of the port numbers is chosen, and only those names which correspond are returned. s_proto The transport protocol from named by the "_transport" label, without the preceding underscore. Send SRV query for this name to discovered local authority servers. Usage for disconnected networks with no authority servers: Hosts should run a "stub server" which acts as though its FQDN is a zone name. Computed SOA gives the host's FQDN as MNAME, "." as the ANAME, seconds-since-1Jan2000 as the SERIAL, low constants for EXPIRE and the other timers. Computed NS gives the host's FQDN. Computed glue gives the host's LAN-local address. Or Hosts may run a "DNS stub server" which acts as though its FQDN is a zone name. The rules governing the behavior of this stub server are given elsewhere [1] [2]. Such stub servers should answer DISCOVER packets for its zone, and will be found by the iterative "discover closest enclosing authority server" by DISCOVER clients, either in the gethostbyname() or SRV cases described above. Note that stub servers only answer with zone names which match QNAME's, not with zone names which are owned by QNAME's. The only deviation from the DNS model is that a host (like, say, a printer offering LPD services) has a DNS server which answers authoritatively for something which hasn't been delegated to it. However, the only way that such DNS servers can be discovered is with a new opcode, DISCOVER, which is explicitly defined to discover undelegated zones for tightly scoped purposes. Therefore this isn't officially a violation of DNS's coherency principles. The capitalized keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 3. IANA Considerations As a new opcode, the IANA will need to assign a numeric value for the memnonic. 4. Security Considerations No new security considerations are known to be introduced. Using multicast for service discovery has the potential for denial of service. 5. Attribution: This material was generated in discussions on the mdns mailing list hosted by Zocalo in March 2000. Paul Vixie crystalized the concepts... Stuart Cheshire, Bill Woodcock, Erik Guttman and were active contributors. 6. Author's Address Bill Manning PO 12317 Marina del Rey, CA. 90295 +1.310.322.8102 bmanning@karoshi.com 7. References [1] draft-ietf-dnsext-mdns-00.txt [2] draft-manning-dnsext-mdns-00.txt