Network Working Group R. Bush Internet-Draft IIJ Intended status: Standards Track August 12, 2010 Expires: February 13, 2011 The RPKI Ghostbusters Record draft-ymbk-ghostbusters-00 Abstract In the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), resource certificates completely obscure names or any other information which might be useful for contacting responsible parties to deal with issues of certificate expiration, maintenance, roll-overs, compromises, etc. This draft describes the RPKI Ghostbusters Record containing human contact information to be signed (indirectly) by a resource-owning certificate. The data in the record are those of a severely profiled vCARD. Requirements Language The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. This document may not be modified, and derivative works of it may not be created, and it may not be published except as an Internet-Draft. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on February 13, 2011. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the Bush Expires February 13, 2011 [Page 1] Internet-Draft The RPKI Ghostbusters Record August 2010 document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Suggested Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. RPKI Ghostbuster Record Payload Example . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. vCARD Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 5. CMS Packaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. Validation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Author's Address . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Bush Expires February 13, 2011 [Page 2] Internet-Draft The RPKI Ghostbusters Record August 2010 1. Introduction In the operational use of the RPKI, it can become necessary to contact, in a human to human fashion, the party responsible for a resource-owning certificate. The primary example of this need is when the owner of a Route Origin Authorizations (ROA) sees that a upstream certificate in the chain needed to validate the ROA is soon to expire thus placing the routability of the address space described by the ROA in jeopardy. As the names in RPKI certificates are seemingly intentionally obscured hashes, there is no way to use the certificate itself to lead to the certificate's maintainer. So, "Who do you call?" This document specifies the RPKI Ghostbusters Record, signed indirectly by the certificate whose maintainer needs to be contacted, which contains human usable contact information for that maintainer. Note that this record is not an identity certificate, but the attestation to the contact data is made by the holder of the attesting certificate. This record is not meant to supplant or be used as resource registry whois data. It gives information about a certificate maintainer not a resource holder. This specification has three main sections. The first, Section 4, is the format of the contact payload information, a severely profiled vCARD. The second, Section 5, profiles the CMS packaging of the payload as a profile of a RPKI signed blob specification. The third, Section 6, describes the proper validation of the signed Ghostbusters Record. 2. Suggested Reading It is assumed that the reader understands the RPKI, [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch], the RPKI Repository Structure, [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct], ROAs, [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], and vCARDs [RFC2426]. 3. RPKI Ghostbuster Record Payload Example An example of an RPKI Ghostbusters Record payload with all fields used is as follows: Bush Expires February 13, 2011 [Page 3] Internet-Draft The RPKI Ghostbusters Record August 2010 BEGIN:vCard VERSION:3.0 FN:Human's Name ORG:Organizational Entity ADR;TYPE=WORK:;;42 Twisty Passage;Deep Cavern; WA; 98666;U.S.A. TEL;TYPE=VOICE,MSG,WORK:+1-666-555-1212 TEL;TYPE=FAX,WORK:+1-666-555-1213 EMAIL;TYPE=INTERNET:human@example.com END:vCard 4. vCARD Profile The goal in profiling the vCARD is not to include as much information as possible, but rather to include as few fields as possible while providing the minimal necessary data to enable one to contact the certificate maintainer. The Ghostbusters vCARD payload is a minimalist subset of the vCARD as described in [RFC2426]. BEGIN - pro forma packaging which MUST be the first line in the vCARD and MUST have the value "BEGIN:vCARD" as described in [RFC2426]. VERSION - pro forma packaging which MUST be the second line in the vCARD and MUST have the value "VERSION:3.0" as described in 3.6.9 of [RFC2426]. FN - the name, as described in 3.1.1 of [RFC2426], of a contactable person who responsible for the certificate. ORG - an organization as described in 3.5.5 of [RFC2426]. ADR - a postal address as described in 3.2.1 of [RFC2426]. TEL - a voice and/or fax phone as described in 3.3.1 of [RFC2426]. EMAIL - an Email address as described in 3.3.2 of [RFC2426] END - pro forma packaging which MUST be the last line in the vCARD and MUST have the value "END:vCARD" as described in [RFC2426]. The BEGIN, VERSION, and END lines MUST be included in a record. To be useful, FN and one or more of ADR, TEL, and EMAIL SHOULD be included. Bush Expires February 13, 2011 [Page 4] Internet-Draft The RPKI Ghostbusters Record August 2010 5. CMS Packaging The Ghostbusters Record is a CMS signed-data object whose CMS packaging is similar to that of a ROA in [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], and is a profile of the same RPKI CMS Signed Object Specification (a spec which is being extracted from ROA spec). Similarly to a ROA, the Ghostbusters Record is signed by an end- entity certificate which is, in turn, signed by the resource-holding certificate whose maintainer is described in the vCARD. The parameters of the RPKI CMS Signed Object Specification which differ from those of a ROAare as follows: eContentType: The ContentType for a Ghostbusters Record is defined as rpkiGhostbusters, and has the numerical value of TO BE ASSIGNED. eContent: The content of a Ghostbusters Record is described above in Section 4. 6. Validation Though the Ghostbusters payload itself can not be validated, a prudent relying party will validate the CMS packaging. Similarly to ROA validation, see Section 3 of [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], the following conditions MUST be true: 1. The contentType of the CMS object is SignedData (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.7.2). 2. The version of the SignedData object is 3. 3. The certificates field in the SignedData object is present and contains an end-entity certificate whose Subject Key Identifier (SKI) matches the sid field of the SignerInfo object. 4. The end-entity certificate in the certificates field is a valid end-entity certificate in the resource RPKI, and there exists a valid certification path from a trust anchor to that end-entity certificate. 5. The public key of the end-entity certificate contained within the CMS certificates field can be used to successfully verify the signature on the Ghostbusters Record. Bush Expires February 13, 2011 [Page 5] Internet-Draft The RPKI Ghostbusters Record August 2010 6. The crls field in the SignedData object is omitted. 7. The eContentType in the EncapsulatedContentInfo is rpkiGhostbusters (OID TO BE DETERMINED). 8. The version of the SignerInfo is 3. 9. The signedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is present and contains both the ContentType attribute (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.3) and the MessageDigest attribute (OID 1.2.840.113549.1.9.4). 10. The unsignedAttrs field in the SignerInfo object is omitted. 11. The digestAlgorithm in the SignedData and SignerInfo objects as well as the signatureAlgorithm in the SignerInfo object conform to the RPKI Algorithms and Key Size Profile specification [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-algs]. 7. Security Considerations Though there is no on the wire protocol in this specification, there are attacks which could abuse the data described. As the data, to be useful, need to be public, little can be done to avoide this exposure. Phone Numbers: The vCARDs may contain real world telephone numbers which could be abused for telemarketing, abusive calls, etc. Email Addresses: The vCARDs may contain Email addresses which could be abused for purpases of spam. 8. IANA Considerations This document has no IANA Considerations. 9. Acknowledgments The author wishes to thank Russ Housley for suggesting profiling the vCARD specification, and the authors of [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format], from which the author liberally stole. 10. References Bush Expires February 13, 2011 [Page 6] Internet-Draft The RPKI Ghostbusters Record August 2010 10.1. Normative References [I-D.ietf-sidr-roa-format] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", draft-ietf-sidr-roa-format-07 (work in progress), July 2010. [I-D.ietf-sidr-rpki-algs] Huston, G., "A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure", draft-ietf-sidr-rpki-algs-01 (work in progress), May 2010. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC2426] Dawson, F. and T. Howes, "vCard MIME Directory Profile", RFC 2426, September 1998. 10.2. Informative References [I-D.ietf-sidr-arch] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing", draft-ietf-sidr-arch-09 (work in progress), October 2009. [I-D.ietf-sidr-repos-struct] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", draft-ietf-sidr-repos-struct-04 (work in progress), May 2010. Author's Address Randy Bush Internet Initiative Japan, Inc. 5147 Crystal Springs Bainbridge Island, Washington 98110 US Phone: +1 206 780 0431 x1 Email: randy@psg.com Bush Expires February 13, 2011 [Page 7]