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Using Identity as Raw Public Key in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and  
Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)  
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## Abstract

This document specifies the use of identity as a raw public key in Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS). The TLS protocol procedures are kept unchanged, but signature algorithms are extended to support Identity-based signature (IBS). A typical Identity-based signature algorithm, the ECCSI signature algorithm defined in RFC 6507, is supported in the current version.

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## 1. Introduction

DISCLAIMER: This is a personal draft and has not yet seen significant security analysis.

Traditionally, TLS client and server exchange public keys endorsed by PKIX [PKIX] certificates. It is considered complicated and may cause security weaknesses with the use of PKIX certificates Defeating-SSL [Defeating-SSL]. To simplify certificates exchange, using RAW public key with TLS/DTLS has been specified in [RFC 7250] and has been included in the TLS 1.3[RFC 8446]. With RAW public key, instead of transmitting a full certificate or a certificate chain in the TLS messages, only public keys are exchanged between client and server. However, using RAW public key requires out-of-band mechanisms to bind the public key to the entity presenting the key.

Recently, 3GPP has adopted the EAP authentication framework for 5G and EAP-TLS is considered as one of the candidate authentication methods for private networks, especially for networks with a large number of IoT devices. For IoT networks, TLS/DTLS with RAW public key is particularly attractive, but binding identities with public keys might be challenging. The cost to maintain a large table for identity and public key mapping at server side incurs additional maintenance cost. e.g. devices have to pre-register to the server.

To simplify the binding between the public key and the entity presenting the public key, a better way could be using Identity-Based Cryptography(IBC), such as ECCSI public key specified in [RFC 6507], for authentication. Different from X.509 certificates and raw public keys, a public key in IBC takes the form of the entity's identity. This eliminates the necessity of binding between a public key and the entity presenting the public key.

The concept of IBC was first proposed by Adi Shamir in 1984. As a special class of public key cryptography, IBC uses a user's identity as public key, avoiding the hassle of public key certification in public key cryptosystems. IBC broadly includes IBE (Identity-based Encryption) and IBS (Identity-based Signature). For an IBC system to work, there exists a trusted third party, PKG (private key generator) responsible for issuing private keys to the users. In particular, the PKG has in possession a pair of Master Public Key and Master Secret Key; a private key is generated based on the user's identity by using the Master Secret key, while the Master Public key is used together with the user's identities for encryption (in case of IBE) and signature verification ( in case of IBS).

A number of IBE and IBS algorithms have been standardized by different standardization bodies, such as IETF, IEEE, ISO/IEC, etc. For example, IETF has specified several RFCs such as [RFC 5091], [RFC 6507] and [RFC6508] for both IBE and IBS algorithms. ISO/JTC and IEEE also have a few standards on IBC algorithms.

RFC 7250 has specified the use of raw public key with TLS/DTLS handshake. However, supporting of IBS algorithms has not been included therein. Since IBS algorithms are efficient in public key transmission and also eliminate the binding between public keys and identities, in this document, an amendment to RFC 7250 is added for supporting IBS algorithms.

IBS algorithm exempts client and server from public key certification and identity binding by checking an entity's signatures and its identity against the master public key of its PKG. With an IBS algorithm, a PKG generates private keys for entities based on their identities. Global parameters such as PKG's Master Public Key (MPK) need be provisioned to both client and server. These parameters are not user specific, but PKG specific.

For a client, PKG specific parameters can be provisioned at the time PKG provisions the private key to the client. For the server, how to get the PKG specific parameters provisioned is out of the scope of this document, and it is deployment dependent.

The document is organized as follows: Section 3 defines the data structure required when identity is used as raw public key. Section 4 defines the cipher suites required to support IBS algorithm over TLS/DTLS. Section 5 explains how client and server authenticate each other when using identity as raw public key. Section 6 gives examples for using identity as raw public key over TLS/DTLS handshake procedure. Section 7 discusses the security considerations.

## 2. Terms

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals.

## 3. Extension of RAW Public Key to IBC-based Public Key

To support the negotiation of using raw public between client and server, a new Certificate structure is defined in RFC 7250. It is used by the client and server in the hello messages to indicate the types of certificates supported by each side.

When RawPublicKey type is selected for authentication, a data structure, subjectPublicKeyInfo, is used to carry the raw public key and its cryptographic algorithm. Within the subjectPublicKeyInfo structure, two fields, algorithm and subjectPublicKey, are defined. The algorithm is a data structure specifies the cryptographic algorithm used with raw public key, which is represented by an object Identifiers (OID); and the parameters field provides necessary parameters associated with the algorithm. The subjectPublicKey field within the subjectPublicKeyInfo carry the raw public itself.

```

subjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm             AlgorithmIdentifier,
    subjectPublicKey      BIT STRING
}

AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm             OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    parameters           ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL
}

```

Figure 1: SubjectPublicKeyInfo ASN.1 Structure

When using an IBS algorithm, an identity is used as the raw public key, which can be converted to an BIT string and put into the subjectPublicKey field. The algorithm field in AlgorithmIdentifier

structure is the object identifier of the IBS algorithm used. Specifically, for ECCSI signature algorithm, the OBJECT IDENTIFIER is described with following data structure:

```
sa-eccsiWithSHA256 SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM ::= {
  IDENTIFIER id-alg-eccsi-with-sha256
  VALUE ECCSI-Sig-Value PARAMS TYPE NULL ARE absent
  HASHES { mda-sha256 }
  SMIME-CAPS { IDENTIFIED BY id-alg-eccsi-with-sha256 }
}
```

Figure 2: ECCSI Signature Algorithm ANSI.1 Structure

Beside OID, it is necessary to tell the peer the set of global parameters used by the signer. The information can be carried in the payload of the parameters field in AlgorithmIdentifier. In the following, a data structure for carrying ECCSI-based parameters are defined. For other IBS algorithm, it can be defined in the future.

The structure to carry the ECCSI-based global parameters is specified in Figure 2:

```
ECCSIPublicParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
  version    INTEGER { v2(2) },
  curve      OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
  hashfcn    OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
  pointP     POINT,
  pointPpub  POINT
}
```

Figure 3: ECCSI Global Parameters ANSI.1 Structure

With above data structure, pointP shall be G in RFC 6507 and pointPpub shall be KPAK in RFC 6507. The POINT structure specifies a point on an elleptic curve and is defined as follows:

```
POINT ::= SEQUENCE {
  x INTEGER,
  y INTEGER
}
```

Figure 4: POINT Structure ANSI.1 Structure

To support IBS algorithm over TLS protocol, a data structure for signature value need to be defined. A data structure for ECCSI is defined as follows(based RFC 6507):

```

ECCSI-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
    r INTEGER,
    s INTEGER,
    PVT OCTET STRING
}

```

Figure 5: ECCSI Signature Value ANSI.1 Structure

where PVT (as defined in RFC 6507) is encoded as 0x04 || x-coordinate of [v]G || y-coordinate of [v]G.

To use a signature algorithm with TLS, OID for the signature algorithm need be provided. For ECCSI algorithm, an OID has been assigned by IANA recently. The following table shows the basic information needed for the ECCSI signature algorithm to be used for TLS.

Key Type	Document	OID
Elliptic Curve-Based Signatureless For Identity-based Encryption (ECCSI)	Section 5.2 in RFC 6507	1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.29

Table 1: Algorithm Object Identifiers

#### 4. New Signature Algorithms for IBS

To support using identity as raw public key, new signature algorithms corresponding to the IBS need to be defined. With TLS 1.3, the value for signature algorithm is defined in the SignatureScheme. This document proposes to support the IBS algorithm, ECCSI, defined in [RFC 6507]. As a result, the SignatureScheme data structure is amended by add in the support for ECCSI algorithm.

```

enum {
    ...

    /* IBS ECCSI signature algorithm */
    eccsi_sha256 (TBD),

    /* Reserved Code Points */
    private_use (0xFE00..0xFFFF),
    (0xFFFF)
} SignatureScheme;

```

Figure 6: Include ecdhe\_eccsi in KeyExchangeAlgorithm

Note: The signature algorithm of `eccsi_sha256` is defined in RFC6507.

Note: Other IBS signature algorithms can be added in the future.

## 5. TLS Client and Server Handshake Behavior

When IBS is used as RAW public for TLS, signature and hash algorithms are negotiated during the handshake.

The handshake between the TLS client and server follows the procedures defined in [RFC 8446], but with the support of the new signature algorithms specific to the IBS algorithms. The high-level message exchange in the following figure shows TLS handshake using raw public keys, where the `client_certificate_type` and `server_certificate_type` extensions added to the client and server hello messages (see Section 4 of [RFC 7250]).

```

client_hello,
+key_share
+signature_algorithms
client_certificate_type,
server_certificate_type    ->

                                <-  server_hello,
                                + key_share
                                {EncryptedExtensions}
                                {client_certificate_type}
                                {server_certificate_type}
                                {Certificate}
                                {CertificateVerify}
                                {CertificateRequest}
                                {Finished}
                                [Application Data]

{Certificate}
{CertificateVerify}
{Finished}      ----->
[Application Data] <-----> [Application Data]

```

Figure 7: Basic Raw Public Key TLS Exchange

The client hello messages tells the server the types of certificate or raw public key supported by the client, and also the certificate types that client expects to receive from server. When raw public with IBS algorithm from server is supported by the client, the client includes desired IBS cipher suites in the client hello message based on the order of client preference.

After receiving the client hello message, server determines the client and server certificate types for handshakes. When the selected certificate type is RAW public key and IBS is the chosen signature algorithm, server uses the SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure to carry the raw public key, OID for IBS algorithm and ECCSIPublicParameters for global public parameters. With these information, the client knows the signature algorithm and the public parameters that should be used to verify the signature. The signature value is in the CertificateVerify message and the format of signature value should be specified by each IBS algorithm. In this document, an ECCSI-Sig-Value data structure for ECCSI signature algorithm is defined based on the specification of RFC 6507

When sever specifies that RAW public key should be used by client to authenticate with server, the client\_certificate\_type in the server hello is set to RawPublicKey. Besides that, the server also sends Certificate Request, indicating that client should use some specific signature and hash algorithms. When IBS is chosen as signature algorithm, the server need to indicate the required IBS signature algorithms in the signature\_algorithm extension within the CertificateRequest.

To support more IBS signature algorithms, additional values can be added to the SignatureAlgorithm data structure in the future.

If raw public key is selected by server for client authentication, the client checks the CertificateRequest received for signature algorithms. If client wants to use an IBS algorithm for signature, then the signature algorithm it intended to use must be in the list of supported signature algorithms by the server. Assume the IBS algorithm supported by the client is in the list, then the client specifies the IBS signature algorithm and PKG information with SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure in the certificate structure and provide signatures in the certificate verify message. The format of signature in the CertificateVerify message should be sepcified by each individual signature algorithm. In this document, an ECCSI-Sig-Value data strcuture for ECCSI signature algorithm is defined based on the specification of RFC 6507.

The server verifies the signature based on the algorithm and PKG parameters specified by the messages from client.

## 6. Examples

In the following, examples of handshake exchange using IBS algorithm under RawPublicKey are illustrated.



## 6.1. TLS Client and Server Use IBS algorithm

In this example, both the TLS client and server use ECCSI for authentication, and they are restricted in that they can only process ECCSI keys. As a result, the TLS client sets both the `server_certificate_type` extension and the `client_certificate_type` extension to be raw public key; in addition, the client sets the signature algorithm in the client hello message to be `eccsi_sha256`.

When the TLS server receives the client hello, it processes the message. Since it has an ECCSI raw public key from the PKG, it indicates in (2) that it agrees to use ECCSI and provided an ECCSI key by placing the `SubjectPublicKeyInfo` structure into the Certificate payload back to the client (3), including the OID, the identity of server, `ServerID`, which is the public key of server also, and PKG public parameters (`ECCSIPublicParameters`). The `client_certificate_type` in (4) indicates that the TLS server accepts raw public key. The TLS server demands client authentication, and therefore includes a `certificate_request`(5), which requires the client to use `eccsi_sha256` for signature. A signature value based on the `eccsi_sha256` algorithm is carried in the `CertificateVerify` (6). The `ECCSI-Sig-Value` is defined in this document according to the specification in the RFC 6507. The client, which has an ECCSI key, returns its ECCSI certificate in the Certificate payload to the server (7), which includes an OID for the ECCSI signature algorithm, the `PKGInfo` for KMS parameters, and identity of client, `ClientID`, which is the public key of client also. The client also includes a signature value, `ECCSI-Sig-Value`, in the `CertificateVerify` (8) message.

When client/server receive PKG public parameters from peer, it should decide whether these parameters are acceptable or not. An example way to make decision is that a whitelist of acceptable PKG public parameters are stored locally at client/server. They can simply make a decision based on the white list stored locally.

```

client_hello,
+key_share // (1)
signature_algorithm = (eccsi_sha256) // (1)
client_certificate_type=(RawPublicKey) // (1)
server_certificate_type=(RawPublicKey) // (1)
->
<- server_hello,
+ key_share
{ server_certificate_type = RawPublicKey} // (2)
{certificate=((1.3.6.1.5.x,
ECCSIPublicParameters), serverID)} //(3)
{client_certificate_type = RawPublicKey // (4)
{certificate_request = (eccsi_sha256)} //(5)
{CertificateVerify = {ECCSI-Sig-Value} // (6)
{Finishaed}

{Certificate=(
(1.3.6.1.5.x,
ECCSIPublicParameters),
ClientID)} // (7)
{CertificateVerify = (ECCSI-Sig-Value)} //(8)
{Finished }
[Applicateion Data] ---->
[Application Data] <----> [Application Data]

```

Figure 8: Basic Raw Public Key TLS Exchange

## 6.2. Combined Usage of Raw Public Keys and X.509 Certificates

This example combines the uses of an ECCSI key and an X.509 certificate. The TLS client uses an ECCSI key for client authentication, and the TLS server provides an X.509 certificate for server authentication.

The exchange starts with the client indicating its ability to process a raw public key, or an X.509 certificate, if provided by the server. It prefers a raw public key, since `eccsi_sha256` proceeds `ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256` in the `signature_algorithm` payload, and the `RawPublicKey` value precedes the other value in the `server_certificate_type` payload. Furthermore, the client indicates that it has a raw public key for client-side authentication.

The server chooses to provide its X.509 certificate in (3) and indicates that choice in (2). For client authentication, the server indicates in (4) that it has selected the raw public key format and requests an ECCSI certificate from the client in (4) and (5). The TLS client provides an ECSSI certificate in (6) and signature value after receiving and processing the TLS server hello message.

```

client_hello,
+key_share
signature_algorithms =(eccsi_sha256,
  ecdsa_sepc256r1_sha256)} // (1)
{client_certificate_type=
(RawPublicKey)} // (1)
{server_certificate_type=
(RawPublicKey, X.509) // (1)
->
<- server_hello,
+key_share
{server_certificate_type=X.509} // (2)
{Certificate = (x.509 certificate)} // (3)
{client_certificate_type = (RawPublicKey)} // (4)
{CertificateRequest} = (eccsi_sha256)} // (5)
{CertificateVerify}
{Finished}

certificate=(
(1.3.6.1.5.x,
ECCSIPublicParameters),
ClientID), // (6)
{CertificateVerify =
(ECCSI-Sig-Value)} //(8)
{ Finished }
[Application Data] ---->
[Application Data] <----> [Application Data]

```

Figure 9: Basic Raw Public Key TLS Exchange

## 7. Security Considerations

Using IBS-enabled raw public key in TLS/DTLS will not change the information flows of TLS, so the security of the resulting protocol rests on the security of the used IBS algorithms. The example IBS algorithms mentioned above are all standardized and open, and thus the security of these algorithms is supposed to have gone through wide scrutinization.

## 8. IANA Considerations

Existing IANA references have not been updated yet to point to this document.

IANA is asked to assign an OID for ECCSI signature algorithm specified in the [RFC6507], which is used by this document. The required OID should be assigned under the registry of SMI Security for PKIX Algorithms (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6) with following name:

- id-alg-eccsi-with-sha256.

Note: recently, an OID has been assigned by IANA to ECCSI as 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.6.29.

The following TLS registries shall be updated also:

- Signature Scheme Registry: signature algorithm for ECCSI, eccsi\_with\_sha256, are required to be reserved.

## 9. Acknowledgements

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## Appendix A. Examples

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