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Constrained Join Proxy for Bootstrapping Protocols
draft-vanderstok-anima-constrained-join-proxy-01

Abstract

This document defines a protocol to securely assign a pledge to an owner, using an intermediary node between pledge and owner. This intermediary node is known as a "constrained-join-proxy".

This document extends the work of [ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] by replacing the Circuit-proxy by a stateless constrained join-proxy, that transports routing information.

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1. Introduction

Enrolment of new nodes into constrained networks with constrained nodes present is described in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] and makes use of Enrolment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030]. The specified solutions use https and may be too large in terms of code space or bandwidth required. Constrained devices in constrained networks [RFC7228] typically implement the IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) [RFC4944] and Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [RFC7252].

CoAP has chosen Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) [RFC6347] as the preferred security protocol for authenticity and confidentiality of the messages. A constrained version of EST, using Coap and DTLS, is described in [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est].

DTLS is a client-server protocol relying on the underlying IP layer to perform the routing between the DTLS Client and the DTLS Server. However, the new "joining" device will not be IP routable until it is authenticated to the network. A new "joining" device can only initially use a link-local IPv6 address to communicate with a neighbour node using neighbour discovery [RFC6775] until it receives the necessary network configuration parameters. However, before the device can receive these configuration parameters, it needs to authenticate itself to the network to which it connects. In [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra] Enrolment over Secure Transport (EST) [RFC7030] is used to authenticate the joining device. However, IPv6 routing is necessary to establish a connection between joining device and the EST server.

This document specifies a Join-proxy and protocol to act as intermediary between joining device and EST server to establish a connection between joining device and EST server.

This document is very much inspired by text published earlier in [I-D.kumar-dice-dtls-relay].

2. Terminology

The following terms are defined in [RFC8366], and are used identically as in that document: artifact, imprint, domain, Join Registrar/Coordinator (JRC), Manufacturer Authorized Signing Authority (MASA), pledge, Trust of First Use (TOFU), and Voucher.

3. Requirements Language

In this document, the key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14, RFC 2119 [RFC2119] and indicate requirement levels for compliant STuPiD implementations.

4. Join Proxy functionality

As depicted in the Figure 1, the joining Device, or pledge (P), is more than one hop away from the EST server (E) and not yet authenticated into the network. At this stage, it can only communicate one-hop to its nearest neighbour, the Join proxy (J) using their link-local IPv6 addresses. However, the Pledge (P) needs

to communicate with end-to-end security with a Registrar hosting the EST server (E) to authenticate and get the relevant system/network parameters. If the Pledge (P) initiates a DTLS connection to the EST server whose IP address has been pre-configured, then the packets are dropped at the Join Proxy (J) since the Pledge (P) is not yet admitted to the network or there is no IP routability to Pledge (P) for any returned messages.




Figure 1: multi-hop enrolment.

Furthermore, the Pledge (P) may wish to establish a secure connection to the EST server (E) in the network assuming appropriate credentials are exchanged out-of-band, e.g. a hash of the Pledge (P)'s raw public key could be provided to the EST server (E). However, the Pledge (P) is unaware of the IP address of the EST-server (E) to initiate a DTLS connection and perform authentication with.

A DTLS connection is required between Pledge and EST server. To overcome the problems with non-routability of DTLS packets and/ or discovery of the destination address of the EST Server to contact, the Join Proxy is introduced. This Join-Proxy functionality is configured into all authenticated devices in the network which may act as the Join Proxy for newly joining nodes. The Join Proxy allows for routing of the packets from the Pledge using IP routing to the intended EST Server.

5. Join Proxy specification

The Join Proxy can operate in two modes:

- o Statefull mode
- o Stateless mode

In the statefull mode two configuration are envisaged:

- o Join Proxy knows EST Server address

- o Pledge knows EST Server address

5.1. Statefull Join Proxy

In stateful mode, the joining node forwards the DTLS messages to the EST Server.

Assume the Pledge knows the address of the EST server. The message is transmitted to the EST Server as if it originated from the joining node, by replacing the IP address and port of the Pledge to the DTLS IP address of the proxy and a randomly chosen port. The DTLS message itself is not modified. Consequently, the Join Proxy must track the ongoing DTLS connections based on the following 4-tuple stored locally:

- o Pledge link-local IP address (IP_C)
- o Pledge source port (p_C)
- o EST Server IP address (IP_S)
- o EST Server source port (p_R)

The EST Server communicates with the Join Proxy as if it were communicating with the Pledge, without any modification required to the DTLS messages. On receiving a DTLS message from the EST Server, the Join Proxy looks up its locally stored 4-tuple array to identify to which Pledge (if multiple exist) the message belongs. The DTLS message's destination address and port are replaced with the link-local address and port of the corresponding Pledge and the DTLS message is then forwarded to the Pledge. The Join Proxy does not modify the DTLS packets and therefore the normal processing and security of DTLS is unaffected.

In Figure 2 the various steps of the process are shown where the EST Server address is known to the Pledge:

EST Client (P)	Join-Proxy (J)	EST Server (E)	Message	
			Src_IP:port	Dst_IP:port
--ClientHello-->			IP_C:p_C	IP_S:5684
	--ClientHello-->		IP_R:p_R	IP_S:5684
		<--ServerHello--	IP_S:5684	IP_R:p_R
		:		
<--ServerHello--		:	IP_S:5684	IP_C:p_C
:		:	:	:
:		:	:	:
--Finished-->			IP_C:p_C	IP_S:5684
	--Finished-->		IP_R:p_R	IP_S:5684
		<--Finished--	IP_S:5684	IP_R:p_R
<--Finished---			IP_S:5684	IP_C:p_C
:		:	:	:

IP_C:p_C = Link-local IP address and port of EST Client

IP_S:5684 = IP address and coaps port of EST Server

IP_R:p_R = IP address and port of Join Proxy

Figure 2: constrained statefull joining message flow with EST server address known to Join Proxy.

Assume that the pledge does not know the IP address of the EST Server it needs to contact. In that situation, the Join Proxy can be configured with the IP address of a default EST Server that an EST client needs to contact. The EST client initiates its request as if the Join Proxy is the intended EST Server. The Join Proxy changes the IP packet (without modifying the DTLS message) as in the previous case by modifying both the source and destination addresses to forward the message to the intended EST Server. The Join Proxy keeps a similar 4-tuple array to enable translation of the DTLS messages received from the EST Server and forwards it to the EST Client. In Figure 3 the various steps of the message flow are shown:

EST Client (P)	Join Proxy (J)	EST Server (E)	Message	
			Src_IP:port	Dst_IP:port
--ClientHello-->			IP_C:p_C	IP_Ra:5684
	--ClientHello-->		IP_Rb:p_Rb	IP_S:5684
		<--ServerHello--	IP_S:5684	IP_Rb:p_Rb
		:		
<--ServerHello--		:	IP_Ra:5684	IP_C:p_C
		:	:	:
		:	:	:
--Finished-->		:	IP_C:p_C	IP_Ra:5684
	--Finished-->		IP_Rb:p_Rb	IP_S:5684
		<--Finished--	IP_S:5684	IP_Rb:p_Rb
<--Finished--		:	IP_Ra:5684	IP_C:p_C
	:	:	:	:

IP_C:p_C = Link-local IP address and port of DTLS Client

IP_S:5684 = IP address and coaps port of DTLS Server

IP_Ra:5684 = Link-local IP address and coaps port of DTLS Relay

IP_Rb:p_Rb = IP address (can be same as IP_Ra) and port of DTLS Relay

Figure 3: constrained statefull joining message flow with EST server address known to Join Proxy.

5.2. Stateless Join Proxy

The Join-proxy is stateless to minimize the requirements on the constrained Join-proxy device.

When a joining device as a client attempts a DTLS connection to the EST server, it uses its link-local IP address as its IP source address. This message is transmitted one-hop to a neighbour node. Under normal circumstances, this message would be dropped at the neighbour node since the joining device is not yet IP routable or it is not yet authenticated to send messages through the network. However, if the neighbour device has the Join Proxy functionality enabled, it routes the DTLS message to a specific EST Server. Additional security mechanisms need to exist to prevent this routing functionality being used by rogue nodes to bypass any network authentication procedures.

If an untrusted DTLS Client that can only use link-local addressing wants to contact a trusted end-point EST Server, it sends the DTLS message to the Join Proxy. The Join Proxy extends this message into

a new type of message called Join ProxY (JPY) message and sends it on to the EST server. The JPY message payload consists of two parts:

- o Header (H) field: consisting of the source link-local address and port of the Pledge (P), and
- o Contents (C) field: containing the original DTLS message.

On receiving the JPY message, the EST Server retrieves the two parts. The EST Server transiently stores the Header field information. The EST server uses the Contents field to execute the EST server functionality. However, when the EST Server replies, it also extends its DTLS message with the header field in a JPY message and sends it back to the Join Proxy. The Header contains the original source link-local address and port of the DTLS Client from the transient state stored earlier (which can now be discarded) and the Contents field contains the DTLS message.

On receiving the JPY message, the Join Proxy retrieves the two parts. It uses the Header field to route the DTLS message retrieved from the Contents field to the Pledge.

The Figure 4 depicts the message flow diagram when the EST Server end-point address is known only to the Join Proxy:

EST Client (P)	Join Proxy (J)	EST server (E)	Message	
			Src_IP:port	Dst_IP:port
--ClientHello-->			IP_C:p_C	IP_Ra:5684
	--JPY[H(IP_C:p_C),--> C(ClientHello)]		IP_Rb:p_Rb	IP_S:5684
	<--JPY[H(IP_C:p_C),-- C(ServerHello)]		IP_S:5684	IP_Rb:p_Rb
<--ServerHello--			IP_Ra:5684	IP_C:p_C
:			:	:
:			:	:
--Finished-->			IP_C:p_C	IP_Ra:5684
	--JPY[H(IP_C:p_C),--> C(Finished)]		IP_Rb:p_Rb	IP_S:5684
	<--JPY[H(IP_C:p_C),-- C(Finished)]		IP_S:5684	IP_Rb:p_Rb
<--Finished--			IP_Ra:5684	IP_C:p_C
:			:	:

IP_C:p_C = Link-local IP address and port of the Pledge

IP_S:5684 = IP address and coaps port of EST Server

IP_Ra:5684 = Link-local IP address and coaps port of Join Proxy

IP_Rb:p_Rb = IP address(can be same as IP_Ra) and port of Join Proxy

JPY[H(),C()] = Join Proxy message with header H and content C

Figure 4: constrained stateless joining message flow.

5.3. Stateless Message structure

The JPY message is constructed as a payload with media-type application/multipart-core specified in [I-D.ietf-core-multipart-ct]. Header and Contents fields use different media formats:

1. header field: application/CBOR containing a CBOR array [RFC7049] with the pledge IPv6 Link Local address as a 16-byte binary value, the pledge's UDP port number, if different from 5684, as a CBOR integer, and the proxy's ifindex or other identifier for the physical port on which the pledge is connected. Header is not DTLS encrypted.
2. Content field: Any of the media types specified in [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est] and [I-D.ietf-anima-constrained-voucher] dependent on the function that is requested:

- * application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=server-generated-key
- * application/pkcs7-mime; smime-type=certs-only
- * application/voucher-cms+cbor
- * application/voucher-cose+cbor
- * application/pkcs8
- * application/csrattrs
- * application/pkcs10
- * application/pkix-cert

Examples are shown in Appendix A. The content fields are DTLS encrypted.

6. Comparison of stateless and statefull modes

The stateful and stateless mode of operation for the Join Proxy have their advantages and disadvantages. This section should enable to make a choice between the two modes based on the available device resources and network bandwidth.

Properties	Stateful mode	Stateless mode
State Information	The Proxy needs additional storage to maintain mapping of the Pledge's address with the port number being used to communicate with the Server.	No information is maintained by the Join Proxy
Packet size	The size of the forwarded message is the same as the original message.	Size of the forwarded message is bigger than the original, it includes additional source and destination addresses.
Specification complexity	The additional functionality the Proxy to maintain state information, and modify the source and destination addresses of the DTLS handshake messages	New JPY message to encapsulate DTLS message The Server and the proxy have to understand the JPY message in order to process it.

Figure 5: Comparison between stateful and stateless mode

7. Discovery

It is assumed that Join-Proxy seamlessly provides a coaps connection between Pledge and coaps EST-server. An additional Registrar is needed to connect the Pledge to an http EST server, see section 8 of [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est].

The Discovery of the coaps EST server by the Join Proxy follows section 6 of [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est]. The discovery of the Join-Proxy by the Pledge is an extension to the discovery described in section 4 of [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]. In particular this section replaces section 4.2 of [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]. Three discovery cases are discussed: coap discovery, 6tisch discovery and GRASP discovery.

7.1. GRASP discovery

In the context of autonomous networks, discovery takes place via the GRASP protocol as described in [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra]. The port number is.

EDNote: to be specified further

7.2. 6tisch discovery

The discovery of EST server by the pledge uses the enhanced beacons as discussed in [I-D.ietf-6tisch-enrollment-enhanced-beacon].

7.3. Coaps discovery

In the context of a coap network without Autonomous Network support, discovery follows the standard coap policy. The Pledge can discover a Join-Proxy by sending a link-local multicast message to ALL CoAP Nodes with address FF02::FD. Multiple or no nodes may respond. The handling of multiple responses and the absence of responses follow section 4 of [I-D.ietf-anima-bootstrapping-keyinfra].

The presence and location of (path to) the join-proxy resource are discovered by sending a GET request to `"/.well-known/core"` including a resource type (rt) parameter with the value `"brski-proxy"` [RFC6690]. Upon success, the return payload will contain the root resource of the Join-Proxy resources. It is up to the implementation to choose its root resource; throughout this document the example root resource `/est` is used. The example below shows the discovery of the presence and location of join-proxy resources.

```
REQ: GET coap://[FF02::FD]/.well-known/core?rt=brski-proxy
```

```
RES: 2.05 Content  
</est>; rt="brski-proxy";ct=62
```

Port numbers, not returned in the example, are assumed to be the default numbers 5683 and 5684 for coap and coaps respectively (sections 12.6 and 12.7 of [RFC7252]). Discoverable port numbers MAY be returned in the <href> of the payload.

8. Security Considerations

It should be noted here that the contents of the CBOR map are not protected, but that the communication is between the Proxy and a known registrar (a connected UDP socket), and that messages from other origins are ignored.

9. IANA Considerations

This document needs to create a registry for key indices in the CBOR map. It should be given a name, and the amending formula should be IETF Specification.

9.1. Resource Type registry

This specification registers a new Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attributes in the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values" subregistry under the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters" registry.

rt="brski-proxy". This EST resource is used to query and return the supported EST resource of a join-proxy placed between Pledge and EST server.

10. Acknowledgements

Many thanks for the comments by Brian Carpenter.

11. Contributors

Sandeep Kumar, Sye loong Keoh, and Oscar Garcia-Morchon are the co-authors of the draft-kumar-dice-dtls-relay-02. Their draft has served as a basis for this document. Much text from their draft is copied over to this draft.

12. Changelog

12.1. 00 to 01

- o Added Contributors section
- o Adapted content-formats to est-coaps formats
- o Aligned examples with est-coaps examples
- o Added statefull Proxy to stateless proxy

12.2. 00 to 00

- o added payload examples in appendix
- o discovery for three cases: AN, 6tisch and coaps

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Appendix A. Stateless Proxy payload examples

Examples are extensions of two examples shown in [I-D.ietf-ace-coap-est].

EDNote:
provisional stake holder examples to be improved and corrected.

A.1. cacerts

The request from Join-Proxy to EST-server looks like:

```
Get coaps://192.0.2.1/est/crts
(Accept: 62)
(Content-format: 62)
payload =
82          # array(2)
18 3C      # unsigned(60)
83          # array(3)
69          # text(9)
    464538303A3A414238 # "FE80::AB8"
19 237D    # unsigned(9085)
65          # text(5)
    6964656E74        # "ident"
```

The response will then be

2.05 Content

(Content-format: 62)

Payload =

```

83          # array(3)
18 3C      # unsigned(60)
83          # array(3)
69          # text(9)
           464538303A3A414238      # "FE80::AB8"
19 237D    # unsigned(9085)
65          # text(5)
           6964656E74              # "ident"
82          # array(2)
19 0119    # unsigned(281)
59 027F    # bytes(639)
3082027b06092a864886f70d010702a082026c308202680201013100300b
06092a864886f70d010701a082024e3082024a308201f0a0030201020209
009189bcd9c99244b300a06082a8648ce3d0403023067310b3009060355
040613025553310b300906035504080c024341310b300906035504070c02
4c4131143012060355040a0c0b4578616d706c6520496e63311630140603
55040b0c0d63657274696669636174696f6e3110300e06035504030c0752
6f6f74204341301e170d3139303130373130343034315a170d3339303130
323130343034315a3067310b3009060355040613025553310b3009060355
04080c024341310b300906035504070c024c4131143012060355040a0c0b
4578616d706c6520496e6331163014060355040b0c0d6365727469666963
6174696f6e3110300e06035504030c07526f6f742043413059301306072a
8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d03010703420004814994082b6e8185f3df
53f5e0bee698973335200023ddf78cd17a443ffd8ddd40908769c55652ac
2ccb75c4a50a7c7ddb7c22dae6c85cca538209fdbbf104c9a38184308181
301d0603551d0e041604142495e816ef6ffcaaf356ce4adffe33cf492abb
a8301f0603551d230418301680142495e816ef6ffcaaf356ce4adffe33cf
492abba8300f0603551d130101ff040530030101ff300e0603551d0f0101
ff040403020106301e0603551d1104173015811363657274696679406578
616d706c652e636f6d300a06082a8648ce3d0403020348003045022100da
e37c96f154c32ec0b4af52d46f3b7ecc9687ddf267bcec368f7b7f135327
2f022047a28ae5c7306163b3c3834bab3c103f743070594c089aaa0ac870
cd13b902caa1003100
]

```

A.2. serverkeygen

The request from Join-Proxy to EST-server looks like:


```
Get coaps://192.0.2.1/est/skg
(Accept: 62)
(Content-Format: 62)
  Payload =
83          # array(3)
18 3C      # unsigned(60)
83          # array(3)
69          # text(9)
          464538303A3A414238 # "FE80::AB8"
19 237D    # unsigned(9085)
65          # text(5)
          6964656E74        # "ident"
82          # array(2)
19 011E    # unsigned(286)
58 D2      # bytes(210)
3081cf3078020100301631143012060355040a0c0b736b67206578616d70
6c653059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107034200041b
b8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe820d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c5
1dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a28
4cc99fa000300a06082a8648ce3d04030203470030440220387cd4e9cf62
8d4af77f92ebed4890d9d141dca86cd2757dd14cbd59cdf6961802202f24
5e828c77754378b66660a4977f113cacdaa0cc7bad7d1474a7fd155d090d
```

The response will then be

2.05 Content

(Content-format: 62)

Payload =

```

84          # array(4)
18 3C      # unsigned(60)
83        # array(3)
69        # text(9)
          464538303A3A414238 # "FE80::AB8"
19 237D   # unsigned(9085)
65        # text(5)
          6964656E74        # "ident"
82        # array(2)
19 011E   # unsigned(286)
58 8A     # bytes(138)
308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30
6b02010104200b9a67785b65e07360b6d28cfc1d3f3925c0755799deeca7
45372b01697bd8a6a144034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe82
0d8e38ea97e9d65d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78
cd33f3c1846e304f1717f8123f1a284cc99f
19 0119   # unsigned(281)
59 01D3   # bytes(467)
308201cf06092a864886f70d010702a08201c0308201bc0201013100300b
06092a864886f70d010701a08201a23082019e30820143a0030201020208
126de8571518524b300a06082a8648ce3d04030230163114301206035504
0a0c0b736b67206578616d706c65301e170d313930313039303835373038
5a170d3339303130343038353730385a301631143012060355040a0c0b73
6b67206578616d706c653059301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d
030107034200041bb8c1117896f98e4506c03d70efbe820d8e38ea97e9d6
5d52c8460c5852c51dd89a61370a2843760fc859799d78cd33f3c1846e30
4f1717f8123f1a284cc99fa37b307930090603551d1304023000302c0609
6086480186f842010d041f161d4f70656e53534c2047656e657261746564
204365727469666963617465301d0603551d0e04160414494be598dc8dbc
0dbc071c486b777460e5cce621301f0603551d23041830168014494be598
dc8dbc0dbc071c486b777460e5cce621300a06082a8648ce3d0403020349
003046022100a4b167d0f9add9202810e6bf6a290b8cfd9b9c9fea2cc1
c8fc3a464f79f2c202210081d31ba142751a7b4a34fd1a01fcfb08716b9e
b53bdaadc9ae60b08f52429c0fa1003100

```

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