SIPPING H. Tschofenig
Internet-Draft Nokia Siemens Networks
Intended status: Informational H. Schulzrinne
Expires: August 28, 2008 Columbia University
D. Wing
Cisco
J. Rosenberg
Cisco Systems
D. Schwartz
XConnect
February 25, 2008
A Framework to tackle Spam and Unwanted Communication for Internet
Telephony
draft-tschofenig-sipping-framework-spit-reduction-03.txt
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Abstract
Spam, defined as sending unsolicited messages to someone in bulk, is
likely to become a problem on SIP open-wide deployed networks. A
number of solutions have been proposed for dealing with Spam for
Internet Telephony (SPIT) and unwanted communication, for example,
content filtering, black lists, white lists, consent-based
communication, reputation systems, address obfuscation, limited use
addresses, turing tests, computational puzzles, payments at risk,
circles of trust, and many others.
This document describes the big picture that illustrates how the
different building blocks fit together and can be deployed
incrementally.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Communication Patterns and User Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1. Closed Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.2. Semi-Open Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.3. Open Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.4. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.5. Usability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5. Protocol Interactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.1. Rule Enforcement via a Trusted Intermediary . . . . . . . 10
5.2. Incremental Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
5.3. Botnets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
6. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
7. Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
9. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
10. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
10.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix A. Outside the Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix B. Authorization Engine in SIP UA . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 22
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1. Introduction
The problem of Spam for Internet Telephony (SPIT) is an imminent
challenge and only the combination of several techniques can provide
a framework for dealing with unwanted communication attempts.
[I-D.ietf-sipping-spam] provides four core recommendations that need
to be considered for a SPIT solution, namely
o Strong Identity
o White Lists
o Solve the Introduction Problem
o Don't Wait Until its Too Late
This document illustrates how existing building blocks can be put
together to form a solution to deal with SPIT. New building blocks
can be added to provide more efficient SPIT handling, since there is
no single solution that provides 100 % protection.
The purpose of this document defines a model of internal device
processing, protocol interfaces, and terminology to illustrate a way
in which SPIT prevention techniques can be added in a seamless
fashion. We focus only on the most important solution components and
consider many other aspects either outside the scope of this work
(see Appendix A) and postpone them for future work.
2. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119].
3. Framework
Figure 1 shows the interaction between the end host and a SIP proxy
belonging to its VoIP provider. One important part of the overall
solution is the ability to make authorization decisions based on
incoming communication attempts. The entity that writes these
authorization rules is referred as Rule Maker. The Rule Maker might
be a user via some form of user interface. Some rules may be
generated automatically by a piece of software by observing the users
behavior. Furthermore, in certain deployment environments an initial
rule set will be provided by some third party entity, such as the
enterprise system administrator or the VoIP provider.
Policies are processed by corresponding module within the SIP proxy,
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called Authorization Engine, that interacts with the message routing
component. By following this architectural approach the Policy
Decision Point (PDP) and the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) are
closely combined. As such, authorization policies are stored at at a
SIP proxy rather than the SIP UA client itself. The implications of
relocating these two functions, PDP and PEP, to the SIP UA client are
described in Appendix B.
+---------------------------------------------------------+
| Authorization |
| re-route Policy +------------+ |
| ^ (implicit) ######| Rule Maker | |
| o +#######+ # +------------+ |
| o # # # |
| +---o----------#-------#--+ # Authorization |
| | o # # |<####### Policy |
+--------+ | | o Proxy # # | |
| | | | o # # |<*******************+ |
| Sender |<***>|+-------+ v # | * |
| | | ||Msg. | +-----------+| Authorization * |
+--------+ | ||Routing| | Authz. || Policy (explicit) * |
^ o | ||Engine |<->| Engine |<#################+ * |
* o | |+-------+ +-----------+| # * |
* o | +-^--*--^-----------------+ # v |
* o | o * o +-------------+ |
* o | o * o | | |
* +oooo|oooo+ * +ooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo>| Recipient/ | |
+**************************************************>| Rule Maker | |
| +-------------+ |
| |
| |
+-------------------Domain Boundary-----------------------+
Legend:
oooo: SIP message interaction
****: Protocol Interaction for authorizing the message sender
####: Management of authorization policies
Figure 1: Overview
Assume that an arbitrary entity transmits a message to a specific URI
that finally hits the SIP proxy on the recipients side. Information
provided within that message are used as input to the rule
evaluation. Any part of the message may serve as input to the
evaluation process but for practical reasons only a few selected
fields do most of the work. The authenticated identity of the sender
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is probably the most valuable information item. One could, however,
imagine that other information, such as reputation information
obtained from social networks, could offer additional input to the
authorization engine.
The protocol interaction for authorizing the message sender refers to
the ability of the recipient or the proxy to interact with the sender
to request authorization. The request for authorization might
require the message sender to be challenged (e.g., via hash cash
[I-D.jennings-sip-hashcash], via SIP payment
[I-D.jennings-sipping-pay], or via CAPTCHAs
[I-D.tschofenig-sipping-captcha]). Some other mechanisms, such as
SIP Identity do not require the verifying entity to challenge the
authentication service since the identity assertion is pushed towards
the recipient.
Figure 2 shows this integration step. The conditions part of the
rule offer a mechanisms to incrementally extend the overall framework
with new components. Depending on the outcome of the rule
evaluation, the message may be re-routed to another entity, such as
an answering machine, to the recipient, rejected or other actions are
triggered. The latter aspect is particularly interesting since it
allows further solution components to be executed.
SIP msg with
authenticated
identity +---------------+
-------------->| |---------------->
Additional | | Spam marked msg
Msg fields | Authorization |
-------------->| Engine |---------------->
Other SPIT | | Re-routed msg
Prevention | |
Components | |---------------->
-------------->+---------------+ Forwarded to
| | original recipient
| |
<-----------+ +----------->||
Politely blocked Blocked
Figure 2: Message Filtering and Routing
Note that some traffic analysis and consequently some form of content
filtering (e.g., of MESSAGEs) message be applied locally within the
VoIP provider's domain also under the control of the end user.
However, this is largely an implementation-specific technique without
protocol impact. For example, consider a VoIP provider that wants to
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utilize a statistical analysis tool for Spam prevention. It is not
necessary to standardized the algorithms nor protocols; the impact
for the authorization policies is mainly the ability to allow the
Rule Maker to enable or to disable the usage of these statistical
techniques and potentially to map the output of the analysis process
to value range from 0 (i.e., the message is not classified as Spam)
and 100 (i.e., the message was classified as Spam). A Rule Maker may
decide to act with an appropriate action on a certain level of Spam
marking.
Authenticated Identities:
Initial VoIP provider are likely to secure their SIP signaling
using Transport Layer Security (TLS) or IP security (IPsec)
between neighboring providers and use P-Asserted-ID [RFC3325].
Note: SIP Identity is comparable to DomainKeys Identified Mail
(DKIM) [I-D.ietf-dkim-overview] used for associating a
"responsible" identity with an email message and provides a
means of verifying that the association is legitimate.
SIP Identity [RFC4474] is a proposal for stronger security
mechanisms used to provide the verification service with the
authenticated identity. SIP Identity is a reasonably simple
specification and does not rely on a huge amount of infrastructure
support.
This framework does not assume a specific mechanism for asserting
identities to be used but a strong identity mechanism is a pre-
requisity for authorization policy handling to be successful.
Authorization Policies:
Even if policy decision making and policy enforcement is done
outside the SIP UA client then still there might not be a need to
standardize an authorization policy language if the policies can
be modified via a webpage. This approach of policy handling is
done in many cases today already for various applications.
Unfortunately, this approach tends to become cumbersome for end
users and therefore it is better to hide a lot of policy details
from the end user itself and to make use of context information,
for example, address books and authorization policies available
already created for presence based systems.
Additionally, a user may have multiple devices and a consistent
view of the policies should be provided.
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An example solution for authorization policies for dealing with
reducing unwanted communication is described in
[I-D.tschofenig-sipping-spit-policy] with the requirements
detailed in [I-D.froment-sipping-spit-requirements].
There is still one significant problem unsolved: since white lists
need to be created somehow and hence there is an introduction
problem. Section 4 discusses this aspect in more details.
4. Communication Patterns and User Groups
When communication takes place then at least three types of groups
can be identified.
4.1. Closed Groups
People in this group communicate only with the peers in their group.
They do not appreciate communication attempts from outside.
Communication is possible only for people within this list. Here is
an example of a closed group: Consider parents that do not want their
children from getting contacted by strangers. Hence, they may want
to create a white list containing the identifies of known friends,
parents and other relatives on behalf of their kids.
The usage of authorization policies for usage with closed groups is
straight forward. The introduction problem is also not considered
very large given that the identities are typically known.
4.2. Semi-Open Groups
In a semi-open environment all members of the same group are allowed
to get in contact with everyone else (e.g., for example in a company
environment). For members outside the company the communication
patters depend on the role of the person (e.g., standardization
people, sales people, etc.) and on the work style of the person.
For this category we distinguish a number of (non-spam) message
sources based on their characteristics:
o "friends" or "acquaintances", i.e., those we have communicated
with before.
o strangers, divided into 'interesting' and 'uninteresting'. The
latter are messages from people that someone does not care to have
a conversation with or respond to, at least at that particular
moment.
Strangers can be defined by individual names or whole domains. A
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special class of 'stranger' messages are transaction-related
communications, such as Instant Messaging or automated calls from an
airline or shipping company.
One way to deal with the introduction problem is to make use of
techniques like hash cash [I-D.jennings-sip-hashcash] or Completely
Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart
(CAPTCHA) based robot challenges [I-D.tschofenig-sipping-captcha].
Alternatively, a communication attempt may also be forwarded to an
answering maschine or alternative ways of establishing the initial
interaction may be proposed.
The usage of authorization policies for usage with Semi-Open Groups
is challenging but is considered manageable.
4.3. Open Groups
People in this type of group are not allowed to limit communication
attempts. Help desks, certain people in governmental agencies,
banks, insurance companies, etc.
For open groups a solution for providing SPIT prevention is far more
complicated. Consider a person working on a customer support
helpdesk. Ideally, they would like to receive only calls from
friendly customers (although the motivation for calling is most
likely a problem) and the topic of the calls only relates to problems
they are able to solve. Without listening to the caller they will
have a hard time to know whether the call could be classified as
SPIT. Another extreme case is a Public Safety Answering Point where
emergency service personell is not allowed to reject calls either.
Many SPIT prevention techniques might not be applicable since
blocking callers is likely not possible and applying other
techniques, such as turing tests, might not be ideal in an case of
open groups.
Statistical analysis may be helpful in some cases to deliver
additional information about the calling party. Social networks
might provide similar techniques based on reputation based systems.
4.4. Summary
Based on the discussions regarding communication patters and groups
the following observations can be made:
o A single person very likely has many roles and they may have an
impact on the communication patterns.
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For example, consider a person who is working in a company but
also want to be available for family members.
o The context in which a person is may change at any time. For
example, a person might be available for family members while at
work except during an important meeting where communication
attempts may be rejected. Switching a context has an impact for
reachability and the means for communicating with a specific
recipient, based on enabled rule sets.
From an authorization policy point of view it is important to be able
to express a sphere (i.e., the state a user is in) and to switch
between different spheres easily by thereby switching to a different
rule set.
4.5. Usability
An important aspect in the usage of authorization policies is to
assist the user when creating policies. Ideally, the policies should
be established automatically. Below, there are a couple of examples
to illustrate the idea given that these aspects are largely
implementation issues:
o It must be possible for the proxy to automatically add addresses
on outbound messages and calls to the rule set. This approach is
similar to stateful packet filtering firewalls where outbound
packets establish state at the firewall to allow inbound packets
to traverse it again.
o Already available information in the address book can be used for
building the policy rules there is quite likely already a
relationship available with these persons existent.
o A large amount of email is non-personal, automated communication,
such as newsletters, confirmations and legitimate advertisements.
These are often tagged as spam by content filters. This type of
correspondence is usually initiated by a transaction over the web,
such as a purchase or signing up for a service.
[I-D.shacham-http-corr-uris], for example, defines an HTTP header
for conveying future correspondence addresses that can be
integrated in the rule set.
5. Protocol Interactions
This section describes the necessary building blocks that are
necessary to tie the framework together.
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5.1. Rule Enforcement via a Trusted Intermediary
o Some from of strong identity assurance is required to build the
basis for identity-based authorization. SIP Identity [RFC4474] or
P-Asserted-ID [RFC3325] are examples of available mechanisms.
These mechanisms allow the authenticated identity of the sending
party to be determined.
o Authorization Policies based on the Common Policy framework
[RFC4745], as extended in [I-D.tschofenig-sipping-spit-policy] for
the purpose of SPIT prevention, are mandatory to implement at the
end host side and at the trusted intermediary. The implementation
of the rule evaluation engine might only be necessary on the
trusted VoIP proxy. Harmonization with the work done for presence
authorization [I-D.ietf-simple-presence-rules], which is based on
Common Policy [RFC4745], can be accomplished and is highly
desirable.
o XML Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP) [RFC4825] is used to
create, modify and delete authorization policies and is mandatory
to implement at the end host side and at the trusted intermediary.
5.2. Incremental Deployment
An important property is incremental deployment of additional
solution components that can be added and used when they become
available. This section aims to illustrate how the extensibility is
accomplished, based on an example.
Consider a VoIP provider that provides authorization policies that
provide the following functionality equivalent to the Common Policy
framework, i.e., identity-based, sphere and validity based conditions
initially. For actions only 'redirection' and 'blocking' is
provided. In our example we give this basic functionality the AUID
'new-spit-policy-example' with the namespace
'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:new-spit-policy-example'.
When a client queries the capabilities of a SIP proxy in the VoIP
providers network using XCAP the following exchange may take place.
GET /xcap-caps/global/index HTTP/1.1
Host: xcap.example.com
Initial XCAP Query for Capabilities
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Etag: "wwhha"
Content-Type: application/xcap-caps+xml
new-spit-policy-example
xcap-caps
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xcap-caps
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:spit-policy
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy
Initial XCAP Response with the supported Capabilities
As shown in the example above, Common Policy and the example SPIT
extension is implemented and the client can upload rules according to
the definition of the rule set functionality.
Later, when the VoIP provider updates the functionality of
authorization policies as more sophisticated mechanisms become
available and get implemented the functionality of the authorization
policy engine is enhanced with, for example, hashcash and the ability
to perform statistical analysis of signaling message. The latter
functionality comes with the ability to mark messages are Spam and
the ability for end users to enable/disable this functionality. We
use the namespaces 'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:hashcash' and
'urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:statistical-analysis' for those.
A end user could now make use of these new functions and a capability
query of the SIP proxy would provide the following response.
GET /xcap-caps/global/index HTTP/1.1
Host: xcap.example.com
Second XCAP Query for Capabilities
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HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Etag: "wwhha"
Content-Type: application/xcap-caps+xml
spit-policy
xcap-caps
hashcash
statistical-analysis
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:spit-policy
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:common-policy
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:hashcash
urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:statistical-analysis
Second XCAP Response with the supported Capabilities
New SPIT handling functionality may extend condition, actions and/or
transformation elements of a rule.
5.3. Botnets
A botnet is a large number of compromised maschines that are used to
create and send spam or viruses or flood a network with messages as a
denial of service attack.
Such a botnet represents a significant challenge for a VoIP
infrastructure and also for the mechanisms proposed in this document.
Recently observed attacks indicated that some botnets tried to steal
credentials to distribute messages with "real" identities. To deal
with the threat it is useful to classify the behavior of these bots
into three categories, namely
o The botnet does not have access to the user's credentials. In
this case identity-based white lists provides adequate protection.
o The botnets does have access to user's credentials of compromised
maschines but distributes messages in a random fashion. In this
case identity-based white lists provides adequate protection since
it is unlikely that the recipient will have that person in their
whitelist.
o In this category the botnet has access to the user's credentials
and utilizes addresses from the user's addressbook. In this case
whitelists do not provide a proper protection. Since the
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recipient knows the sender of the message it would, in many cases,
be able to get in contact with him or her and report the observed
problem. This approach does not work with a pure maschine-to-
maschine communication environment without user involvement.
6. Privacy Considerations
This document does not propose to distribute the user's authorization
policies to other VoIP providers nor is the configuration of policies
at SIP proxies other than the trusted user's VoIP provider necessary.
Furthemore, if blocking or influencing of the message processing is
executed by the VoIP provider then they have to be explicitly enabled
by the end user. Blocking of messages, even if it is based on
"super-clever" machine learning techniques often introduces
unpredictability.
Legal norms from fields of law can take regulative effects in the
context of SPIT processing, such as constitutional law, data
protection law, telecommunication law, teleservices law, criminal
law, and possibly administrative law. See, for example, [Law1],
[Law2] and [Law3]. For example, it is mandatory to pass full control
of SPIT filtering to the end user, as this minimises legal problems.
An overview about regulatory aspects can be found in [Spit-AL].
7. Example
This section shows an example whereby we consider a user
Bob@company-example.com that writes (most likely via a nice user
interface) the following policies. We use a high-level language to
show the main idea of the policies.
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RULE 1:
IF identity=alice@foo.example.com THEN ACCEPT
IF identity=tony@bar.example.com THEN ACCEPT
RULE 2:
IF domain=company-example.com THEN ACCEPT
RULE 3:
IF unauthenticated THEN
EXECUTE hashcash
RULE 4:
IF
THEN
REDIRECT sip:voicebox@company-example.com
RULE 5:
IF
THEN
block
Example of Bob's Rule Set
At some point in time Bob uploads his policies to the SIP proxy at
his VoIP providers SIP proxy.
PUT
/spit-policy/users/sip:bob@company-example.com/index/~~/ruleset
HTTP/1.1
Content-Type:application/spit+xml
Host: proxy.home-example.com
<<<< Added policies go in here. >>>>
[Editor's Note: In a future version an XML example
policy document will be listed here.]
Uploading Policies using XCAP
When BoB receives a call from his friends, alice@foo.example and
tony@bar.example.com, then all the rules related to the spit policy
are checked. Only the first rule (rule 1) matches and is applied.
Thus, the call is forwarded without any further checks based on Rule
1. The rules assume that the authenticated identity of the caller
has been verified.
When Bob receives a call from a co-worker,
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Charlie@company-example.com, Rule 2 is applied since the domain part
in the rule matches the domain part of Charlie's identity.
Now, when Bob receives a contact from an unknown user, called Mallice
in this example. Rule 3 indicates that an extended return-
routability test using hashcash [I-D.jennings-sip-hashcash] is used
with the call being redirected to Bob's voicebox afterwards. This
exchange is shown in Figure 9.
UA Proxy Bob's
Malice Voicebox
| INVITE | |
|------------------------->|Puzzle: work=15; |
| |pre="VgVGYixbRg0mdSwTY3YIfCBuAAA="; |
| 419 with Puzzle |image="NhhMQ2l7SE0VBmZFKksUC19ia04="; |
| |value=160 |
|<-------------------------| |
| | |
| ACK | |
|------------------------->| |
| |Puzzle: work=0; |
| |pre="VgVGYixbRg0mdSwTY3YIfCBuYmg="; |
| |image="NhhMQ2l7SE0VBmZFKksUC19ia04=" |
| INVITE with Solution |value=160 |
|------------------------->| INVITE |
| |------------------------------------->|
| | |
| | 180 Ringing |
| 180 Ringing |<-------------------------------------|
|<-------------------------| |
| | 200 OK |
| 200 OK |<-------------------------------------|
|<-------------------------| |
| | ACK |
|---------------------------------------------------------------->|
| | |
Figure 9: Example Exchange: Malice contacts Bob
Depending on the outcome of the exchange the call is forwarded to a
mailbox sip:voicebox@company-example.com (in case Malory returned the
correct solution, see Rule 4) or blocked in case an incorrect
response was provided. It might be quite easy to see how this rule
set can be extended to support other SPIT handling mechanisms as well
(e.g., CAPTCHAs, SIP Pay, etc.).
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8. Security Considerations
This document aims to describe a framework for addressing Spam for
Internet Telephony (SPIT) in order to make it simple for users to
influence the behavior of SIP message routing with an emphasis on
SPIT prevention.
The framework relies on three building blocks, namely SIP Identity,
authorization policies based on Common Policy and Presence
Authorization Policy, and XCAP.
As a high-level overview, the framework allows the user to control
end-to-end connectivity at the SIP message routing level whereby the
glue that lets all parts fit together is based on authorization
policies. Several other solution components can be developed
independently and can be plugged into the framework as soon as
available.
It must be avoided to introduce Denial of Service attacks against the
recipient by misguiding him or her to install authorization policies
that allow senders to bypass the policies although that was never
intended by the recipient. Additionally, it must not be possible by
extensions to the authorization policy framework to create policies
to block legitimate senders or to stall the processing of the
authorization policy engine.
9. Acknowledgments
We would like to thank
Jeremy Barkan, Dan York, Alexey Melnikov, Thomas Schreck, Eva
Leppanen, Cullen Jennings, Marit Hansen and Markus Hansen for
their review comments to a pre-00 version.
Jeremy Barkan, Eva Leppanen, Michaela Greiler, Joachim Charzinski,
Saverio Niccolini, Albert Caruana, and Juergen Quittek for their
comments to the 00 version.
Otmar Lendl, Jan Seedorf, Saverio Niccolini, Kai Fischer, Joachim
Charzinski, Dan York, Peter Saint-Andre, Brian Azzopardi, Martin
Stiemerling, and Juergen Quittek for their comments to the -01/-02
version.
10. References
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10.1. Normative References
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", March 1997.
[RFC4474] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", RFC 4474, August 2006.
[RFC4745] Schulzrinne, H., Tschofenig, H., Morris, J., Cuellar, J.,
Polk, J., and J. Rosenberg, "Common Policy: A Document
Format for Expressing Privacy Preferences", RFC 4745,
February 2007.
[RFC3325] Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private
Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for
Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks", RFC 3325,
November 2002.
[RFC4825] Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML)
Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)", RFC 4825, May 2007.
10.2. Informative References
[I-D.ietf-sipping-spam]
Rosenberg, J. and C. Jennings, "The Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP) and Spam", draft-ietf-sipping-spam-05 (work
in progress), July 2007.
[I-D.ietf-simple-presence-rules]
Rosenberg, J., "Presence Authorization Rules",
draft-ietf-simple-presence-rules-10 (work in progress),
July 2007.
[I-D.jennings-sip-hashcash]
Jennings, C., "Computational Puzzles for SPAM Reduction in
SIP", draft-jennings-sip-hashcash-06 (work in progress),
July 2007.
[I-D.wing-sipping-spam-score]
Wing, D., Niccolini, S., Stiemerling, M., and H.
Tschofenig, "Spam Score for SIP",
draft-wing-sipping-spam-score-02 (work in progress),
February 2008.
[I-D.ietf-sip-consent-framework]
Rosenberg, J., Camarillo, G., and D. Willis, "A Framework
for Consent-based Communications in the Session Initiation
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Protocol (SIP)", draft-ietf-sip-consent-framework-04 (work
in progress), January 2008.
[I-D.ietf-dkim-overview]
Hansen, T., Crocker, D., and P. Hallam-Baker, "DomainKeys
Identified Mail (DKIM) Service Overview",
draft-ietf-dkim-overview-09 (work in progress),
February 2008.
[I-D.tschofenig-sipping-spit-policy]
Tschofenig, H., Wing, D., Schulzrinne, H., Froment, T.,
and G. Dawirs, "A Document Format for Expressing
Authorization Policies to tackle Spam and Unwanted
Communication for Internet Telephony",
draft-tschofenig-sipping-spit-policy-02 (work in
progress), November 2007.
[I-D.schwartz-sipping-spit-saml]
Schwartz, D., "SPAM for Internet Telephony (SPIT)
Prevention using the Security Assertion Markup Language
(SAML)", draft-schwartz-sipping-spit-saml-01 (work in
progress), June 2006.
[I-D.shacham-http-corr-uris]
Shacham, R. and H. Schulzrinne, "HTTP Header for Future
Correspondence Addresses", draft-shacham-http-corr-uris-00
(work in progress), May 2007.
[I-D.jennings-sipping-pay]
Jennings, C., "Payment for Services in Session Initiation
Protocol (SIP)", draft-jennings-sipping-pay-06 (work in
progress), July 2007.
[I-D.froment-sipping-spit-requirements]
Tschofenig, H., Dawirs, G., Froment, T., Wing, D., and H.
Schulzrinne, "Requirements for Authorization Policies to
tackle Spam and Unwanted Communication for Internet
Telephony", draft-froment-sipping-spit-requirements-02
(work in progress), February 2008.
[I-D.niccolini-sipping-feedback-spit]
Niccolini, S., "SIP Extensions for SPIT identification",
draft-niccolini-sipping-feedback-spit-03 (work in
progress), February 2007.
[I-D.tschofenig-sipping-captcha]
Tschofenig, H., Leppanen, E., Niccolini, S., and M.
Arumaithurai, "Completely Automated Public Turing Test to
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Tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) based Robot
Challenges for SIP", draft-tschofenig-sipping-captcha-01
(work in progress), February 2008.
[Spit-AL] Hansen, M., Hansen, M., Moeller, J., Rohwer, T., Tolkmitt,
C., and H. Waack, "Developing a Legally Compliant
Reachability Management System as a Countermeasure against
SPIT, Third Annual VoIP Security Workshop, Berlin,
available at
https://tepin.aiki.de/blog/uploads/spit-al.pdf",
June 2006.
[Law1] "Bundesnetzagentur: Eckpunkte der regulatorischen
Behandlung von Voice over IP (VoIP), available at
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/media/archive/3186.pdf",
September 2005.
[Law2] "70. Konferenz der Datenschutzbeauftragten des Bundes und
der Laender: Entschliessung Telefonieren mit
Internettechnologie (Voice over IP - VoIP), available at
http://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/material/themen/press
e/20051028-dsbk-voip.htm", Oktober 2005.
[Law3] "Working Party 29 Opinion 2/2006 on privacy issues related
to the provision of email screening services, WP 118,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/
docs/wpdocs/2006/wp118_en.pdf", February 2006.
Appendix A. Outside the Scope
We consider the following aspects outside the scope of this document:
o Mechanisms to publish SPIT causing parties on the Internet, i.e.,
information about domains that create SPIT.
o Determining the source of unwanted traffic in real-time.
o Pushing packet filters and authorization policies towards the SPIT
sending domain.
Appendix B. Authorization Engine in SIP UA
When white lists are stored and managed only at the SIP UA client
then the authorization policies language and the protocol to modify
the policies do not need to be standardized; they are purely
implementation specific details.
While this appears to be an advantage there are various drawbacks
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including the inability to synchronize policies among different
devices. Additionally, some information that is typically available
to the Policy Decision Point may not be available to the end host.
To avoid standardizing the exchange of such type of information an
abstract form of Spam marking is proposed in
[I-D.wing-sipping-spam-score].
Authors' Addresses
Hannes Tschofenig
Nokia Siemens Networks
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
Munich, Bavaria 81739
Germany
Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@nsn.com
URI: http://www.tschofenig.com
Henning Schulzrinne
Columbia University
Department of Computer Science
450 Computer Science Building
New York, NY 10027
US
Phone: +1 212 939 7004
Email: hgs@cs.columbia.edu
URI: http://www.cs.columbia.edu
Dan Wing
Cisco Systems, Inc.
170 West Tasman Drive
San Jose, CA 95134
USA
Email: dwing@cisco.com
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Jonathan Rosenberg
Cisco Systems
600 Lanidex Plaza
Parsippany, New York 07054
USA
Email: jdrosen@cisco.com
URI: http://www.jdrosen.net
David Schwartz
XConnect
Malcha Technology Park
Jerusalem, 96951
Israel
Email: dschwartz@xconnect.net
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