Network Working Group                                             Seak
Internet Draft                                              Cathy.Wang
Intended status: Standards Track                            Antiy Labs
Expires: June 2011                                   December 26, 2010



                Detection Event Description Language (DEDL)
                      draft-seak-malware-dedl-00.txt


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Abstract

   This document describes the detection event description language
   (DEDL). DEDL is common standards languages proposed for describing
   the network security detection event, with which the network security
   event detection device can handle the detection result effectively.
   It describes the detection event in a standard format by using the
   descriptor and support general condition deduction.

Table of Contents


   1. Introduction................................................2
      1.1. Requirements...........................................2
      1.2. Goals..................................................3
      1.3. The Role of DEDL on the Web............................3
   2. DEDL Overview...............................................3
      2.1. DEDL...................................................3
      2.2. Detection Event........................................3
      2.3. Detection Event Handling Rules.........................4
   3. Detection Event.............................................4
      3.1. Event Header...........................................4
      3.2. Event Option...........................................5
      3.3. Event Action...........................................7
   4. Detection Event Handling Rule...............................8
      4.1. Parallel Merge Rule (Parallel).........................8
      4.2. Radiation Merge Rule (Radiation).......................8
      4.3. Aggregation Merge Rule (Aggregation)...................9
      4.4. Conduction Chain Merge Rule (Conduction)...............9
   5. Security Considerations....................................10
   6. IANA Considerations........................................10
   7. References.................................................10
      7.1. Normative References..................................10
      7.2. Informative References................................10
   8. Acknowledgments............................................10

1. Introduction

1.1. Requirements

   Worm incident has occupied the mainstream of network security
   incident. Network security incident detection equipments face serious
   flood records problems. In order to avoid the record flood effects
   and also show the relationship between detection records, network
   security event detection equipments need to merge the detection
   records according to the certain rules. Therefore, we need a



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   description language which can well describe the detection event in a
   standard format and support general condition deduction.

1.2. Goals

   In order to meet the need of network security event detection devices
   in handling the detection records, DEDL has be proposed with the
   following ultimate goals in mind.

   Plain text displays

   Descript a almost network security event information

   Support general condition deduction

   Easily read by program and human

   Facilitate the process of the scientific statistics

   Scalability

1.3. The Role of DEDL on the Web

   DEDL can be used to describe the network security event, with which
   the network security event detection device can handle the detection
   result simply and effectively.

2. DEDL Overview

2.1. DEDL

   Detection Event Description Language (DEDL) is a simple, flexible
   description language. It describes the detection event in a standard
   format by using the descriptor and support general condition
   deduction.

2.2. Detection Event

   The detection events are written in DEDL can be divided in two
   logical sections, the event header and the event options. The event
   header contains the event's name, type, source IP, target IP, source
   port, target port, time, action, protocol. The event option section
   contains extension information which records the result after the
   conduction deduction.

   Figure 1 illustrates a sample detection event written in DEDL:



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   +------------------------------------------------+
   |                                                |
   |  Event<Name:"Backdoor.Win32.bo.a";             |
   |        Type:"Backdoor";                        |
   |        SIP:"202.118.16.23";                    |
   |        TIP:" 202.118.16.26";                   |
   |        Sport:"80";                             |
   |        TPort:"4677";                           |
   |        Time:"2010-11-17 18:57:14";             |
   |        Protocol:"HTTP";                        |
   |        Action:"transmission";                  |
   |        [Rule:"";                               |
   |         Times:"";                              |
   |         TimeRang:"";                           |
   |         IPRange:"";                            |
   |         IPChain:""]                            |
   |       >                                        |
   |                                                |
   +------------------------------------------------+

              Figure 1 Sample Detection Event Written in DEDL

   The text after the first and up to the first parenthesis is the event
   header and the section enclosed in parenthesis contains the event
   options. The words before the colons in the event's header section
   and options section are called keywords.

2.3. Detection Event Handling Rules

   In order to avoid the record flood effects, DEDL supports general
   condition deduction. Based on a well defined condition deduction rule
   set, the detection event written by DEDL can be merged and also
   retain the same relationship.

3. Detection Event

3.1. Event Header

   The event header section contains nine key elements of a detection
   event that reflects when, where, and what happened:

   1. Name - the network security event name that were detected by the
      equipment.

   1. Type - the type of detection event.

   2. SIP - source IP address.


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   3. TIP - target IP address.

   4. SPort - source port.

   5. TPort - target port.

   6. Time - the time when event was detected.

   7. Protocol - transfer protocol of the event.

   8. Action - the action that causes the event was detected. The
      details about the action are specified in the section 3.3.

3.2. Event Option

   The event option section contains extension information which records
   the result after the conduction deduction. It is not specifically
   required by any detection event. They are just used for records the
   result when the event were merged with others based on a predefined
   condition deduction even rule set. Event options are separated from
   each other using the semicolon character. Event option keywords are
   separated from their arguments with a colon character.

   1. Rule - the condition deduction rule that used to handling this
      detection event.

   2. Times, TimeRange - the times that same events happened in a
      continuous time range. They are optional parameters of the
      deduction result.

   Figure 2 illustrates a sample deduction result with Times, TimeRange

















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   +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                                                                   |
   | If exist                                                          |
   |   Event<Name:"Backdoor.Win32.bo.a";Type(1);SIP(1);TIP(1);Time(1)> |
   |   Event<Name:"Backdoor.Win32.bo.a";Type(1);SIP(1);TIP(1);Time(2)> |
   |   Event<Name:"Backdoor.Win32.bo.a";Type(1);SIP(1);TIP(1);Time(3)> |
   |   Event<Name:"Backdoor.Win32.bo.a";Type(1);SIP(1);TIP(1);Time(4)> |
   | and                                                               |
   |   Time(1)<Time(2)<Time(3)<Time(4)                                 |
   | than                                                              |
   |   Event<Name:"Backdoor.Win32.bo.a";                               |
   |         [Rule:"Parallel";Times:"4";TimeRange:"time(1)->time(4)"]  |
   |        >                                                          |
   |                                                                   |
   +-------------------------------------------------------------------+

           Figure 2 Sample deduction result with Times, TimeRange

   3. IPRange - the range of IP address. It is one of the optional
      parameters in the deduction result.

   Figure 3 illustrates a sample deduction result with IPRange:

   +------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                                                                  |
   | If exist                                                         |
   |   Event<Name:"Worm.Win32.Dvldr";Type(1);SIP(1);TIP(1);TPort(1)>  |
   |   Event<Name:"Worm.Win32.Dvldr";Type(1);SIP(1);TIP(2);TPort(1)>  |
   |   Event<Name:"Worm.Win32.Dvldr";Type(1);SIP(1);TIP(3);TPort(1)>  |
   |   Event<Name:"Worm.Win32.Dvldr";Type(1);SIP(1);TIP(4);TPort(1)>  |
   | and                                                              |
   |   TIP(1),TIP(2),TIP(3),TIP(4)constitute a consecutive IP rang    |
   | than                                                             |
   |   Event<Name:"Trans.Worm.Win32.Dvldr";                           |
   |         [Rule:"Radiation";IPRange:"TIP(1)->TIP(4)"]>             |
   |                                                                  |
   +------------------------------------------------------------------+

               Figure 3 Sample deduction result with IPRange

   4. IPChain - the IP conduction chain. It is one of the optional
      parameters in the deduction result.

   Figure 4 illustrates a sample deduction result with IPChain





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   +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                                                                   |
   | If exist                                                          |
   |   Event<Name:"RPC_Exploit";SIP(1);TIP(1); Time(1)>                |
   |   Event<Name:"RPC_Exploit";SIP(2);TIP(2); Time(2)>                |
   | and                                                               |
   |   TIP(1)= SIP(2)                                                  |
   | and                                                               |
   |   Time(1)<Time(2)                                                 |
   | than                                                              |
   |   Event<Name:"Trans.Worm.Win32.Dvldr";                            |
   |         [Rule:"Conduction"; IPRange:"SIP(1)->TIP(1)-> TIP(2)"]>   |
   |                                                                   |
   +-------------------------------------------------------------------+

               Figure 4 Sample deduction result with IPChain

3.3. Event Action

   It is the action that cause the event was detected. We classify the
   action into ten categories:

   1. Scan - an action that attempts to get the information (e.g.
      version) of remote host or service. This action does no harm to
      that host or server.

   2. Attack - attack the network equipment or host to make it congested
      or make a computer resource unavailable to its intended users.

   3. Intrude - the action that gets the OS authorization by OS
      Vulnerability and subsequently executes entity code in the
      intruded remote host.

   4. Control - controlled action of backdoor or botnet.

   5. Update - an action that virus, spyware or other malware update
      their version.

   6. Steal - an action that malware steal the data stored in some host.

   7. Dangerous Access - an action that visit website or some resource
      that contains fishing, Trojan or cheating information.

   8. Cheat - an action that malware disseminate cheat information.





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   9. Unusual behavior - an unusual behavior is such as network
      connection or network traffic increasing suddenly, using or
      running sensitive network application.

   10.Transmission - The transmission of protocol data.

4. Detection Event Handling Rule

   It is a predefined condition deduction rule set, by which the
   detection event can be merged and also retain the same relationship.
   We use the conditional-testing statement (if and than) to illustrate
   these rules:

4.1. Parallel Merge Rule (Parallel)

   The events with same name, same type, source IP and target IP can be
   merged into one record. Typical examples are the email worm sending
   event of the computed infected with email worm and the email worm
   sending event sent between mail servers.

   If exist

     Event< Name(1);Type(1);SIP(1); TIP(1);Time(1) >

     Event< Name(1);Type(1);SIP(1); TIP(1);Time(2) >

   and

     Time(1)< Time(2)

   than

     event can be merged

   A sample of this rule is the same one illustrated in Figure 2.

4.2. Radiation Merge Rule (Radiation)

   The events can be merged together if they are with same name, same
   type, same source IP, same target port and different target IP that
   constitute a consecutive IP address range. Typical example is the
   scan action of worm or hacker.

   If exist

     Event< Name(1),Type(1);SIP(1);TIP(1);TPort(1)>



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     Event< Name(1),Type(1);SIP(1);TIP(2);TPort(1)>

   than

     events can be merged

   A sample of this rule is the same one illustrated in Figure 3.

4.3. Aggregation Merge Rule (Aggregation)

   The events can be merged together if these events are with same name,
   same type, same target IP, same target port and different source IP.
   Typical examples are the DDos attack, the online update of worm, and
   IRC connection.

   If exist

     Event<Name(1);Type(1);SIP(1);TIP(1);TPort(1)>

     Event<Name(1),Type(1);SIP(2);TIP(1);TPort(1)>

   than

     events can be merged

   Figure 5 illustrates a sample deduction result of aggregation merge
   rule:

   +-----------------------------------------------------------------+
   |                                                                 |
   | If exist                                                        |
   |   Event<Name:"IRC.Repro.b[IRC]";Type(1);SIP(1);TIP(1),Time(1)>  |
   |   Event<Name:"IRC.Repro.b[IRC]";Type(1);SIP(2);TIP(1),Time(2)>  |
   | than                                                            |
   |   Event<Name:"IRC.Repro.b[IRC]";                                |
   |         [Rule:"Aggregation";IP_Chain:"SIP(1),SIP(2)"]>          |
   |                                                                 |
   +-----------------------------------------------------------------+

         Figure 5 Sample Deduction Result of Aggregation Merge Rule



4.4. Conduction Chain Merge Rule (Conduction)

   The events can be merged together if there is infection relationship
   between them.


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   If exist

     Event< Name(1),SIP(1);TIP(1); Time(1)>

     Event< Name(1),SIP(2);TIP(2); Time(2)>

   and

     {TIP(1),SIP(2)}belong to intranet Net(a)

   and

     Time(1)<Time(2)

   than

     events can be merged

   A sample of this rule is the same one illustrated in Figure 4.

5. Security Considerations

   (none)

6. IANA Considerations

   This document has no actions for IANA

7. References

7.1. Normative References

   (none)

7.2. Informative References

   [RFC5385] Touch, "Version 2.0 Microsoft Word Template for Creating
             Internet Drafts and RFCs", RFC 5385, February 2010.

8. Acknowledgments

   This document was prepared using 2-Word-v2.0.template.dot.







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Authors' Addresses

   Seak
   Antiy Labs
   Beijing China

   Email: Seak@antiy.net


   Cathy Wang
   Antiy Labs
   Beijing China

   Email: wsyfuture@antiy.net


































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