INTERNET-DRAFT S. Sakane Intended Status: Informational Cisco Systems Expires: March 14, 2011 M. Ishiyama Toshiba Corp. September 9, 2010 Kerberos Options for DHCPv6 draft-sakane-dhc-dhcpv6-kdc-option-09.txt Abstract This document defines new four options of Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) to carry a set of configuration information related to the Kerberos protocol [RFC4120]. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted to IETF in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/1id-abstracts.html The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html This Internet-Draft expires in March 14, 2011. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 1] Internet-Draft September 2010 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF Contributions published or made publicly available before November 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other than English. Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 2] Internet-Draft September 2010 Table of Contents 1. Introduction ................................................. 4 2. Conventions used in this document ............................ 5 3. Kerberos Options ............................................. 5 3.1. Kerberos Principal Name Option .......................... 5 3.2. Kerberos Realm Name Option .............................. 6 3.3. Kerberos Default Realm Name Option ...................... 7 3.4. Kerberos KDC Option ..................................... 7 4. Client Operation ............................................. 8 4.1. A recommendation of KDC discovery for a client .......... 9 5. Server Operation ............................................. 11 6. Appearance of this option .................................... 11 7. IANA Considerations .......................................... 11 8. Security Considerations ...................................... 12 9. Acknowledgments .............................................. 12 10. References ................................................... 13 10.1. Normative References ................................... 13 10.2. Informative References ................................. 14 Appendix A. Why DNS is not acceptable in some environment ........ 14 Authors' Addresses ............................................... 18 Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 3] Internet-Draft September 2010 1. Introduction The Kerberos Version 5 [RFC4120] is an authentication system which is based on the trusted third-party authentication protocol. Each organization wishing to use the Kerberos protocol establishes its own "realm", and each client is assigned to the realm. At least one Key Distribution Center (KDC) is required for the Kerberos operation of the realm. When a client wants to start communication with a server (that means another client of the KDC), and to be authenticated to the server, the client needs to take a credential from the KDC. In this process, the client presents both an identifier itself, and a realm name to which the client itself belongs. After the client gets a credential from the KDC, the client presents it to the peer. The peer can authenticate the access from the client with the credential. Hence, the client needs to know at least one IP address of KDC from which the client can get a credential before the client begins the communication with the peer. Here is a use case that a client has to know a realm name. A public workstation for an unspecified several number of students in a college does not have any initial configuration for Kerberos. If there is a mechanism providing a realm name and a set of IP addresses of the KDC, a student only puts a user identifier and a pass phrase into the workstation, and can user the Kerberos authentication system. To provide a set of IP addresses of the KDC, the Kerberos V5 specification [RFC4120] defines a KDC discovery by utilizing DNS SRV records [RFC2782]. In the meantime, the system which does not employ DNS, but does use DHCP, exists like the industrial system. Some industrial systems don't use DNS because they have already had their own name spaces and their own name resolution systems, including the pre-configured mapping table into the device, rather than FQDN and DNS. And these systems dare not to employ DNS for only the name resolution because adding a new server brings to decrease the reliability of the system, and to increase the management cost of the system. (The detail is described in the APPENDIX), For such environment, another mechanism is required to provide a set of IP addresses of the KDC. Providing a set of IPv4 addresses of the KDC to the devices deployed into the PacketCable Architecture [PCARCH], the KDC Server Address sub-option for the DHCPv4 CableLabs Client Configuration option is defined in RFC 3634 [RFC3634]. However, a mechanism which does not depend on any architecture is required for providing a realm name and a set of IPv6 addresses. The Kerberos option for DHCPv6 defined by this document allows to Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 4] Internet-Draft September 2010 provide a realm name and/or a list of IP addresses of the KDC. The Kerberos option does not replace and deny of the previous methods, and this option does not interfere with those methods. 2. Conventions used in this document The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [RFC2119]. It is assumed that the readers are familiar with the terms and concepts described in the DHCPv6 [RFC3315]. Since a server would mean a DHCP server or a server in the Kerberos service, when there is no declaration in particular, the server means a server against a client of the Kerberos service in this document. 3. Kerberos Options The Kerberos options provide a set of configuration parameters which a clients and a servers of Kerberos will use. This document defines the options listed below. Kerberos Principal Name Option Kerberos Realm Name Option Kerberos Default Realm Name Option Kerberos KDC Option Other options may be defined in the future. Those should be defined in another document. This section describes the format of each option, and the usage of each field. These options can appear multiple times in a DHCPv6 message. However, the order of the options MUST NOT mean. Typical usage is described in section XXX. 3.1. Kerberos Principal Name Option This option provides a principal name of the Kerberos system. It is intended that a DHCPv6 server determines a specific set of the configuration parameters of the Kerberos system for either a client or a server specified by the principal-name field. The format of the Kerberos Principal Name option is: Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 5] Internet-Draft September 2010 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | OPTION_KRB_PRINCIPAL_NAME | option-len | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ : : : principal-name : : (variable length) : : : +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ o option-code (16-bit): OPTION_KRB_CLIENT_PRINCIPAL (TBD by IANA) o option-len (16-bit): length of the principal-name field. o principal-name (variable): a client principal name. The encoding of the principal-name field MUST be conformed to "PrincipalName" defined in section 5.2.2 of RFC 4120 [RFC4120]. 3.2. Kerberos Realm Name Option This option provides a realm name of a domain of the Kerberos system. It is intended that a DHCPv6 server determines a set of the configuration parameters of a KDC in a Kerberos domain specified by the realm-name field. The format of the Kerberos Realm Name option is: 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | OPTION_KRB_KDC_OPTION | option-len | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ : : : realm-name : : (variable length) : : : +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ o option-code (16-bit): OPTION_KRB_REALM_NAME (TBD by IANA) o option-len (16-bit): the length of the realm-name field in octets. o realm-name (variable): a realm-name. The encoding of the realm- name field MUST be conformed to "Realm" which is defined in Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 6] Internet-Draft September 2010 section 5.2.2 of RFC 4120 [RFC4120]. 3.3. Kerberos Default Realm Name Option This option provides a default realm name of a domain of the Kerberos system. It is intended that a DHCPv6 server provides a default realm name to both the clients or the servers in the Kerberos system. This option MAY be provided with one or more Kerberos KDC Option sometimes. The option-code of this option is OPTION_KRB_DEFAULT_REALM_NAME. The format and the usage of each field are similar to the Kerberos Realm Name Option. 3.4. Kerberos KDC Option This option provides a set of configuration parameters of a KDC. It is intended that a DHCPv6 server provides a set of the configuration parameters of a KDC in a Kerberos domain. The format of the Kerberos KDC Option is: 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | OPTION_KRB_KDC_OPTION | option-len | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Priority | Weight | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Service Type | Reserved | Port Number | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | | | | KDC IPv6 address | | | +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ : : : realm-name : : (variable length) : : : +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ o option-code (16-bit): OPTION_KRB_KDC_OPTION (TBD by IANA) Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 7] Internet-Draft September 2010 o option-len (16-bit): 24-octet + the length of the realm-name field in octets. o Priority (16-bit): see the description of Weight field. o Weight (16-bit): both Priority and Weight are for a server selection mechanism. These parameters indicate a hint for a kind of server selection mechanism of a client. An implementer MUST follow the DNS SRV specification [RFC2782] for this usage. o Transport Type (8-bit): The Service Type specifies the transport of the Kerberos communication. The Kerberos specification [RFC4120] defines to use both UDP and TCP for communication between clients and servers. The exchanges over TCP is described in [RFC5021]. The exchanges over TLS is described in [STARTTLS]. The transport type is defined in below. Value Transport Type ---- -------------- 0 Reserved 1 UDP 2 TCP 3 TLS 4-254 Unassigned 255 Reserved o Reserved (8-bit): initialized to zero for transmission, and ignored on reception. o Port Number (16-bit): a port number listened to by the KDC. o KDC address (128-bit): an IPv6 address of the KDC. 4. Client Operation This section describes the client behavior when the client requires a set of the configuration parameters of the Kerberos system, and when the client receives messages from the DHCPv6 server. The processing of both the Information-request message and the Option Request Option MUST be conformed to [RFC3315]. An implementor MUST refer to the Stateless Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Service for IPv6 [RFC3736]. When the client requires a set of the configuration parameters of a Kerberos system in the phase of its bootstrapping, the client SHOULD Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 8] Internet-Draft September 2010 put the client principal name itself into the Kerberos Principal Name Option. The client expects to receive the Default Realm Name Option and/or the KDC option of the client and/or the additional one or more KDC options required by the client's operation. When the client requires a specific information of a certain realm, the client MUST specify the realm name into the Kerberos Realm Name Option. When the client requires a specific information related to a certain server of the Kerberos system, the client MUST put the principal name of the server into the Kerberos Principal Name Option. More than one KDC Options MAY be presented in a DHCPv6 message of the Reply Message from the server. In this case, the client MUST contact to the addresses in the order of the value of the priority field in each Kerberos KDC Option. The value of the weight field might be considered simultaneously. For this usage, an implementer could refer to the DNS SRV specification [RFC2782]. The client MAY include any other options with data values as hints to the server as it is described in section 18.1.5 of RFC 3315 [RFC3315]. 4.1. A recommendation of KDC discovery for a client When a client has a capability of both the DNS method defined by section 7.2.3.2 of [RFC4120] and the DHCP method defined by this document, which methods the client adopts depends on the policy of the environment. The administrator of the realm MUST define the method to the client before the client is installed into the environment. When there is no criteria in the environment, and the client could get the Kerberos information from both the DNS server and the DHCP server, then the information from DNS is recommended. The following is a recommendation of the behavior of the client in such environment where there is no criteria. Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 9] Internet-Draft September 2010 No Ans. or +------------+ DNS Info. +-----------+ No Ans. Start --> | Ask DHCP(1)| ----------> | Ask DNS(3)| ------> Abort(4) +------------+ +-----------+ / \ \ Only KRB / \ DNS and \ KRB Info. Info. / \ KRB Info. \ / \ \ | | | | V | V No Ans. +-----------+ KRB Info. V Adopt Info. <-------- | Ask DNS(6)| ---------> Adopt Info. from DHCP +-----------+ from DNS (2), (7) (5), (8) Abbreviations: Ans.: Answer Info.: Information KRB: Kerberos 1) At the first, the client asks both DNS and KRB information to the DHCP server. 2) If the client gets only a response with KRB information from the DHCP server, the client adopts the information from the DHCP server. 3) As the result of (1), if the client gets either no answer or only a response with DNS information from the DHCP server, the client then asks KRB information to the DNS server. 4) If the client gets no answer from the DNS server, then the client will abort. 5) If the client gets KRB information from the DNS server, then the client adopts the information from the DNS server. 6) As the result of (1), if the client gets both DNS and KRB information from the DHCP server, then the client asks KRB information to the DNS server. 7) If the client gets no answer from the DNS server, the client adopts the KRB information from the DHCP server. 8) As the result of (6), if the client gets KRB information from the DNS server, the client adopts the information instead of another from the DHCP server. Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 10] Internet-Draft September 2010 5. Server Operation After the DHCPv6 server receives a message which is contained an Option Request Option, what information the server will provide depends on the policy of the server in the end. If there is no criteria on the server, the following operation is recommended. The server SHOULD send a Reply Message back to the client when the option number of the Kerberos option is specified in the Option Request option by the client. When the message from a client did not include any information which can be used to determine the configuration parameter for a specific client, the server SHOULD reply at least the Default Realm Name Option. 6. Appearance of this option The Kerberos option MUST NOT appear in any other than the following messages: Solicit, Advertise, Request, Renew, Rebind, Information- request and Reply. The option MAY also appear in the DHCP-relay- message field of both Relay-forward or Relay-reply message. If this option appears in messages other than those specified above, the receiver MUST ignore it. The number of the Kerberos option MAY appear in the Option Request Option in the DHCPv6 message types Solicit, Request, Renew, Rebind, Information-request and Reconfigure. The number MAY also appear in the DHCP-relay-message field of both Relay-forward or Relay-reply message. The sub-option of the Kerberos option MUST appear only in the Kerberos option. 7. IANA Considerations When this document is published, the IANA is requested to assign four option codes from the "DHCPv6 Options Codes" registry for the following. OPTION_KRB_CLIENT_PRINCIPAL OPTION_KRB_REALM_NAME OPTION_KRB_DEFAULT_REALM_NAME OPTION_KRB_KDC_OPTION IANA is required to maintain a new number space of Kerberos Message Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 11] Internet-Draft September 2010 Transport Type, located in the Kerberos Parameters Registry. The initial types are described in section XXX. IANA assigns future type with a "IETF Consensus" policy as described in BCP 26. Future proposed type is to be referenced symbolically in the Internet-Drafts that describe it, and shall be assigned numeric code by IANA when approved for publication as an RFC. 8. Security Considerations The security considerations in RFC 3315 fully apply. The message of DHCPv6 could be altered undesirably. If an adversary modifies the response from a DHCPv6 server or inserts its own response, a client could be led to contact a rogue KDC or a server which does not know the client access. Both cases are categorized into a kind of the denial of service attack. However, such incorrect KDC does not know the shared key between the client and a valid KDC. The incorrect KDC is not be able to proceed any further state of the client. Even when the client receives a response from such KDC, the client can know the fact that it has received an inappropriate message after it verifies the response with the shared key. The considerable situation is that the support of an unconfigured workstation used by multiple users, which obtains its KDC information and default realm via DHCP. In such a scenario, the workstation may not have a host or other service key, and thus be unable to validate TGT's issued to users for the purposes of authorizing login. If this is the case, an altered DHCP response could result in the workstation talking to a rogue KDC which it will be unable to distinguish from a real KDC, and allowing access by unauthorized users. In order to minimize potential vulnerabilities, a client SHOULD require to use the DHCPv6 authentication defined in section 21 of RFC 3315, or any other authentication mechanism. Sometimes, the Kerberos information is manually configured into the client before the DHCPv6 process starts. Generally, the manual configuration to the device should be preferred to the configuration by the DHCP server. Overriding the manual configuration should be considered in anytime. 9. Acknowledgments The authors are very grateful to Nobuo Okabe and Shigeya Suzuki. They contributed the summary explaining why DNS is not appropriate to Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 12] Internet-Draft September 2010 some industry networks, which is put as the appendix of this document. Ted Lemon gave us many suggestions to improve the specification in terms of the DHCP manner. Ken'ichi Kamada and Yukiyo Akisada contributed for the initial work of making this document. The authors also thank Jeffrey Hutzelman, Kazunori Miyazawa, Kensuke Hosoya, Nicolas Williams, Nobumichi Ozoe, and Sam Hartman. They gave us valuable comments and suggestions for this document. 10. References 10.1. Normative References [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC2782] A. Gulbrandsen, P. Vixie, L. Esibov, "A DNS RR for specifying the location of services (DNS SRV)", RFC 2782, February 2000. [RFC3315] R. Droms, Ed., J. Bound, B. Volz, T. Lemon, C. Perkins, M. Carney. "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, July 2003. [RFC3736] R. Droms, "Stateless Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) Service for IPv6", RFC 3736, April 2004. [RFC4120] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn, "The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)", RFC 4120, July 2005. [RFC5021] Josefsson, S., "Extended Kerberos Version 5 Key Distribution Center (KDC) Exchanges over TCP", RFC 5021, August 2007. [STARTTLS] Josefsson, S., "Using Kerberos V5 over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol", draft-josefsson-kerberos5-starttls-09 (work in progress), August 2010. Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 13] Internet-Draft September 2010 10.2. Informative References [PCARCH] "PacketCable 1.0 Architecture Framework Technical Report", PKT-TR- ARCH-V01-991201, http://www.packetcable.com/downloads/specs/pkt- tr-arch-v01-991201.pdf [RFC3634] K. Luehrs, R. Woundy, J. Bevilacqua, N. Davoust, "Key Distribution Center (KDC) Server Address Sub-option for the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) CableLabs Client Configuration (CCC) Option", RFC 3634, December 2003. Appendix A. Why DNS is not acceptable in some environment Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 14] Internet-Draft September 2010 1. Summary - This appendix describes reasons why DHCP-based KDC discovery is more suitable than DNS-based KDC discovery described in RFC4120 (= the RFC4120-way) for the industrial systems. - The main reason is that some industrial systems don't use DNS because they have already had their own name spaces and naming systems rather than FQDN and DNS. - Less servers benefits the industrial systems: 1) Less messages simplifying the systems. 2) Less servers contributing reliability, and reducing management cost. - We understand that RFC4120 does not require DHCP for KDC discovery. However, we will have to solve DNS discovery when considering the RFC4120-way. And it is natural way to use DHCP for the purpose. - DHCP-based KDC discovery is more efficient under those systems (=expecting not to use DNS). 2. Background (what's industrial systems?) Industrial systems are a kind of sensor systems. The systems have a large number of devices, i.e. sensors and actuators, usually called field devices by which the systems control plants, factories, buildings, etc. The field devices have the following features: 1) Their resources, e.g. processing capability, memory size, footprint, power consumption and user i/f, are limited even though they are physically large. 2) The field device is controlled as an I/O by a administrative device, usually called controller, with a legacy communication technology. 3) Security of the field devices have not been cared because they are regarded as being on I/O buses, not networks. 3. High-level goal and some requirements 3.1. IP and security can enhance the industrial systems. Our goal is to introduce latest IP-based network technology into field devices for enhancing the entire system. 1) Network architecture (=IP technology) can enhance the systems including the field devices. Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 15] Internet-Draft September 2010 2) The field devices will require security if network architecture is introduced. The field devices will not be I/O devices anymore. 3.2. Auto-configuration benefits the industrial systems. Auto-configuration will also be important for large systems like the industrial systems if introducing new technology or capability: 1) Reducing engineering cost when installing/configuring large number of field devices over spread area. The following are existing large systems. The size of a plant, the size of an industrial system and the number of field devices are growing. - An example of a single large process automation system: About 20000 field devices over 2km*2km area References: - http://www.process-worldwide.com/fachartikel/pw_facha rtikel_2699276.html - An example of a distributed process automation systems: About 30000 field devices for 26 distributed sites over 30km*30km area. References: - http://www.mikrocentrum.nl/FilesPage/3462/Presentatie %20C3-1.pdf - http://www.nam.nl/home/Framework?siteId=nam-en&FC2=/n am-en/html/iwgen/algemeen/zzz_lhn.html&FC3=/nam-en/ht ml/iwgen/algemeen/over_de_nam.html - An example of a single large building automation system: 170000 control points of 16500 field devices in 729,000 sq. meters (7.8 million sq. ft.) building complex. References: - http://www.echelon.com/company/press/2003/echelon_mor i.htm 2) Reducing the chance of human error. 3) Making disaster-recovery easier. 3.3. Security mechanism suited to resource-limited devices are necessary. Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 16] Internet-Draft September 2010 Kerberos-based security can be suited resource-limited devices, i.e. the field devices, because of not requiring public key cryptography (of course, when not using PKINIT). 4. Some industrial systems don't use DNS. For field devices, there have been multiple technologies (see Section 6) which don't use DNS because of having already had their own name spaces and naming systems even though introducing IP (partially at this moment). For example, "tag" is the common logical identifier for the process automation systems and Device ID is the common logical identifier for the building automation systems. (You may think those names are not so abstracted, though....) 5. KDC discovery with DHCP is more suitable than the one with DNS. If Kerberos is introduced into the field devices, auto-configuration will be achieved with the following steps: 1) Learning DNS address(es) by DHCP 2) Learning KDC address(es) by DNS based on RFC4120-way. However, DNS will be used by kerberos-related part only. Most application will not use DNS as described above. If DHCP can advertise KDC-related information instead of DNS, there are the following advantages. 1) It can reduce messages handled by the field devices. Consequently, it can reduce footprint of the field devices. 2) It can reduce the number of servers. Consequently, it contribute to management cost of the systems. 6. References There have been multiple technologies for field devices. Examples: - FOUNDATION Fieldbus (http://www.fieldbus.org/) - PROFIBUS (http://www.profibus.com/) - BACnet (http://www.bacnet.org/) - LonWorks (http://www.echelon.co.jp/products/lonworks.html) - Modbus (http://www.modbus.org/) You can learn about communication technology of field devices with wikipedia: - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fieldbus - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BACnet - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LonWorks Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 17] Internet-Draft September 2010 Authors' Addresses Shoichi Sakane Cisco Systems 2-1-1 Nishi-Shinjuku, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 163-0409 Japan E-mail: ssakane@cisco.com Masahiro Ishiyama Toshiba Corporation 1, komukai-toshiba-cho, Saiwai-ku, Kawasaki 212-8582 Japan E-mail: masahiro@isl.rdc.toshiba.co.jp Sakane & Ishiyama [Page 18]