Network Working Group S. Krishnan Internet-Draft Ericsson Intended status: Informational N. Steinleitner Expires: August 27, 2008 University of Goettingen Y. Qiu Institute for Infocomm Research G. Bajko Nokia February 24, 2008 Guidelines for firewall administrators regarding MIPv6 traffic draft-krishnan-mip6-firewall-admin-03 Status of this Memo By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet- Drafts. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt. The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html. This Internet-Draft will expire on August 27, 2008. Copyright Notice Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). Abstract This document presents some recommendations for firewall administrators to help them configure their existing firewalls in a way that allows in certain deployment scenarios the Mobile IPv6 Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 1] Internet-Draft MIPv6 Firewall Administrator guidelines February 2008 signaling and data messages to pass through. For other scenarios, the support of additional mechanisms to create pinholes required for MIPv6 will be necessary. This document assumes that the firewalls in question include some kind of stateful packet filtering capability. Table of Contents 1. Requirements notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4. Home Agent behind a firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.1. Signaling between the MN and the HA . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.2. IKEv2 signaling between MN and HA for establishing SAs . . 5 4.3. Data traffic from and to MN passing through the HA . . . . 5 5. Correspondent Node behind a firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5.1. Route optimization signaling between MN and CN through HA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5.2. Route optimization signaling between MN and CN . . . . . . 7 5.3. Binding Update from MN to CN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5.4. Route Optimization data traffic from MN . . . . . . . . . 7 5.5. Bi-directional tunnelled data traffic from the MN to the CN through HA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6. Mobile Node behind a firewall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6.1. Signaling between MN and HA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6.2. Signaling between MN and CN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6.3. IKEv2 signaling between MN and HA for establishing SAs . . 10 7. Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 8. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 9. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 10. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 13 Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 2] Internet-Draft MIPv6 Firewall Administrator guidelines February 2008 1. Requirements notation The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. 2. Introduction Network elements such as firewalls are an integral aspect of a majority of IP networks today, given the state of security in the Internet, threats, and vulnerabilities to data networks. MIPv6 [RFC3775] defines mobility support for IPv6 nodes. Firewalls will interfere with the smooth operation of the MIPv6 protocol unless specific steps are taken to allow Mobile IPv6 signaling and data messages to pass through the firewall. The problems caused by firewalls to Mobile IPv6 are documented in [RFC4487]. This document presents some recommendations for firewall administrators to help them configure their firewalls in a way that allows the Mobile IPv6 signaling and data messages to pass through. This document assumes that the firewalls in question include some kind of stateful packet filtering capability. The static rules that need to be configured are described in this document. In some scenarios, the support of additional mechanisms to create pinholes required for MIPv6 signalling and data traffic to pass through will be necessary. A possible solution, describing the dynamic capabilities needed for the firewalls to create pinholes based on MIPv6 signalling traffic is described in a companion document [MIP6FWVENDOR]. Other solutions may also be possible. 3. Abbreviations This document uses the following abbreviations: o CN: Correspondent Node o CoA: Care of Address o CoTI: Care of Test Init o HA: Home Agent o HoA: Home Address o HoTI: Home Test Init Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 3] Internet-Draft MIPv6 Firewall Administrator guidelines February 2008 o HoT: Home Test o MN: Mobile Node o RO: Route Optimization o RRT: Return Routability Test 4. Home Agent behind a firewall This section presents the recommendations for configuring a firewall that protects a home agent. +----------------+ +---+ | | | A | | | +---+ | +----+ | External | | HA | +----+ MN | +----+ | FW | +---+ | Home Agent +----+ | B | | of A | +---+ | | External | | Node +----------------+ Network protected by a firewall Figure 1: HA behind a firewall For each type of traffic that needs to pass through this firewall, recommendations are presented on how to identify that traffic. The following types of traffic are considered o Signaling between the MN and the HA o IKEv2 signaling between MN and HA for establishing SAs o Data traffic from and to MN passing through the HA 4.1. Signaling between the MN and the HA The signaling between the MN and HA is protected using IPSec ESP. These messages are critical to the MIPv6 protocol and if these messages are discarded, Mobile IPv6 as specified today will cease to work. In order to permit these messages through, the firewall has to detect the messages using the following patterns. Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 4] Internet-Draft MIPv6 Firewall Administrator guidelines February 2008 Destination Address: Address of HA Next Header: 50 (ESP) Mobility Header Type: 5 (BU) Destination Address: Address of HA Next Header: 50 (ESP) Mobility Header Type: 1 (HoTI) This pattern will allow the BU messages from MNs to HA to pass through. It will also allow the HoTI messages (related to route optimization) between the MN and the HA to pass through. 4.2. IKEv2 signaling between MN and HA for establishing SAs The MN and HA exchange IKEv2 signaling in order to establish the security associations. The security associations so established will later be used for securing the mobility signaling messages. Hence these messages need to be permitted to pass through the firewalls. The following pattern will detect these messages. Destination Address: Address of HA Transport Protocol: UDP Destination UDP Port: 500 4.3. Data traffic from and to MN passing through the HA If a CN tries to initiate traffic to an MN, a stateful firewall would prevent these connection requests to pass through as there is no established state on the firewall. If this is necessary to do, the pattern to look for is Destination Address: MN HoA Allowing this traffic might allow any kind of traffic, including malicious traffic, to pass through unfiltered to the MN. This would expose the MN to any type of possibly malicious traffic, resulting in a denial of service or exploitation of known security vulnerabilities. This practice is NOT RECOMMENDED. 5. Correspondent Node behind a firewall This section presents the recommendations for configuring a firewall if a node behind it should be able to act as Mobile IPv6 CN. Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 5] Internet-Draft MIPv6 Firewall Administrator guidelines February 2008 +----------------+ +----+ | | | HA | | | +----+ | | Home Agent | +---+ +----+ of B | |CN | | FW | | | C | +----+ | +---+ | +---+ | | | B | | | +---+ +----------------+ External Mobile Network protected Node by a firewall Figure 2: CN behind a firewall For each type of traffic that needs to pass through this firewall, recommendations are presented on how to identify that traffic. The following types of traffic are considered o Route optimization signaling between MN and CN through HA o Route optimization signaling between MN and CN o Binding Update from MN to CN o Route Optimization data traffic from MN o Bi-directional tunnelled data traffic from the MN to the CN through HA 5.1. Route optimization signaling between MN and CN through HA Parts of the initial route optimization signaling has to pass through the HA, namely the HoTI and the HoT messages. Without assistance, the HoTI message from the HA to the CN is not able to traverse the firewall. The following pattern will allow these messages to traverse. Destination Address: CN Address Mobility Header Type: 1 This pinhole allows the HoTI message from the HA to the CN to traverse the firewall. The HoT message from the CN to the MN through the HA can traverse the firewall without any assistance. Hence no pinhole is required. Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 6] Internet-Draft MIPv6 Firewall Administrator guidelines February 2008 5.2. Route optimization signaling between MN and CN Route Optimization allows direct communication of data packets between the MN and a CN without tunnelling it back through the HA. To get route optimization work, the MN has to send a CoTI message directly to the CN, which response with a CoT message. However, a stateful firewall would prevent the CoTI message to pass through as there is no established state on the firewall. The following pinhole will allow the CoTI message to traverse. Destination Address: CN Address Mobility Header Type: 2 The CoT message from the CN to the MN can traverse the firewall without any assistance. Hence no pinhole is required. 5.3. Binding Update from MN to CN After successfully performing the return routability procedure, the MN sends the BU to the CN and expects the BA. Since this BU does not match any previous installed pinhole rules, an additional pinhole with the following format is required. Destination Address: CN Address Mobility Header Type: 5 This allows the BU to traverse the firewall and the BA can pass the firewall without any assistance. Therefore, the Binding Update sequence can be performed successfully. 5.4. Route Optimization data traffic from MN Also the Route Optimization data traffic from MN directly to the CN can not traverse the firewall without assistance. A dynamically created pinhole such as the one specified in [MIP6FWVENDOR] will allow this traffic to pass. 5.5. Bi-directional tunnelled data traffic from the MN to the CN through HA If a MN tries to initiate traffic to a CN through the HA using bi- directional tunnelling, a stateful firewall would prevent these connection requests to pass through as there is no established state on the firewall. This is usually a problem as CNs often provide services. A solution is to static configure the firewall to let this traffic pass through. However, this is only an acceptable option if Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 7] Internet-Draft MIPv6 Firewall Administrator guidelines February 2008 it is not necessary to open an all-embracing pinhole, e.g. if the destination ports are well-known. In this case, the pinhole has to look like Destination Address: CN Address Destination Port: Application Ports If the ports are unknown, it is necessary to install a pinhole with only the Destination Address as pattern. Allowing this traffic might allow any kind of traffic, including malicious traffic, to traverse to the CN. Allowing this traffic might allow any kind of traffic, including malicious traffic, to pass through unfiltered to the CN. This would expose the CN to any type of possibly malicious traffic, resulting in a denial of service or exploitation of known security vulnerabilities. This practice is NOT RECOMMENDED. 6. Mobile Node behind a firewall This section presents the recommendations for configuring a firewall that protects the network a mobile node visiting. +----------------+ +----+ | | | HA | | | +----+ | | Home Agent | +---+ +----+ of A +---+ | | A | | FW | | B | | +---+ +----+ +---+ |Internal | External | MN | Node | | +----------------+ Network protected by a firewall Figure 3: MN behind a firewall For each type of traffic that needs to pass through this firewall, recommendations are presented on how to identify that traffic. The following types of traffic are considered o Signaling between MN and HA o Route Optimization Signaling between MN and CN Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 8] Internet-Draft MIPv6 Firewall Administrator guidelines February 2008 o IKEv2 signaling between MN and HA for establishing SAs 6.1. Signaling between MN and HA As described in Section 4.1, the signaling between the MN and HA is protected using IPSec ESP. Currently, a lot of firewalls are configured to block the incoming ESP packets. Moreover, from the view of the firewall, both source and destination addresses of these messages from/to mobile node are variable. Fortunately, for a stateful firewall, if the initial traffic is allowed through the firewall, then the return traffic is also allowed. A mobile node is always the initiator for the BU. Since MN's CoA is not able to be known in advance, the firewall can use following patterns to permit these messages through. Source Address: Visited subnet prefix Destination Address: Address of HA Next Header: 50 (ESP) Mobility Header Type: 1 (HoTI) Source Address: Visited subnet prefix Destination Address: Address of HA Next Header: 50 (ESP) Mobility Header Type: 5 (BU) This pattern will allow the initial packets (e.g. BU from MNs to HA, HoTI, etc.) to pass through the firewall. Then the return packets (BA from HA to MN, HoT) is also able to pass through accordingly. 6.2. Signaling between MN and CN Route Optimization allows direct communication of data packets between the MN and a CN without tunneling it back through the HA. It includes 3 pairs of messages: HoTI/HoT, CoTI/CoT and BU/BA. The first pair can pass through the firewall using the pattern described in section 5.1. Here we discuss CoTI/CoT and BU/BA messages. Following pattern permits these messages through the firewall. Source Address: Visited subnet prefix Mobility Header Type: 2 (CoTI) Source Address: Visited subnet prefix Mobility Header Type: 5 (BU) This pattern allows the initial messages (CoTI and BU) from the MN to the CN pass through the firewall. The return messages (CoT and BA) Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 9] Internet-Draft MIPv6 Firewall Administrator guidelines February 2008 from the CN to the MN can also passes through the firewall accordingly. 6.3. IKEv2 signaling between MN and HA for establishing SAs The MN and HA exchange IKEv2 signaling in order to establish the security associations. The security associations so established will later be used for securing the mobility signaling messages. Due to variable source/destination IP addresses and MN always as initiator, the following pattern will let the negotiation pass. Source Address: Visited subnet prefix Transport Protocol: UDP Destination UDP Port: 500 7. Contributors This document is one of the deliverables of the MIPv6 firewall design. The following members of the team were involved in the creation of this document. Hannes Tschofenig Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net Gabor Bajko Gabor.Bajko@nokia.com Suresh Krishnan suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com Hesham Soliman solimanhs@gmail.com Yaron Sheffer yaronf@checkpoint.com Qiu Ying qiuying@i2r.a-star.edu.sg Niklas Steinleitner steinleitner@cs.uni-goettingen.de Vijay Devarapalli vijay.devarapalli@AzaireNet.com 8. IANA Considerations This document does not require any IANA action. 9. Security Considerations This document specifies recommendations for firewall administrators Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 10] Internet-Draft MIPv6 Firewall Administrator guidelines February 2008 to allow Mobile IPv6 traffic to pass through unhindered. Since some of this traffic is encrypted it is not possible for firewalls to discern whether it is safe or not. This document recommends a liberal setting so that all legitimate traffic can pass. This means that some malicious traffic may be permitted by these rules. These rules may allow the initiation of Denial of Service attacks against Mobile IPv6 capable nodes (the MNs, CNs and the HAs). Especially the rules specified in Section 4.3 and Section 5.5 are broadly defined and hence possess the most potential for abuse. Hence, if these rules are implemented, the firewalls SHOULD be configured to rate- limit such traffic on a per-destination basis. This would allow the firewall to mitigate possible denial of service attacks on the endpoints. Please note that such measures would not mitigate other potential security issues. 10. Normative References [MIP6FWVENDOR] Krishnan, S., "Guidelines for firewall vendors regarding MIPv6 traffic", draft-krishnan-mip6-firewall-vendor-01 (work in progress), November 2007. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [RFC3775] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004. [RFC4487] Le, F., Faccin, S., Patil, B., and H. Tschofenig, "Mobile IPv6 and Firewalls: Problem Statement", RFC 4487, May 2006. Authors' Addresses Suresh Krishnan Ericsson 8400 Decarie Blvd. Town of Mount Royal, QC Canada Phone: +1 514 345 7900 x42871 Email: suresh.krishnan@ericsson.com Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 11] Internet-Draft MIPv6 Firewall Administrator guidelines February 2008 Niklas Steinleitner University of Goettingen Lotzestr. 16-18 Goettingen Germany Email: steinleitner@cs.uni-goettingen.de Ying Qiu Institute for Infocomm Research 21 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Singapore Phone: +65-6874-6742 Email: qiuying@i2r.a-star.edu.sg Gabor Bajko Nokia Email: gabor.bajko@nokia.com Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 12] Internet-Draft MIPv6 Firewall Administrator guidelines February 2008 Full Copyright Statement Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. This document and the information contained herein are provided on an "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Intellectual Property The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in this document or the extent to which any license under such rights might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be found in BCP 78 and BCP 79. Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at http://www.ietf.org/ipr. The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-ipr@ietf.org. Acknowledgment Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF Administrative Support Activity (IASA). Krishnan, et al. Expires August 27, 2008 [Page 13]