Network Working Group S. Kanno Internet-Draft NTT Software Corporation Intended status: Informational M. Kanda Expires: August 8, 2011 NTT February 4, 2011 Addition of the Camellia Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS) draft-kanno-tls-camellia-00 Abstract This document specifies forty-two cipher suites for the Transport Security Layer (TLS) protocol to additional support the Camellia encryption algorithm as a block cipher. Status of this Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at http://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on August 8, 2011. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License. Kanno & Kanda Expires August 8, 2011 [Page 1] Internet-Draft Addition of Camellia cipher for TLS February 2011 Table of Contents 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.1. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2. Proposed Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1. HMAC based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.2. Galois Counter Mode(GCM) based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . 4 2.3. Pre-Shared Key (PSK) based Cipher Suites . . . . . . . . . 5 3. Cipher Suite Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.1. Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.2. Cipher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.3. PRFs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.4. PSK cipher suites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 6. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Kanno & Kanda Expires August 8, 2011 [Page 2] Internet-Draft Addition of Camellia cipher for TLS February 2011 1. Introduction This document proposes the addition of new cipher suites to the Transport Layer Security (TLS) [6] protocol to support the Camellia [2] encryption algorithm as a block cipher algorithm. The proposed cipher suites include variants using SHA-2 family of cryptographic hash functions and Galois counter mode (GCM) [11]. Elliptic curve cipher suites and pre-shared key (PSK) cipher suites are also included. The Camellia algorithm and its properties are described in [2]. 1.1. Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119 [1]. Kanno & Kanda Expires August 8, 2011 [Page 3] Internet-Draft Addition of Camellia cipher for TLS February 2011 2. Proposed Cipher Suites 2.1. HMAC based Cipher Suites The eight cipher suites use Camellia [2] in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) [2] mode with a SHA-2 family HMAC using elliptic curves encryption: CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; 2.2. Galois Counter Mode(GCM) based Cipher Suites The twenty cipher suites use the same asymmetric key algorithms as those in the previous section but use the authenticated encryption modes defined in TLS 1.2 [6] with the Camellia in GCM [11]. CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; Kanno & Kanda Expires August 8, 2011 [Page 4] Internet-Draft Addition of Camellia cipher for TLS February 2011 2.3. Pre-Shared Key (PSK) based Cipher Suites The fourteen cipher suites describe pre-shared key cipher suites. The first six cipher suites use Camellia with GCM and the next eight cipher suites use the Camellia with SHA-2 family HMAC using asymmetric key encryption or elliptic curves encryption. CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; Kanno & Kanda Expires August 8, 2011 [Page 5] Internet-Draft Addition of Camellia cipher for TLS February 2011 3. Cipher Suite Definitions 3.1. Key Exchange The RSA, DHE_RSA, DH_RSA, DHE_DSS, DH_DSS, ECDH, DH_anon, and ECDHE key exchanges are performed as defined in RFC5246 [6]. 3.2. Cipher The CAMELLIA_128_CBC cipher suites use Camellia [2] in CBC mode with a 128-bit key and 128-bit IV; the CAMELLIA_256_CBC cipher suites use a 256-bit key and 128-bit IV. AES authenticated encryption with additional data algorithms, AEAD_AES_128_GCM and AEAD_AES_256_GCM are described in RFC5116 [5]. And AES GCM cipher suites for TLS are described in RFC5288 [7]. AES and Camellia share common characteristics including key sizes and block length. CAMELLIA_128_GCM and CAMELLIA_256_GCM are defined according as those of AES. 3.3. PRFs The hash algorithms and PRF algorithms for TLS 1.2 SHALL be as follows: a) The cipher suites ending with _SHA256 use HMAC-SHA-256 as the MAC algorithm, The PRF is the TLS PRF [6] with SHA-256 as the hash function, b) The cipher suites ending with _SHA384 use HMAC-SHA-384 as the MAC algorithm, The PRF is the TLS PRF [6] with SHA-384 as the hash function. When used with TLS versions prior to 1.2, the PRF is calculated as specified in the appropriate version of the TLS specification. 3.4. PSK cipher suites Pre-shared key cipher suites for TLS are described in RFC4279 [3], RFC4785 [4], RFC5487 [9], and RFC5489 [10]. Kanno & Kanda Expires August 8, 2011 [Page 6] Internet-Draft Addition of Camellia cipher for TLS February 2011 4. Security Considerations At the time of writing this document there are no known weak keys for Camellia. And no security problem has been found on Camellia (see NESSIE [12], CRYPTREC [13], and LNCS 5867[14]). The security considerations in previous RFCs (RFC4279 [3], RFC4785 [4], RFC5116 [5], RFC5288 [7], RFC5289 [8], RFC5487 [9]), and GCM [11] apply to this document as well. Kanno & Kanda Expires August 8, 2011 [Page 7] Internet-Draft Addition of Camellia cipher for TLS February 2011 5. IANA Considerations IANA is requested to allocate (has allocated) the following numbers in the TLS Cipher Suite Registry: CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DH_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDH_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_GCM_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_GCM_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256 = {TBD,TBD}; CipherSuite TLS_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384 = {TBD,TBD}; Kanno & Kanda Expires August 8, 2011 [Page 8] Internet-Draft Addition of Camellia cipher for TLS February 2011 6. References 6.1. Normative References [1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. [2] Matsui, M., Nakajima, J., and S. Moriai, "A Description of the Camellia Encryption Algorithm", RFC 3713, April 2004. [3] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4279, December 2005. [4] Blumenthal, U. and P. Goel, "Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Ciphersuites with NULL Encryption for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 4785, January 2007. [5] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated Encryption", RFC 5116, January 2008. [6] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008. [7] Salowey, J., Choudhury, A., and D. McGrew, "AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM) Cipher Suites for TLS", RFC 5288, August 2008. [8] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/ 384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)", RFC 5289, August 2008. [9] Badra, M., "Pre-Shared Key Cipher Suites for TLS with SHA-256/ 384 and AES Galois Counter Mode", RFC 5487, March 2009. [10] Badra, M. and I. Hajjeh, "ECDHE_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 5489, March 2009. [11] Dworkin, M., "Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) for Confidentiality and Authentication", April 2006, . 6.2. Informative References [12] "The NESSIE project (New European Schemes for Signatures, Integrity and Encryption)", . [13] Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), "Cryptography Research and Evaluation Committees", Kanno & Kanda Expires August 8, 2011 [Page 9] Internet-Draft Addition of Camellia cipher for TLS February 2011 . [14] Mala, H., Shakiba, M., and M. Dakhil-alian, "New Results on Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round Camellia-128", November 2009, . Kanno & Kanda Expires August 8, 2011 [Page 10] Internet-Draft Addition of Camellia cipher for TLS February 2011 Authors' Addresses Satoru Kanno NTT Software Corporation Phone: +81-45-212-9803 Fax: +81-45-212-9800 Email: kanno.satoru@po.ntts.co.jp Masayuki Kanda NTT Phone: +81-422-59-3456 Fax: +81-422-59-4015 Email: kanda.masayuki@lab.ntt.co.jp Kanno & Kanda Expires August 8, 2011 [Page 11]